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The New Frontiers of  
Environmental Conservation
Robert Fletcher, Wolfram Dressler, and Bram Büscher
The global conservation movement is undergoing profound changes. While 
the venerable fortress conservation paradigm has been thoroughly critiqued 
(Brockington 2002; Igoe 2004; Adams 2004), the community-based conser-
vation (CBC) approach that aimed to replace it, along with the integrated 
conservation and development projects (ICDPs) in which CBC is commonly 
based, has suffered a similar fate over the last two decades (e.g., Wells and 
McShane 2004; Dressler et al. 2010). Indeed, the very compatibility of con-
servation and development has recently been called into question by con-
servationists contending that the trade-offs between livelihood and environ-
mental concerns may be largely irreconcilable (e.g., McShane et al. 2011). 
In response, the conservation debate has seen a myriad of divergent calls for 
alternative strategies, such as total landscape approaches (e.g., Sayer 2009) 
and a (partial) return to strict protectionism (e.g., Oates 1999; Terborgh 1999).
But while many novel hybridized versions of the older conservation 
paradigms are emerging in practice, the field of conservation also seems to 
be “reinventing” itself in its entirety to a degree that is not yet clearly under-
stood. What is clear, however, is that this reinvention is very much tied to 
and in line with broader dynamics in neoliberal capitalism (Igoe, Neves, and 
Brockington 2010). This convergence is represented by mechanisms such 
as ecotourism, payments for ecosystem services, and biodiversity derivatives, 
as well as a variety of novel financial and technological instruments such as 
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species and wetlands banking, carbon trade, and conservation social media, 
among others. With wildlife populations and biodiversity riches threatened 
the world over, new and innovative methods of addressing these threats are 
necessary—and none, we are told, are newer and more innovative than those 
drawing and/or relying on “the market.” As public funding for conservation 
grows scarcer and organizations increasingly turn to the private sector to 
make up the shortfall, market forces have found their way into conservation 
policy and practice to a degree unimaginable only a decade ago. With much 
at stake, it is critical to investigate how such “neoliberal conservation” (Igoe 
and Brockington 2007; Büscher et al. 2012) is reshaping human-nature 
relations fashioned over two centuries of capitalist development.
Without going into depth here (but see the chapters by Dressler, Wilshu-
sen, Igoe, and others for broader discussions), we see capitalist development 
as a powerful dynamic that originated in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
Europe and has since gone through a long and complex process of inten-
sification, expansion, and struggle to encompass nearly all facets of life in 
virtually all areas of the world to a greater or lesser degree (Meiksins Wood 
2002). This dynamic, in short, centers on a particular mode of production, 
circulation, application, and consumption that entails a continuous need 
for capital accumulation and growth of private profits. Neoliberalism, by 
contrast, has been enacted in earnest since the 1970s and refers to a particular 
ideology, governmentality, and set of practices that aim to replicate capitalist 
market dynamics across the social and public landscape (Fletcher 2010). 
Capitalism and neoliberalism, thus, are not the same and should not be con-
fused conceptually (Foucault 2008; Fletcher 2010). Yet, they are intimately 
intertwined in that both thrive on and stimulate similar principles such as 
commodification, competition, financialization, and market discipline. 
While this introduction does not intend to give an in-depth analytical and 
conceptual exposé of the two (convoluted and complex) concepts, we stress 
some of their key elements as they relate to conservation. We start from the 
premise that the links between capitalism and conservation are long-standing 
(Grove 1995; Brockington, Duffy, and Igoe 2008) and that the links between 
neoliberalism and conservation also rest on more than thirty years of histor-
ical entanglement, conflict, and conjunction. Our aim in this introduction 
is to engage several key elements in these entanglements that have been 
central in the emerging debate concerning “neoliberal conservation” and 
that provide the overall structure for this volume supported by each chapter.
Three main lines of critical analysis, we contend, have dominated dis-
cussions of neoliberal conservation, and these will structure the different 
sections of this volume. The first line explores the ways in which neoliberal 
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principles such as commodification, competition, financialization, and 
market discipline articulate with earlier conservation strategies, local socio-
cultural dynamics, and rural livelihoods, producing novel mechanisms and 
major landscape changes in situ (Dressler and Roth 2010). The second line 
investigates the discourses, perceptions, and representations of neoliberal 
conservation and how they work to legitimate and “sell” novel relations 
between humans and nonhuman natures. The third line of analysis inves-
tigates the combined effects of these trends by assessing the mechanisms 
that transcend the conservation of particular in situ natural resources to 
allow for the abstraction and circulation of “natural capital” throughout 
the global economy. Considered together, these dynamics have produced 
a truly global conservation frontier: a suite of networks, activities, and 
regulations that are rapidly changing the relations between people and 
nature worldwide. This frontier traverses and connects the boardrooms 
of global hedge funds, trees owned by small farmers, consumers, interest 
groups, giant nature reserves, and a myriad of species (both human and 
nonhuman) trying to survive in changing ecologies. It boasts grand images 
of pristine landscapes connected to often contradictory material realities 
and consequences, leaving some actors struggling to access new markets 
and others dispossessed by various “green grabs” (see Fairhead, Leach, and 
Scoones 2012b). Building on Arsel and Büscher (2012), we refer to these 
new frontiers of neoliberal conservation as “Nature™ Inc.”
Just as the frontiers of Nature™ Inc. are global and local, interconnected 
and dispersed, highly complex and ambiguous, so too have been academic 
efforts to understand them. Hence, despite the rapid proliferation and 
diversification of this literature, there remains a need to organize it within 
a cohesive analytical structure, to push critical analysis in new directions, 
and to map new arenas for future research beyond the bounds of current 
study. This is what the present volume offers, focusing on the three themes 
outlined above, shorthanded as (1) Nature™ Inc.–society entanglements; 
(2) representations of Nature™ Inc.; and (3) the global circulation of nat-
ural capital.
The remainder of this introduction lays the groundwork for this discus-
sion, situating it within the history of research addressing the neoliberaliza-
tion of environmental policy and practice, foreshadowing the interventions 
offered by our contributors. We begin by outlining the rapidly growing 
academic literature analyzing contemporary neoliberalism, describing how 
this analysis has been applied to environmental policy and in particular to 
describe the phenomenon we refer to as Nature™ Inc. We then trace the 
development of Nature™ Inc. over the past several decades, identifying a 
6 • Introduction
trend toward increasing abstraction and financialization in order to facili-
tate the global circulation of “natural capital” as the emphasis has shifted 
from ecotourism through payment for environmental (or ecosystem) ser-
vices (PES) and on to newer mechanisms like carbon markets and species 
banking. We conclude by providing brief overviews of the chapters that 
follow, focusing on the three themes detailed above.
The (Mis)Uses of “Neoliberalism”
As Flew (2011, 44) observes, neoliberalism “has been one of the great aca-
demic growth concepts of recent years.” From a mere handful of references 
in the 1980s, Boas and Gans-Moore (2009) identify a dramatic surge in 
scholarly attention to neoliberalism in subsequent decades: between 2002 
and 2005 the term appeared in more than a thousand social science aca-
demic articles yearly. The concept’s popularity has only increased in the 
intervening years, rendering its usage increasingly diffuse “such that its 
appearance in any given article offers little clue as to what it actually means” 
(Boas and Gans-Moore 2009, 139). At its worst, neoliberalism has become 
“nothing more than a vehicle for academics who like to criticise things that 
they do not like” (Igoe and Brockington 2007, 445), while at its broadest, 
the term is used “as a sloppy synonym for capitalism itself, or as a kind of 
shorthand for the world economy and its inequalities” (Ferguson 2010, 171).
This conceptual confusion is unfortunate, since neoliberalism, more 
precisely defined, reflects a distinct process with tremendous global influ-
ence, as many perceptive analysts highlight (see, amongst others, Peck 
2010; Steger and Roy 2010; McCarthy 2012). As such, we and the con-
tributors to this volume argue that it remains extremely important to (be 
able to) engage with the term. Growing complaints that neoliberalism has 
become so overused that it has lost all meaning—or even that the process it 
refers to does not actually exist as such—risk contributing to the hegemony 
of neoliberalism itself by allowing the ideology to fade from the realm of 
public discourse and insert itself as the invisible and hence unquestionable 
common sense of our time (Peck 2010; Büscher et al. 2012).
Neoliberalism defined more strictly is commonly identified with the wide-
spread trend toward increasing relaxation of state oversight over political- 
economic affairs and reliance on the “invisible hand” of the market to 
efficiently allocate resources across the social landscape. Castree (2008a), 
building on Harvey (2005), characterizes neoliberalism as promoting 
the interrelated processes of decentralization, deregulation (or, rather, 
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reregulation from state to nonstate actors), marketization, privatization, 
and commodification. This is not to imply a homogeneous and static pro-
cess. Rather, it implies that neoliberalism diffuses sporadically, unevenly, in 
articulation with local sociocultural patterns and institutions (Harvey 2005; 
Foucault 2008; Dressler and Roth 2010; Steger and Roy 2010; Roth and 
Dressler 2012). Hence, many scholars have taken up the call to describe 
the diversity of “actual existing neoliberalisms” (Brenner and Theodore 
2002; Duffy 2012) rather than positing some pure ideological edifice from 
which existing institutions are presumed to deviate (see esp. Brenner and 
Theodore 2002; Roth and Dressler 2012). Likewise, as a partial, uneven, 
and ongoing process, analysts increasingly speak in terms of neoliberaliza-
tion rather than neoliberalism per se (see esp. Peck 2010). Yet, as Brenner, 
Peck, and Theodore (2010, 332) point out, “empirical evidence underscor-
ing the stalled, incomplete, discontinuous or differentiated character of 
projects to impose market rule, or their co-existence alongside potentially 
antagonistic projects (for instance, social democracy) does not provide a 
sufficient basis for questioning their neoliberalized, neoliberalizing dimen-
sions.” Notwithstanding pronounced diversity in practice, similar dynamics 
can be observed in a wide variety of contexts, informed by a coherent set 
of theoretical prescriptions (Harvey 2005; Foucault 2008; Peck 2010) and 
manifesting in policies and practices with a distinct family resemblance. 
Indeed, neoliberalism’s very flexibility can be seen as one of its most essen-
tial characteristics (Peck 2010; Duffy and Moore 2010).
So characterized, neoliberalism/neoliberalization has been analyzed in 
a number of interrelated ways. Most broadly, there is a strong distinction 
between treatments inspired by neo-Marxist and poststructuralist thought, 
respectively (Castree 2008a; Ferguson 2010; Fletcher 2010; McCarthy 
2012; Wacquant 2012; Overbeek and Van Apeldoorn 2012). It is primarily 
in terms of their analysis of the nature and motives of neoliberal governance 
that the two perspectives diverge. In Harvey’s (2005) paradigmatic Marxist 
reading, neoliberal economics is an ideological smokescreen concealing a 
more fundamental class project of accumulation by dispossession aimed 
to employ free-market policies for private appropriation of the commons. 
Hence, Harvey asserts, “It has been part of the genius of neoliberal theory to 
provide a benevolent mask full of wonderful-sounding words like freedom, 
liberty, choice, and rights, to hide the grim realities of the restoration or 
reconstitution of naked class power, locally as well as transnationally, but 
most particularly in the main financial centres of global capitalism” (119). 
Similarly, Overbeek and Van Apeldoorn (2012, 4) define neoliberalism as 
a political project aimed to restore capitalist class power in the aftermath of 
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the economic and social crises of the 1970s and the challenge posed to the 
rule of capital globally by the call for a New International Economic Order.
For Foucault (2008), by contrast, neoliberalism is a broader approach 
to human governance in general, a particular “art of government” or “gov-
ernmentality.” More than a class project or ideology, then, in Foucault’s 
reading, neoliberalism—particularly in the US context—is a “whole way of 
thinking and being,” a “general style of thought, analysis and imagination” 
(218). In contrast to conventional understandings of governmentality (see 
Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006), describing the processes by which 
subjects internalize social norms that compel them to self-regulate in the 
absence of overt domination, a specifically neoliberal governmentality oper-
ates through the construction and manipulation of the “external incentive 
structures within which individuals, understood as self-interested rational 
actors” (Fletcher 2010, 173), make decisions among alternative courses 
of action. Thus, Foucault (2008, 260, 271) describes neoliberalism as an 
“environmental type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation of 
individuals,” a “governmentality which will act on the environment and 
systematically modify its variables.”
The distinction between these perspectives is significant and should, 
pace Ferguson (2010, 171–72), always be spelled out. While the con-
tributors to this volume adopt different positions in this debate, we take 
inspiration from several recent efforts to synthesize the two perspectives 
into a workable framework for analysis and potential action. Ferguson, for 
instance, suggests that “bringing these two different referents together can 
be more interesting, if we don’t just equate them, but instead reflect on 
the conceptual themes they share (broadly, a technical reliance on market 
mechanisms coupled with an ideological valorization of private enterprise 
and a suspicion of the state), and use such a reflection to ask if the new arts 
of government developed within First World neoliberalism might take on 
new life in other contexts, in the process opening up new political possibil-
ities” (173). Similarly, Wacquant (2012, 66, emphasis in original) proposes 
“a via media between these two approaches that construes neoliberalism 
as an articulation of state, market and citizenship that harnesses the first to 
impose the stamp of the second onto the third.”1 Springer (2012), among 
others, pursues reconciliation of the two perspectives as well.
In all, and despite their proliferation and sometimes dilution, debates 
and discussions concerning neoliberalism continue to display a richness 
and analytical sophistication that make wading through the conceptual 
muddle well worth the effort (see also, e.g., McCarthy 2012). Moreover, the 
contemporary situation makes it necessary to engage the term in one way or 
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another in order to tackle the power dynamics that influence so many facets 
of modern life, including conservation. We describe next how these debates 
have played out concerning analysis of environmental policy, charting the 
emergence of debates concerning neoliberal conservation in particular.
From Neoliberal Environments to Nature™ Inc.
Following McAfee’s (1999) prescient identification of the emerging trend 
involving “selling nature to save it,” the critical academic literature address-
ing the process we refer to as Nature™ Inc. became centered on analysis of 
neoliberal nature. Important trailblazers were McCarthy and Prudham’s 
(2004) seminal paper introducing a special issue of Geoforum, Heynen and 
Robbins’s (2005) introductory article in Capitalism Nature Socialism, and 
the spate of writing, anthologized in Neoliberal Environments (Heynen 
et al. 2007), that followed. Alongside this work, the first efforts to con-
ceptualize neoliberal conservation emerged (Sullivan 2006a; Büscher and 
Whande 2007; Igoe and Brockington 2007), which, analysts pointed out, 
demands unique mechanisms in order to harness the value of resources 
in situ (see esp. Büscher et al. 2012). While the neoliberal environments 
literature has continued to develop fruitful insights (see, e.g., Bakker 2009; 
Castree 2010a, 2010b), the neoliberal conservation discussion quickly 
expanded as well, soon producing several books (Brockington, Duffy, and 
Igoe 2008; Brockington 2009; Duffy 2010) as well as a variety of special 
journal issues (Brockington and Duffy 2010a; Sullivan 2010a; Arsel and 
Büscher 2012; Büscher and Arsel 2012; Roth and Dressler 2012; Fairhead, 
Leach, and Scoones 2012a; Corson, MacDonald, and Neimark 2013) and 
an array of individual articles too numerous to mention. Indeed, because 
of the importance, global presence, and urgency of the topic, this literature 
will continue to expand rapidly (assisted by the new book series on the 
topic initiated by the University of Arizona Press, of which this volume is 
the first installment).
While the present volume builds upon all of this previous work, it engages 
in particular with Arsel and Büscher’s 2012 Forum issue of Development 
and Change in which the concept of Nature™ Inc. was first advanced. The 
authors highlight the three interrelated dimensions of this term (“nature,” 
“trademarked,” and “incorporated”), observing that it follows a long line 
of similar attempts to highlight the increasingly corporate nature of a vari-
ety of socioenvironmental processes designated by such monikers as Life 
Inc. (Rushkoff 2011), Green, Inc. (MacDonald 2008), Environment, Inc. 
10 • Introduction
(Bosso 2005), and so forth. Yet they also highlight the double meaning of 
the “incorporated” qualifier to signify as well the fact that within neoliberal 
conservation “nature needs to be rendered a distinct ‘corpus,’ an ‘entity’ 
that stands outside of society and economy” (Arsel and Büscher 2012, 59). 
Meanwhile, the “trademarked” dimension of the term emphasizes the fact 
that within the framework of Nature™ Inc. the “nature” in question must be 
“protected, legalized, and institutionalized by particular systems of power 
and associated symbols” (Arsel and Büscher 2012, 60). Finally, use of the 
contentious term “nature” (see, e.g., Latour 2004; Goldman, Nadasdy, 
and Turner 2011) is intended not to designate some inert force external 
to human affairs but to highlight the intricate entanglement of humans 
and nonhumans within complex “socionatures” as well as to emphasize 
nonhumans’ agency as “actants” in such networks rather than as the passive 
objects of human manipulation.
The Development and Change issue, in turn, was based on papers pre-
sented at an international conference held the previous summer at the 
Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, the Netherlands, from June 30 
to July 2, 2011. This conference was the first large assembly of scholars 
seeking to critically interrogate “the market panacea in environmental 
policy and conservation,” and it introduced the Nature™ Inc. concept to 
frame this trend. Originally intended to attract around 60 participants, the 
conference’s call for papers drew over 230 submissions (of which 180 were 
accepted for presentation), further evidencing the groundswell of academic 
interest in this area.
This volume offers a further cross section of these conference presen-
tations, carefully selected in order to provide a sample of the range of 
perspectives in the emerging literature and updated to reflect the most 
recent developments and offer predictions of future trends. The volume 
thus provides the first comprehensive critical overview of the full range of 
contemporary debates concerning neoliberal environmental conservation, 
drawing together the substance of many of the special journal issues and 
articles preceding it. Each of these addressed important yet specific aspects 
of the conversation, though all failed to provide a more structural overview 
of the debate. This volume goes further than merely providing a state-of-
the-field review of the neoliberal conservation discussion, however; it also 
pushes the conversation in productive new directions by providing innova-
tive theoretical work and empirical material in relation to what we identify 
as the three most significant new “frontiers” of environmental conservation: 
Nature™ Inc.–society entanglements; representations of Nature™ Inc.; and 
the global circulation of natural capital. Before introducing the various 
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chapters and their specific interventions, we offer a brief overview of the 
development of Nature™ Inc. in order to historicize our discussion.
The Evolution of Nature™ Inc.
The commodification of natural resources is, of course, not a new phenom-
enon (Bellamy Foster 2000; Harvey 2006b; Nevins and Peluso 2008; Peluso 
2012). The rendering of nonhumans as “fictitious commodities” (Polayni 
1944) has occurred for at least as long as a capitalist mode of production has 
pursued its relentless quest to colonize new spaces, times, peoples, and pro-
cesses across societies and landscapes (Harvey 1989, 2005). What is relatively 
recent, however, is the widespread effort on the part of capitalist industry 
to internalize natural resources as an integral component of production for 
“sustainable” management in the long term rather than simply externalizing 
environmental (as well as social) costs in the interest of short-term profit 
(Brockington, Duffy, and Igoe 2008). This is what Martin O’Connor (1994a) 
calls capitalism’s “ecological phase,” which can be seen to have commenced 
in earnest in the 1970s—the very period of neoliberal consolidation (Harvey 
2005; Peck 2010)—with the acknowledgment of the environmental “limits 
to growth” (Meadows, Meadows, and Randers 1972) and the convening of 
the first major international conference (United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment) in the same year as the publication of Meadows, 
Meadows, and Randers’s text to confront this reality.
This coincided as well with a growing recognition of the human costs of 
traditional approaches to conservation, entailing state-centered “fortress” 
style management commonly prescribing the coercion and displacement 
of large numbers of resource-dependent peoples (or seemingly less con-
frontational resource substitutions) who were thus justifiably hostile to 
those responsible for their condition (see Wells and Brandon 1992; Peluso 
1993; Neumann 1998; Brockington 2002; Igoe 2004; Dowie 2009). Out 
of this recognition grew the integrated conservation and development and 
community-based conservation campaigns. These campaigns sought to 
reconcile formerly competing concerns for conservation and development, 
incorporating the local peoples most dependent upon and knowledgeable 
about immediate resources as integral “stakeholders.” Such interventions 
pursued a Hegelian synthesis of sorts between opposing theses, with devel-
opment planners called upon to address environmental management and 
conservationists compelled to include human development in their work 
as well. MacDonald (2010b, 527) points toward the crucial role in this 
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mission of the Convention on Biological Diversity, an “active political 
space . . . in which rights and interests may be negotiated and new social 
relations configured around those negotiations.” He continues that “this 
arena can lead to creative opportunities for new, and previously excluded, 
groups to claim authority, but it also creates a context in which privileged 
positions and perspectives can be consolidated and codified in ways that 
structure policy and practice.” This, he argues, is indeed what happened.
Central to this effort was the need to generate revenue from natural 
resources without substantially degrading them over time, and it was in 
this aim that the first seeds of Nature™ Inc. were sown. While resource 
commodification in the form of extraction and processing had been (and 
still is) seen as a relatively straightforward process, achieving the oppo-
site—commodification through conservation, or what West (2006) calls 
“conservation-as-development”—required novel ways of thinking and 
performing. How could value be generated from resources preserved in 
situ when value had almost always previously been created by transporting 
resources from their place of origin and thus fleeing the localized environ-
mental and social impacts effected by this displacement? A raft of novel 
institutional approaches was soon developed in pursuit of this agenda, with 
earlier devolved CBC strategies now taking on new market mechanisms to 
conserve “ecosystem services” by placing an imputed market value on them, 
the income from which would purportedly provide local users with incen-
tives to curb the extensive use of natural resources (Dressler et al. 2010).
Of course, once again, this was not an entirely new phenomenon. As 
Brockington, Duffy, and Igoe (2008) contend, protected conservation areas, 
while commonly framed by proponents as bastions of pristine nature stand-
ing opposed to the base forces of predatory capitalism, have, in fact, always 
been connected with processes of capitalist commodification, particularly 
in the form of the nature-based tourism (e.g., safari trips, trophy hunting) 
commonly promoted inside them. Yet in the neoliberal age, this com-
modification has intensified and transformed to a degree unimaginable in 
those halcyon days of yore. Hence, one of the first moves of Nature™ Inc. 
was to magnify and transform this nature-based recreation—now relabeled 
“ecotourism”—as an ostenibly “nonconsumptive” (and thus sustainable) 
form of income generation. Other means of harnessing the value of in situ 
resources, from bioprospecting to ostensibly sustainable forms of resource 
extraction (i.e., logging), were promoted as well.
The chief problem with such mechanisms in terms of commodifica-
tion is that the value they generate is fundamentally tied to the environ-
ments they address, requiring either the movement of people to the site 
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of production (in the case of ecotourism) or the transport of resources to 
the site of consumption (bioprospecting, sustainable forestry). Moreover, 
scholars keep pointing out the enormous “gender costs” of these initiatives 
in terms of women’s livelihoods and “lost spaces” (Harcourt 2012).2 The 
“friction” (Tsing 2005) resulting from this movement increases transaction 
costs substantially, reducing both potential profit and the ecological gains 
such mechanisms ostensibly provide. Thus, a major innovation in the 
development of Nature™ Inc. came with the formulation in the 1990s of 
the payment for environmental services (PES) mechanism. This, of course, 
built on the growing framing of “nature” as a “service provider” in general, 
a perspective also promoted by the Convention on Biological Diversity 
initiated in Rio in 1992 (see Robertson 2006; Sullivan 2009; MacDonald 
2010b) and popularized by ecological economist Robert Costanza and 
colleagues’ (1997) ambitious effort to quantify all the environmental ser-
vices provided by the planet. Through PES, “consumers” of ecological 
services could now pay their “producers” remotely, allowing for the spatial 
separation of consumers from the resources they (non)consume and thus a 
partial abstraction of value from any particular landscape, given that within 
the PES framework environments are rendered equivalent such that degra-
dation in one location can be “offset” by preservation elsewhere (see Brock-
ington, Duffy, and Igoe 2008; Sullivan 2009). This then initiated a bold 
new era in conservation, a shift from hybridized forms of CBC–Nature™ 
Inc. to increased reliance on so-called market mechanisms.
Yet even in PES there are important limitations to the accumulation 
process. Essentially, conservation is still tied to a particular piece of land, 
inhibiting the abstraction of value from dependence on any particularities 
of place and thus nonhuman natures’ transformation into full-fledged 
commodities that could circulate globally (see esp. Büscher, this volume). 
Hence, Nature™ Inc. has truly come of age with the recent development 
of innovative financial mechanisms that facilitate this abstraction, separat-
ing the creation of value from connection to any particular environment 
and thus allowing value to circulate freely around the globe as fully fun-
gible stores of value (see Bracking 2012; Sullivan 2013b; Büscher, this 
volume). The rise of the global carbon market, facilitated by the “flexible 
mechanisms” of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’s 
(UNFCCC) Kyoto Protocol (also emanating from Rio), in which abstract 
carbon credits are traded between spatially disconnected players, is only 
one aspect of this trend (see Bumpus and Liverman 2008; Lohmann, this 
volume). Species and wetlands banking, in which destructive development 
in one area can be offset by purchasing credits ostensibly representing 
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equivalent preservation elsewhere (see Pawliczek and Sullivan 2011; Sul-
livan 2013b), signifies its intensification. Environmental derivatives take 
Nature™ Inc. to new heights by trading not in any particular conservation 
mechanism at all, however abstract, but rather in markets only loosely 
linked by other conservation mechanisms to actual existing landscapes 
(Büscher 2010a; Cooper 2010). In this spirit, major international initiatives 
such as REDD+ have pumped millions of dollars into national treasuries 
with the hope of working through decentralized structures and local institu-
tions to pay or provide (livelihood) cobenefits to users to avoid deforestation 
by sequestering carbon in anthropogenic forests. Facilitating and sustaining 
carbon sequestration via a range of market incentives for local behavioral 
changes now draws on, or works through, existing institutions from earlier 
interventions and dramatically reinforces the circulation of finance and 
capital that helped stoke climate change in the first place—effectively, new 
forms of carbon capitalism (Fletcher 2012b).
What is significant about this Brave New Neoliberal World is that, to an 
unprecedented degree, capitalism is endeavoring to accumulate not merely 
in spite of but rather precisely through the negation of its own negative 
impacts on both physical environments and the people who inhabit them, 
proposing itself as the solution to the very problems it creates. Büscher 
(2012, 29) thus characterizes neoliberal conservation as “the paradoxical 
idea that capitalist markets are the answer to their own ecological con-
tradictions.” This contradictory process signifies both a partial reversal of 
familiar capitalist engagements with nature (very partial, that is, because 
more “traditional” engagements continue and also seem to intensify) and 
an intensification of capitalist dynamics at the same time. It is this trend, 
both intensifying historical patterns and transforming them in important 
ways, that we call Nature™ Inc.
Through all of this, Nature™ Inc., like the neoliberalism that under-
pins it, continues its global ascendance. As MacDonald (2010a) relates, it 
was at the World Conservation Congress in Barcelona, sponsored by the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature, in September 2008 that 
serious debate concerning the appropriateness of market mechanisms and 
corporate partnership within the sphere of what Brockington and colleages 
(2008) call “mainstream conservation” was finally displaced to the margins. 
By the time of the Convention on Biological Diversity’s 10th Conference 
of the Parties in Nagoya, Japan, in October 2010, such debate had all but 
disappeared as the campaign to calculate and create markets for trade in the 
Earth’s environmental services culminated in the conference’s uncritical 
endorsement of the United Nations Environment Program’s (UNEP) The 
Nature™ Inc. • 15
Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) initiative (MacDonald 
and Corson 2012). As a “grounded” extension of this, these days it seems 
that the prime objective of conservation policy is to “grab green” locally, 
what Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones (2012b, 237) define as “the appropri-
ation of land and resources for environmental ends.” Hence, neoliberal 
conservation has become part of a discursive process manifesting materially 
as broader resource and landgrabs (White et al. 2012; Fairhead, Leach, 
and Scoones 2012b), the main goal of which is the appropriation of value 
of seemingly anything material and important as basic “inputs” for life. 
As such, there is less space for “nature” to function as its own actant: it is 
needed for its “services.” All this is captured by the slogan “Nature is Dead! 
Long live Nature™ Inc.” (Arsel and Büscher 2012, 53).
At the time of writing we are now precisely twenty years past Rio, and thus 
the future course of conservation is being charted yet again by the outcome 
of the Rio+20 conference held in June 2012 (as well as the subsequent World 
Conservation Congress in Jeju, South Korea, in September). Discussions 
at Rio+20 centered on the concept of the “green economy,” advanced via 
a recent United Nations Environment Programme report (2011) as a pur-
portedly novel replacement for a “sustainable development” increasingly 
pronounced dead on arrival. By all appearances, green economy discourse 
represents yet another intensification of Nature™ Inc. (Brockington 2012). 
At the same time, resistance to neoliberal conservation is growing, signified 
not only by the rise of the critical literature surveyed above endeavoring to 
problematize the trend but also by the increasing on-the-ground critique 
advanced by social movements throughout the world concerning the perils 
and pitfalls of increasing commodification of socionatures.
How this contest will play out remains to be seen. The chapters in this 
volume offer a variety of important tools to understand this situation, both 
now and as it develops and transforms into the future. In the next section, 
we explain how.
Outline of the Book
The book is divided into three sections. The first addresses what we call 
Nature™ Inc.–society entanglements. In the initial contribution to this sec-
tion, Wolfram Dressler presents a fine-grained analysis of the ways in which 
conservation has become increasingly neoliberalized in Palawan Island, a 
biodoversity hotspot in the Philippines. Dressler grounds his analysis in the 
distinction between “first,” “second,” and “third” natures, where the first 
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designates resources subject to only minimal manipulation and employed 
primarily for their use value; the second applies to landscapes that have 
been substantially transformed for commodity production (e.g., agricul-
ture); and the third describes ways in which “commodity relations extend 
further to produce and assign an abstract market value to nature based 
in speculative assumptions, categories, and representations of how nature 
should be or ought to become for and by humans within and beyond local 
environments.” Based on these distinctions, Dressler describes a movement 
from “first to third nature,” contending that current conservation practices 
around Palawan’s celebrated Puerto Princesa Subterranean River National 
Park are increasingly entangling both raw materials and commodity- 
producing landscapes within virtualistic speculative relationships that tie 
their value to global financial markets. The unfortunate consequence of 
this movement has been “to replace and erase a forest landscape filled with 
deeper history, cultural heritage, political relations, and social meanings.”
In chapter 2, Ken MacDonald and Catherine Corson continue the 
section by analyzing the social construction of “natural capital” through 
the studies, programming, and practices of global biodiversity financing, 
focused on the emerging The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity 
(TEEB) initiative. Drawing on Carrier and Miller’s (1998) notion of “vir-
tualism” and data gathered at quite a unique field site—namely, interna-
tional conferences and meetings—they argue that, in line with neoliberal 
conservation, the consortium of actors orchestrating TEEB “abstract out” 
nature by assigning market values to it, “materializing” it, and rendering it 
“natural capital.” This, they contend, unfolds within and is supported by 
international conservation institutions such as the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity (CBD), which promotes abstract notions of nature as capital 
as the only basis for saving it. This promotion occurs not only through the 
market structures that assign financial value to material nature but also 
through “performance”—the process by which actors enact expertise and 
authority in the work of alignment and articulation of neoliberal abstrac-
tions of natures. In this sense, social gatherings like the CBD conferences 
entail more than just “exchange” of ideas; rather, they constitute an ideo-
logical space wherein the agency of TEEB is established and enacted as the 
basis for the production of natural capital as unquestioned “doxa.”
In chapter 3, Frank Matose provides another one of the more empirically 
grounded analyses in the book. Looking at how local villagers around a 
protected forest in Zimbabwe negotiate and respond to various forms of 
dispossession, he draws attention to Gidden’s idea of “structuration” in rela-
tion to neoliberal conservation. Structuration relates to the “reproduction 
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of social systems,” which in this case refers to a (post)colonial forest reserve 
that has long caused conflicts both among local communities and between 
these communities and the Zimbabwe Forestry Commission. Neoliberal 
conservation here is still very much “fortress conservation,” with the Forestry 
Commission finding different ways to marginalize forest residents from the 
resources they previously utilized. Matose, however, goes beyond this top-
down analysis to explicitly emphasize the agency of forest residents and the 
different types of resistance they employ to counter externally directed con-
servation practices. He distinguishes between overt and covert resistance in 
response to dynamics of privatization, the rollback of the state, and new forms 
of conservation-territorialization. He concludes that through these dynam-
ics, different types of agency become visible in what are otherwise often 
generalized as processes of straightforward “accumulation by dispossession.”
The book’s second section pulls back from this ground-level focus to 
explore representations of Nature™ Inc. in the global arena. In chapter 4, 
Robert Fletcher takes a provocative turn by critically engaging what he 
describes as the common gap between the “vision” and the “execution” 
of neoliberal governance manifested in a widespread failure of neoliberal 
conservation strategies to “perform as intended.” Drawing on diverse theory 
from Foucault to Žižek, he accounts for the perverse contradiction between 
the rhetoric and the reality in neoliberal conservation by suggesting that 
its broader “virtual vision” requires interventions that run counter to free- 
market activities in order to preserve, reinforce, and actualize the original 
goals of market-based conservation. Fletcher contends, further, that failure to 
acknowledge this “characteristic disjuncture between vision and execution 
in neoliberal conservation may take the form of ‘fetishistic disavowal’”—a 
simultaneous admission and denial. The practical consequence of this anal-
ysis is to show that dominant beliefs in the value of capitalism are remarkably 
resilient in the face of the facts that contradict market outcomes; rather than 
amend their beliefs and behaviors to “fit the new facts,” individuals have 
the uncanny ability to deny or explain away these facts so as to preserve the 
capitalist “truth regime” (in which capitalists’ own wealth progresses as they 
disavow their policies’ excesses and contradictions!).
In chapter 5 Dan Brockington focuses on a very different but equally 
important phenomenon in neoliberal conservation, namely, its increasing 
dependence on a particular element of the “persuasive forces of profit 
seeking”: celebrities. As celebrities might not be the first thing that comes 
to mind when thinking about Nature™ Inc., Brockington highlights their 
importance by pointing out that despite the general shallowness associated 
with celebrities, they also exercise substantial power and thus need to be 
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taken seriously. Moreover, celebrities are part of a “broader evolution of the 
role of style in society in producing and reproducing distinction, privilege, 
and inequality.” Conservation and environmental action are often also seen 
as mechanisms of distinction—for commercial, ego, or other purposes—
while they help celebrities “look good” by “doing good.” Indeed, Brock-
ington shows how celebrities and NGOs are increasingly “doing good” 
together and so reinforce each other’s image and commercial potential. 
He goes further to frame this dynamic in terms of Colin Crouch’s idea of 
“post-democracies,” or “disengagement and apathy with respect to politics 
by much of the citizenry that democracies are meant to empower. They are 
characterized by increasing inequality but apparent popular acquiescence 
to this fact.” Celebrity endorsement, then, becomes a seemingly nonpolit-
ical way of dealing with politically contentious issues of environment and 
biodiversity conservation. In the process, Brockington argues, conservation 
becomes spectacularized and part of the circulating capital on which the 
new “green economy” depends. He concludes that we have good reasons 
to be wary of these trends but equally stresses that “we need to be alert to 
the radical potential of celebrity.” Celebrities are not uniform and might 
thus perhaps be able to join radical causes.
In chapter 6, Peter Wilshusen argues that we need to look at the “ways in 
which the term ‘capital’ has been discursively extended and transformed as 
a means of articulating concepts and organizing practices related to sustain-
able livelihoods and institutional design/environmental governance.” Fur-
ther, he contends that the “discursive extension of the term ‘capital’ beyond 
its original meaning within economics” in fact “erases” power by masking 
“an incremental process of economic reductionism within conservation/
development theory and practice.” In building this argument, Wilshusen 
adds to the neoliberal conservation literature by rereading, rediscovering, 
and criticizing work by Bourdieu. On the one hand, he argues that we 
need to use Bourdieu’s concepts of misrecognition and dissimulation to 
understand the way discourses about economic concepts are twisted to 
suit capitalistic ends. On the other hand, he points out that, ironically, this 
very understanding by Bourdieu was subsequently taken up by economists 
to do exactly that: to misrecognize the implications of key concepts and 
consequently assimilate them to neoliberal logic. In this case, the famous 
“five capitals” (physical, cultural, financial, human, natural) often used in 
the livelihoods literature illustrate the point. Wilshusen concludes by point-
ing at the broader applicability of the arguments made: misrecognition 
and dissimulation happen at both local and global levels and are similarly 
visible in current attempts to construct a “green economy.”
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In this section’s concluding chapter, Larry Lohmann offers an incisive 
deconstruction of financial markets that capitalize, commodify, and trade 
the “natural” elements of disasters as fungible commodities. He describes 
the origin and logic of international carbon markets as the dominant 
market-based “solution” for reducing emissions for climate change mit-
igation, highlighting how science-based policy has been drawn into this 
mechanism, which supposedly enables the “internalization” of global 
warming “externalities” through the accumulation and trading of carbon 
under a capitalist profit motive. The limits of carbon trading to offset and 
reduce overall carbon emissions are effectively exposed by the deep fallacy 
and contradictions of the carbon market itself: how it makes concessions 
to the petroleum industry; how it is powerless to incentivize industry away 
from fossil fuel use; how it draws on private-sector responsibility to sus-
tain and support the “buyer’s market” for carbon (facilitating its exchange 
beyond the state by leveraging its price per ton); and how this last strategy 
will simply not work, as private-sector investment calls for clearly defined 
exchange markets that yield sustainable profits (with a clearly defined 
commodity, which carbon simply is not). In short, Lohmann argues that 
the processes by which carbon markets are said to internalize the negative 
externalities of climate change effectively extend captalist tendencies to 
extract, commodify, and accumulate capital assets for enhancing profit 
and reinforce a technocratic, neoliberal hegemony that only exacerbates 
climate change impacts.
The third and final section of the book explores the different ways in 
which Nature™ Inc. circulates throughout the global sphere, a dynamic we 
call Nature on the Move. In the first installment, Bram Büscher theorizes 
the process by which conserved nature is commodified within capitalist 
markets such that value can be abstracted and detached from its connection 
with particular in situ environments and thus “freely” exchanged through-
out the global economy. Büscher observes that while previous research has 
effectively described the ways in which nonhuman nature is impacted by 
commodification, this research has largely neglected the converse dynamic 
in which nature is taken up and utilized by capital to become what Marx 
called “value in process.” This takes the form of what Büscher labels “fic-
titious conservation,” in that the value generated becomes increasingly 
difficult to connect with the actual resources ostensibly being conserved 
and from which this value supposedly derives. In the process, Büscher 
concludes, dynamics of production, consumption, and circulation become 
increasingly intensified, accelerated, and entangled in ways that make the 
conventional distinctions among them difficult to sustain.
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In chapter 9 Jim Igoe builds on Büscher’s analysis to elaborate on the 
fictional aspect of this “fictitious conservation.” Drawing on Dubord’s 
discussion of “spectacle,” Igoe observes a growing trend wherein the main-
stream conservation movement promotes the circulation of spectacular 
imagery in support of what he calls “ecofunctional nature”: environmental 
policy that claims to “optimize economic growth and ecosystem health” 
through market-based interventions. He describes how, through this pro-
cess, a long-standing preoccupation with “nature for contemplation” in the 
form of protected areas reserved for enjoyment by societal elites has been 
transformed into a “nature for speculation” (a double entendre signifying 
the synchronization of financial markets and media representations) that 
incorporates elements of the previous approach while dramatically trans-
forming the human-environment relationship at the heart of this imaginary. 
In closing, Igoe highlights what is obscured by this spectacle of ecofunc-
tional nature, namely, the “micropolitics” of quotidian struggles for control 
over both the access to and the signification of the nonhuman natures at 
stake in all of this.
This sets the stage for our final chapter, in which Sian Sullivan builds on 
both of the previous contributions to expand on this last theme. What Igoe’s 
ecofunctional nature obscures most centrally, Sullivan contends, are all of 
the diverse ways of conceptualizing human-nonhuman entanglements that 
do not reduce either humans to rational actors calculating maximum utility 
or nonhumans to mere commodity exchange value. She points to a variety 
of other forms in which these relationships have been conceptualized both 
in non-Western societies and in premodern Europe, when animals were 
often accorded many of the same capacities as humans such that they could 
actively participate in legal proceedings (e.g., be prosecuted for murder). 
While acknowledging the potential pitfalls of excessive romanticization of 
indigenous environmental management practices (e.g., the common cari-
cature of a particular people as “ecological noble savages”), Sullivan asserts 
that there are still valuable lessons that can be gleaned from such practices in 
pursuit of what she calls “(re)countenancing an animate nature” that is irre-
ducible to an object of speculation in either financial or voyeuristic senses.
Conclusion
As is clear from the above, the book covers a wide range of topics and per-
spectives, providing the most comprehensive overview yet assembled of the 
rapidly growing study of neoliberal conservation. Despite its broad reach, 
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however, there remain many issues that we have been unable to address 
here in as much depth as we would like. In particular, gender relations in 
neoliberal conservation are only treated tangentially and are indeed one 
of the glaring gaps in the overarching discussion as a whole. This, then, 
constitutes one of the important new directions to which this text points as 
a future research focus. There are several other potential topics we would 
like to note as well. One concerns the future of the green economy. At the 
time of writing, the concept has only just garnered serious discussion in the 
hallowed halls of global environmental governance, yet all signs suggest its 
growing hegemony in the years to come. How this latest gloss for Nature™ 
Inc. is performed, orchestrated, and circulated will thus be an intriguing 
research focus as well. As the increasing urgency of climate change pushes 
this issue ever further to the center of environmental governance discus-
sions, this may have implications in terms of the issue’s articulation and/or 
conflict with other issues (e.g., biodiversity preservation) that may provide 
useful research material as well. The enduring economic crisis is bound 
to have repercussions for the Nature™ Inc. agenda, yet these may go either 
way, either intensifying the agenda still further in the face of financial 
contraction or challenging it with evidence of its own limits. This prospect 
also warrants investigation.
These are (if we can be forgiven for using the term) mere speculations, 
however, and will doubtless be overshadowed by future events impossible 
to predict from our current vantage point. What is certain is that Nature™ 
Inc. in whatever guise is a force requiring urgent engagement by activists 
and academics alike. We hope that this volume helps to emphasize the 
importance of this agenda, to provide a state-of-the-art assessment of its 
current status as a scholarly field, and to offer productive and stimulating 
tools for understanding and researching the phenomenon both now and 
into the future.
Notes
1. But see critiques of Wacquant’s position in Peck and Theodore (2012).
2. See the various chapters in Harcourt (2012), who argues in the introduction that 
the idea of livelihoods must be taken out of its dominant framing, as “gender aware, 
participatory, and just economic activities to sustain livelihoods are almost by necessity 








Capitalizing Conservation on 
Palawan Island, the Philippines
Wolfram Dressler
Market-based conservation is often heralded as the most efficient and 
effective means to improve rural livelihoods and conserve forests in much 
of Southeast Asia (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; Pagiola, Bishop, and 
Landell-Mills 2002; Wunder 2008). State agencies, donors, and NGOs 
promote the payment of local users to maintain ecosystem services and fur-
ther their involvement in market ventures to value alternate uses, reducing 
dependency on forest resources and extensive land uses (Pagiola, Bishop, 
and Landell-Mills 2002). However, as market-based conservation initiatives 
connect with local land-based production and consumption, various forms 
of resource partitioning, privatization, and commodification progress in 
the few remaining frontiers of the region (Rigg and Nattapoolwat 2001; 
Cramb et al. 2009; Potter 2009; Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010). This chapter 
examines how the broader and local processes driving rural transformations 
have been accelerated through the progressive revaluing of nature in terms 
of market-based conservation on the frontier island of Palawan, an inter-
national conservation and development “hot spot.” I demonstrate how the 
pace and scale of agrarian change between rural peoples in central Palawan 
has increased with the onset of resource partitioning, objectification, com-
modification, and revaluing through translocal “capitalist conservation.” 
Changing management structures at the island’s flagship protected area, 
the Puerto Princesa Subterranean River National Park (PPSRNP), have 
intersected with the local political economy of agrarian change, acceler-
ating new capitalist investment, commodity production, and privatization 
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amongst a mixed group of indigenous and migrant resource users. Drawing 
on the notions of first, second, and third natures, I show how market-based 
conservation and agrarian change converge to facilitate the parallel, overlap-
ping shift from primary to tertiary production in one region. I describe how 
indigenous people in and using nature (first nature) for primary purposes 
such as subsistence become alienated from local resources as they work, 
shape, and extract from nature for commodity markets (second nature). I 
then focus on how such commodity relations generate an abstract market 
value on nature that yields equally abstract representations of idealized 
nature (third nature; Hughes 2005). I show that after decades of indigenous 
peoples using nature for commodity markets, the process of the national 
park being valued as a “common” World Heritage site has attracted new 
market investments that reinforce the coconstitution of conservation and 
agrarian change toward intensified capitalist production, rearticulating the 
value of nature on Palawan Island in an abstract sense according to modern 
images and ideals of the Philippines.1
From First to Third Nature: Conceptualizing 
Commodity Landscapes and Capitalist Conservation
The notions of first, second, and third natures offer a suitably nuanced con-
ceptual approach to examine how capitalist markets influence the valuing 
of nature through agrarian change and conservation over time and space 
on Palawan Island. Yet the shifting, recursive nature of such “changing 
natures” suggests anything but a linear trajectory moving from a static his-
torical baseline of human-environment relations. First nature, or “society in 
nature,” refers to rural peoples producing within nature and for themselves 
but often with modern means and methods that are pulled from second 
nature. While not a “fixed” historical moment isolated from trade networks, 
in first nature, social meaning and labor are part of use-value production, as 
commodities remain part of familial social relations and economy, though 
they are connected with financial markets (Smith 2008). Second nature 
refers to an environment “as worked by people and shaped by extraction, 
agriculture, markets and other anthropogenic factors” (Hughes 2005, 158). 
In second nature, unequal commodity relations can sharpen as rural peo-
ples spend more time producing resources once reserved for family needs 
as money commodities for the markets of others, leading in time to social 
and economic differentiation, with poor peasant producers (drawing on first 
nature) providing surplus and labor for intensified commodity production 
Capitalizing Conservation • 27
(Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010). Third nature extends simultaneously from 
first and second natures. It involves the ways in which such commodity 
relations extend further to produce and assign an abstract market value to 
nature based in speculative assumptions, categories, and representations 
of how nature should be or ought to become for and by humans within and 
beyond local environments (Wark 1994; Hughes 2005). As the economies 
of rural agrarian societies mix with but are partly supplanted by tertiary 
production controlled from afar (e.g., ecotourism, businesses, etc.), we see 
the onset of third nature through the emergence of ideas and assumptions 
that value nature speculatively in abstract market terms. In this “condi-
tional sense, ideas of third nature carry assumptions of predictions” of how 
humans should value nature in economic terms (Hughes 2005, 158).
Third nature also conveys a virtual character that is conditional (Hughes 
2005, 158), a character that is conditioned by how our ideals and assump-
tions come to value nature in a speculative fashion through the images and 
ideas of nature circulating in “markets” that inculcate us. Such abstracted 
nature is discursively produced, disembedded, contained, and subject to 
economic valuation. Rural areas zoned as protected areas and transformed 
into ecotourism hot spots, for example, draw people, beliefs, and represen-
tations that project both social and economic values and meanings onto a 
“virtual nature” that conforms to “models of economic abstraction, which 
are taken to be the fundamental reality that underlies and shapes [their] 
world” (Carrier and Miller 1998, 1–2). Eventually, investors, tourists, and 
locals who adopt and invest in such abstractions of nature are “said to 
perceive a virtual reality, seemingly real but dependent upon the concep-
tual apparatus and outlet that generate it” (Carrier and Miller 1998, 2). 
The dominance of such models suggests that all things in an “abstracted 
nature” are being commodified and perceived according to synthetic rep-
resentations of nature and society that adhere to certain norms, beliefs, and 
meaning (Carrier and West 2009). Investing in such virtual nature amounts 
to a “new,” less grounded reality wherein knowing, understanding, and 
acting on idealized representations of nature are manifest in needs, wants, 
and desires that, as bounded and labeled, can be consumed, reproduced, 
and projected as simulations (images, ideas, etc.) that come to represent 
reality without ever having to be in “nature” (Carrier and Miller 1998).
As third nature is produced and consumed by locating new values and 
meanings on how first nature should be (Wark 1994, 199), its valuing and 
consumption can have sustained social, economic, and biophysical impli-
cations for rural landscapes and peoples (West and Carrier 2004). Third 
nature becomes partly prescriptive when local reality is expected to conform 
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to the meanings, signs, and symbols of abstracted models and when people 
act in ways that make this reality conform to the structures of abstract reality 
(Carrier and West 2009, 7). What evolves then are “collections of images, 
ideas, discourses and values that reproduce the material world according to 
ways that they imagine it to be” (Brockington, Duffy, and Igoe 2008, 193), 
giving rise to a commodified, stylized landscape that conforms to people’s 
needs, values, and expectations of nature—particularly in terms of Western 
representations (West and Carrier 2004, 485).
The process by which first, second, and third natures unfold through 
time has become locally manifest on the island of Palawan, the Philip-
pines. The sections below describe how translocal processes that include 
(1) agrarian differentiation, (2) the rise of commodity landscapes, and 
(3) shifts from subsistence to service-sector production have supported and 
reinforced third nature through capitalist conservation at sitio (hamlet) 
Sabang, Barangay Cabayugan, near the Puerto Princesa Subterranean 
River National Park.
Agrarian Differentiation, Commodity Landscapes, and 
Capitalist Conservation on Palawan Island
While the Philippines experienced a steady pace of agrarian change, central 
parts of Palawan only began “filling in” after World War Two. A steady 
influx of migrants from resource-scarce and/or violence-prone areas in the 
Philippines traveled to Palawan to find relative tranquility, abundant fish-
ing grounds, and fertile lands already occupied and used by indigenous 
peoples such as the Tagbanua, Batak, and Pala’wan. In time, migrants from 
Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao comprised much of the local population, 
coming ling and competing with indigenous peoples and producing settle-
ment patterns consisting of intensive agriculture and commercial fishing 
in the coastal zone abutting the central cordillera. With just 35,369 people 
in 1903, the island’s population grew to 755,412 people in 2000, with a 
population growth rate of 3.6 percent (Eder 1999; Philippine Census 2000). 
As the population grew, so too did infrastructure, concessions for timber and 
nontimber forest products, the release of alienable and disposable lands for 
homesteading, land titling through cadastral zones, and commercial agricul-
ture near Puerto Princesa City, the provincial capital (Eder and Fernandez 
1996; Eder 1999). Such agrarian change spread inward and upward.
The mid-1960s until 1986 were witness to Ferdinand Marcos’s political 
influence, policies, and “investments” controlling forests, land, and people 
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in central Palawan. The island’s upland rain forests were exploited exten-
sively through “logging, mining, [and] corporate farming rights, including 
rattan and almaciga . . . concessions” that overlapped with Cabayugan 
(Ocampo 1996, 37). Deforestation rates continued apace, and migrants 
from Bulinao and Cebu had settled in Cabayugan when in 1971 Marcos 
officially declared the island’s 3,901-hectare flagship protected area, the 
Puerto Princesa Subterranean River National Park, in order to retain tim-
ber and tourism potential for his treasury.2 In 1986 the first People Power 
Revolution ousted Marcos, restoring liberal democracy in the Philippines 
(Vitug 2000). Indigenous rights and environmental NGOs soon shifted 
their focus to Palawan, calling attention to indigenous land rights and defor-
estation on the island (Vitug 1993). For the first time, the convergence 
of agrarian change, land rights initiatives, and market-based conservation 
emerged through similar political-economic structures at the national park, 
reinforcing the recursive trend of first nature moving through to second and 
third natures along the prevailing capitalist currents of the time.
First to Third Natures: The Rise of Capitalist Conservation 
at the Puerto Princesa Subterranean River National Park
First Nature: Tagbanua Settlers, Commons, and Landholdings
The Tagbanua Apurhano settled Cabayugan well before migrant farmers 
arrived, park boundaries were zoned, and market-based mechanisms facil-
itated third nature through capitalist conservation. Settling in the 1800s, 
most held the well-forested area as common property. Originally from 
Aborlan and Napsaan, the Tagbanua of Cabayugan are characterized as a 
near-coastal people who had relied on marine resources, forest products, 
and swidden for subsistence, culture, and worldview for centuries (Fox 
1954; Warner 1979). In the area, most Tagbanua long-traded forest products 
extensively with merchants and the neighboring Batak, “hunter-gatherer” 
people (Venturello 1907). As families moved inland, they made swiddens 
and moved on to fertile valley lands and coastal inlets farther northwest 
in Cabayugan, including areas near St. Paul Bay, land uses that defined 
Cabayugan’s first nature.
Those Tagbanua settling near St. Paul Bay tended to define and regulate 
access to the commons according to religious sanctions and group mem-
bership. The presence of a panya’en and other malicious spirits in dream 
worlds mediated initial forest clearings; and access to landholdings and 
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forest resources was partly restricted to those belonging to the Tagbanua 
community, loosely defined by ethnicity and blood ties. Preexisting political 
structures and leadership further influenced local decision making con-
cerning which resources could be accessed and used, decisions based less 
in coercion than social suasion. Tagbanua cleared swidden, planted tree 
crops, cut nontimber forest products for sale, and grazed carabao on these 
lands with relatively few restrictions (see Warner 1979, 35).
In the early 1900s several Tagbanua pioneers were busy extracting usu-
fruct plots from the commons. They planted coconut trees (nyog) and 
other permanent crops such as cashew (kasoy) and coffee (kape) for future 
subsistence and commercial sales on the foreshore area, Sabang Beach. 
The early Tagbanua pioneer Juan Francisco, for example, planted dozens 
of juvenile coconut trees flanking Sabang Beach, while his relatives planted 
coconut palms in Martape just across the valley. Closer to an area called 
Malipien, the old-timer and ladies’ man Gorgonio Pangican was also busy 
clearing forest for swidden, again, planting tree crops in his field.
The labor these pioneer Tagbanua expended to clear lands was the basis 
for securing customary rights to their land—a fact recognized by both indi-
genes and migrants in what was then, seemingly, “society in nature”—first 
nature. Access to forest resources and swidden fields in Cabayugan was 
unrestricted until an expenditure of labor resulted in clearing and planting 
permanent crops and/or marking trees, which, advertising occupancy and 
use rights, secured a farmer’s claim to the harvest and land (Warren 1977, 
56). As these families cleared land, plots were segregated from the forest 
commons, becoming the founder’s property. As such, Francisco’s coconut 
trees at St. Paul Bay advertised his family’s “use right” to an improved 
area—landholdings that would be inherited through successive genera-
tions. A farmer’s right to the land and its products was thus bound to the 
labour he or she invested during field preparation (McDermott 2000).3
In the process of settling near Sabang, senior Tagbanua shaman 
(babalyan) with specific religious functions also assigned cultural beliefs 
to unique landscape features in the area. At the mouth of the underground 
river, Tagbanua harvested tuna (thunnus) in abundance, calling the area 
Tuturingen. Rather than enter the underground river, they paid homage 
to a panya’en, ungao (a malicious anthropophagus deity) occupying the 
recesses of the cavernous (and now world-famous) underground river 
system. While Tagbanua long engaged in the trade of nontimber forest 
products (Venturello 1907), families were generally in control of exchange, 
effort expended for sales, and effort in subsistence production with fellow 
indigenes in the area; the essence of first nature or “society in nature” 
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(Smith 2008). The Tagbanua of Cabayugan already held clear property 
rights on the flat, fertile lands at sitio Sabang and assigned cultural beliefs 
to a variegated karst landscape, the central feature around which migrants 
would settle and the national park would be delineated.
Second Nature: Arrival of Migrants, Commodification,  
and Differentiation
The arrival of migrant settlers in the 1950s until today opened up and trans-
formed the Tagbanua commons into a commodified landscape, or second 
nature, supporting commercial agriculture, private title, and, ultimately, 
major tourism investments around the national park and providing the raw 
material, labor, and infrastructure for park management and tourism devel-
opment years later. The initial pioneers landed in the 1950s and 1960s, with 
others arriving later in Cabayugan’s central valley due to resource scarcity, 
unequal tenant-landlord relations, and conflicts in their place of origin (see 
Kerkvliet 1974; Chaiken 1994). Most started off with livelihoods similar to 
those of Tagbanua.
Other migrants soon followed upon hearing of the island’s bounty from 
relatives who had already settled; some received assistance from family, 
often settling on lands cleared by their predecessors. Next-of-kin and 
prominent migrant pioneers also provided recently settled migrants with 
different livestock and farm implements, which facilitated settlement—a 
kin-based advantage for many expert paddy farmers. Still others with dif-
ferent backgrounds and skills (teachers, carpenters, etc.) settled using their 
own finances. The original migrant population was relatively homogeneous 
and hunted, fished, collected, and farmed alongside Tagbanua (Fox 1954; 
Conelly 1985). The area was land-rich and people-poor.
While the social relations between and within migrants and indigenous 
peoples were never entirely egalitarian, relatively common reciprocal 
work relations were soon succeeded by commodity relations spurred on 
by agricultural intensification, landgrabbing, and, eventually, the onset of 
land privatization—the commodity basis of second nature. Socioeconomic 
differences soon sharpened within and between each group. Locally pow-
erful migrants set out to grab lands that indigenous farmers had already 
claimed by clearing forests for swidden and planting tree crops and, when 
lands were flat, for paddy rice cultivation. Wealthier migrants also hired 
poorer Tagbanua (and poorer migrants) to help clear forests for swidden 
and paddy farming on the flat, fertile alluvial lands in the central valley. 
As Tagbanua labored and produced goods for migrants, production and 
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exchange relations supported fledgling commodity markets, unequal trade 
relations, and the release of land for private titling, with the Bureau of 
Lands releasing 204 and 500 hectares of land in Sabang and Nasuduan, 
respectively (see Dressler 2006).4 Collectively, these lands were classified 
as free patent and were subject to intermittent cadastral surveys for full 
privatization in each sitio. The tree crops, trees, streams, and hills Tagbanua 
used as boundary markers were rendered obsolete with cadastral zones and, 
soon, all-encompassing national park zoning. Cabayugan’s second nature 
had arrived, imbricating first nature.
Third Nature: A National Park and an Emerging  
Commodity Landscape
The declaration of PPSRNP at 3,901 hectares in 1971 and as a World 
Heritage site in 1999 intersected with and supported migrant settlement 
patterns, tourism increases, and infrastructure development, exacerbating 
differentiation, commodification, and privatization of land and nature 
more broadly, except now according to abstract market values based in 
speculative assumptions, categories, and representations—third nature.
In the 1970s and 1980s, prominent migrants who secured posts as man-
agers and rangers used their political and economic leverage to employ 
relatives at the park and claim lands illegally in the coastal sitio, Sabang, 
near St. Paul Bay and Malipien, adjacent to or inside of national park 
boundaries (see Dressler 2006). In the 1970s, in particular, migrants living 
in Sabang whose wealth had grown due to paddy farming soon realized 
that the lands near the beach abutting the national park were worth a lot 
more money, unleashing a beach-front land acquisition frenzy. The land 
acquisitions began when a migrant named Locila Avecino purchased, for a 
meager P1,500, 1.5 hectares of Tagbanua Juan Francisco’s lands and coco-
nuts abutting the beach and national park. In turn, Rudolpho Tagburos 
bought 5 hectares of land from the first Tagbanua, Maruang (after baptism, 
Valentine de los Santos), who held beach-front lands under a registered tax 
declaration certification—de facto evidence of land occupancy and use. 
The going price was P3,000 (US$68) per hectare. Rather than stop there, 
however, farmers such as Avecino and Tagburos kept on buying Tagbanua 
land, with each farmer consolidating smaller plots of land on either side 
of the main market road for about 800 meters down from the beach. Each 
farmer secured about 11 and 24 hectares, respectively, for paddy rice culti-
vation, which they then subdivided amongst their children—private hold-
ings that would support tourism and Cabayugan’s emerging third nature.
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The type of economic venture on these lands changed with a rise in pop-
ulation, land scarcity, park popularity, market-based interventions, and the 
growth of tourism ventures, beliefs, and attitudes. In the 1980s prominent 
members of the migrant community in Sabang and sitios farther south had 
negotiated park management initiatives to acquire the best lands around 
the park and support their own paddy rice agriculture. In the 1990s, with 
the park’s devolution from the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR) to the city of Puerto Princesa, local migrants loyal to 
the mayor, Ed Hagedorn, were given employment privileges at the national 
park. Many migrant park employees and others benefiting from park activ-
ities used their income to diversify their livelihood activities, investing in 
but increasingly shifting from paddy farming to start restaurants and hostels 
that catered to the growing number of domestic and international tourists. 
Moreover, to ensure his political mandate of a “clean and green” Puerto 
Princesa city, the mayor and his council enacted policies to prohibit the 
burning and clearing of old-growth forest for swidden in order to maintain a 
“nature aesthetic” of lush, intact forest canopy along the main road tourists 
(and locals) traveled to reach the national park. By now a combination of 
lush forest, paddy rice, and tourism infrastructure spanned and flanked this 
market road, spreading laterally along the beach front in Sabang, most of 
which was on Avecino’s and Tagburos’s landholdings—lands that Tagbanua 
once held in common.
NGOs soon capitalized on constitutional provisions made in 1987 for 
indigenous land claims (Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claim [CADCs]), 
granting Tagbanua, Batak, and mixed-marriage couples de facto tenurial 
security through these CADCs in 1996 and 1997 in sitio Kayasan and Caba-
yugan, respectively. With mixed groups of migrants occupying low-lying 
foreshore and valley areas once occupied by indigenes, most Tagbanua had 
already moved hinterland from the park, market road, and tourism infra-
structure.5 In 1999 third nature was nigh, with the park’s expansion to 22,202 
hectares and complete rebranding as a World Heritage site under the title 
Puerto Princesa Subterranean River National Park, reflecting the mayor’s 
control over the local landscapes. The expansion created new traditional 
and multiple-use buffer zones that engulfed the ancestral domains in which 
community conservation initiatives and migrant businesses flourished, 
respectively. With the park’s global status growing, visitor numbers soared 
from 30,776 in 1998 to over 100,000 in 2009, and, in time, new forms of 
nature “branding” retained the green rhetoric appealing to tourists who 
imagined Palawan as the last pristine ecofrontier, the imagery of which now 
circulated globally via media and the Internet (Park Visitor Statistics 2009).
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Privatization and the Shift to Tertiary Production
While most projects in the uplands of the traditional-use zone supported 
stabilizing swidden farming with tree crops, sedentary agriculture, and new 
livelihood pursuits (see Dressler 2009), the further intensification of agricul-
ture and the growth of tourism in the multiple-use zone facilitated the shift 
to tertiary production. In multiple-use zones, park managers and planners 
supported state, NGO, and private-sector investments in projects that boosted 
(1) the productivity of paddy rice, (2) the securing of private title and small-
scale businesses, and (3) the development of the tourism infrastructure.
Park-based livelihood projects supported migrant business opportunities 
and paddy rice by maintaining water flows, nutrient inputs, high-yielding 
seeds, farm implements, and market outlets for rice sales, reinforcing 
market-oriented, agricultural intensification. In particular, the UNDP- 
COMPACT programs (Community Management of Protected Areas for 
Conservation), implemented in 2004, geared NGO and state assistance 
toward supporting the intensification of paddy fields and/or wage labor 
(United Nations Development Programme 2004, 26). Moreover, many 
migrant households received support from the local farmers’ cooperative 
and other park-supported people’s organizations that enabled them to 
secure start-up loans for capital buildup (i.e., hand tractors, water pumps, 
etc.) to further mechanize production and invest in small-scale businesses. 
Many migrant farmers’ relatively unfettered access to capital and infrastruc-
ture gave them a productive advantage to enhance farming and small-scale 
businesses that supported tourism development further down the road.
Many migrants used their recently secured private title as collateral 
to build capital investments, start their own businesses catering to local 
and tourist needs, and, in time, secure more land so as to expand their 
tourism-based enterprises in Sabang and surrounds. In Sabang, in par-
ticular, Tagbanua lands have recently become privatized under a titling 
scheme supported by the city government and national park, enabling 
migrant farmers to expand production, invest in small general stores, and 
develop larger businesses that cater to a growing tourism market. In 2009, 
for example, the Land Amortization Management Project in Sabang was 
in full gear, with predominantly, but not exclusively, migrant farmers and 
business owners providing evidence of boundary markers, tax declaration 
certificates, and other means of identifying and proving landownership so 
their holdings could be tendered as private title.
As the local and tourist population grew, Bulinao and Visayan farm-
ers, owners, and tenants became increasingly focused on purchasing and 
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privatizing land near the beach, closer to Sabang. The acquisition and use 
of such lands reflected two broader patterns: initial grabs and purchases 
in the 1960s for farming; and new arrivals purchasing plots from pioneer 
landowners, as well as larger landowners partitioning their plots into smaller 
parcels, which they then rented to poorer tenant migrants at higher prices.
Three migrant farmers who had arrived decades earlier followed a simi-
lar process of settling, claiming, and buying land from Tagbanua, clearing 
land for kaingin and then paddy rice, and, after saving enough money from 
rice sales, again purchasing or claiming land in Sabang in anticipation of 
tourist arrivals. One pioneer farmer, for example, sold all of his fishing 
boats because of his older age and now secures an income from sari-sari 
stores (a basic general store) and remittances from his children who work 
wage-labor jobs elsewhere. Similarly, another farmer who settled in a sitio 
just south of Sabang in 1989 began cultivating paddy rice on his own lot 
and in 1994 used his savings and networks to relocate to Sabang because 
of the good livelihood potential there. Upon relocating to Sabang, the 
family acquired a small plot of land (30 by 40 square meters) worth about 
P15,000 (US$344), which now holds a restaurant that offers Filipino food 
and a store where they “buy and sell” rice and other goods. While family 
members once sold local rice in Sabang, they now purchase most rice from 
markets or the government granary in Puerto Princesa City and then resell 
it at a higher price to locals and new resort owners. However, this family’s 
relatives and children continue to harvest paddy rice in a nearby sitio. They 
then sell it at their restaurant/store in Sabang, showing how preexisting 
livelihood activities can support new, commercially oriented initiatives. 
Other farmers first worked as tenants to save up enough money to buy land 
and start tourism enterprises closer to coastal Sabang.
In other cases, Sabang’s gradually expanding tourism industry has drawn 
newcomers to Sabang in search of livelihood opportunities linked to tertiary 
markets: wage labor at two new four-star resorts (see below), part- to full-
time management of beach cottages (e.g., Mary’s cottages), and a combi-
nation of fishing and/or farming opportunities to supplement their nascent 
businesses. This, in time, prompted larger landowners to sell their lands for 
megatourism development.
Compared to when land was usually purchased to support the expan-
sion of paddy rice farming, new properties at Sabang were now bought 
and sold with the clear intent of owning and operating a business. The 
rise in the number of people who have migrated to Sabang to start up 
tourism-related businesses has also increased the scarcity and transaction 
costs of land in the area. Realizing that property prices have risen, many 
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who claimed and secured significant hectarage as private title early on were 
now busy partitioning medium-size lots and renting out smaller parcels 
of land to poorer migrant tenants and, recently, selling several hectares 
of land (approximately 8–10 hectares) to two luxury resort developers, 
Sheridan Beach Resort and Daluyon Resort, for major sums of money. In 
particular, after Tagburos claimed and subdivided 24 hectares of land to 
his children, his sons and daughters took advantage of rising land prices to 
sell their portions (allegedly for P4 million, or US$86,000) to the Sterling 
Hotel Group, which in turn built a ninety-plus-room resort costing between 
US$100 and $711 a night. A slightly lower-cost land transaction unfolded 
with the Daluyon Resort—the start of Cabayugan, Sabang’s third nature.
Major landowners also began partitioning their lots for tenancy arrange-
ments. Different types of tenants with different types of businesses exist, but 
most rent their lands from the local landed elite who own the majority of 
land along the main market road from Sabang. In most cases, farmers who 
live farther down the road with secure tenure may have one family member 
renting from Tagburos smaller parcels of land that are closer to Sabang. 
Obtaining small- to medium-size loans from the Cooperative Land Bank 
(for which collateral is not needed), drawing on their savings from surplus 
rice sales, and/or receiving remittances from wealthier family members 
abroad, they build small stalls as “buy and sell” operations, cafés, restaurants, 
and souvenir shops. The closer they are to Sabang (and its beach), the more 
rent they pay Tagburos’s family. Generally, those tenants with one or more 
family members generating a sustained cash income (e.g., as a park ranger or 
by working at the megaresorts) and who regularly farm paddy rice are most 
able to pay for higher-priced parcels of land close to Sabang and to greater 
numbers of tourists. The locally uneven political economy and management 
have kept Tagbanua peripheral to the capitalist currents emanating from and 
supported by livelihood projects, tourism, and the park’s commercial profile. 
As such, those locals who already own the most land and hold advantageous 
positions in the local political economy (e.g., the national park) will realize 
the greatest benefits from the shift in primary to tertiary production—or, 
conceptually, the shift from first to third nature in Cabayugan.
Virtual Commodification
It was only after the mayor and his political campaign put the national 
park and the underground river on the map as an international tourism 
destination that the coastal landscape became commodified and revalued 
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in terms of “hypermodernity,” a new, imported reality. The social relations, 
meanings, and materiality constituting local first nature became more fully 
commodified, disembedded, partitioned, and valued in monetary terms. 
Concurrently, people project social and economic values and meanings 
onto nature that correspond to abstract, commodified representations of 
“nature and society” emerging from a modern sense of style, consumption, 
and material desire, concepts that often stem from Manila.
Since the park’s declaration as a World Heritage site in 1999, the city’s 
drive to promote the park globally, the growth in market-based conserva-
tion, and booming tourism numbers have all sped up the rebuilding and 
rebranding of the local area into a commodity landscape: what was once 
forestland is now private title hosting locally owned restaurants, and, more 
ominously, what was once the common coastal property of Tagbanua now 
hosts two new major tourism resorts. With land and capital now commod-
ified, labor was the only item remaining. Tragically, it was young Visayan 
and Tagbanua children who toiled away daily manufacturing hollow blocks 
for one of the resort’s foundation, among related tasks, for less than the daily 
minimum wage (P150, or US$3).
Buoyed by commercial agriculture and capitalist conservation, related 
tourism development, infrastructure, and consumerism have rendered the 
local people and landscape of Sabang as packaged consumer commodities. 
Tourists and locals identify with, value, and consume aspects of nature as 
consumer commodities that (are made to) conform to their expectations 
when, in fact, these commodities are part of a very different local reality. 
In Sabang, tourists and local people now view, appreciate, and consume 
popular consumer images and brands as if they were part of the preexisting 
landscape; for example, one popular fast food symbol, Jolly Bee, is shown 
floating into the mouth of the underground river. Marketers plant these 
images knowing that many domestic tourists from Manila and elsewhere 
value the sense of comfort they experience with the symbolic meanings 
that such brands convey—the Jolly Bee is happy, full of hamburger meat, 
and contentedly isolated from the harsher reality of forest living, something 
from which tourists are also isolated. Few realize that the bee is actually 
floating into a Tagbanua sacred site that is still inhabited by a malevolent 
panya’en who residents believe will inflict sickness on those who enter its 
sanctuary (see figure 1.1).
A few steps away, visitors see the newly erected Tribal Restaurant, with a 
statue of Mickey Mouse beckoning tourists to come eat “jungle fare,” which 
is sourced from Puerto Princesa City and cooked to the modern Filipino 
palate (see figure 1.2). Again, both domestic and international tourists 
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Figure 1.1. The less than jolly side of ecotourism, Sabang, Cabayugan, Palawan 
(photo credit: Olivier Begin-Caouette).
are familiar with the friendly smile of Mickey Mouse and his beckoning 
hands—a representation of local nature that is at once modern Filipino and 
American Disneyfication. Closer to the coconut groves planted by Tagba-
nua pioneers are new reflexology and massage therapy stalls for the many 
tourists who arrive in vans from Puerto Princesa City for a daylong tour of 
the underground river. On the way up and down, tour guides occasionally 
discuss how the darker tribal Batak and Tagbanua still live in the forest 
without venturing out, generating an image for tourists of the area’s indig-
enous peoples as primitive, at once part of but also separate from the park’s 
prevailing “nature aesthetic”—a nature aesthetic maintained by controlling 
the clearing and burning of forest for swidden, deemed incompatible with 
idealized images of nature.
Tourists’ perspectives also reflect (and invest in) third nature in a vir-
tual sense. After visiting the area, tourists have the option of posting their 
perspectives on the park’s virtual World Heritage site, with one visitor 
exclaiming, “We . . . enjoyed the untouched forest and beautiful flowers 
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and the amazing construction of the stairs going up the mountain and the 
beautiful stones laid on the trails.” Another states that “this cave of mystery 
resembles the mystery of life’s journey as well. This cave is something that 
Filipinos should be proud of and share to the world.”6 Other tourists with 
whom I spoke in March 2010 stated similarly that Sabang and the national 
park were ideal places for “getting back to nature” and that, with unspoilt 
forest, the park truly reflected one of the New Seven Wonders of the World 
(see below). One couple just off the plane explained that while they did not 
want the area to be overdeveloped, they did hope that the infrastructure 
would eventually become more “modern,” as it is on Boracay.
Yet tourists do not need even to physically enter the forest or the under-
ground river in order to be in it. The park’s landscape has become virtual, 
spread across placards, billboards, TV screens, in-flight magazines, and var-
ious major international websites (see figure 1.3). In the city itself, visitors 
see brightly colored images of the mayor and foreign dignitaries on massive 
placards superimposed over pictures of the underground river and the karst 
landscape “valuing” and “selling” the national park to new arrivals. Outside 
of Palawan, when visitors exit Terminal 2 of the Ninyo Aquino International 
Airport in Manila, they see large images of the underground river sparkling 
Figure 1.2. A “tribal restaurant” with jungle fare in Sabang, Cabayugan, Palawan.
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with pastel colors plastered high on the wall next to the Marlboro Man 
riding his horse into the sunset. Moreover, in the ethereal world of the 
World Wide Web, virtual voters recently chose the underground river as a 
finalist to be designated as one of the New Seven Wonders of the World, 
showcasing its “natural beauty” and “God given splendor” virtually.7
The image of the “tribal other,” the pristine and mysterious “mouth” 
of the underground river, and the surrounding wild jungle have become 
a virtual spectacle of nature through which capitalism commodifies the 
material and immaterial as glossy goods that tourists can readily consume 
(Brockington, Duffy, and Igoe 2008). The social and material construction 
of such abstract representations of nature, in which people enter a social 
mélange where reality and fantasy become indistinguishable, enables invest-
ment, consumption, and the fulfillment of desires without realizing that 
such constructions are partly disembedded from the reality that underpins 
them. Tourists have come to expect a clean, green, stylized, and romantic 
underground river and forest landscape. Sabang’s first nature has become 
virtually translocal; it is abstracted, valued in market terms, and reified to 
conform to people’s needs, desires, values, and expectations of nature. Yet 
Figure 1.3. Palawan, a virtually commodified tourism landscape.
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the people who supply the places, cultures, and resources for this translo-
cal hyperreality are incorporated and marginalized to the periphery of this 
emerging commodity landscape—the essence of third nature.
Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter has shown that much of Cabayugan’s landscape has been 
irrevocably altered due to decades of incremental agrarian change, privat-
ization, and differentiation through market-based conservation culminating 
in capitalist conservation. The rise of capitalist conservation has stoked and 
been supported by park management rezoning, “added value” livelihood 
support, the growth of small-scale businesses, the rise in tourism numbers, 
and the recent development of major resorts. In the process, we have seen 
privatization and differentiation displace and dispossess the local poor, con-
trol labor relations, and, ultimately, produce spaces of a highly abstracted 
nature. In these spaces, local labor value is sourced and material resources 
are destined to be produced for others who, concurrently, partition nature 
as objects and brands with economic value, conveying idealized represen-
tations and meanings of many things local.
In Cabayugan, we have thus seen an irregular transition from first to 
third nature. Smith (2008, 33) refers to first nature as including modes of 
capitalist production that are embedded in local resource production and 
still somewhat “internal to nature.” While farmers and other resource users 
in Cabayugan have always negotiated and mediated nature with agency, 
in the past their social relations within nature were more “symmetrical” as 
they drew on forest products and land for familial subsistence production 
more than surplus production for external markets. In an idealized sense, 
social relations were based in use-value production above and beyond pro-
ducing commodities for monetary exchange value (Smith 2008). While 
Tagbanua have long produced resources for sale in markets that were 
likely also structurally unequal, more of their time was devoted to pro-
ducing subsistence for familial consumption and exchange with migrants, 
Tagbanua and Batak farmers (see Eder 1987). By extension, the onset of 
second nature involved local social relations increasingly being alienated 
from resource production and exchange—in essence, a shift of use value 
to exchange value for commodity production through agriculture and 
capitalist ventures supporting conservation (e.g., ecotourism such as boat 
trips to the underground river). Second nature, then, implies the rise of 
asymmetrical social relations “with nature” where the resource user begins 
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to harvest resources as goods with a surplus value to be sold and exchanged 
for cash (White 1989). In cases where the Tagbanua became “laborers” to 
produce commodities for park-related tourism markets owned by wealthier 
migrants, many became socially alienated from the product of their labor, 
and increasingly so as more labor time, particularly that of child laborers, 
was invested in working for others’ profit.
Increasing levels of competition and specialization in local livelihood 
processes arose for both agriculture and tourism development, driving 
competition for scarcer land, agricultural intensification, and commercial 
production. In time, the production of goods with surplus value, such as 
paddy rice, and other consumer products demanded more intense eco-
nomic transactions between landlords and tenant famers that supported the 
shift toward tertiary production (e.g., ecotourism operators and restaurant 
owners), particularly through the development of major tourism resorts by 
foreign investors. As second nature sets in, then, we begin to see capitalist 
relations becoming increasingly manifest and pronounced in space, recon-
figuring and hybridizing with (pre)existing social relations of production 
and exchange such that new ways of being, believing, and acting emerge 
in one area (Smith 2008).
The shift to a more abstract third nature thus involved the partitioning 
and economic valuation of nature in terms of ideas, images, and symbols 
that engendered and reproduced idealized representations of nature that 
came to simulate “real nature.” We saw how in Sabang hyperreal notions 
of nature arose through the synthesis of multiple images and meanings 
in various settings—from airports to beach restaurants—that can struc-
ture tourists’ and local people’s sense of reality and truth about the “local 
world” despite often being divorced from actual reality. Tourists’ longing 
for the national park’s nature aesthetic helped to project both values and 
meanings onto nature that conform to “models of economic abstraction, 
which are taken to be the fundamental reality that underlies and shapes 
the world” (Carrier and Miller 1998, 1–2). Hughes (2005, 158) notes 
further that locally partitioned and economically valued nature can thus 
involve “speculation, rather than exploitation . . . [which] in this condi-
tional sense . . . often carries assumptions or predictions regarding human 
action” in nature. Ultimately, then, Cabayugan’s third nature entails both 
the tangibles and intangibles of nature being commodified within and 
beyond local landscapes, starting to replace and erase a forest landscape 
filled with deeper history, cultural heritage, political relations, and social 
meanings. While these place-based meanings have long mixed and merged 
with changing values and understandings, they tend to be forgotten when 
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third nature consumes and removes much of first nature with relative 
force and degrees of permanence. While the notions of first, second, and 
third natures are conceptually abstract explanations of dynamic processes 
of agrarian change and capitalist conservation, the scale and pace of the 
transition are undeniable and will have profound implications for those 
people in nature apparently being “conserved.”
Notes
1. I examined this trend by using a range of qualitative and quantitative methods in 
the area from 2001 until 2010. Data were collected through key informant interviews 
and participant observation of livelihood strategies, resource commodification, and the 
politics of capitalist investment in and through conservation. Household-level data on 
agrarian change came from a livelihood questionnaire in 2001 (N = 157) examining 
changes in livelihood, asset holdings, and land sales. Two follow-up questionnaires 
were conducted in 2006 and 2009 to identify livelihood changes among key indigenous 
swidden farmers (n = 20) and migrant business owners (n = 20), respectively, who 
were in the process of privatizing land or were share tenants on the lands of wealthier 
migrants in the tourism sitio, Sabang, near the underground river at the national park.
2. At the time, the national park was named St. Paul Subterranean River National 
Park.
3. Since land was clearly abundant prior to the 1960s, it was the availability of labor 
and not land that limited production (Warner 1979; McDermott 2000).
4. Key informant interview, Eduardo Castillo, Cabayugan Centro, spring 2004.
5. Much of the CADC lands were leased for twenty-five years as public domain and 
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In the summer of 2007 a reader of the London-based Independent posed 
a question to former US vice president Al Gore: “In 1992 you advocated 
a new set of ‘rules of the road’ for the conduct of the global economy, to 
take account of environmental costs and benefits. What progress do you 
think has been made since then?” Gore responded: “Not nearly enough. 
And actually, a re-examination of accounting systems and measurement 
protocols to include the environment in the routine, everyday calcula-
tions by which our economy is governed, comes about as close as you can 
get to the heart of why we have this crisis. . . . [A]ccounting systems are 
required to hold routinely in mind factors that are deemed to be import-
ant and significant in weighing the pros and cons of any decision. There 
has been progress to reform and redesign the accounting system. But not 
nearly enough.”1
Gore’s remarks were prescient. They were uttered just four months after 
a German proposal to undertake a study on the “economic significance of 
the global loss of biological diversity” had been adopted at the 2007 Pots-
dam G8+5 meeting. Three years later, in 2010, during a press conference 
that introduced the resulting study—The Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity (TEEB)—at the 10th Conference of the Parties (COP10) to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the team leader, Pavan 
Sukhdev, a former senior banker with Deutsche Bank and, until recently, 
head of the United Nations Environment Programme’s Green Economy 
Initiative, made a striking comment: “This is one world; it’s ours to create. 
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Let us create it and make it what we want, rather than wait for it to be 
dictated to us through further crisis and further problems.”2
These comments from Gore and Sukhdev neatly reflect the rhetorical 
force of “natural capital.” The world that TEEB seeks to create is one 
that materializes Gore’s image of a nature simultaneously “accounted” for 
and made subject to market exchange. In many ways this attempt to bring 
nature into alignment with an expressed vision of that world is nothing new 
and reflects the process that Carrier and Miller (1998), among others, have 
described as “virtualism.”
“Nature” has always been brought into being through processes of 
abstraction—ways of cognitively imagining, or more often being taught 
to imagine, one’s surroundings as existing in particular ways for particular 
reasons such that they can be acted upon toward particular ends. Through 
time and across space people have imagined “nature” in different ways, 
with accordant differences in what were considered legitimate modes of 
interacting with the world around them. However, these ways of imaging 
the world have rarely been uniform or gone uncontested. Even in instances 
where ideological domination assumed doxic (or taken-for-granted) qual-
ities, there have been competing modes of abstraction. Consequently, 
the conditions that created the dominant abstraction, and the practices of 
enacting it, needed to be continually (re)enforced.
In the past two decades, a particular image of “the world” as natural cap-
ital has gained prominence. In some sense this is not new. In industrialized 
societies “nature” has been implicitly treated as capital. What is new is a 
striking reduction in the opposition to the idea of a natural world defined 
as capital. Environmental institutions such as the CBD that might have 
challenged the subordination of “nature” to “the economy” have rapidly 
become strong proponents of market-based mechanisms through which 
nature is being increasingly privatized, commercialized, commodified, 
commoditized, and ultimately enclosed and, in the process, erasing pre-
existing socionatures (see Brockington and Duffy 2010b; Büscher 2009; 
Carrier and West 2009; Castree 2008a, 2008b; Heynen et al. 2007; Igoe, 
Neves, and Brockington 2010; McAfee 1999). These processes not only 
have given rise to the concept of “ecosystem goods and services” but are 
also actually creating markets for their exchange (Robertson 2007; Sullivan 
2011a), a process essential to their materialization.
What interests us here are questions about the dynamic processes 
whereby new markets and property relations are created and defined and 
in which power relations are realigned (McCarthy and Prudham 2004). 
How is natural capital enacted, and how are the conditions that create 
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the abstractions upon which it depends produced and reenforced? This 
process, we suggest, requires the continual (re)alignment of actors, labor, 
and instruments around specific interests and ends. Further, that alignment 
involves substantive efforts of articulation (Hall 1986), circulation, and 
orchestration in attempts to enlist actors, institutions, and instruments in 
the project of (re)producing what we once knew as “the environment,” 
or “nature,” as “natural capital” (see Mitchell 2008).3 While we see this 
as an integrated effect of neoliberalism, our focus is not on neoliberalism 
per se but on revealing the important role of performance and the enact-
ment of expertise and authority in the work of alignment and articulation 
that neoliberalism (in all its variegated forms) requires.4 We see that work 
as an important component of what Carrier and Miller (1998) describe 
as “virtualism.”
In this chapter we combine the theoretical lens of virtualism with the 
empirical object of a new multilateral project (TEEB) and the physical 
site and instance of the COP10 to explore how processes of performance, 
orchestration, alignment, and articulation stitch together a dense weave of 
interests and actors in making real a vision of “nature” as capital. TEEB 
began as a study on the economics of biodiversity loss. While officially 
hosted by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), TEEB’s 
working units, including a communications hub and a scientific coordi-
nation group, were located in Germany and financed by the European 
Commission, Germany, the United Kingdom, Norway, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden. Led by Pavan Sukhdev, the project’s goal was to produce a 
Stern Report for biodiversity.5 As it unfolded, TEEB linked and mobilized 
a group of actors focused on the pricing and costing of ecosystems and 
biodiversity, producing reports aimed at distinct bodies of decision makers 
and putting in place demonstration projects oriented around mechanisms 
to incorporate the productive value of ecosystems and biodiversity into 
national accounts.
We argue that TEEB, which as a performative project mobilizes the 
alignments and articulations required to overcome obstacles to the realiza-
tion of “natural capital,” is an institutional expression of an environmental 
vision intended to bring the world into conformity with that vision (Carrier 
and West 2009). In what follows, we use our observations on TEEB to 
further refine the concept of virtualism, asserting that virtualism begins 
with an ideological commitment, in this case to place an economic value 
on nature. Yet, we also understand virtualism to be an ongoing process 
of reproduction grounded in conditions of contestation, where direction-
ality emerging from the configuration of power relations and agencies is 
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continually in the making. This means that any virtualism must be linked 
through virtual moments. It also demands that virtualism be performative: 
making the world conform to an image of itself requires constant orches-
trating, aligning, and articulating actors, interests, institutions, and mech-
anisms to turn fragile social ties into durable associations (Latour 2005).
While the “performativity of economics” paradigm has been associ-
ated historically with studies of specific market technologies generated 
at specialized sites (e.g., Callon 1998a; Garcia-Parpet 2008; Holm 2008; 
MacKenzie 2003; MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2007), recent analysis of 
economic performativity explores the processes of “economization.” This 
agenda is inclusive of a larger variety of sites and practices (Çalışkan and 
Callon 2009, 2010) than those generated at relatively local and specialized 
sites. With this in mind, we emphasize the performativity of a conference 
site, where the site itself serves as a stage that conditions the agency of 
TEEB in the production of natural capital as reality. In revealing the work 
of TEEB as performative in conforming reality to virtual reality by creating 
the conditions for the emergence of ecosystem markets, we highlight the 
importance of particular sites and spaces in the (re)production of agence-
ments that we see as essential for an understanding of virtualism.
Virtualism: Conforming the World to an Abstraction
Carrier and Miller (1998) define virtualism as the attempt to make the 
world around us look like and conform to an abstract model of it. These 
abstractions, they claim, become virtualism when virtual reality stops 
simply being a description of reality and becomes prescriptive of what the 
world should be. The “set of partial analytical and theoretical arguments 
that define a world . . . becomes a virtualism when people forget that the 
virtual reality is a creature of the partial analytical and theoretical perspec-
tives and arguments that generate it, and instead take it for the principles 
that underlie the world that exists and then try to make it conform to that 
virtual reality” (Carrier and West 2009, 7). Virtualism, then, “is a social 
process by which people who are guided by a vision of the world act to try 
to shape that world to bring it into conformity with their vision” (Carrier 
and West 2009, 7).
Miller (2005) discusses the correspondence between powerful actors, 
powerful discourses, and the degree of control they come to exercise over 
the world through their ability to be performative, and he distinguishes, for 
example, between more and less powerful actors, with the more powerful 
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exercising “the ability to construct an economic world as the pure product 
of their own performativity, . . . reflecting their ability to take the virtual (i.e. 
the model) and actualize it in the world” (Miller 2005, 10). However, we 
argue that “realizing the vision” of natural capital does not involve distinc-
tions between more or less powerful actors but rather requires bringing into 
being configurations of actors (in which we include devices, institutions, 
organizations), which become the reality they seek. It is the contestation 
among a multitude of actors, where power is relational, contingent, and 
dynamic, that is important.
In order to envision the ways in which actors and agencies are drawn 
together over time to enact the world, we draw on what Callon has termed 
an agencement—by which he means a heterogeneous ensemble of actors 
“made up of human bodies but also of prostheses, tools, equipment, techni-
cal devices, algorithms, etc.” (Callon 2005, 4) and which he uses to “denote 
sociotechnical arrangements when they are considered from the point of 
view [of] their capacity to act and give meaning to action” (Callon and 
Çalışkan 2005, 24). Callon’s perspective is helpful because it premises the 
effectiveness (i.e., its capacity to do work) of a proposition (e.g., natural capi-
tal) on the ability to draw together a corresponding sociotechnical apparatus.
Making the world conform to an image of itself is a long, messy, and 
conflicted affair involving the constant work of orchestrating, aligning, and 
articulating actors, interests, institutions, and mechanisms and the turning 
of fragile social ties into durable associations (Latour 2005). These pro-
cesses—the construction of agencements—both require performance and 
are also performative (Hardie and MacKenzie 2007; MacKenzie, Muniesa, 
and Siu 2007). In essence, we see TEEB as an actor constituted by and 
constitutive of a dynamic agencement that works to (re)produce and reify 
nature as an array of goods and services subject to costing and that provides 
the institutional basis for creating and positioning markets as a privileged 
arbiter in the distribution of biodiversity and “ecosystem services.” Virtu-
alism, then, is a contested process that, like hegemony, is never complete, 
although it can be successful. For virtualism to be successful, we assert, “vir-
tual moments” need to be linked together through the alignment of actors 
situated differently across time and space, where, in Miller’s (2005, 10–11) 
words, “it is possible to write about the general history of virtualism and to 
carry out ethnography on the virtual moment.” By paying attention to those 
virtual moments, we can observe practices of orchestration, alignment, and 
articulation in ways that integrate actors into a shared orientation within 
a developing and expanding network that subsequently works to create a 
world in accordance with models of how the world ought to be.
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Studying the Field of Biodiversity Conservation
Indeed, a primary contribution of this work and that on which it builds is 
the extension of an attempt to ethnographically study an event like COP10 
to understand these practices of orchestration, alignment, and articulation 
and how the site or the event works to constitute a virtual moment as one 
among many in a translocal field of organized conservation (Brosius and 
Campbell 2010; MacDonald 2010a). This focus on the event illuminates 
work that is often disaggregated in space and performed in bureaucratic 
sites resistant to direct observation (but see Corson 2010; Mosse 2006; Rob-
ertson 2010). It also allows us to examine the reconfiguration of power rela-
tions among key actors as well as the emergence, circulation, negotiation, 
and stabilization of idealized categories of biodiversity, which subsequently 
serve as vehicles for the realization of “natural capital.”
Our capacity to do this, however, is grounded in a reconfiguration of 
methodological practice based on rethinking the notion of “the field” in 
conservation social science. This is required in part because of the intensive 
institutionalization of conservation practice and policy that has occurred in 
the past two decades through mechanisms of global environmental gover-
nance such as the CBD. The structure of the institutions of environmental 
governance that emerged out of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment 
and Development consolidated state authority, redirecting state and donor 
resources away from bilateral relations with conservation organizations and 
aligning them with the CDB program of work and the funding of that 
program through the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the financial 
mechanism of the convention. This consolidation of state authority under 
the guise of internationalism reconfigured power relations (MacDonald 
2010b) and positioned the mechanisms of the convention, particularly its 
mandated meetings, as active political spaces—arenas in which interests 
could be negotiated, new social relations could be configured around 
those negotiations, and privileged positions and perspectives could be 
consolidated and codified in ways that structure policy and practice (see 
Strathern 2000).
We can think of these spaces, then, as what some management schol-
ars refer to as field-configuring events (Lampel and Meyer 2008): affairs 
that temporarily bring actors together; construct arenas for demonstrating, 
displaying, and promoting perspectives, mechanisms, techniques, and prac-
tices; and provide the institutional context and opportunity to transform 
contestation into legitimated outcomes and shape disparate organizations 
and individuals into a “community” that shares a common meaning system 
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(Scott et al. 2000). Accordingly, we can see them as sites of “culture mak-
ing,” of sense making, and of learning how to make sense.
Attending to these events is important, as the emergence of transnational 
environmental governance, the consequent threat of regulation, and the 
accordant possibility of subordinating some interests in “the environment” 
have drawn previously separated actors together into spaces in which claims 
over “nature” and the ideological and material struggles that lie underneath 
those claims become not only unavoidable but more readily visible and 
subject to scrutiny (Latour 2004). Within (and beyond) these spaces, actors 
intentionally seek to give substance to the institutions and organizations 
engaged in environmental governance in ways that express that interest. 
These events, then, though not necessarily privileged, become import-
ant sites in which to compile accounts of these interests; they are places 
where the stakes of actors are articulated, where actions and associations 
formed in relation to those stakes become visible, where dissension within 
and between groups becomes apparent, and where contestation over the 
shaping of conservation policy and practice becomes clear. They provide 
an opportunity to observe encounters (e.g., huddles among delegates) and 
actions (e.g., gestures, tones of voice) that do not enter the official record. 
By being present at the site, we are able to record the process of knowledge 
being translated and to observe how it gains traction in relation to particular 
interests. We witness meaning as it is being made, challenged, transformed, 
and translated. And we are exposed to the agency of those involved in the 
process of structuring, orchestrating, and scripting the event.
Of course, this notion of tracking phenomena through time and space is 
not new (see Marcus 1995, 2000, among others), but it does call for imag-
inative modifications of methodological practice, particularly when those 
relations being tracked involve multiple actors appearing simultaneously 
in time-condensed spaces. The size of a Conference of the Parties makes 
it impossible for any one researcher to effectively cover the entire event or 
even track specific projects, like TEEB, as they are represented across the 
event. In response to these challenges, we have been involved with a group 
of scholars in the formation of an innovative approach to studying events 
that we term “collaborative event ethnography.”
The goal of collaborative event ethnography is to adapt ethnographic 
practice to the spatial and temporal demands of the event. This means 
breaking from the conventional model of the lone ethnographer and the 
geographically contiguous community and working to realize the benefits 
gained from a group of observers jointly developing an approach to the study 
of the event, jointly developing the analytic frame for the research, training 
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the collective team, working together around agreed-upon objectives, with 
shared guides to participant observation, common formats for recording 
observations, and modes of sharing the resulting field notes, recordings, 
transcripts, photographs, and images. In many ways this is designed to 
mimic the ways in which other groups such as conservation organizations 
seek to understand and influence the outcomes of field-configuring events.
In the case of COP10, the collaborative team involved seventeen research-
ers. Each member was part of smaller teams constructed around a matrix 
of themes and topics. The selection of themes (e.g., the tracking of market 
logics) reflected a combination of what we identify as dominant issues 
influencing current conservation discourses, based on our past research as 
individuals and our group experience at the World Conservation Congress. 
Topics were dictated by the COP10 agenda, which provided structure to 
the event. Small teams were made up of members aligning with at least 
one theme and one topic and were guided in their work by team leaders. A 
team of five researchers tracked the presence of market-based mechanisms 
and private-sector actors, but they aligned themselves simultaneously with 
a topic that allowed us to witness the distributed presence of a project like 
TEEB (where it was mentioned, how it was invoked, by whom, to what end, 
etc.), something that would have been impossible for a single researcher.6
As much as this chapter focuses on the presence of TEEB at COP10, 
it is important to note that what is presented here is also the result of our 
having tracked, through time and space, the way in which the promotion of 
newly “appropriate” modes of conceiving, making legible, and acting upon 
nature have gained credence and come to define a field or assume a strong 
“field mandate.” Through the work of the team at COP10 it became clear 
that TEEB both symbolizes and enacts such a mode and is in the process of 
assuming a strong field mandate within organized biodiversity conservation.
The Virtual Moment of TEEB
Held once every two years, a Conference of the Parties is the primary 
meeting of the parties to the CBD. It is the venue where those parties revise 
text that was negotiated at the interim meetings of various working groups 
and advisory bodies to the CBD and render decisions based on that text. 
These decisions structure the program of work and the ideological orien-
tation of the CBD. The conference draws together actors with an explicit 
interest in biodiversity conservation and configures power relations likely to 
mobilize material resources and institutional legitimacy in the continuing 
52 • Kenneth Iain MacDonald and Catherine Corson
but shifting practice of biodiversity conservation. To be institutionalized 
within the CBD is to have the sanction of states and to be articulated 
with related institutions such as the GEF. The presence of authoritative 
actors with the capacity to implement mechanisms through their respective 
organizations and personal contacts helps to establish durable associations 
required for the realization of natural capital. Alignment and articulation 
as ongoing processes are key to the (re)production of those networks. It is 
this temporality that makes TEEB a moment in the virtualism of natural 
capital and the site of COP10 an instance in that moment, because the 
work of producing conformity must, almost by definition, enlist dominant 
institutional mechanisms and actors, which are revealed in the particular 
moments and at particular sites like COP10 (MacDonald 2010a).
The Alignment, Articulation, and Orchestration of 
TEEB: From Study to Approach
TEEB’s capacity to generate alignment and articulation during COP10 was 
built on an existing institutional calculus put in place long before the meet-
ing. The TEEB team had to bring together people with access to diverse 
sectors (e.g., politics, business, science, governance) and distinct sources of 
credibility. They had to design mechanisms for the circulation of informa-
tion among individuals contributing resources to support the project, and 
they had to develop modes of communication that could both differentiate 
among these interests and maintain some degree of unified intent.
As TEEB grew from its origin as a proposal at the Potsdam G8 meeting 
in 2007 to an initiative, a study, and ultimately an approach, its structure 
took on new shape as various qualities and properties were used to align and 
articulate these different sets of actors. The best evidence of this lies in the 
composition of TEEB’s fifteen-member advisory board, which includes key 
organizational leaders such as the executive director of the UNEP, Achim 
Steiner, and the director general of the International Union for Conserva-
tion of Nature (IUCN), Julia Marton Lefevre, together with leading eco-
logical and environmental economists. Through the alignment of key aca-
demic and policy leaders, its embrace of so-called epistemic pluralism, and 
a diversity of economic instruments (Monfreda 2010), TEEB disembedded 
economic and policy expertise from their disciplinary and organizational 
confines and rearticulated them as allies in a common struggle.
In May 2008 the TEEB team released the first TEEB Interim Report 
at the ninth COP. By COP10 in 2010, the team had released five reports/
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websites targeted to different audiences: ecologists and economists, busi-
nesses, national and international policymakers, local and regional poli-
cymakers, and citizens, whose website was titled Bank of Natural Capital 
(http://bankofnaturalcapital.com/). Unabashed about its intentions, a syn-
thesis report (TEEB 2010, 4) states: “TEEB seeks to inform and trigger 
numerous initiatives and processes at national and international levels.” It 
goes on to list various targeted processes and venues, including the G8+5 
and the G20; the Millennium Development Goals; the 2012 Rio+20 Earth 
Summit; UN efforts to mainstream the environment in financial services; 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
responsible business conduct Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and 
industry voluntary guidelines.
The most striking evidence that TEEB is to become a key mechanism in 
state environmental planning and is likely to become an important “tool” 
in GEF’s funding arrangements is found in several recommendations taken 
in intersessional meetings of the CBD in preparation for COP10. From the 
May 2010 fourteenth meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Tech-
nical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA14), six key recommendations 
related to protected areas, sustainable use of biodiversity, and incentive 
measures explicitly advised parties and multilateral financial institutions, 
including the GEF, to look to TEEB for guidance in developing and 
implementing “additional means and methods of generating and allocat-
ing finance, inter alia on the basis of a stronger valuation of ecosystem 
services.”7 Two recommendations from the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working 
Group on Review of Implementation of the Convention direct the exec-
utive secretary of the CBD to extend TEEB by working with UNEP, the 
World Bank, and the OECD to further develop “the economic aspects 
related to ecosystem services and biodiversity,” develop “implementation 
tools for the integration of the economic case for biodiversity and ecosystem 
services,” and facilitate “implementation and capacity-building for such 
tools.” They also directed the secretariat to develop “capacity-building 
workshops, to support countries in making use of the findings of the TEEB 
study and in integrating the values of biodiversity into relevant national and 
local policies, programmes and planning processes.”8
The Distributed Presence of TEEB at COP10
The use of COP10 as the stage for the rollout of TEEB attracted the atten-
tion and resource investments of potential affiliates. Within the confined 
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space of a Congress Centre and over a concentrated time of ten days, 
TEEB’s distribution system was able to reach the major influential actors 
across a range of ideological perspectives, encourage alignment, and pub-
licize what actors no longer referred to as a study but as an approach. The 
discourse of natural capital was not, as in previous meetings, restricted to 
parochial discussions of economic incentives (MacDonald 2010a, 2010b). 
Instead, TEEB was well integrated across streams, making it difficult for any 
particular interest group to ignore. The heads of both UNEP and the CBD 
secretariat highlighted TEEB in the opening ceremonies, and it was a key 
presence in sessions devoted to ecological modelling, climate change, sus-
tainable use, and parliamentary decision making, among others. In other 
words, it was widely distributed, widely promoted, and widely accessible.
That large plenary rooms—spaces in which large audiences could con-
gregate—were reserved at particular times for TEEB-related presentations 
and that TEEB presentations were integrated into sessions organized by 
influential actors across the meeting indicated the intensity of the work 
that had gone into configuring a TEEB network prior to COP10 with the 
specific intent of foregrounding it during the meeting. It relies upon asso-
ciations with event planners or sponsors who have the capacity not only 
to “direct” through the configuration of spaces of presentation but also to 
integrate certain perspectives into a program in ways that achieve visibility 
and presence for that perspective. These associations, which were estab-
lished well in advance of the meeting, enabled TEEB to have a distributed 
presence at COP10 so that the performance of TEEB could occur in front 
of a diversity of audiences.
This orchestration structures the performance of the model in ways that 
reveal power relations configured through the agencement. By observing 
and tracking the distributed presence of TEEB during COP10, we could 
observe TEEB as a political project—an agencement that extends beyond 
its intellectual substance. We could see virtualism unfold in practice where 
alignment and articulation drew actors together not simply by sheer force 
of material domination but through appeals to particular interests.
The Virtual Reality of Natural Capital
At the end of the formal presentation of TEEB to the parties to the CBD, 
as the applause was dying down and people were rising from their seats, a 
senior executive of a prominent UN agency leaned over to Pavan Sukhdev 
and, presumably not realizing that his microphone was still on, uttered the 
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prophetic phrase “TEEB begins now!” This odd remark revealed COP10 as 
a critical turning point for TEEB. The transformation had multiple qualities: 
(1) TEEB was being institutionalized as a component of the CBD; (2) it was 
undergoing a metamorphosis from a study to an approach or a mechanism 
that would enable it to engage in performance and thereby draw more actors 
into its sociotechnical network; and (3) the results of its performance would 
create the conditions for the atomization and pricing of those “services” of 
nature not currently commoditized. To say that “TEEB begins now” suggests 
a shared understanding that what had occurred before the COP meeting was 
simply preparing the ground for the “real” work of TEEB.
As much as the performance of TEEB at COP10 can be analyzed as 
a virtual moment, TEEB did not begin at COP10 or at Potsdam. Indeed, 
TEEB and its role in the virtualism of “natural capital” begin with an ideo-
logical commitment to placing an economic value on nature—to remake 
nature into “natural capital,” a vision that began long before COP10. Con-
trary to the currency that seems to be accorded to TEEB, it offers no new 
economic instruments: techniques such as green accounting and valuation 
and calls to internalize externalities, even as they were contested, have long 
defined the competing fields of environmental and ecological economics 
(e.g., Costanza and Daly 1992; Costanza et al. 1997; Daily 1997; Ehrlich 
and Ehrlich 1981; Pearce, Markandya, and Barbier 1989).
While there may be little new in the economics that TEEB invokes, 
what is new is the purposeful alignment of particular actors—an author-
itative managerial class—brought together around it, the production of a 
visionary to serve as the embodiment of TEEB, and the calculated manner 
in which it has targeted key audiences. TEEB’s institutional appeal lies in 
this sanction and the (re)packaging, (re)presentation, and (re)distribution 
of ecological and environmental economics as a product—an ostensibly 
implementable package designed, in relation to techniques of governance, 
to avoid complexity (and in doing so appeal to policy makers) and to easily 
adopt the reductionist managerial logics of “best practices” that accompany 
the operation and regulation of markets. If TEEB is the packaging and 
vehicle for performing economics, it is the longue durée of intellectual pro-
duction that has produced a virtual reality of natural capital as an expressed 
image of the environment as a reservoir of capital, or “nature conceived in 
the image of capital” (O’Conner 1994a, 131). It is able to reproduce itself 
over time and space through the implementation of “regimes of invest-
ment” integrated in “a rational calculus of production and exchange” (Bel-
lamy Foster 2002, 36). Accordingly, it presents environmental problems as 
failures to account for or adequately value (i.e., price and cost) components 
56 • Kenneth Iain MacDonald and Catherine Corson
of nature. “The problem” in this vision is not with capitalism as a system 
of socioeconomic organization nor with markets as the basis for exchange 
and distribution but with a “nature” that has not been adequately priced.
In introducing TEEB at the CBD, Sukhdev described “the problem” as 
nature that has been economically “invisible.” This invisibility is a shared 
problem with a shared solution: “The economic invisibility of nature must 
end. . . . Governments must respond to the economic value of nature by 
changing policies. . . . Companies must respond to the value of nature by 
recognizing their externalities and adopting a different and more responsi-
ble forward behaviour.”9 The solution, in accordance with this definition of 
“the problem,” is to make nature visible as capital so that it can become part 
of the “rational system of commodity exchange” (Foster 2002, 35). Accord-
ingly, realizing natural capital entails breaking the environment down 
into specific components—(ecosystem) goods and services—that can be 
alienated and brought into being as commodities, given an imputed price 
(TEEB would say a value), and subordinated to market mechanisms and 
policy instruments that use price as the basis for environmental protection.
TEEB and the Legitimation of Natural Capital
TEEB applies conventional practices of cost accounting to an “invisible” 
nature, simultaneously enabling other “market mechanisms” (e.g., PES, 
biodiversity offsets). As such, TEEB steps in to occupy sacred quantita-
tive ground, providing the value determinations that “markets” and “pay-
ments” and “property swaps” require to be inserted into legal regimes of 
contractuality and moral spheres of equitable exchange. In this practice 
of accounting—or valuation—we enter the domain of Latour’s metrology 
(1987, 15), in our case, the making of nature as a regime “inside which 
facts can survive.”
“The number” as representation simultaneously holds and issues an 
appeal. It is discrete, it is easily subject to the algorithmic needs of models, 
and it communicates the authority of an imagined objectivity. But what the 
number appeals to is distinct from (though integrally related to) the appeal 
that the number holds. In the latter case, it attracts through its capacity 
to legitimate and to make actors and their interests, needs, and responsi-
bilities visible, with all of the accordant gains that visibility generates. In 
explaining their articulation with TEEB at COP10, for example, modelers 
spoke of an opportunity for their models to have a policy impact; activists/
environmental groups saw an opportunity to use TEEB to reach policy 
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makers and make them see “how the world really is,” and ministers of 
environment sought an opportunity to demonstrate to ministers of finance 
that biodiversity does have a “value” figure that can be incorporated in 
national accounts. As one said, “In my budget I had 6 million pounds to 
address fungal diseases in honey bees. The Finance Department said get 
rid of it, and I said I could, but it would cost 190 million pounds. They 
asked why, and I explained the effect of fungal diseases on pollination and 
the cost of decline in yields, which had been quantified by our national 
accounts office. I got my 6 million pounds.”10
Much of this appeal of the number is bound to the authority granted 
economics and cost-benefit analysis, but it is also related to shifts in the 
context of environmental decision making as practices of neoliberal gover-
nance have subordinated ecological rationales to economic rationales. Yet, 
these rationales also demonstrate that the intellectual apparatus behind the 
number with all its assumptions and calculations is incidental. Its power 
to convince is what really matters. As the head of UNEP Media reflected, 
“TEEB’s gone from . . . a kind of interesting subject for environmental 
correspondents to one now where business correspondents and the pol-
iticians are getting the message. One [reason] of course is the numbers. 
Sheer numbers make one sit up in bed, don’t they?”11 Like technologies of 
visualization, such as maps, models, and narratives designed to make nature 
legible (Scott 1998) and visible (Brosius 2006; Forsyth 2003), numbers 
create nature as understandable and approachable for policy makers and 
thus mechanisms for remaking reality. By packaging a series of numbers, 
TEEB appealed to policy, business, and public audiences not only to sup-
port conservation but also to help create the conditions for the emergence 
of a market for ecosystem services.
It is the claims made on behalf of numbers and the sanctioning effect 
of those claims that give us insight into TEEB’s primary claim, which is 
a moral one. TEEB leadership carefully crafted a message to seek win-
win-win solutions that would simultaneously encompass the environment, 
the economy, and people. The constant refrain across TEEB sessions of 
nature being the “GDP of the poor” positioned TEEB, accounting, and the 
pricing of nature as projects that served the interests of “the poor.” Sukhdev 
argued, “The central concern of TEEB is that the economic invisibility of 
nature has . . . exacerbated the suffering of human beings, especially those 
at the bottom of the economic pyramid. . . . That is the biggest finding that 
TEEB has to present to you today.”12
In this explicit calculation, designed to appeal to development practi-
tioners as well as conservationists, TEEB has become another moment in 
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conservation’s long struggle to become relevant to the poor. Like many such 
efforts, it endeavors to illustrate how, via its commodification, conservation 
can become compatible with poverty reduction (Büscher 2010a). This util-
ity of “the poor” in the promotion of the financialization of biodiversity is 
instrumentalist at root. In terms of degradation, biodiversity loss is greatest in 
areas subject to industrialization and urbanization, and that in fact is where 
we find the majority of the world’s poor—those without access to land and 
without access to clean water or air. It ignores the fierce and often violent 
battles over property and property rights that market mechanisms open up 
and appeals instead to social justice as a moral quantity best pursued and 
distributed through the market. In making nature visible and legible, the 
number abstracts and decontextualizes socionature and subsequently reem-
beds it in society (McAfee and Shapiro 2010), translating socioecological 
characteristics into a “nature” that capitalism “can see” (Robertson 2007).
The crucial moral appeal of TEEB, however, lies in implicit assump-
tions about rationalism and policy making. During COP10, Pavan Sukhdev 
stated: “Economics at the end of the day is the currency of policy, and it’s 
important to get the economics right. But economics at the same time is 
only weaponry. The direction in which you shoot is an ethical choice.”13 
The reliance of TEEB on rationalism for its own legitimation is readily 
apparent: “Understanding and capturing the value of ecosystems can lead 
to better informed . . . decisions; accounting for such value can result in 
better management; investing in natural capital can yield high returns; 
and sharing the benefits of these actions can deliver real benefits to those 
worst off in society” (TEEB 2009, 3). Sukhdev frequently repeated a phrase 
from management school texts: “What you do not measure, you do not 
manage.”14 Trite as this sounds, it is significant, since it frames the question 
of legibility, or the way in which a world (i.e., nature) comes into being 
through the production and accumulation of “facts” about that world.
These comments are grounded in a crucial assertion that “business” 
and, more problematically, government have not been acting rationally—
that in allowing the degradation of ecosystems and biodiversity, they have 
been undermining the capacity to accumulate wealth. Yet, rather than see 
this problem as malignant—as a contradiction of capitalism—it is viewed 
as a function of not having the right “information.” As such, these are 
also claims regarding the morality of metrics, as if to say that what is fixed 
quantitatively can be acted upon qualitatively—if policy makers had the 
right (quantitatively correct) information, they would make the right (qual-
itatively correct, i.e., moral) decisions—and that rational decisions cannot 
be made in the absence of “the right information.”
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If TEEB is the rationalist device meant to produce nature as capital, 
the success of that alignment is strongly attached to the qualities of those 
performing it, and rationalism requires the embodied enactment of exper-
tise to legitimate its authority (Carr 2010). Carrier and West (2009, 7) 
acknowledge this when they point out that some agents are better placed 
than others to conform the world to a virtual vision: “The visionary must 
be powerful politically and the vision must be grounded in a form of 
knowledge production that is powerful socially.” As the singular consistent 
embodied presence of TEEB, Pavan Sukhdev presented himself and was 
produced as a visionary for natural capital:
If you want to ask when the first glimmerings happened, it was when a 
friend of my wife’s asked me, “Why are some things worth money and 
other things not?” Economics treats . . . nature and its flows, its benefits, 
as externalities, and her question was very simple and very important. . . . 
I have kind of understood the issue, perhaps earlier than the average man 
on the street, and I just felt it was my duty to bring it out, to do as much 
work to develop this issue and understand why it is that we can’t seem to 
account for what’s valuable.15
These words position Sukhdev as a visionary. However, the production of 
a visionary also requires the sanction of other politically powerful actors. 
Where academic ecological economists failed to mobilize environmental 
institutions and organizations, Sukhdev has successfully directed the inte-
gration of their models into conservation institutions such as the CBD, 
conservation NGOs, states, and private-sector actors.
In many ways, the success of TEEB was tied to features that address the 
desire among CBD parties and other conservation organizations to engage 
with “nontraditional” actors. Sukhdev’s credentials as a “conservation out-
sider” served to legitimate his expertise. As the UNEP media official stated, 
“The success of TEEB is [that] we have someone like Pavan who’s available 
all the time for press, for media, for interviews to get the message out, with 
the credibility of being a banker, right? He wasn’t from an environmen-
tal NGO, so he wasn’t part of the converted, although of course he has 
been converted.”16
As the TEEB visionary, the embodiment of expertise, recognized and 
sanctioned by a loose coalition of powerful actors, Sukhdev was able to 
help shift the CBD in a new direction. He reflects what Greenwood and 
Suddaby (2006) have termed “institutional entrepreneurs,” actors who 
support institutions that promote interests the actors value but that have 
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been previously suppressed by other actors or logics. During COP10, for 
example, as the prominence of TEEB became evident, side event titles 
changed, corridor conversations shifted, and high-level politicians strug-
gled to reformulate their speeches in the language of ecosystem services 
and, more specifically, TEEB. Sukhdev frequently appeared on a variety 
of stages with other powerful actors, and his enactment of expertise and 
authority underpinned this capacity to achieve conformity—to enroll a 
wide range of actors across the event and beyond it, across networks that 
spanned private, nonprofit, and public sectors. Ultimately, TEEB cannot 
perform, cannot become part of the agencement, and cannot do the work 
of realizing the virtual reality of natural capital without the voice(s), like 
Sukhdev’s, that lend it the sanction of expertise and authority, the stage(s) 
upon which they enact expertise, and the audiences for whom they per-
form. This is what makes virtual moments like TEEB and instances like 
COP10 integral to, and integral to understanding, the production and 
legitimation of “natural capital.”
Conclusion
So, as nature has changed in human eyes, the ways that we 
deal with nature and each other have changed as well.
—james g. carrier and paige west, eds.,  
Virtualism, Governance and Practice
Bringing the world into being as natural capital is an ongoing and dynamic 
exercise in virtualism, where TEEB is a moment in the longue durée of 
the virtualism of natural capital. If virtualism is the process through which 
“reality” is made to conform to virtual reality, we describe a moment in 
the virtualism of natural capital and examine an emergent political proj-
ect—TEEB—as one key step in conforming image to reality. However, 
describing the emergent implications of that moment requires a capacity 
to situate it as an agencement that maps the heterogeneous ensemble of 
actors, institutions, and devices (the apparatus) engaged in the production 
of natural capital and the dynamic and contested relations among them.
Carrier argues, “What distinguishes economic abstraction is the com-
bination of its institutional power and its tendency to slip into virtualism. 
This is the conscious attempt to make the real world conform to the virtual 
image, justified by the claim that the failure of the real to conform to the 
ideal is a consequence merely of imperfections, but is a failure that itself 
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has undesirable consequences” (Carrier and Miller 1998, 8). We do not 
disagree with this, but our analysis of TEEB suggests three modifications:
1. The institutional power Carrier highlights does not precede virtual-
ism but is also brought into being as virtualism realizes some measure 
of “success,”
2. Virtualism is not something that is slipped into. The “slip” is a 
march—it is orchestrated, structured, scripted, and contested. Virtu-
alism is achieved through performance that facilitates the reproduc-
tion of an agencement (i.e., the articulation and alignment of actors, 
institutions, devices, technologies, and methodologies) (Hardie and 
MacKenzie 2007).
3. Human actors know they are engaged in performance and acts of 
articulation and alignment. While virtualism begins with an ideolog-
ical commitment, it must also be achieved through virtual moments 
that are linked together in an ongoing process of reproduction 
grounded in conditions of contestation. It relies on processes of 
alignment and articulation that draw powerful actors together to 
subsequently enact that virtual reality with an aim to establishing 
durable associations in ways that institutionalize and subsequently 
operationalize those models to convert abstractions into reality.
It is through rendering a valued nature “legible” (i.e., priced and costed) 
for key audiences that TEEB, as a component of natural capital, has been 
able to mobilize a critical mass of support ranging from modelers to policy 
makers, parliamentarians, and bankers. In its acts of reducing the complex-
ity of ecological dynamics to idealized categories and in claiming to be a 
quantitative force for morality, TEEB is engaged in the production and 
circulation of practices designed to conform the “real” to the virtual. Under-
standing these acts of conformity, we argue, requires attending to the spaces 
where the performance of this model and the “facts” it produces are made 
apparent. The CBD is one such site where the discursive strategies through 
which TEEB mobilizes the alignments and articulations required to over-
come obstacles to the realization of “natural capital” are readily apparent.
Indeed, it is these alignments and articulations that are a condition of 
TEEB’s production. Contrary to what proponents would assert, it is the 
network of attached actors that is TEEB, not the substance. As we pointed 
out above, the ideas contained in the TEEB study are not new. What is 
new is the packaging, its attendance to specific audiences, the assemblage 
(institutional conditions) that contribute to its prominence (presence), and 
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the capacity of those conditions and the presence they provide to draw 
actors to the package. TEEB is more than simply an ostensible product “for 
sale” (or, as Pavan Sukhdev frequently repeated, “a gift”), it is a packaged 
good, containing premises, assumptions, models, and predictions, that is 
intentionally networked and articulated with a broader group of actors 
and devices.
It would be an overstatement, however, to exaggerate the possibility of 
such calculation, for as projects like TEEB become dominant—as they 
are instutionalized—choice is constrained and articulation becomes more 
likely, especially if smaller actors seek to retain legitimacy and funding 
within the network of institutional environmental governance (MacDon-
ald 2010b). As we witnessed during COP10, sanctioning TEEB as a core 
mechanism of the CBD is one way to lend it institutional coherence and 
to mobilize alignment and subsequent articulations. The ramifications of 
this are difficult to predict, but the analytic utility of witnessing TEEB 
being converted from study to tool is that it provides the ability to track its 
deployment across space and to make more sense of the relations involved 
in its circulation and both the policy and material ecological effects of 
that deployment. Since the rollout of TEEB at COP10, for example, it 
has rapidly circulated through subsequent meetings related to biodiversity. 
A case in point was the January 2011 Symposium on Caribbean Marine 
Protected Areas, held in Guadeloupe, where a representative of Fonds 
français pour l’environnement mondial, Paris (the French focal point for 
the GEF), referred to “Nagoya, where a major event was the publication 
of a study of the valuation of ecosystems [TEEB], made public during 
the convention,” and the moderator introduced TEEB to the assembled 
audience of protected area managers, academics, and state and NGO 
representatives as “the international bible of socioeconomic assessment.”17 
The biblical status that TEEB seems to have earned so quickly reflects the 
shifting ideological and material landscape of biodiversity conservation, 
where a new “reality”—a new ontology—is being brought into being by 
reordering relations of power around the ideological project of “accounting 
for nature” and the political project of convincing business and policy-
makers that nature is valuable because it can be priced (see also Mac- 
Donald 2010a).
While we have restricted much of our analysis to a particular project in 
the production of natural capital, it is important to highlight the relations 
between the processes of alignment and articulation that we have described 
here and how they reflect the containment of an effective oppositional 
politics and the very possibility of imagining natural capital. In a volume on 
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virtualism in conservation projects, Carrier and West (2009, 1) recognize 
environmentalisms as different kinds of “ways of thinking” that “intersect 
with the world and people in it” and, consequently, the ways in which peo-
ple identify and evaluate their natural surroundings, but they give fleeting 
mention of the ways in which environmentalism has become a vehicle that 
operates in the interests of capital accumulation and a vessel to be claimed 
in the legitimation of distinct projects. Once seen as a singular and distinct 
threat to accumulation, “environmentalism” has become in practice a pol-
itics that can be enlisted, contained, and directed to the interests of capital 
accumulation.
TEEB is indicative of this process. Its rhetoric of crisis and value under-
pins a larger political project that aligns capitalism with a new kind of 
ecological modernization in which “the market” and market devices serve 
as key mechanisms in practical efforts to conform the real and the virtual. 
The consequences of this, however, are material and have been expressed 
by others who have described how the ascendance of neoliberal conserva-
tion has shifted the locus of decision making in international conservation 
(Corson 2010; MacDonald 2010b). Nowhere is this more apparent than 
in arenas of international conventions, where states are granting their 
authority not just to private investors but to speculators who, desperate for 
a new and profitable investment frontier, are sinking their capital into the 
promise of nature and speculating on its scarcity, all the while describing 
their actions as environmentalism (Sullivan 2011a). TEEB is a step in this 
process, legitimating the market as the means through which biodiversity 
is conceived, stabilized, and exchanged; it is the realm in which economic 
rationale, in realizing new forms of accumulation, displaces ecological 
rationale. Within this realm the financial modeling of nature provides 
critical new investment opportunities, and the construction of environ-
mental services as commodities opens them up to speculative behavior, as 
calls for internalizing environmental externalities are transformed into the 
“optimistic embrace of the returns that might be captured if this ‘value’ of 
environmental externalities can be priced and traded” (Sullivan 2011a, 7). 
We argue that TEEB is playing an important role in legitimating and cir-
culating the narratives, images, and ideas of nature essential to these new 
speculative nature markets.
As projects like TEEB become instruments for capital expansion, they 
become agents of nature’s restructuring, underpinning what Bram Büscher 
(this volume) calls “one of the biggest contradictions of our times”: the 
idea that “nature can be conserved by increasing the intensity, reach, and 
depth of capital circulation.” That contradiction is the virtualism of natural 
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capital. Increasingly, modes of conforming reality with the image of nat-
ural capital circulate in popular culture and the daily economy of life. 
As travelers purchase carbon offsets to assuage the “guilt” of flight and as 
schoolchildren come to understand trees first and foremost as services in 
the reproduction of capital accumulation, we move closer to the virtualism 
of natural capital.
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chapter three
Nature, Villagers, and  
the State
Resistance Politics from Protected Areas  
in Zimbabwe
Frank Matose
This chapter addresses what Harvey calls “accumulation through disposses-
sion” (2003, 93) insofar as conservation leads to dispossession, alienation, 
and ultimately impoverishment of rural people around protected areas. 
Through a case study of protected forests in Zimbabwe, the chapter argues 
that the colonial and postcolonial Zimbabwean state implemented prac-
tices to dispossess and alienate forest residents from protected forests to 
make way for commercial timber harvesting and wildlife hunting. During 
colonial times but also today, this was a deliberate strategy that should be 
seen in the context of forcing local people to become part of the reserve 
labor pool for (developing) settler capital. However, over time, forest 
residents developed various strategies of resisting the state bureaucracy’s 
attempts at dispossession.
Many studies have explored resistance around forest reserves (e.g., Guha 
1989; Peluso 1992; Moore 2005), following on James Scott’s studies in 
Southeast Asia of this phenomenon. This chapter traces how values placed 
on forest resources by different actors (see Matose 2002), institutional 
arrangements, and the way policies are framed in different contextual set-
tings conjoin to construct particular types of relationships among different 
sets of people around protected forests. The interaction of domination and 
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struggle results in a variety of outcomes around forest reserves (Haynes and 
Prakash 1991), characterized by conflict, resistance, and different forms of 
collaboration or cooperation. Different actors resist the impact of policy 
framing and institutional arrangements in different ways, yet this is not 
always easy to recognize, as for many actors “hidden transcripts” rarely 
come to the surface (Scott 1990). Hence, Scott (1985) earlier argued that 
studying the “weapons of the weak”—that is, the subtle struggles waged 
by the less powerful, such as villagers—is very revealing; the otherwise 
mundane activities of the less powerful become the more pertinent to study, 
as they represent the everyday struggles against more powerful state and 
capital agents. Thus, in this chapter, the emphasis is placed on agency 
within rather than on analyzing the broader structural political economy 
of neoliberal conservation, upon which many other chapters focus. Com-
munities that live within and around reserved forests in Zimbabwe are not 
known for their open confrontations with the Zimbabwe Forestry Commis-
sion (FC). However, latent forms of struggle not only are waged against the 
FC’s forms of power and hegemonic control over resources but also involve 
a variety of struggles within heterogeneous communities.
This chapter focuses on the agency of local people by engaging the 
quotidian politics and the moral economy of African villagers through a 
discussion of power, domination, and resistance vis-à-vis the state’s neolib-
eral accumulation project around protected areas (see Scott 1985, 1990; 
Hanchard 2006; Holmes 2007). The chapter adds to recent scholarship 
around the critique of conservation (see, e.g., Brockington, Duffy, and 
Igoe 2008; Büscher 2009; and chapters in this volume, among others) by 
exploring how local people negotiate state dispossession and exercise their 
power based on Foucault’s understanding of power and Giddens’s (1984) 
ideas about structuration. Foucault (1982, 217) states that power is in many 
formulations an “all-embracing and reifying term” such that in order to 
understand it more meaningfully, what becomes pertinent is to study the 
multiple power relations in a given context. Struggles over power relations 
are universal; they are found in multiple localities, transcending social and 
economic boundaries. Such struggles are over the effects of power, but they 
are also directed at the framing of knowledge about forest environments.
In the ensuing discussion, then, power is analyzed in terms of the way 
forest policies have been framed around forest reserves in Zimbabwe, 
particularly since the 1990s, as will be discussed in section 1. Power rela-
tions emanate either from application of capacities or through discursive 
practices, a process that entails both knowledge politics and direct overt 
domination. Power relations have to be understood from the perspective of 
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their origin, their nature, and how they become manifest. Foucault (1982, 
219) argues that “power exists only when it is put into action.” The way 
forest policies are framed is therefore a reflection of the exercise of power 
by forestry authorities. Nonetheless, forest policies do change, and under-
standing this requires an understanding of the concept of agency. For this 
understanding, the discussion turns to Giddens’s theory of structuration.
Giddens (1984, 25) defines structuration as the “conditions governing 
the continuity or transmutation of structures, and therefore the reproduc-
tion of social systems.” The structures are the rules and resources that 
facilitate the production and reproduction of social systems over time and 
space. Analyzing the structuration of social systems “means studying the 
modes in which such systems, grounded in the knowledgeable activities of 
situated actors who draw upon rules and resources in the diversity of action 
contexts, are produced and reproduced in interaction” (Giddens 1984, 
25). This means that people are knowledgeable agents who are actively 
constituted by and reconstitute social systems from their social interactions. 
Change is effected by people’s agency. Giddens defines agency not in terms 
of people’s intentions in doing things but in terms of “their capability of 
doing those things in the first place” (9).
Building on this work, attention is paid to the informal contestations 
of domination by the state by different social groupings. I argue, follow-
ing Scott (1985, 1990), that the “weak”—in this case, villagers—use both 
overt and covert forms of resistance. An attempt will be made to deepen 
discussion of whether the consequences of dispossession and neoliberal 
conservation for the weak are often more indirect, disparate, and individual 
than collective and overt and whether, in relation to this, one can discern 
different categories and types of resistance. More concretely, the chapter 
picks up on three threads from critical conservation literature. The first of 
these is that the phenomenon of the “scaling back of the state” associated 
with neoliberalization (Igoe and Brockington 2007, 436) does not mean 
that the state disappears; instead, it is merely reformed (see, e.g., Büscher 
2010c; Fletcher 2010). Since the start of the 1990s, the structural adjust-
ment imperatives of the World Bank have been foisted upon the Zim-
babwe state, resulting in cutbacks of state funding to conservation, in turn 
providing impetus for the FC (as a state corporation) to raise this funding 
gap from the protection of state forests. (It has to be noted that since 2000 
Zimbabwe has suffered a massive economic and social downturn due to 
political turmoil in the country that has only somewhat abated since 2009.) 
This issue will be returned to in the next section.
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Allied to the first point, neoliberalization has also led to the prolifer-
ation of privatization in order to make conservation a success (Igoe and 
Brockington 2007). In the case of Zimbabwean forests, state collusion with 
private capital has always been a feature of green capitalism since the turn 
of the twentieth century (see, e.g., Kwashirai 2009), but since the 1990s, the 
marketing of forests for funding conservation has gained new impetus, as 
discussed further below. The third focal point is in relation to what Igoe and 
Brockington (2007, 437) refer to as “territorialisation”—that is, the offer 
of state-controlled territories to investors through rents and concessions, 
an offer, as the authors point out, that predates neoliberalization but has 
become more pronounced because of it. In the case that will be discussed, 
territorialization takes the form of safari hunting and timber concessions 
to private capital. All of this has taken place under the cloud of a “discur-
sive blur” (Büscher and Dressler 2007) in the sense that increasingly I 
witnessed the forests being protected under the policy discourse of “biodi-
versity conservation” in sync with discourses elsewhere in the world but in 
contradiction to local realities and practices (Matose 2002, forthcoming).
The chapter is structured as follows. Sections 1–3 provide the backdrop 
to the overall argument by describing the setting of the protected forests. 
Sections 4–6 describe what local people do in different contexts to express 
their power/agency. In section 7 the chapter returns to the main argument 
about the effects of the state’s dispossession agenda on local people.
1. Background to the Zimbabwe Forestry Landscape
About 2.4 percent (9,414 square kilometers) of Zimbabwe’s land area is 
forested and managed on behalf of the state by the FC, which operates 
as a quasi-autonomous agency that is both focused on conservation and 
a capital-generating, business-like entity. A study site from one of the pro-
tected forest/state reserves located in the western part of the country was 
selected for this research, conducted mostly between 1997 and 1999, with 
less intensive visits in 2002 and 2011. The case study area included the 
Gwayi/Mbembesi Forests (hereafter Gwayi for convenience) located in 
the Lupane and Bubi Districts of Matebeleland North Province. To the 
south, the forest shares the border with Umguza District, while to the south-
west lies Tsholotsho District. There are resident communities on borders 
with the other districts that use forest resources, making the rural district 
councils (RDCs) part of the overall forest-outreach system. Each district is 
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subdivided into several wards. It is from two such wards that the two villages 
for the study in the Gwayi case were selected. This case itself was selected 
on the basis of being the biggest and oldest forest area, at over 180,000 
hectares (combined area), and gazetted in 1931 and 1940, respectively, 
for each part of the forest. The forest has a long history of settlement by 
largely Nbebele-speaking people, stretching back before state dispossession 
during colonization (1900–1940) (see Kwashirai 2009). The rest of this 
section highlights how forestry conservation in Zimbabwe has evolved in 
the framework of neoliberal pressures.
First, the 1990s witnessed the growth of the tourism industry in Zim-
babwe as the neoliberal economic dictates of structural adjustment pro-
grams (SAPs) began to take effect and led to the scaling back of the state 
(Ferguson 2006; Igoe and Brockington 2007). Whereas the FC prior to the 
1990s received full state funding for conserving forests, after SAP imple-
mentation less and less funding came from the central state, with this gap 
being filled by revenue derived from the new opportunities created by the 
neo liberal environment of foreign exchange deregulation. Tourism rose 
substantially as a result, bringing revenue from wildlife conservation, even 
within reserved forests like Gwayi. According to Hodgson (1989, 2), “the 
Forestry Commission has identified the Gwayi Forest as being particularly 
valuable as a wildlife resource, as it contains the complete range of eco-
systems and an existing valuable wildlife population. The presence of the 
tenant farming programme, isolating the major riverine vegetation area, 
interferes with the wildlife programme. . . . It is this area that the Forestry 
Commission has identified as being particularly critical as a wildlife habitat.”
A focus on revenue generation from wildlife utilization also increased 
the need to move residents from western Gwayi to eastern Gwayi in order to 
create another wildlife habitat following the success of the Insuza Wetland 
displacement in the 1960s, when forest residents were forcibly moved to their 
current location in western Gwayi (see Matose 2002). However, because of 
people’s resistance, a policy of “harassment” was initiated to induce residents 
to move: “On the issue of water provision, he [the senior minister of local 
government and urban and rural development] said he had noticed, when 
he was Minister of Natural Resources, that animals get much better atten-
tion. He cited Hwange National Park as an example, where he said there is 
a water-point every 2km interval that runs all day, to make sure water spills. 
But the Forestry Commission is denying human beings access to water for 
drinking, restricting people to three times a week, he said it was ridiculous.”1
Such relocation from the forests has been justified on two main grounds. 
First, the forest authorities argue that if any people are allowed to stay, 
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pressure will continue for others to settle, and this will lead to “the destruc-
tion of forests.” Second, the FC argues that it is not in a position to provide 
the level of infrastructure that is available to communal land residents 
and therefore would be guilty of depriving forest occupants of the right to 
share the development being enjoyed by those living in communal lands 
by allowing them to stay in the forests (Matose 2002). The need to move 
forest residents is often supported by “scientific” arguments such as the 
following: “The actual and prospective environmental changes associated 
with the settling of people in Gwayi/Bembesi forest areas is reflected by the 
results. . . . Deforestation is the first in the chain of environmental problems 
to occur. Removal of vegetative cover, as is happening in the settled area, 
reduces nutrient cycling in the ecosystem, exposing the soil to heavy rain, 
generating soil erosion and reducing soil moisture” (Mhuriro 1996, 32–33).
Forcing forest residents to move from landscapes that are identified for 
wildlife habitat was also attempted but defied, as discussed in greater detail 
below (see also Matose 2002). The attempts to remove forest residents 
from the heart of Gwayi forests constitutes the second form of neoliberal 
conservation practice. The claiming of territory (after Igoe and Brock-
ington 2007) occupied by forest residents was meant to create space for 
more wildlife habitat along the Mbembesi River (Matose 2002), but in 
practice the idea was to increase the revenue streams that would accrue 
from increased safari-hunting concessions. At the same time, the quote 
above also illustrates the “discursive blur” that Büscher and Dressler (2007) 
discuss in relation to neoliberal conservation (described in greater detail 
in Matose, forthcoming). Since the 1990s and with the rise in significance 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the FC (a signatory to 
the CBD as well as implementing its provisions) has used international 
discourses around this convention to justify practices that effectively mar-
ginalize forest residents. Table 3.1 depicts the number of villagers who are 
being affected by the FC’s need to depopulate the western part of the forest: 
over 20,000 people occupy a mere 11,000-hectare portion of over 180,000 
hectares of forestland.
2. Timber Concessions
Forest areas were originally set aside with the primary purpose of ensuring 
a sustained supply of hardwood timber to a burgeoning settler industry 
in the early twentieth century (McGregor 1991; Alexander, McGregor, 
and Ranger 2000; Mapedza 2007; Kwashirai 2009; Matose, forthcoming). 
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Gwayi 144,230 2004–5 1,124 11,012 5,136 2,726 9,052 1,012 6,000
Bembesi 55,100 1994–
2001
928 10,444 3,964 2,328 1,055 1,121 5,200
Source: Forestry Commission Report 2010.
Revenue from timber concessions continues to be important for the FC 
in the Gwayi case study at both organizational and individual levels. As 
an example, in 1998 forest managers covertly sold timber worth over 
ZW$1 million (US$56,818; US$1 = ZW$18) to a saw-milling company, 
and each of the officers involved personally received around ZW$200,000 
(US$11,363) in return. However, their covert rent-seeking practices were 
eventually discovered, and they were dismissed from FC service, although 
the money was not recovered (Matose 2002). At the organizational level, 
timber sales generated the highest revenue for Gwayi forest in 1998 
(ZW$2,677,000, or US$148,722), accounting for 63 percent of the total 
income for the forest. Despite this, timber concessions do not necessarily 
realize the best values of the commercial timber due to weaknesses in the 
bidding process between the FC and the logging companies (Mushove 
1993; Dore 1999). At the same time, timber revenue is not assured every 
year, as cutting cycles vary by species.
3. Wildlife Safari Hunting
For the Gwayi case under discussion, wild animals are a prominent part 
of protected forests in Matebeleland by virtue of being in close proximity 
to national parks, especially Hwange National Park. Since the 1950s, a 
thriving safari-hunting industry has been operating within protected forests, 
in part to fund the FC and in part as a component of a broader conservation 
strategy of the state. This is achieved through spreading the wildlife resource 
across different agencies. Due to the importance of the wildlife-hunting 
industry, in the 1960s forest tenants were forcibly relocated from the Insuza 
Vlei (wetland) to make way for a wildlife habitat and increase the capital 
derived from this activity (Matose 2002; see also Kwashirai 2009). Once 
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forest tenants were forcibly moved, wildlife species were introduced into 
the re-created space, and over time the species diversity has increased in 
relation to the market (hunters’) demand. The latest figures that could be 
obtained from the FC annual reports indicate that wildlife safari hunt-
ing generates over 60 percent of the agency’s revenue as of 2009 (over 
US$500,000), now exceeding timber revenue.
These two sources of revenue have illustrated the increasing importance 
given to forest conservation for funding a privatized arm of the state that 
used to be solely supported from the Zimbabwe treasury prior to 1990. 
With the neoliberalization of the state since 1990, the revenues derived 
from conservation have increased in significance, leading to changes in 
practices that in turn have adversely affected relations with forest resident 
communities. In the next section, an analysis is made of why conflicts take 
place in certain circumstances, while resistance and other relations dominate 
in others in response to the state’s dispossession and accumulation tactics.
4. Different Forms of Resistance around Protected Forests
Why do some conflicts become overt while others are manifest in other 
ways? First, some forms and types of resistance can be traced partly to 
the issue of cultural identity of the Ndebele residents (Matose 2002). The 
fertile valleys of the Kalahari Sand Dunes have been the Ndebele residents’ 
home for many generations. This way of life came under increasing threat 
from the cumulative effect of the state’s neoliberal conservation practices 
around protected forests, practices that threaten Ndebele residents’ exis-
tence and culture. Cultural identity also revolves around keeping large live-
stock herds, which require access to good rangelands, and western Gwayi 
provides that. Grazing is a highly valued resource for older Ndebele forest 
residents in both Gwayi sites, and these residents’ livelihoods are threatened 
if state regulations are highly enforced. These livestock owners would be 
left with no option but to take their battles into the open (see Matose 2002).
At the core of the conflicts are power-based negotiation over meanings 
and perceptions of what the Gwayi forest represents. Forest officials within 
the forestry bureaucracy at various levels formed an alliance to move res-
idents from the west to the less productive east in order to pursue con-
servation objectives and to realize more value from an increased wildlife 
habitat. This move to relocate, thereby dispossessing residents of their 
land, was intended to raise revenues to cater to the dried-up state funding 
(the rolling back of the state) and also the commercialization and de facto 
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“privatization” of the FC that took place in 2000. This had a precedent in 
the nearby Insuza Wetland in the 1960s, when wildlife was introduced in 
large numbers and became a source of revenue (Dore 1999). Older forest 
residents who own livestock resist relocation because of the great impor-
tance they attach to their way of life from livestock raising and farming 
along the fertile Mbembesi Valley, in contrast to the infertile sands on the 
eastern part of the forest.
What does this imply in relation to the arguments at the outset con-
cerning the effects of neoliberal conservation on local people who in turn 
exercise agency as theorized by Scott (1985, 1990)? Hanchard (2006, 35) 
states that actors who resist “are coagulants in the sense that they infuse 
a relatively self-contained instance with their own notions of justice, 
equality, and redress to significantly affect micropolitical—and sometimes 
macropolitical—outcomes in daily life.” This occurs through “episodic 
circumstances within their immediate environment” (33), and during these 
episodes actors engage in activities to express their agency in a variety of 
ways. What matters is the scale of protest and the degree to which dissent is 
articulated. Gross injustice leads to articulation at a variety of places, albeit 
at the individual level, but the cumulative effect is to be highly visible to 
the state, which is the intention of those overtly resisting the collusion of 
the state with capital.
Second, whether these different visions (transcripts) remain hidden or 
become public is linked to the state’s pursuit of what Scott (1998) refers 
to as the “high modernism agenda,” in this case, the ordering of nature 
through the practice of forestry. Sustained yield management illustrates 
Scott’s framing by organizing landscapes into forest reserves in the early 
twentieth century in the form of blocks within each forest from which 
periodic harvests are organized. The ordering of nature obviously affects 
forest residents, compounded by the privatization or intense commercial-
ization of forest resources by the neoliberal state since the 1990s. Prior 
to that, when forest conservation was fully funded by the state, the FC 
allowed forest residents access to game meat and living off Gwayi Forest. 
Elsewhere I trace how these practices have been put into effect since settler 
colonialism at the beginning of the last century (Matose, forthcoming).
As a result of the state’s long-established practices, villagers/forest res-
idents have developed long-term strategies to assert their agency. These 
assertions of power take the form of “hidden transcripts” (Scott 1990) that 
are a way of life for most forest villagers. Their way of life has evolved 
around a technical bureaucracy that attempts to tame nature as an accu-
mulation strategy (Smith 2007), with villagers forming an “inconvenient” 
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reserve labor pool. Forest residents who in the early part of the twentieth 
century were convenient to the forestry enterprise as reserve laborers are 
now considered inconvenient to a much more robust commercial conser-
vation, while their population has risen. State attempts at social engineering 
(Scott 1998; more robust details in Matose 2002) have led to the develop-
ment of parallel cultural practices that are hidden from the state’s gaze but 
highly intentional. Nonetheless, the effects of these practices on the forest 
landscape would be visible to state forestry officials, even though the acts 
themselves might have been hidden.
Any of the neoliberal conservation practices referred to in the previ-
ous section may lead to forest residents engaging in such forms of covert 
resistance. Scott (1985, xvi) describes these acts as “the ordinary weapons 
of relatively powerless groups . . . false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignor-
ance, slander, arson, sabotage . . . [that] typically avoid any direct, symbolic 
confrontation with authority.” Such acts are intentional on the part of the 
villagers/actors, and they are often unnoticed, although in my experience, 
the effects of these acts were often noticed. Acts of incendiarism would 
always have a profound effect on the forest landscape and would be noticed 
by the targeted state forestry officials. In many cases, those performing such 
acts would go unpunished, as they would be very difficult to apprehend. 
The cumulative effect of such acts, no matter how mundane, would impact 
the state’s policies regarding forest villagers/residents. The rest of this chap-
ter documents the agency of forest residents in relation to state conservation 
practices in terms of the framework provided here.
5. Overt Resistance
Case Study 1. Land and Pole Tickets in Gwayi West, 
September 1997
Things came to a head in terms of relations between the FC and commu-
nities in the west to the extent that the forester in charge was beaten by one 
youth from the community. My research work was suspended for a while 
due to tempers that were running so high in the area that it was too danger-
ous to have discussions with residents. On September 16, 1997, the forester 
for Gwayi was driving his truck within one of the residents’ villages. It had 
rained the previous day, and there were pools of water in the dirt road. 
When the forester approached one pool of water, instead of avoiding it by 
driving around it, he drove through it and splashed a young man who was 
walking along the same road. The young man was so infuriated (not least 
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because of the fines that his mates had been issued by this same forester) 
that he whistled for the forester to stop. The young man then walked over 
to the driver’s side of the car and slapped the driver, daring him to come out 
of the car. The forester asked the young man why he had slapped him. The 
young man replied that the forester had gone too far, and if he carried on 
giving residents problems, his life was going to be in danger. The forester 
then drove off, heading for the safety of the administrative offices. When 
I talked to the head of the Residents Association (RA) about the incident, 
he replied: “Of course, these young men react differently to being harassed 
by forest authorities. Sometimes that’s what these rude foresters need, to be 
beaten once in a while. The young man had been denied the opportunity 
to clear land for farming, and then he is splashed with muddy water, while 
at the same time these foresters don’t give you a lift. This is too much!”2
Rarely did contestation develop into open conflict around protected 
forests. However, between 1996 and 1997, relations between forest manag-
ers and forest residents in Gwayi West became so poor that they reached a 
boiling point. Overt conflict emerged over the use of land in Gwayi West, 
pitting forest residents’ tenure against the enlargement of wildlife habitat for 
forest managers. Only in the incident above was there a physical exchange 
between a resident and the forester for Gwayi. Even the mechanisms used 
by different managers during the period in question led to forest residents 
describing the conditions described in case study 1 as “warlike” because 
forest residents reminded managers of the 1970s liberation war, which 
led to Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980. Such mechanisms included 
the closure of water wells and dip tanks, leaving residents to rely on sand 
wells dug in a nearby river for their water needs and to buy chemicals for 
livestock dosages. These mechanisms were part of the general practice of 
“harassment” to which the FC resorted in order to compel Gwayi West 
residents to move to Gwayi East after initial refusal in 1995. The coer-
cion of residents was all part of the neoliberal conservation imperative 
that the FC developed post-SAP, as the rolling back of the state led to 
attempts to increase territory under direct FC control—in other words, 
“territorialization”—in order to meet survival needs in the absence of state 
support. At the same time, eviction fitted into the overall scheme of com-
mercialization in which poor, nonpaying forest residents had no role. In 
this way, the FC operates as a private enterprise when in reality it is a state 
conservation arm.
As a result of the pursuit of neoliberal conservation policy, there were 
increased attempts between 1993 and 1998 to relocate all forest residents 
from the west of Gwayi forest to the east. In order to realize this aim, forest 
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managers resorted to the prohibition of expansion of settlement and cultiva-
tion areas for all forest residents. This marked the beginning of heightened 
conflicts between the two groups. Not only did residents in Gwayi West 
resist the relocation, but they lobbied various political and government 
hierarchies to assert their right to stay on forestland. Conflict was shaped 
by the residents’ long history of movement within the forest. For example, 
some had to make way for wildlife in the Insuza Wetland in the late 1960s, 
and further movement was strongly resisted (Matose 2002). This was not 
least because there is a “black government” in power and “black” admin-
istrators running forestry affairs from whom forest residents expected more 
support than from colonial officers.3
Conflicts were fueled further by the FC’s lack of consideration of basic 
social issues for which the organization had been responsible prior to the 
neoliberalization of the state in the 1990s. The FC used to provide several 
services to forest residents with funding from the central state, which was 
then terminated. At the peak of the 1997–98 period, marked by frustrations 
on the part of forestry officials concerning the failure to realize the territorial 
expansion for wildlife, forest residents were subject to “harassment.” Not 
only were dip tanks and water wells closed, thereby cutting off livestock and 
forest residents from important sources of sustenance, but school operations 
were undermined through the prohibition of school reconstruction. School 
buildings in Gwayi West were mostly brick under thatch for classrooms, 
while teachers’ dwellings were constructed from poles and mud.
During this period, Gwayi West residents lived in perpetual uncertainty 
and anxiety about their future within the forest, especially given the expe-
riences of 1990, when some homes were burned and some people moved 
to distant communal lands (see Matose 2002). Foresters and forest man-
agers also continuously told residents to leave. There was no longer any 
reference to the previous permit arrangements, which had given residents 
the authority to reside on forestland at least up to 1987. In some parts of 
Gwayi West, the FC had granted grazing leases that effectively reduced the 
amount of land available to local residents in certain villages as a means to 
compel them to move east. Grazing leases were part of the privatization/
commercialization of forest resources under the neoliberal conservation 
culture that had enveloped the FC in the 1990s. Forest managers (the 
same ones who were subsequently fired for selling timber fraudulently) 
were alleged to be “very harsh and hostile as well as brutal.”4 Frequently, 
the denial of permits for construction materials was accompanied by threats 
of eviction from the forest altogether. Residents who resisted such permit 
denials or whose homes were in such a state of disrepair that they went 
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ahead and cut poles and thatch grass without permits received irregular 
fines from the FPU (Forest Protection Unit, an armed wing of the FC 
charged with antipoaching activities). These fines ranged from as little 
as ZW$200 (US$11) to as much as ZW$4,000 (US$222), but most of the 
residents charged with such fines could not afford them. This was followed 
by the destruction of the newly established homes of grown-up children.
The residents’ representatives eventually sought mediation by the 
governor of the province (as a senior ruling party official and the highest 
government representative) in the deteriorating situation.5 As the governor 
described the circumstances in a separate meeting much later, “the forestry 
officials use archaic legislation to repress fellow black people.”6 This was in 
reference to the unchanged Forest Act, which failed to reflect forest dwell-
ers’ current needs and circumstances. The governor was then instrumental 
in getting the FC board to facilitate the ending of residents’ “harassment” 
by managers. As a result, permits were resumed pending the outcome of 
negotiations for a potential Shared Forest Management Project. At the 
same time an FC board commission was instituted to review policies con-
cerning forest residents, and this in turn ordered officials to suspend their 
harassment until permanent solutions for the residents could be found. As 
of 2011, such permanent solutions were not yet in place.
Thus, in this first type of resistance, the cumulative effects of neoliberal 
conservation practices led forest residents to exercise their agency in the 
open, but this in turn led the state to develop even tougher strategies to 
effect its policies, resulting in an interplay between structure (the state) and 
agency (local people’s practices) in these power relations (Giddens 1984). 
Attempts to move forest residents from Gwayi West, pursued to dispossess 
local people from their ancestral lands in order for the FC to accumulate 
more value through the sale of wildlife, were successfully resisted by res-
idents who continued to live on their lands within the protected forest.
6. Covert Resistance
Hidden transcripts (Scott 1990) emerged from the state practice of privatiz-
ing or commercializing forest resources, in terms of which forest residents 
were marginalized from resources they had previously accessed through a 
permit system. This prompted reactions different from those detailed in the 
previous section. The most pervasive form of everyday resistance—pilfering 
or theft—was witnessed in relation to the practices of game hunting, as 
illustrated in case study 2, below. Hunting occurred in both villages but 
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was more pronounced in Gwayi West, where there were more long-term 
inhabitants, who have more of a history of hunting than more recent immi-
grants to forest areas. There was also less hunting in Gwayi East because of 
the highway barrier and the veterinary fences, as well as the distance to the 
Insuza Wetland. Hunting is as much about asserting rights and identity as 
securing a protein source. For hunters to be successful they have to operate 
in groups that endure over time and to be able to stay ahead of the FPU. At 
certain times hunters also rely on the wider community not to “sell them 
out” to forest authorities after hunters’ tracks lead into a village. There 
would therefore be group resistance in the sense that a whole village would 
be silent about the identity of a hunter or hunters when residents knew 
full well who had been in the forest recently. Hence a hide-and-seek game 
ensued that sometimes forced FPU members to be stern and search every 
homestead for game meat.
Case Study 2. Game Hunting
The following is an extract of an interview with a young man in Gwayi 
West about hunting:
We usually arrange to meet at some place inside the forest close to where 
one of us would have sighted a reasonable herd of eland. This will be my 
brother, our next-door neighbor [who actually lived a kilometer away], 
and a cousin and two of his friends. Our neighbor and cousin who is 
friends with some of the forest guards would have found out where they 
would be patrolling in the next few days in order for us to have a better 
chance of not being caught. We then take our dogs to the arranged 
meeting place around sunset. Hunting is usually done when there is 
full moonlight so that we can see at night. An eland herd with calves is 
the one targeted for easiness of kill. Dogs then chase the animals until 
they are tired. We will be running behind to find them in a circle with 
their heads in the center and kicking outwardly at the dogs. This is what 
eland do when they are tired. We then move closer and stab at those we 
can. At most we usually get two before they run off again. We then skin 
the animals very quickly and hide the skins somewhere and allow the 
carcasses to be drained of blood before setting off back home. The meat 
will have already been divided into equal portions for each person. We 
then ferry the meat in bags. We usually approach the village from indirect 
approaches from the forest to avoid our tracks being easily detected by 
the forest guards.7
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Because of the increased presence of members of the FPU, hunters no 
longer waited for the meat to dry while still in the forest. If the team were 
unsuccessful in one night, they would return home rather than sleep out 
and risk the chances of being caught.
Case Study 3: Grazing Conflict in Gwayi East
As demonstrated by the following case study, conflicts over grazing areas 
were witnessed not only in Gwayi West but also in Gwayi East:
I was a little mischievous, my children, and I cut the vet [veterinary] 
fence across the Falls road [Victoria Falls to Bulawayo Road] and let 
in my starving cattle. I had to save them from dying, as I had lost three 
already to this drought. As you can see, there is no grazing on this side 
at this time of the year, and I couldn’t watch my cattle die daily. I asked 
the forestry officials at Forest Hill [20 kilometers away] to help us with 
the grazing area that is not leased across the road, but they sent me to 
the vet people, who in turn referred me back to the foresters. I came 
back with no clear answer. At the same time the lessee of the grazing 
area directly across from us waters his animals in our river, in the green 
zone every day, and takes them back to the red zone. However, when I 
asked to do the same I was thrown back and forth. I decided therefore to 
be mischievous and cut the fence to let my cattle survive. Now the vet 
people together with foresters are coming to shoot my cattle for crossing 
into the red zone and back into the green zone illegally, as well as for 
cutting their fence. Now, if my cattle die, then my children will not know 
what cattle looked like, and thus my family will be dead. That is why I 
have called all the village men to come and witness the shooting of my 
cattle and my death. I have had to ask for permission from the school in 
order for me to attend this case.8
The narrator of this story was a rich old resident of Gwayi East to whom 
grazing was very important for his household welfare. He even risked his 
life to save his cattle. The case demonstrates the inherent conflicts between 
the FC and cattle owners over grazing resources in Gwayi East. Reloca-
tion, together with the enforcement of veterinary regulations, would reduce 
available grazing in the eastern part of the forest. Large cattle owners, who 
are mostly earlier inhabitants, are unhappy with the FC, and as the case 
amply demonstrates, conflicts can become open at any time, given the covert 
operations to ensure that livestock have access to better range in the west.
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These cases highlight hidden transcripts that emerge from the state’s 
neoliberal ordering of nature (Scott 1998), which resulted in the privatiza-
tion of resources such as game meat and grazing areas that excluded forest 
residents. The two cases of hunting and grazing represent people exercising 
their agency in a recursive way (Giddens 1984) in the face of constraints 
imposed by the state’s domination of nature. In both cases, forest residents 
reflexively decided to take actions against the structural conditions imposed 
by the state.
Resistance also took the form of more mundane actions in reaction 
to any particular neoliberal conservation policy and practice of the FC. 
Many forest-harvesting activities that were permitted prior to the mid-1990s 
became criminalized with the commercialization of the FC. However, res-
idents employed several covert strategies to retain access to forest resources.
Defiance is one form of resistance witnessed in Gwayi West. Women 
continued to harvest thatch grass when permits were unilaterally frozen—
and collection prohibited altogether—during the 1997 season. While many 
homes were also in a general state of disrepair, many men continued to 
harvest poles to rebuild their homes regardless of the formal institutions 
that prohibited the felling of trees for poles in the same year. The most 
pronounced defiance by all forest residents in Gwayi West is their contin-
ued stay despite the official policy and practices to relocate them to the 
east since 1993. Even with the power relations embedded in threats and 
practices of “harassment” by successive foresters, forest residents continue 
to live in the area they are supposed to leave.
The way different actors talked about various FC officials represented 
another form of resistance. Language in public arenas rarely expresses hid-
den agendas (Scott 1990), except in some circumstances in Gwayi West 
when residents openly denied being called “squatters.” Away from forest 
officials, however, residents expressed decidedly different opinions about 
prevailing policy and practice. For example, one old man whose family had 
been moved from the Insuza Wetland to make way for a wildlife habitat in 
the 1960s said: “Mrs. Farqhuar [the former safari camp manager in Gwayi 
Forest], who came and took land away from us, can kill animals at will and 
cut trees for pleasure, while we cannot hunt to feed ourselves, and yet she 
found us living here. This is very painful!”9
Covert resistance also took the form of pilfering and theft (as with the 
second type of resistance) of prohibited resources from the forest. Some-
times different households do the pilfering to “fix” forest authorities and 
assert a group’s rights to forest resources or just as a means to gain access to 
highly valued resources. Recourse to such acts of defiance illustrates the 
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agency that local people exercise in the face of neoliberal conservation 
practices. This agency is exercised in a variety of complex ways linked to 
both temporal and spatial contexts that the cases presented here illustrate, 
even though there are structurally dominant ways in which the state exer-
cised power in the forests, particularly the Foucaultian senses of discipline 
(in relation to ordering people to live their lives in certain ways that were 
not normal or natural to them), discourse (not only were people termed 
“squatters” when they had lived in forests before the FC, but local people’s 
knowledge was considered irrelevant in managing forests), and governmen-
tality (through Scott’s ordering of nature in certain ways and, together with 
these practices, the way people lived their lives to conform to this view of 
how forests should be). The cases presented here illustrate the feedback that 
local people provided to the state’s power (Giddens’s structuration [1984]; 
Scott 1985, 1990) by exercising their own power and agency.
7. Conclusions
This chapter has presented the argument that in Zimbabwe, the state, 
through the Forestry Commission, has been setting aside forest landscapes 
for purposes of conservation—ostensibly a public good, but in reality this 
public good has been used to further the state’s strategy of accumulation 
by dispossession (Harvey 2006b). This state accumulation has been done at 
the expense of local people who have been relegated to even poorer forms 
of existence to make way for the state to collude with private capital through 
the various conservation practices elaborated throughout the chapter. The 
chapter has also presented the outcomes of these processes of primitive 
accumulation, outcomes that lead to local people engaging in various forms 
of resistance.
In a Foucaultian sense, such resistance constitutes an exercise of power 
that, in most circumstances, takes more “quotidian” forms (Scott 1985). 
That is, the exercise of power is more observable in the nature of relations 
between forest authorities and forest residents and neighbors in the day-to-
day struggles over control of forest resources and the assertion of identity, 
respectively. As described earlier in the chapter, policy framing represents 
a way of exercising power in Foucaultian terms (Foucault 1982). Through 
the agency of local actors, these conservation practices are resisted, leading 
to contentious relations among the different stakeholders around forest 
resources. Forest reserves are thus symbolic arenas for realizing divergent 
visions and livelihood patterns. Early inhabitants of the forests clash with 
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forest authorities to assert their rights of stay (for forest residents), as their 
ways of life are intimately connected to various forest resources. Access to or 
use of some of these resources is nevertheless prohibited by the FC because 
of the value of these resources to the bureaucracy, especially under neolib-
eral dictates, where the central state has withdrawn support for conservation 
activities. Thus we have seen, for example, how the state protection of 
Gwayi Forest as a wildlife habitat has marginalized local people’s livelihood 
needs and sense of identity concerning forest use. This has resulted in the 
development of resistance by forest residents as they exercise their power 
and agency.
This chapter has presented the complex interaction between neoliberal 
conservation practices by the state and the resistance of forest-dependent 
people. The chapter has therefore illustrated the different forms of agency 
exercised by local people in response to the privatization of the state in 
forestry conservation. Such different types of agency are not commonly rec-
ognized in either the literature on neoliberal conservation or that address-
ing accumulation by dispossession, given their emphasis on broader issues 
of political economy. The findings have also made a contribution toward 
understanding the effects of the rolling back of the state raised by Ferguson 
(2006) and the impact of this process on different local people in various 
settings who do not just sit back in the face of this exercise of power but 
contest, resist, and struggle against it in many ways.
Notes
1. Letter by the area manager to the manager, Indigenous Resources Division of the 
Forestry Commission of Zimbabwe, “Minutes of the Tenants Meeting with Minister, 
J. Msika, on the 2nd of February, 1991.”
2. Interview with Gwayi West chairman of the Residents Association after the beat-
ing incident on September 16, 1997.
3. Expression from interview with Gwaqula in Gwayi West, September 1998.
4. One resident’s reaction to hard treatment by foresters in Gwayi West, November 
1997.
5. The chairman of the Residents Association as a local ruling party representative 
could access the governor’s office at any time through party channels.
6. Interview with Matebeleland North governor in Bulawayo over his opinion about 
the conflicts in Gwayi, October 1998.
7. Interview with Heneri, August 1998.
8. Interview with Mr. Ndhlovu in Gwayi East, September 1998.









Taking the Chocolate Laxative
Why Neoliberal Conservation “Fails Forward”
Robert Fletcher
As the full scale of the ecological problems confronting us has become 
increasingly apparent, efforts to address them have become increasingly 
focused on engagement with capitalist markets—a trend described in this 
volume as “Nature™ Inc.” Yet for many critics, it is precisely capitalist mar-
kets that are in no small part responsible for the environmental problems 
they are now called upon to solve (see Fletcher 2012c). Büscher (2012, 
29) thus describes neoliberal conservation as “the paradoxical idea that 
capitalist markets are the answer to their own ecological contradictions.” 
Consequently, while the ecological crisis threatening the future of life on 
Earth is becoming increasingly acknowledged within mainstream global 
society, at the same time it is becoming increasingly difficult to imagine 
addressing this crisis in other than capitalist terms (see also Swyngedouw 
2011), reinforcing Jameson’s (2003, 76) observation that “it is easier to 
imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism.” 
Accounting for this paradox is the purpose of this analysis.
It does so by addressing two interrelated questions. First, why is there so 
often a substantial gap between theory and practice in neoliberal forms of 
environmental conservation? As I will show, many ostensibly market-based 
mechanisms include in their actual implementation tools and strategies 
largely antithetical to foundational neoliberal principles. In addition, irre-
spective of their methods, such mechanisms often fail to achieve intended 
results. While these dynamics have been noted by other research with 
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respect to specific contexts and strategies, I suggest that they actually consti-
tute a common pattern in neoliberal conservation. I contend that this situa-
tion results in part from the particular virtualistic (Carrier and Miller 1998; 
Carrier and West 2009) vision underlying market mechanisms, insofar as 
they seek to transform the world to conform to a model that is assumed 
to already exist. This vision, I suggest, contains fundamental errors while 
offering such impossible criteria for fulfillment that reconciling theory and 
practice would in fact be quite difficult.
If this is so, however, it raises a second key question: Why is this gap 
between vision and execution so rarely acknowledged within neoliberal 
discourse? I demonstrate that, despite a common failure to execute neo-
liberal conservation strategies as envisioned, this reality is seldom directly 
attributed to the fundamental nature of market mechanisms themselves. 
Rather, it seems, neoliberal analysts tend to engage in a sort of “fetishistic 
disavowal” (Žižek 1989, 2008)—a simultaneous admission and denial—
often superficially acknowledging yet ultimately dismissing for the most 
part potential critiques concerning the presence of essential contradictions 
in the operation of neoliberal mechanisms.
I contend that this dynamic is sustained through recourse to fantasy, by 
means of which the gap between what Carrier and West (2009) call “vision” 
and “execution” (or, in Lacanian terms, between Real and Symbolic) is 
effectively obfuscated. As with all fantasies, neoliberalism is supported 
through stimulation of desire, in this case, desire for fulfillment (both 
material and sensual) via the spectacular consumption that neoliberal 
capitalism characteristically promotes. Such fulfillment, however, is most 
commonly denied, replaced by what Neves (2009a) calls “pseudocatharsis,” 
a partial satisfaction that paradoxically augments the very desire it purports 
to satiate by providing subjects with just enough stimulation that they 
are motivated to continue their commitment to neoliberal mechanisms 
in quest for the resolution constantly deferred. In this way, the failure of 
neoliberal policies to achieve intended aims is disavowed and faith in the 
neoliberal project sustained.
In developing this analysis, I build on a growing body of research address-
ing neoliberalization within natural resource management generally (see, 
e.g., Castree 2008a, 2008b, 2010a, 2010b; Heynen et al. 2007) and conserva-
tion specifically (e.g., Brockington, Duffy, and Igoe 2008; Brockington and 
Duffy 2010a, 2010b; Büscher et al. 2012; Corson, MacDonald, and Neimark 
2013; Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones 2012b; Fletcher 2010, 2012c; Sullivan 
2006a; but see Büscher et al. 2012 for insightful discussion of important sim-
ilarities and differences between these interrelated literatures). At the same 
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time, I draw on Žižek’s (e.g., 1989, 2008) idiosyncratic fusion of Marx and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis to take this discussion in new directions. While 
Žižek has employed his framework to comment extensively on capitalist 
mechanisms in general, the particular dimensions of neoliberalization have 
not been extensively addressed. Several recent works have drawn on Žižek 
and other psychoanalytic perspectives to engage with neoliberalism in gen-
eral (e.g., Dean 2008; Layton 2009; Glynos 2012) but have not addressed 
environmental governance. Likewise, several researchers have analyzed 
environmentalism from a Lacanian/Žižekian perspective (e.g., Stavrakakis 
1997a, 1997b; Swyngedouw 2010, 2011; Kingsbury 2010, 2011) but have 
left the particular dimensions of neoliberalization within environmental 
governance largely unexplored. By bringing all of these discussions together 
(in a theoretical framework described most extensively in Fletcher 2013), 
I aim to produce a novel synthesis that contributes to the understanding of 
the growing trend to employ free-market mechanisms to mitigate environ-
mental degradation. As Bloch observes, “Most critics of neoliberalism leave 
the reader mystified as to how such flawed ideas could ever have become 
so powerful” (in Peck 2010, back cover). Building on Peck’s (2010) own 
incisive analysis, the present discussion seeks to account for this dynamic 
with respect to neoliberal conservation specifically.
I begin by outlining the Lacanian/Žižekian framework underpinning 
this analysis. I then apply this framework to highlight a common diver-
gence between vision and execution in the implementation of neoliberal 
environmental governance mechanisms, observing a characteristic pattern 
of antineoliberal intervention in the face of market mechanisms’ common 
failure to perform as envisioned. I document a widespread tendency to 
deny this reality by explaining it not as a failure of market mechanisms 
per se but, on the contrary, as a failure to engage the market sufficiently. I 
analyze this as an expression of disavowal concerning the contradictions of 
neoliberal governance, describing the manner in which the logic of neo-
liberal discourse obfuscates these dynamics. Finally, I apply this framework 
to an analysis of what is arguably the most prominent form of neoliberal 
conservation globally at present, namely, ecotourism.
Neoliberalism, Fantasy, and Desire
Žižek’s framework (first substantially outlined in The Sublime Object of 
Ideology [1989]) is grounded in Lacan’s iconic triad: Imaginary–Symbolic–
Real. In this model, the Real is a placeholder name for that which subverts 
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signification, exhibiting a dual character as “both the hard, impenetrable 
kernel resisting symbolization and a pure chimerical entity which has in 
itself no ontological consistency” (Žižek 1989, 190). By contrast, the Sym-
bolic designates our attempts to represent the Real and impose order upon it. 
Due to the very nature of the Real, however, such representation inevitably 
falls short of its aim. The Real, as Lacan famously asserted, is thus “impossi-
ble,” incapable of representation; it is “the rock upon which every attempt 
at symbolization stumbles” (190).
As a result, there is invariably a gap between the Real and its Symbolic 
representation, with the Real comprising an “irreducible excess” overflow-
ing our illusions of order and coherence. This excess, denied within the 
symbolic order, manifests as “symptom,” the “return of the repressed” (Žižek 
1989, 57) by means of which the Real ruptures and undermines Symbolic 
attempts to create coherence. A symptom is thus “the point at which the 
immanent social antagonism assumes a positive form, erupts on to the 
social surface, the point at which it becomes obvious that society ‘doesn’t 
work,’ that the social mechanism ‘creaks’” (143). A symptom therefore indi-
cates a fundamental antagonism or inconsistency in the social order; it is 
a “surplus-object” or “the leftover of the Real eluding symbolization” (51).
The Imaginary, the third element in Lacan’s triad, represents our efforts 
to conceal this essential disjuncture by means of fantasy, which Žižek calls 
the “screen concealing the gap” (1989, 132) between Real and Symbolic. 
Fantasy thus “constitutes the frame through which we experience the world 
as consistent and meaningful,” obscuring the fact that the Symbolic order is 
in fact “structured around some traumatic impossibility, around something 
which cannot be symbolized” (138). In other words, “fantasy is a means for 
an ideology to take its own failure into account in advance” (142).
This function of fantasy is sustained through desire, pursuit of what 
Lacan called jouissance, usually translated as “enjoyment” but more 
properly a mixture of pleasure and pain that promises a satisfaction it can 
never deliver. Hence, unresolved desire is sustained over time, and thus “in 
the fantasy-scene desire is not fulfilled, ‘satisfied,’ but constituted” (Žižek 
1989, 132). Rather, “through fantasy, jouissance is domesticated” (138). In 
this way, fantasy’s promise to deliver the desired satisfaction at some future 
point conceals the impossibility of this promise, the Real–Symbolic gap 
it obscures, and the symptoms that signal this disjuncture as well. In the 
process, fantasy commonly invokes a scapegoat, such that the disjuncture 
between Real and Symbolic is further sutured by positing the infiltration 
of “an external element, a foreign body introducing corruption into the 
sound social fabric” (142). Consequently, “what is excluded from the 
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Symbolic . . . returns in the real as a paranoid construction of” that which is 
repressed (143).
As a shorthand description for this complex dynamic, ideology can thus 
be understood as “a totality set on effacing the traces of its own impossibil-
ity” (Žižek 1989, 50).
In applying his framework to social analysis, Žižek outlines two “comple-
mentary procedures” comprising a comprehensive psychoanalytic inquiry: 
“One is discursive, the ‘symptomal reading’ of the ideological text bringing 
about the ‘deconstruction’ of the spontaneous experience of its meaning. 
. . . [T]he other aims at extracting the kernel of enjoyment, at articulating the 
way in which—beyond the field of meaning but at the same time internal to 
it—an ideology implies, manipulates, produces a pre-ideological enjoyment 
structured in fantasy” (1989, 125, emphasis in original). In the following, I 
apply these twin procedures to analyze the peculiar persistence of neoliberal 
conservation (Fletcher 2013) in both discursive and visceral dimensions.
How Neoliberal Is Neoliberal Conservation?
As previously described, so-called market-based conservation mechanisms 
are increasingly promoted to address pressing environmental problems, from 
biodiversity loss to climate change, by international financial institutions 
(IFIs), national governments, private-sector firms, and, increasingly, even 
the NGOs ostensibly intended to represent civil society interests vis-à-vis all 
of the preceding (Levine 2002; Chapin 2004; Corson 2010). Such market 
mechanisms, which include established forms like ecotourism, payment for 
environmental services (PES), and carbon markets (Fletcher 2009, 2012b; 
Fletcher and Breitling 2012), as well as newly emerging forms including 
environmental derivatives and species and wetlands banking (see Sullivan 
2013b; Büscher, this volume), are explicitly designed to ascribe sufficient 
monetary value to natural resources that stakeholders will elect to preserve 
rather than deplete them, thereby incentivizing conservation over resource 
extraction (see Fletcher 2010).
Despite this growing enthusiasm concerning neoliberal conservation 
mechanisms, their efficacy in many cases remains questionable. Indeed, a 
growing body of research demonstrates that such mechanisms in fact com-
monly fail to perform as intended (e.g., Büscher and Dressler 2007; Carrier 
and West 2009; Fletcher 2012c; Fletcher and Breitling 2012; McAfee 
2012a, 2012b; Lohmann 2011; Milne and Adams 2012; West 2006). More-
over, in cases where neoliberal mechanisms do appear successful, there 
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is often ambiguity concerning the extent to which such mechanisms are 
actually faithful to the principles they claim to enact. Even acknowledging 
the extreme heterogeneity of neoliberalization in practice (Büscher and 
Dressler 2012; Dressler and Roth 2010; Harvey 2005), an essential neo-
liberal tenet dictates that primary responsibility for allocating resources 
should be left to market actors, with the state acting mostly to provide the 
legal and administrative structures shaping markets rather than intervening 
directly (see Foucault 2008; Fletcher 2010). This is certainly not to imply 
that neoliberalism proscribes all state involvement in the market, as critics 
often assume. On the contrary, Foucault (2008, 146) observes, foundational 
neoliberal economists, including both Hayek and Friedman, maintained 
that intervention was in fact necessary to “make the market possible,” for 
the market was not seen as a natural, presocial entity but as an artificial 
construct requiring continual maintenance (see also Fletcher 2010; Peck 
2010). Hence, Foucault (2008, 132) maintains, “Neoliberalism should not 
be identified with laissez-faire, but rather with permanent vigilance, activity 
and intervention.”
Even given this more nuanced understanding of the neoliberal state, 
however, it is clear that many ostensibly neoliberal conservation mecha-
nisms do not function as such in practice. In his analysis, Foucault (2008, 
174) distinguishes between “organizing” and “regulatory” actions, observing 
that while neoliberalism encourages the former (through state action to cre-
ate the “conditions of the market via legal and administrative structures”), 
it seeks to minimize the latter actions, which entail direct intervention in 
market transactions. Hence, mechanisms that involve substantial regulatory 
intervention rather than mere organizing activity can be seen as contrary 
to core neoliberal principles.
My previous research has revealed several instances in which ostensibly 
neoliberal conservation strategies function otherwise in practice. Here, I 
will consider just two of these, ecotourism and PES, as these are arguably 
the most paradigmatic (and widespread) neoliberal conservation mecha-
nisms at present. Concerning PES, research demonstrates that Costa Rica’s 
celebrated national program, while widely hailed as a successful example 
of market-based conservation, actually relies extensively on nonmarket 
mechanisms to function, including a national law prohibiting land-use 
change on private land and national fuel and water tariffs appropriating 
and redistributing resources to fund the system (see Fletcher and Breitling 
2012). In fact, voluntary market transactions, upon which the program 
is ostensibly based in its expressed intention to transfer payments from 
consumers of environmental services to these services’ producers, comprise 
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less than 1 percent of the program’s total activity, despite persistent efforts 
to enhance the centrality of this mechanism (Blackman and Woodward 
2010). As a result, over the program’s lifetime the state has been forced 
to increase its reliance on nonmarket tools in order to keep the program 
running, with the result that, in its actual practice, the PES system func-
tions less as a neoliberal mechanism than as a subsidy in disguise (Fletcher 
and Breitling 2012). Milne and Adams (2012) reach a remarkably similar 
conclusion concerning a community-based PES program in Cambodia.
My research on ecotourism demonstrates an analogous dynamic. While 
industry advocates often explicitly endorse a neoliberal approach to encour-
aging local participation in the industry, promoting ecotourism as a means 
for local users to profit from in situ natural resources and thus incentiviz-
ing conservation (what Honey [2008, 3] calls the “stakeholder theory”), in 
their actual practice planners tend to enact a quite different perspective. 
Planners’ efforts to appeal to locals commonly entail an implicit effort to 
acculturate the latter to aspects of the particular cultural perspective that 
motivates ecotourism’s practice, demonstrating that despite their neoliberal 
rhetoric, many planners actually consider such value change as important 
to successful ecotourism development as provision of economic incentives 
(Fletcher 2009).
Similar dynamics have been documented elsewhere (e.g., Carrier and 
West 2009; Büscher and Dressler 2007). Hence, Büscher and Dressler 
(2007) describe a common gap between “reality” and “rhetoric” in neo-
liberal environmental policies, while Carrier and West (2009) identify 
a similar disjuncture between “vision” and “execution.” On the whole, 
Harvey (2005, 19) observes “a creative tension between the power of 
neoliberal ideas and the actual practices of neoliberalization that have 
transformed how global capitalism has been working over the last three 
decades.” Peck (2010, xiii, emphasis in original) describes the history of 
neoliberalization as “one of repeated, prosaic, and often botched efforts 
to fix markets, to build quasi-markets, and to repair market failure.” Steger 
and Roy (2010) outline a long series of failed efforts of neoliberal policies 
to achieve intended results in diverse contexts, from Chile’s dramatic 1982 
recession following nearly a decade of aggressive liberalization through 
the second US President Bush’s plunging of the global economy into the 
current crisis. Indeed, one might assert with Peck (2010) that a neolib-
eral vision-execution gap is nigh inevitable, that neoliberal conservation 
mechanisms may in fact be largely incapable of achieving their lofty goal 
of facilitating substantial resource preservation on a global scale. Why this 
would be so is the subject of the next section.
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Vision and Execution
In his influential Brief History of Neoliberalism, Harvey contends that 
neoliberal economics functions largely as an ideological smokescreen 
concealing the fact that neoliberalization is at root a project by means of 
which a transnational capitalist class (Sklair 2001) seeks to consolidate 
wealth and power through “accumulation by dispossession”: “It has been 
part of the genius of neoliberal theory to provide a benevolent mask full of 
wonderful-sounding words like freedom, liberty, choice, and rights, to hide 
the grim realities of the restoration or reconstitution of naked class power, 
locally as well as transnationally, but most particularly in the main financial 
centres of global capitalism” (Harvey 2005, 119).
Neoliberalism here is thus understood as an ideology in the classic 
Marxist sense of a “false consciousness” concealing an underlying objective 
reality (see Scott 1990; Fletcher 2007). From this perspective, the osten-
sive “gap” between vision and execution in neoliberal governance exists 
because neoliberal policies were never in fact intended to function in the 
public interest in the first place. Hence, Harvey (2005, 19) asserts that 
“when neoliberal principles clash with the need to restore or sustain elite 
power, then the principles are either abandoned or become so twisted as 
to be unrecognizable.”
An alternate yet complementary view takes its cue from Polanyi’s (1944) 
analysis of liberalism’s “double movement” to suggest that neoliberal policies 
tend to produce such “perverse economic consequences and pronounced 
social externalities” that extramarket intervention is required to redress 
these excesses in order to stave off the social unrest they would otherwise 
provoke (Peck and Tickell 2002, 388). In this frame, the vision-execution 
gap results not merely from the project of accumulation per se but from 
the need to restore order when this project runs awry (see also Peck 2010).
Undoubtedly there is some truth in both of these analyses, instances in 
which elites cynically manipulate neoliberal policies for their own ends 
while subordinates embrace the dominant ideology offered to conceal this 
aim, as well as moments in which neoliberal excess demands a reactionary 
response in the form of state intervention. However, as might be expected 
given his trenchant critique of many aspects of Marxist epistemology (see 
esp. Foucault 1991), in a recently published series of lectures from 1979 
Foucault (2008, 218) preemptively contests the perspectives outlined 
above, viewing neoliberalism not as an ideological smokescreen concealing 
material interests but as a discourse, that is, as a “whole way of thinking 
and being,” a “general style of thought, analysis and imagination.” In this 
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understanding, neoliberalism does not conceal so much as construct real-
ity—or at least a certain depiction of reality—by generating a particular 
“truth-regime of the market” (144). This in fact brings us close to Žižek’s 
understanding of ideology: it is “not simply a ‘false consciousness,’ an illu-
sory representation of reality, it is rather this reality itself which is already 
to be conceived as ‘ideological’” (1989, 15).
Neoliberalism, in this sense, can be understood as a quintessential 
example of what Carrier and colleagues (Carrier and Miller 1998; Carrier 
and West 2009) call “virtualism,” a project that seeks to reshape the world 
in conformance with its predetermined vision while claiming to merely 
reflect the reality it seeks to transform. Hence, Lemke (2001, 203) describes 
neoliberalism as a “political project that endeavours to create a social reality 
that it suggests already exists,” while Bourdieu (1998b) calls neoliberalism 
“the implementation of a utopia” that paradoxically “conceiv[es] of itself 
as the scientific description of reality.”
From this perspective, then, neoliberalism would not be conceived as 
a mystifying ideology obscuring the “true” aim of class consolidation but 
would take at face value that at least some neoliberal advocates earnestly 
believe that their perspective is capable of achieving intended goals and 
genuinely strive to make it do so (Li 2007; Peck 2010). This is certainly 
not to deny that the philosophy can be used cynically at times to pursue 
actors’ self-interested ends (as neoliberal theory itself would indeed predict) 
or conceal their true intentions, merely that one cannot necessarily assume 
such motives at the outset in all cases. In this understanding, neoliberal 
policies would be seen to fail to achieve intended aims when their virtu-
alistic vision conflicts with the reality it seeks to transform. Büscher and 
Dressler (2007) therefore attribute disjuncture between rhetoric and reality 
in neoliberal conservation to the fact that projects tend to operate with 
simplistic blueprints that do not do justice to the complex local realities 
they confront, echoing Scott’s (1998) influential analysis of the common 
failure of large-scale transformational projects in general. In a Lacanian 
frame, this would be described as a manifestation of the inevitable gap 
between Real and Symbolic representation.
I would go further, however, to contend that neoliberal projects fail not 
merely due to their simplified vision per se but due to the particular nature 
of this vision. First, there is obviously the fact that, as a number of critical 
economists recognize, the so-called free market that neoliberal policies seek 
to implement and harness is extremely difficult—if not impossible—to real-
ize. As Stiglitz (2008b, 42) describes, “Markets were efficient only if capital 
markets were impossibly perfect. . . . There could be no externalities (no 
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problems of air and water pollution), no public goods, no issues of learning, 
and no advances in technology that were the result either of learning or 
expenditures on R&D. . . . [T]here also could not be any imperfections 
of information, changes in the information structure, or asymmetries of 
information.”
In addition to these significant obstacles, the theory of essential human 
nature—and thus of the nature of motivation, human relations, and social 
change as well—in which neoliberalism is grounded is, I would argue, 
so fundamentally flawed, misrepresenting in such significant ways how 
humans actually behave, that it would in fact be quite difficult for neo-
liberal policies to function as intended. Specifically, neoliberal theory is 
commonly grounded in a rational actor/Homo economicus model of human 
nature and behavior, assuming that people seek, first and foremost, to max-
imize their material utility and perform cost-benefit assessments in order to 
do so (see Foucault 2008). The basic neoliberal governance strategy—to 
create incentive structures that encourage people to exercise their rational 
choice in socially desired ways—follows fundamentally from this view 
(Fletcher 2010). Yet this model of human nature has long been contested 
by anthropologists, among others, who contend that it does not accurately 
describe human motivation in all situations and contexts (see Büscher et 
al. 2012 for an overview of this critique). Graeber (2011), indeed, contends 
that only through centuries of concerted violence, both physical and con-
ceptual, has this peculiar vision become so widely accepted. And if the 
understanding of the nature of human motivation informing neoliberal 
policies is so essentially flawed—if there is such a fundamental gap, in 
other words, between the Real of human nature and its representation in 
neoliberal theory—policies and practices following from this understand-
ing would be hard-pressed to function otherwise.
Disaster and Dissimulation
Notwithstanding the frequency of its occurrence, neoliberalism’s failure 
to achieve intended results is rarely explicitly acknowledged—is, in fact, 
commonly denied or explained away—within mainstream economic 
discourse (Peck 2010; Büscher et al. 2012). Consider, for instance, the 
dominant response to the current global economic crisis. The deepening 
recession of late 2008 witnessed a proliferation of statements claiming that 
the crisis signaled neoliberalism’s wholesale failure and the need to return 
to some type of Keynesianesque regulatory regime (see Peters 2008). Stiglitz 
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(2008a), most trenchantly perhaps, proclaimed: “Neo-liberal market fun-
damentalism was always a political doctrine serving certain interests. It 
was never supported by economic theory. Nor, it should now be clear, is it 
supported by historical experience. Learning this lesson may be the silver 
lining in the cloud now hanging over the global economy.”
Yet less than a year later, following the infamous bailout packages imple-
mented in a number of countries, such voices had largely fallen silent or 
even reversed their positions. Thus the IMF (2009, 9, emphasis added) 
stated in its annual report: “The seeds of the global crisis were sown during 
the years of high growth and low interest rates that bred excessive optimism 
and risk taking and spawned a broad range of failures—in market discipline, 
financial regulation, macroeconomic policies, and global oversight.” The 
last three of these “failures,” of course, refer to errors in state governance, 
while the first concerns the “irrational exuberance” of market players (a 
classic neoliberal scapegoat—see Dean 2008; Layton 2009). Similarly, an 
open letter signed by more than two hundred economists published in the 
New York Times in January 2009 asserted, “Lower tax rates and a reduction 
in the burden of government are the best ways of using fiscal policy to boost 
growth” (cited in Peck 2010, 270).
All of this conforms to Foucault’s (2008, 116) characterization of the 
logic of neoliberal response to economic crisis in general as maintaining, 
“Nothing proves that the market economy is intrinsically defective since 
everything attributed to it as a defect and as the effect of its defectiveness 
should really be attributed to the state.” A similar response had predominated 
in past neoliberal crises as well. Harvey (2005, 97) describes this same logic 
in the mainstream response to the 1997 Asian financial collapse, observing, 
“The standard IMF/US Treasury explanation for the crisis was too much 
state intervention and corrupt relationships between state and business 
(‘crony capitalism’). Further neoliberalization was the answer.” Steger and 
Roy (2010) identify an analogous reaction to the series of crises precipitated 
by neoliberal restructuring in the United States and elsewhere over the span 
of several decades. In short, Peck (2010, 6) observes, “It is both an indict-
ment of neoliberalism and testament to its dogged dynamism, of course, 
that laboratory experiments do not ‘work.’ They have nonetheless tended 
to ‘fail forward,’ in that their repeated manifest inadequacies have—so far 
anyway—repeatedly animated further rounds of neoliberal intervention.”
This response, which I call “the beatings will continue until morale 
improves” strategy, has been prevalent within the realm of environmental 
governance as well. In October 2008, as the crisis deepened, the Inter-
national Union for Conservation of Nature held its World Conservation 
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Congress in Barcelona, Spain, during which, as Ken MacDonald (2010a) 
describes, a market agenda that had until then been hotly debated among 
the organization’s membership achieved hegemony within the upper 
echelons. Christine MacDonald (2009) thus observes: “By early October, 
when the world’s conservation elites gathered in Barcelona for their biggest 
meeting of the year, markets were crashing around the world, spreading 
panic and doubt about the wisdom of unbridled free market economics. 
But the conservationists, corporate CEOs, billionaire philanthropists, and 
heads of state and royal houses don’t seem to have heard the news. In 
Barcelona’s conference rooms and banquet halls, the conversation centered 
on how environmental groups must become even more like corporations.”
How do we account for this persistent resilience of neoliberal ideology 
in the face of widespread critique concerning its failure in practice? In 
Harvey’s Marxist vision, of course, this is easily explained: if neoliberal 
ideology is not intended to accurately account for reality at all but merely 
to obfuscate the class project it seeks to legitimate, then “failure” is merely 
further obfuscated through additional obscuring rhetoric. Undoubtedly, 
again, there is some truth in this view, at least with respect to some (perhaps 
most) stakeholders. Yet this appears to be only part of the picture. Büscher 
and colleagues (2012, 24) offer a more nuanced analysis of this issue in 
seeking to explain “why the neoliberalizing of environmental conservation 
is so opaque and seductive to those involved with conservation work.” They 
contend that neoliberal conservation tends to obfuscate fundamental con-
tradictions in its deployment by means of three main tactics: (1) “win-win” 
rhetoric asserting that these contradictions can be resolved through the very 
processes that stimulate them; (2) media spectacle creating “the appearance 
of general consensus with the ideological assumptions of neoliberal capital-
ism” (Büscher et al. 2012, 18, emphasis in original); and (3) the aggressive 
disciplining of dissenting voices that question these representations. All of 
this, they contend, results in a sort of “closed loop” thinking, “whereby 
in failing to take into account the wider processes of which it is part, the 
self-corrective actions of an ill-functioning system perpetuate illness-causing 
conditions, while providing temporary illusion of improvement” (14).
Yet, again, this may explain only a portion of the phenomenon in ques-
tion. Consider the following statement, offered by an ecological economist 
in the online discussion of a critique of emerging conservation financializa-
tion strategies (Sullivan 2010b): “If we were serious about having a true mar-
ket economy, mergers and acquisitions and other means of concentrating 
power would be disallowed” (William Rees, http://www.capitalinstitute.org/
forum/ecosystem/can-nature-be-monetized-capital-institute-conversation, 
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accessed October 15, 2010). This statement strikes me as extraordinary, 
tantamount to acknowledging an inherent contradiction at the very heart of 
neoliberal policy. For free markets to exist, Rees appears to be saying, they 
must be regulated in ways diametrically opposed to the essential neoliberal 
principle dictating that the state should not intervene directly in the market 
to regulate players’ resource allocation decisions. This contradictory pro-
nouncement seems to go beyond the techniques of obfuscation that Büscher 
and colleagues (2012) highlight. Rather, it smacks of the dynamic that Žižek 
(1989, 12) calls “fetishistic disavowal,” represented by the formula: “I know 
very well, but still . . .” In Žižek’s (2008, 14) description, for instance, a Cold 
War Communist might admit, “I know very well that things are horrible in 
the Soviet Union, but I nevertheless believe in Soviet socialism.” Similarly, 
in the statement cited above, Rees seems to be saying, “I know free markets 
are impossible; nevertheless, I believe that they can function.”
Likewise, Büscher and colleagues (2012, 15) note that “not all conser-
vationists are so smitten by the allure of neoliberal solutions,” highlighting 
instances in which critical assessments of market-based mechanisms have 
been published by prominent mainstream voices in core conservation 
journals (e.g., Chan et al. 2007; Child 2009; Ehrenfeld 2008; Peterson 
et al. 2009; Redford and Adams 2009; Walker et al. 2009). Yet such “crit-
ical messages are often ignored by mainstream organizations and media, 
and if they are acknowledged, often denied or twisted to suit particular 
neoliberal objectives” (Büscher et al. 2012, 22). As a result, the authors 
observe, paradoxically, that “alternative viewpoints do not always need to be 
actively suppressed in order to be disciplined. Indeed, they can perversely 
be stimulated as some kind of catharsis, without impacting on the broader 
hegemonic system” (22).
A Lacanian/Žižekian analysis may help to shed light on this dynamic by 
framing neoliberal theory and the practices through which it is implemented 
as a Symbolic order that attempts to simultaneously represent and shape 
the Real in virtualistic fashion. The Real, of course, inevitably exceeds this 
imposition, generating the characteristic gap between vision and execution 
in neoliberal governance observed earlier. This gap manifests as symptom, 
the main form of which, as Žižek (2008) describes of capitalism in general, 
is superfluous waste: the environmental and social excess that neoliberalism 
externalizes in its quest for profit, namely, the ecological damage wrought by 
and the masses rendered expendable within the capitalist production process.
The gap between neoliberal theory and the Real it confronts, as well as 
the waste accumulated as symptom of this gap, is sutured within the Imag-
inary through fantasy. Central to neoliberal environmental governance, 
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from this perspective, is the fantasy that “capitalist markets are the answer 
to their own ecological contradictions” (Büscher 2012, 29; see also Swyn-
gedouw 2010, 2011). This, of course, is the underlying logic of all of the 
governance mechanisms described at the outset, functioning like Žižek’s 
oft-quoted example of the chocolate laxative, a real product that claims 
to be the antidote to the problem (constipation) it itself provokes. This 
conviction is grounded in two further fantasies: that by addressing environ-
mental and social issues in the production and consumption process, cap-
italism can facilitate (1) accumulation without end and (2) consumption 
without negative consequences. In this second fantasy, so-called ethical 
consumption claims to resolve the contradiction between the increased 
consumption essential to capitalist expansion and the ecological/social 
crisis provoked by this expansion by ostensibly linking purchase to social 
programs that claim to actually redress rather than stimulate such crisis 
(Carrier 2010; Igoe 2010; Igoe, Neves, and Brockington 2010; West 2010). 
In the first fantasy, meanwhile, market environmentalism claims to resolve 
the parallel opposition between economic growth and environmental 
limits by promoting ostensibly sustainable—even “nonconsumptive” 
(West 2006)—resource exploitation (Brockington, Duffy, and Igoe 2008; 
Büscher et al. 2012).
The gaps between Real and Symbolic in all of these constructions have 
been increasingly highlighted by critical analysis. “Ethical consumption” 
has been shown, in many cases, to carry substantial social and environ-
mental consequences that are obscured by self-congratulatory rhetoric 
claiming universally beneficial outcomes (Carrier 2010; Igoe 2010; Igoe, 
Neves, and Brockington 2010; West 2010). The common recourse to 
celebrity endorsement for environmental causes and products aids such 
obfuscation (Brockington 2009; Sullivan 2011b). Market environmental-
ism, meanwhile, entails its own contradictions, leading conservationists to 
increasingly conclude that its aim to reconcile economic development and 
environmental protection has largely failed thus far (see, e.g., McShane 
et al. 2011)—without, however, attributing this failure to market mecha-
nisms themselves but rather to ostensibly inherent “trade-offs” between 
conservation and development concerns (see Fletcher 2012c).
All of this, however, is further mystified by means of the metafantasy 
at the heart of neoliberal governance in general, which Dean (2008, 55), 
drawing on Žižek, calls the “fantasy of free trade”: “The fantasy of free 
trade covers over persistent market failure, structural inequalities, the vio-
lence of privatization, and the redistribution of wealth to the ‘have mores.’ 
Free trade sustains at the level of fantasy what it seeks to avoid at the level 
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of reality—namely, actually free trade among equal players, that is equal 
participants with equal opportunities to establish the rules of the game, 
access information, distribution, and financial networks, etc.” By means of 
this fantasy, any shortcomings of neoliberal policies can be explained away 
via the logic that these problems are due not to neoliberalism itself but to 
the failure to implement it properly and to a sufficient degree. Hence Fou-
cault’s (2008, 116) characterization of neoliberal reasoning, cited above, 
as asserting that “nothing proves that the market economy is intrinsically 
defective since everything attributed to it as a defect and as the effect of 
its defectiveness should really be attributed to the state.” In other words, 
failure is not failure of market logic but merely “market failure,” a techno-
cratic rather than political problem (Li 2007; Büscher 2010a) remedied 
by simply working harder to “get the market right.” Hence, the fantasy 
of free trade dictates that no matter how greatly neoliberal policies fail 
in practice, the fiction can be sustained that this failure is due not to any 
fundamental errors or contradictions in these policies’ internal logic but 
rather to the fact that they have been implemented incompletely; thus, if 
only neoliberalism could function with less inhibition, less state regulation, 
it would actually perform as intended. As Žižek observes, in this fantasy 
(neoliberal) capitalism fails because it is not pure enough, reinforcing his 
observation that “ideology really succeeds when even the facts which at 
first sight contradict it start to function as arguments in its favour” (1989, 
50). In this way, critique of neoliberal logic itself is effectively neutralized.
The Objet Petit A of Desire
As Dean (2008) points out, it is of course desire that sustains the fantasy 
of free trade: desire on the part of neoliberal advocates to see their policies 
function as intended; desire on the part of those excluded from neoliber-
alism’s benefits to finally receive the material rewards dangled in front of 
them. De Vries (2007) identifies this latter function of desire in interna-
tional development policy, wherein the masses excluded from the fruits 
of development may nevertheless sustain faith in development’s potential 
due to their desire to receive the benefits (projects, public works, etc.) long 
promised by planners (see also Glynos 2012). It is this same desire, I suggest, 
that in part makes neoliberalism so resilient, so resistant to critique; rather 
than undermining the perspective, paradoxically, neoliberalism’s thwarting 
of the jouissance it promises merely enhances its appeal by augmenting 
desire for the elusive fulfillment. In addition, of course, neoliberalism does 
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in fact deliver a semblance of a promised pleasure, and thus “for quite a 
few people, capitalism is not just hard graft. It is also fun. People get stuff 
from it—and not just more commodities. Capitalism has a kind of crazy 
vitality. It doesn’t just line its pockets. It also appeals to gut feelings” (Thrift 
2005, 1; see also Glynos 2012). Yet this may merely enhance one’s ideolog-
ical attachment by stimulating desire for further sensation in pursuit of a 
satisfaction constantly deferred (Fletcher and Neves 2012).
To further illuminate this process it may help to return to Žižek and 
Lacan, who claim that the desire stimulated by fantasy originates in a 
fundamental “lack” intrinsic to subject formation for which the pursuit 
of jouissance seeks in a sense to compensate. Freud (1962) described an 
“oceanic feeling,” which he claimed represented a reminder, in a sense, 
of the primordial sense of oneness one experiences during preseparation 
infancy. Echoing this, Lacan distinguished jouissance (lowercased) from 
Jouissance (capitalized), describing the latter as akin to Freud’s oceanic 
feeling: a primordial sense of wholeness that subjects attempt to recapture 
later in life in the form of a lesser, derivative jouissance (see Fink 1995). As a 
result of its origin in an essential lack, however, jouissance, as noted earlier, 
promises a satisfaction it can never deliver, ensuring, paradoxically, that 
unresolved desire is sustained rather than resolved, for as Lacan asserted, 
desire is always at root a desire for desire—what Lacan termed the impos-
sible objet petit a—itself. Indeed, Žižek contends that the very idea of a 
primal Jouissance, which present jouissance seeks to replicate, is in fact 
illusory, a “fantasmatic construction” sustaining the delusion that “there 
was once a time or space before lack” (McMillan 2008, 22).
All of this coalesces in the peculiar configuration of neoliberal envi-
ronmental governance, in which contradictions are concealed and faith 
is sustained through fantasies of future fulfillment of the desire paradoxi-
cally stimulated by neoliberal arts of government themselves. This is well 
illustrated by the example of ecotourism, probably the most widespread 
form of neoliberal environmental governance in the world at present 
(see, e.g., Duffy 2002, 2008, 2012; Duffy and Moore 2010; Fletcher 
2009, 2011; Fletcher and Neves 2012). As described in detail elsewhere 
(Fletcher 2011; Fletcher and Neves 2012), the tremendous attention 
devoted to the potential of ecotourism to solve myriad environmental and 
social ills over the past several decades (see Honey 2008) reflects the activity’s 
implicit promise to redress a variety of problems created by processes of 
capital accumulation. Specifically, ecotourism may provide a spatial fix in its 
investment of excess capital in new geographic development; a temporal fix 
in its selling of an ephemeral experience that is instantaneously consumed 
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and must therefore be continually repurchased (hence minimizing turnover 
time for recovery of invented capital); a time-space fix via foreign lending for 
ecotourism development (i.e., that offered by the World Bank); a “social” fix 
in its effort to counteract capitalism’s tendency toward inequality by redistrib-
uting wealth back to poor rural communities; and “psychological” fixes in 
the selling of an experience of “nature-culture unity” to redress the common 
sense of humans’ alienation from nonhuman natures wrought by capital-
ism’s metabolic rift (Neves n.d.), as well as an experience of sensation-rich 
enchantment to counter capitalist modernity’s concern with rationalization 
and disenchantment (Fletcher and Neves 2012). In this sense, as Büscher 
(2012) describes, capital expansion through ecotourism is framed as a solu-
tion to the ecological (and social) contradictions of capitalism itself, prom-
ising a form of production and consumption that not only does not degrade 
but in fact enhances both environments and social relations.
This presentation, however, conceals a number of contradictions intrin-
sic to the very process of ecotourism development, whereby significant eco-
logical and social costs are obfuscated via a pervasive ecotourism “bubble” 
(Carrier and Macleod 2005) that emphasizes ecotourism’s positive poten-
tial and minimizes its negative consequences (Fletcher and Neves 2012). 
In terms of the Lacanian framework outlined above, this can be seen as an 
instance of the inevitable gap between Real and Symbolic sutured in the 
Imaginary via the free-market fantasy that further, intensified application 
of neoliberal principles can not only fulfill ecotourism’s lofty promise but 
also rectify these evident deficiencies in its implementation.
This obfuscation is aided by a further dimension of ecotourism devel-
opment that, as intimated earlier, takes the body as its focus. In addition 
to expanding geographically, in other words, ecotourism transforms the 
human body itself into an important site of capital accumulation (Harvey 
2000), thereby providing what might be called a “bodily” fix (Guthman 
and DuPuis 2006) to complement the others previously outlined (see 
Fletcher and Neves 2012). It does so by turning the body itself into a site of 
accumulation (Fletcher and Neves 2012). What ecotourism as a capitalist 
“product” offers most centrally is an experience of jouissance, a feeling 
of intense sensation or excitement that, although commonly framed as 
unequivocal enjoyment, in fact frequently entails significant negative 
emotions and bodily sensations as well, confirming the ambiguous status 
of jouissance as a mixture of pleasure and pain (Kingsbury 2010, 2011).
Even this ambivalent state is fleeting, however, as the sensation recedes 
and mundane reality intrudes once more. In other words, the affective 
release offered in ecotourism is transitory, and hence, rather than delivering 
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an enduring satisfaction of existential angst, the experience usually provides 
merely a “pseudocatharsis” that paradoxically leaves the subject even more 
dissatisfied through deprivation of the previous stimulation. Yet the fleeting 
experience provides enough pleasure that its subsequent withdrawal inspires 
a desire for further experience in the hope of recapturing the previous “high” 
and thereby achieving the enduring resolution thus far denied. In this way, 
an opportunity for further accumulation is created as tourists seek to reexpe-
rience the desired emotional stimulation in search of an illusory satisfaction. 
As the object of this process is an ephemeral affective state that passes quickly 
with little residual impact on the body, this accumulation process can be 
virtually infinite, facilitating continual capitalization without readily discern-
ible limit or consequence. In this way, Lacan observed, “surplus enjoyment” 
and “surplus value” go hand in hand, stimulation of the first facilitating 
accumulation of the second by compelling increased consumption of the 
products and services through which jouissance is pursued (Žižek 1989). In 
the process, the jouissance conferred by the ecotourism experience helps 
to sustain a global industry of substantial proportions (Honey 2008), the 
fastest-growing segment of an international tourism market currently valued 
at more than US$1 trillion (UNWTO 2012).
The Jouissance of Ecotourism
My empirical research concerning the practice of ecotourism, conducted 
primarily through participant observation with whitewater paddlers (both 
rafters and kayakers) on expeditions ranging from one day to two weeks in 
a number of locations throughout North, Central, and South America, 
illustrates this dynamic (see Fletcher 2009). “Serious” paddlers—those who 
engage in their pursuits independently and regularly, often doing so profes-
sionally (for nominal pay provided through equipment sponsorships and 
suchlike)—are commonly caught up in an incessant quest to experience 
new rivers in new locations, progressively increasing the difficulty of their 
endeavors as they grow comfortable with previous challenges that conse-
quently no longer provide sufficient stimulation to be compelling. In this 
manner, many paddlers spend the bulk of each year traveling from river to 
river around the globe, expanding, in the process, the ecotourism industry 
of which they are part and parcel. One of my key informants, for instance, 
could reasonably be considered an “adrenaline junky,” seeming unable to 
stop engaging in quite perilous undertakings that, indeed, nearly cost him 
his life on several occasions. In the year that I first encountered him, he 
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spent the summer kayaking and working as a commercial raft guide in Cali-
fornia, then moved east for a month to paddle in West Virginia, after which 
he migrated to eastern Canada to continue raft guiding there. Following 
this, he spent several weeks in Jamaica pioneering a new commercial raft 
operation before continuing on to Chile, where I encountered him again 
in Patagonia, working one of the most difficult rivers in the world. Over the 
next several months I watched him consistently push the limits of safety, 
dumping clients into the river on several occasions, including once when 
he drove his raft straight into a series of monstrous waves that caused him 
to flip end over end in one of the most spectacular crashes I have ever 
seen. In the years since, he has continued his adrenaline odyssey, earning 
recognition for his skillful first descents of several previously unrun rapids 
while almost losing his life several more times as well.
A similar escalation occurs with clients on commercial whitewater raft-
ing trips. In Chile I participated for several months as a guide on a series 
of weeklong rafting trips widely considered among the premier ecotours in 
the world (see Fletcher 2009). For clients, this trip was often the crowning 
moment of a long history of engagement in similar pursuits, which they 
took great pleasure in describing as we sat around the campfire during 
downtime after a day on the river. By the end of the trip, however, many 
participants were already planning their next excursion, inquiring what 
I and the other guides thought was “the next most difficult river” after 
the one they had just completed. Neves describes a similar situation on 
whale-watching tours (in Fletcher and Neves 2012).
These dynamics are supported by construction of what I call an “eco-
tourism imaginary” composed of fantasmatic representations of past expedi-
tions—usually tied up with European colonialism (see Braun 2003)—that 
functions as a model for ecotourists’ undertakings, suggesting that the 
latter can achieve experiences similar to the larger-than-life protagonists 
of these celebrated tales. Several clients on the Chilean raft trip, for 
instance, claimed to have been inspired by Shackleton’s famous (aborted) 
Transantarctic Expedition of 1911–12 (see Lansing 1959; Fletcher 2009). 
The narratives describing these expeditions, however, are of course merely 
aestheticized condensations of the actual (Real) experiences they reference. 
Descriptions of colonial expeditions, for instance, commonly whitewash 
the negative impacts of colonialism and emphasize the ostensive adventur-
ous heroism of the colonists themselves (Fletcher 2012b). Hence, the rep-
resentations they convey are largely fantasies, motivating not through their 
realistic portray of the grueling rigor of historical experience but through 
mobilization of desire for the pleasurable emotion they ostensibly offer.
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Conclusion
In dynamics such as this, processes of production and consumption in 
neoliberal capitalism are synchronized through their shared pursuit of 
jouissance. Fantasies of the pleasure attendant to endless accumulation on 
the part of producers are supported by fantasies of limitless pleasure prom-
ised by sensation-rich experience on the part of consumers, allowing both 
parties to participate in the construction of a global industry/imaginary. 
This is further reinforced by market mechanisms’ claim not only to avoid 
negative social and environmental impacts but on the contrary to confer, 
through both production and consumption, substantial socioenvironmen-
tal benefits, thus offering as well the promise of the jouissance-laden “warm 
glow” produced by charitable giving (see Wilson 2012), which Bishop and 
Green (2008, 39) indeed compare to “the dopamine-mediated euphoria 
often associated with sex, money, food, and drugs.”
This analysis therefore suggests that attachment to an ideology such 
as neoliberalism is a function not merely of cynical manipulation in the 
interest of accumulation, disciplinary internalization of power relations, 
or even simple provision of monetary incentives but also of a visceral, 
libidinal investment in the pursuit of jouissance. In this way, as Wilson 
(2012, 7) describes, “beneath the articulation of discourses, the organisa-
tion of institutions, and the arrangement of social relations, jouissance is 
mobilised and regulated through disavowed social fantasies that structure 
relations of domination in ways that displace or foreclose their constitutive 
antagonism.” This dynamic may help to explain the remarkable resilience 
of neoliberal ideology within environmental governance (and beyond) 
despite neoliberal policies’ recurrent inadequacy in actual practice.
How, then, is critique to effectively confront this situation? Acknowl-
edging the implications of the disavowal he highlights, Žižek (1989, 25) 
cautions that “we must avoid the simple metaphors of demasking, of throw-
ing away the veils which are supposed to hide the naked reality. We can 
see why Lacan, in his Seminar on The Ethic of Psychoanalysis, distances 
himself from the liberating gesture of saying finally that ‘the emperor has 
no clothes.’” Rather, Žižek suggests, the aim of critique must be “to detect, 
in a given ideological edifice, the element which represents within it its 
own impossibility” (143), to undertake a “symptomal reading” that seeks 
“to discern the unavowed bias of the official text via its ruptures, blanks, 
and slips” (1997, 10). As Kapoor (2005, 1205) paraphrases, “This means 
tracking and identifying ideology’s Real—its slips, disavowals, contradic-
tions, ambiguities.”
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For neoliberal conservation, this Real may manifest as symptom in grow-
ing evidence concerning the overwhelming failure of more than thirty years 
of persistent global efforts to integrate conservation and development by 
harnessing market mechanisms to commodify in situ natural resources and 
thereby incentivize their preservation (e.g., Fletcher 2012c; McShane et al. 
2011; Wells and McShane 2004). What this failure may point to, indeed, 
is nonhuman nature’s essential recalcitrance in the face of persistent 
attempts to make it pay for itself, the eruption of the unruly “Real of nature” 
(Stavrakakis 1997a; Swyngedouw 2011) through the neoliberal fantasy that 
the same capitalist forces that commonly exacerbate both poverty and eco-
logical destruction can be employed to resolve these selfsame problems. 
Stavrakakis (1997a, 124), for instance, suggests, “What is shown by the 
current environmental crisis . . . is that there are in fact some limits, limits 
to growth and economic expansion, limits imposed by the Real of nature.” 
Highlighting the mechanisms sustaining disavowal of this realization, our 
urgent task is to “accept fully . . . the Real in its irreducible constitutivity” 
(128). As Büscher and colleagues (2012) advocate, this entails working to 
develop (as well as recognize and support where they already occur—see 
Sullivan, this volume) alternate modes of being that do not commit such 




Celebrity Spectacle,  
Post-Democratic Politics,  
and Nature™ Inc.
Dan Brockington
Two frontiers of capitalist expansion are restructuring environmental resource 
use and policies. There is a new round of landgrabbing by elites, corpora-
tions, and governments worldwide that is threatening the resource bases of 
the rural poor (Borras et al. 2011; Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones 2012b). And 
there is the reconfiguration of environmental policies around payments for 
environmental services, which again could substantially compromise rural 
livelihoods (Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008; Redford and Adams 2009; 
Kosoy and Corbera 2010; Brockington 2011). Both trends are driven by the 
same dynamic—the relentless capitalist pursuit of profit, which seeks to 
enclose new lands and create (and take possession of) new commodities.
In such a context, spending any time thinking or writing about celeb-
rity may seem foolish. Barricades and protest are surely more intelligent 
responses to landgrabbing than reaching for the nearest copy of Heat (a 
celebrity news magazine). I have some sympathy with that response; I have 
firsthand experience of how useless Heat can be when opposing landgrabs. 
However, if we follow the politics of celebrity endorsements for environ-
mental issues and other good causes, then we can learn a great deal about 
how the political space and policy environments have been created that 
enable such appropriations to take place.1
To understand the nature of celebrity’s role in Nature™ Inc. we must 
make three routine observations. First, there is not enough critical public 
or academic debate about these twin capitalist frontiers. As Redford and 
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Adams (2009) have complained, payments for environmental services are 
greeted too enthusiastically. Landgrabs are portrayed as attempts to solve 
global food shortages or replace hydrocarbons with green biofuels. The 
persuasive forces of profit-seeking capitalism, with decades of experience 
of guile behind them, and the marketing branches of NGOs are being 
directed at selling these possibilities. Accumulation through dispossession 
can be welcomed as a progressive move.
Second, we must note that celebrities are part of the persuasion to sup-
port these moves. The Prince’s Trust (established by Prince Charles, first 
in line to the British throne), for example, has been adept at enrolling a 
large number of international names to promote plans to make the carbon 
in rain forests worth enough money for capitalism to seek to preserve it 
(Igoe 2010).2 Harrison Ford (an actor) supports Conservation International 
to advertise the possibilities of realizing value from ecosystem services in 
Africa. Even if Ford somewhat gauchely declared that Africa was a conti-
nent where “nature and people are one,” the message was clear. Nature is 
good for business, and African ecosystems are a good place to conduct it.
Finally, we must note that celebrities are also part of the opposition. 
Consider, for example, the appearance of Paul McCartney (a musician), 
Robert Redford (an actor), and Cilla Black (a TV personality) joining 
Greenpeace to speak out against oil exploration in the Arctic during the 
recent Earth Summit.3 They were initiating a signature petition that will 
enroll more than a million signatures and that will then be deposited sym-
bolically beneath the ice of the North Pole. Their stance provides an appar-
ently welcome contrast to more establishment-driven publicity. It surely 
represents an instance of popular and civic power taking on political and 
economic power in opposition to capitalist expansion.
In some respects their stance is just that: it both seeks to limit capitalism’s 
terrain and may create the political space for more opposition. But we 
cannot just take this campaign at face value. Look at the sorts of politics that 
this is promoting. Burying signatures beneath the North Pole creates good 
spectacle, but it does not give those signatories much voice or visibility. 
Rather, it gives Greenpeace political capital to wield; the primary direct 
beneficiary of this Arctic petition will be Greenpeace and not the Arctic. 
This is the same organization whose support of the newly declared Chagos 
Marine Protected Area has aroused some controversy because that support 
did not, initially, make clear enough Greenpeace’s backing of the claims 
of formerly resident Chagossians or their opposition to the presence of a 
massive, polluting American military base on Diego Garcia in an exclave 
in the heart of the park (Sand 2010). This unusual example shows that 
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mainstream conservation organizations can be rather useful to the estab-
lishment. Celebrity opposition to capitalist expansion, therefore, needs to 
be taken not just at face value but in terms of the broader relationships that 
celebrities signify and empower.
We need to see the very presence of celebrity voices as a testimony to the 
incorporation of NGOs and civil society groups by mainstream politics and 
businesses. At the very moment when celebrities protest capitalist expan-
sion, they are demonstrating and furthering its power. The marchers against 
capitalism are also its vanguard, for the incorporation of celebrity, and the 
cultivation of relationships that make petitions like Greenpeace’s possible, 
reflects a reorientation and reconfiguration of the corporate sector. This 
reconfiguration has seen closer and more intimate relationships develop 
between NGOs (also referred to here as the “third sector”), the celebrity 
industries, and the corporate sector.
The significance of this alliance is best understood in terms of Colin 
Crouch’s (2004) idea of “post-democracy.” Post-democracies are character-
ized by disengagement and apathy with respect to politics by much of the 
citizenry that democracies are meant to empower. They are characterized 
by increasing inequality but apparent popular acquiescence to this fact. 
Politics and government become the domain of elites, lobbyists, and special 
advisors. These societies are liberal in that they allow free rein to all sorts of 
diverse voices and movements. At the same time, these lobbies and advisors 
are particularly vulnerable to domination by the wealthy, who have the 
most resources to promote their interests. For Crouch (2004, 13, 52), the 
power of corporate elites is the “fundamental problem” of postindustrial 
societies, because one of the “core political objectives of corporate elites 
is clearly to combat egalitarianism.” He finds that the post-democratic 
societies have been stricken by the “establishment of a new dominant, 
combined political and economic class” (52) that mirrors far too closely 
the pre-democratic politics of the nineteenth century.
This is why celebrity matters. Vast lands are being sucked into the cor-
porate maw. Nature’s intimate inner workings are separated, packaged, 
commodified, and sold. And the political space that makes these policies 
possible, the thinking that advances them, and the interest groups that 
lobby for them are becoming the territory of elites amongst whom celebri-
ties play a prominent role. Moreover, celebrity is an important part of the 
circulation of images and ideas upon which the creation of new forms of 
speculative, and often spectacular, value can hinge. Celebrity is not just 
ornamental to this process, it is constitutive of it.
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I will demonstrate below more comprehensively that celebrity is part of 
Crouch’s political elites, but to do so I need to extend his argument in one 
respect. While Crouch notes the rise of issue-based politics and lobbying 
organizations, he does not make clear enough the role of NGOs in con-
structing and speaking with the political elites. As I show below, Corson’s 
(2010) accounts of the International Conservation Caucus Foundation 
or Holmes’s (2010) exploration of the transnational conservation class or 
Sireau’s (2008) account of Make Poverty History will quickly underline 
how important these groups are in elite formation and reproduction. By 
following the work of celebrity in NGOs, we will quickly scent both the 
power and reach of corporate influence within the third sector, as well as 
the importance of the role of celebrity lobbying among these elite groups.
These arguments will also require me to extend the normal subject 
matter of this volume and talk not just about environmental NGOs and 
environmental politics but about the NGO movement as a whole, with a 
particular focus on development issues. I can defend this on three grounds. 
First, while environmental NGOs are extremely powerful and influential 
in themselves, their dynamics have to be understood within the context of 
broader changes across NGOs. The division between development and 
environmental NGOs often breaks down anyway. Environmental NGOs 
take on development projects and vice versa. Second, I have a wealth of 
interview material from across the environmental and development orga-
nizations in the third sector that demonstrates the need to consider them 
together.4 Third, environmental issues, particularly within poorer parts 
of the world, are simply an aspect of development issues. Decisions to 
conserve a national park are part of development plans. Payments for envi-
ronmental services are a development project, they are part of immanent 
and planned development. We have as much to learn about Nature™ Inc.’s 
promulgation from the activities of development NGOs as we do from 
specific environmental NGOs.
The argument proceeds as follows. I examine how celebrity and the third 
sector have become more intertwined over time and how that process reflects 
and is driven by the strength of corporate interests. I then examine the role 
of those interests in contemporary capitalist conservation with respect to the 
creation of elites and with respect to the creation value through circulating 
images. The role of celebrity in the construction of potentially regressive 
elites is not, however, the end of the story. I will also argue that celebrity 
involvement can advance radical causes. In the conclusion I offer my rea-
sons for finding some radical potential for celebrity activism.
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Celebrity, NGOs, and the Corporate Sector
There has been a shift across the third sector to embrace more effectively 
the opportunities that celebrity is perceived to offer. The shift takes the form 
of a more systematic, organized, and professional approach to relations 
between NGOs and the celebrity industries. The indications are numerous. 
Increasing numbers of NGOs (75 percent of the largest thirty in the UK, 
according to a BBC report) now have dedicated celebrity liaison officers 
whose job it is to manage relations with high-profile personalities. In the 
UK the Media Trust, which promotes effective media use by charities, 
runs bespoke celebrity liaison workshops for NGOs who want to learn how 
to work with celebrities. NGOs sign up to professional celebrity contact 
databases, which keep updated lists of how to contact different public fig-
ures—and these databases advertise their more important NGO clients to 
signify the value of their services. The Red Pages, for example, announces 
its services to Oxfam and the British Red Cross on its front page, along with 
other commercial clients such as M&C Saatchi and Vivienne Westwood.5
I date the professionalization as occurring in the UK mostly since 2000, 
as most celebrity liaison within NGOs seems to have begun full time and 
in earnest since then. The celebrity liaison officers’ forum, a monthly meet-
ing, has been convening in London for about eight years. But there are 
precursors—Oxfam’s first such appointment was in 1994. It probably has 
a longer history in the United States, where, for example, the comedian 
Danny Thomas was particularly effective at mobilizing celebrity support 
for the St. Jude’s Children’s Research Hospital since the 1960s (Weberling 
2010) and where the Elizabeth Glazer Pediatric Aids Fund took a lead in 
promoting celebrity support for HIV/AIDS research.
The professionalization of relationships between NGOs and the celeb-
rity industries did not initiate an increased wave of celebrity-focused public-
ity. It is an evolution in response to steadily increasing needs of association 
with celebrity. This much is plain from trends in the increase in articles 
about charity that mention celebrity. Figure 5.1 presents trends from the 
Guardian newspaper, for which we have the longest records. This shows a 
steady increase up to about 2005, when, for reasons that remain unclear, 
the persistent rise begins to slow, if not decline. Note too that the proportion 
of charity articles that mention celebrity is greater than the proportion of 
all articles that mention celebrity. In other words, the charitable sector has 
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If we reverse our gaze and examine the response of the celebrity indus-
tries to the charitable sector, then a different pattern emerges. In brief, the 
proportion of articles about celebrity that mention charity has increased 
only marginally. Most celebrity articles are still about the traditional fare 
of celebrity. The rise of “charitainment” (as Time magazine heralded the 
celebrity-drenched fare of 2005) has not substantially affected reporting 
about celebrity matters (see Poniewozik 2005).
There has, however, been a response from the celebrity industries to the 
opportunities of the charitable sector. Three of the four major talent agen-
cies in Hollywood have, since 2000, established foundations that manage 
their corporate social responsibility interests and, crucially, the charitable 
interests of their clients. Dedicated staff facilitate their clients’ expression 
of their charitable interests, providing them with contacts, reading, and 
information on the causes that they wish to pursue. As Rene Jones, who 
provides this service for clients of the United Talent Agency, explained to 
Jonathan Foreman (2009), “It’s mostly counseling advice. You meet, get to 
know one another, and then you act as a matchmaker and bring credible 
organisations to their attention. It’s not always an instant process, but the 
ones that last longest are those with an organic connection.”
There are also specialist independent companies that act as brokers 
between wealthy stars and the causes that they wish to pursue. One of the 
more prominent is the Global Philanthropy Group, whose clients include 
prominent Hollywood A-listers and whose investigation into the musician 
Madonna’s charity Raising Malawi led to a rather damning report and his 
company taking on Madonna as a client.
Finally, we should note that speaking out for good causes has become 
a substantial part of some celebrities’ brands. Bono (a musician) is so well 
associated with poverty relief in Africa after his work for Band Aid, Live Aid, 
the Jubilee Debt Relief Campaign, DATA, ONE, the G8 of 2005, and Live 
8 that he has appeared in Louis Vuitton advertisements with the title “All 
the best journeys begin in Africa.” Angelina Joli (an actress), who was also 
featured in this series, was photographed in Thailand. Similarly, George 
Clooney, Don Cheadle, and Matt Damon (all actors) are known for their 
interventions in Sudan and in Damon’s case with water development and 
microfinance. With respect to the environment, the musician Sting has 
maintained a persistent interest in rain forest conservation, and there is a 
persistent trickle of nature documentary presenters who, achieving fame as 
nature’s spokespeople, also support environmental charities.6
The growth of celebrity in charities, despite its many potential financial 
and political advantages for NGOs, is not at all something that the sector 
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is responding easily or happily to. Rather, there is often a lingering suspi-
cion about the inequalities and excess of celebrity. Some NGOs deliber-
ately eschew any form of engagement with celebrities. Part of their brand 
and politics is to work without them. Even in NGOs that do work with 
celebrities, their celebrity liaison officers can feel marginalized within the 
organizations. The origins of the celebrity liaison officers’ forum was in 
the chance meeting of officers who were delighted to meet colleagues who 
shared their difficulties and problems at work. One of the most prominent 
and distinguished environmental NGOs has only recently begun organiz-
ing and investing seriously in formal celebrity liaison operations. I have it 
on good authority that the chief communications officer of another major 
environmental NGO was unable to identify a picture of Madonna’s face 
(she has long been extremely famous).
Even if the trend is receiving only a cautious and equivocal welcome 
from some members and employees of NGOs, it is nonetheless an increas-
ingly important aspect of the way that the third sector is working. As we 
have seen, publicity and fundraising events can often be strongly flavored 
by celebrity. Examining some of the reasons behind this shift will help us 
to consider its consequences.
The reasons for this shift in the NGO sector are multiple. We must not 
ignore the importance of individual sentiment, especially for those celeb-
rities who are more prominently involved. But we also have to recognize 
the numerous structural factors driving the growth of these interactions. 
As I have argued previously (Brockington 2009), part of that growth is 
simply due to the increasing numbers of NGOs and celebrities over the 
last twenty-five years. Their mutual need for good publicity has resulted in 
more interactions.
However, for the purposes of this chapter, and particularly the argument 
I advance with respect to post-democracy and the dominance of corporate 
interests, we need to recognize another driving force. The interactions of 
celebrity and charity are fueled by a strong corporate interest in getting 
access to celebrity. Across the interviews I conducted, the corporate fasci-
nation with celebrity proved a constant theme. Corporates are “starstruck,” 
and they “really liked having celebrities involved” (Sources 35 and 48). The 
corporate teams within NGOs can be those who make the most requests 
for celebrity involvement.
Celebrity has long been a significant aspect of corporate advertising. 
Getting the match of celebrity with corporate brand right is a matter of 
keen investigation by a number of researchers, for some associations have 
been astonishingly successful and lucrative (Pringle 2004). But “it’s very 
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expensive for a corporation to get a celebrity spokesperson, so they love it 
when by doing good works they also get to grab a few photos . . . or do a joint 
press conference with a celebrity. It’s a big added benefit. . . . They love get-
ting that opportunity to be associated with a celebrity for free” (Source 55).
One of the attractions of working with charities with good celebrity 
contacts is that it provides the opportunity for celebrities to be associated 
with these companies’ products and brand. Charities have to be extremely 
careful that they do not let their celebrity spokespeople become free endors-
ers of corporate products, as that would threaten the celebrity business 
model. More than one organization has drawn up written guidelines for 
celebrity liaison officers to follow so that they do not cross the line beyond 
a legitimate partnership between celebrity, charity, and corporation.
But the dividing line between what can be done freely for the charity 
and what must be paid for by the corporation can be thinly drawn. Public 
figures can endorse the relationship that companies may have with NGOs, 
but they may not endorse the company itself. Furthermore, some associa-
tions with particularly well known charitable causes can result in further 
opportunities for (paid) corporate endorsement for the celebrity. Some pub-
lic figures take the resulting work and endorsement opportunities. Others 
refuse to take on such endorsements, saying, “It is an insult to be offered 
to be paid” as a result of any association that arises out of work for charity 
(Source 71). Numerous charities for their part advertise the possibilities of 
association with their celebrity spokespeople on their corporate webpages. 
They seek to recommend their services to potential corporate partners in 
terms of the celebrities with whom they are associated.
It is not just the possibilities of free access to expensive people that 
appeals to corporate partners. Sometimes there are strong brand consid-
erations at work. Certain NGOs can host prestigious and plush events 
with celebrity attendees with whom it is simply good business to be asso-
ciated. It is important to appreciate the scale of these events. Journalists 
from the Daily Mirror have recently compiled a league table of the most 
expensive and luxurious such occasions, a table that bears summarizing 
(see table 5.1), because the expense and luxury of these events is simply 
mind-boggling. It is not surprising, therefore, that some corporate sponsors 
are so keen to be associated with these events: “In the first instance the draw 
is going to be that to have [public figure E] associated with their product is 
highly desirable, and [then] to sponsor an event that we do at [location F], 
which is very elite [and] which an awful lot of very rich or famous people 
come to, is perfect to their brand” (Source 67). In some instances the 
importance of corporate sponsorship is such that it is the corporate interests 
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more than anything else that determine the level of celebrity engagement. 
One charitable campaign reviewed its activities and questioned whether it 
should continue working with celebrities and instead use “real” women in 
its public announcements. The campaign realized that fewer celebrities 
might be better for some of the consumers of its advertisements and mes-
saging, but “we came to the conclusion that actually the corporates like to 
be associated with the campaign because of the kudos it holds and because 
of the level of celebrities it has supporting it. Because the majority of the 
income is raised through corporate partners . . . we do actually need to have 
celebrity support to keep them engaged” (Source 63).
Finally, we must note too that the corporate fascination with celebrity 
sponsors at charitable events is not just about dismal economics and the 
bottom line. It can include other, more personal inclinations. One of the 
pleasures and privileges of success in business is that one gets to meet in 
Table 5.1. Costly charitable occasions 
Event Year Cost (£) Money 
Raised (£)




2009 400,000 550,000 72%
Raisa Gorbachev 
Foundation Gala
2007 400,000 1,200,000 33%
Prince’s Trust 
Berkeley Square Ball
2008 420,000 450,000 93%
Caudwell Children 
Annual Ball
2009 818,000 2,520,000 32%
Grant and Anthea’s 
Summer Ball
2007 829,000 942,000 88%
Elton John’s White 
Tie and Tiara Ball
2007 972,000 8,010,000 12%
ARK Gala Dinner* 2007 3,900,000 26,000,000 15%
Source: Sommerlad 2009.
* The large sums here are accurate. The dinner is hosted by a billionaire financier who insists that 
the party must be “mind-boggling” for his guests, who pay £10,000 for a ticket. The organization 
has also tried to curb the expenses of subsequent galas, frugally keeping them to below £2 million 
for an evening.
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person the famous people everyone else only hears about in the media: 
“[Company G] absolutely loved [public figure H]. . . . [S]he’s very special 
to a group of men of a certain age. . . . She’s . . . lovely and charming 
and articulate. . . . [S]he delivers both emotionally and rationally and . . . 
appeals to the softer side of them” (Source 48). Similarly, politicians are 
most aware of the beneficial publicity that can result from being seen to be 
associated with popular public figures. They are keen to meet them and 
to be seen to meet with them: “You might be able to meet with someone 
lower down in the office, but suddenly you are meeting with the chief of 
staff or with the principal instead of a staff member two or three levels 
below because you are accompanied by a celebrity. You also might be able 
to get a hearing on Capitol Hill because one of those testifying would be a 
celebrity. . . . That happens all the time” (Source 93).
Celebrity, then, is not just a pawn in negotiating arrangements between 
charities and corporations, nor is it just a vehicle for getting into the news. 
It is also a lubricant in the negotiation machinery, it helps bring people 
to meetings, it facilitates the negotiation of deals, and it enables a large 
number of policy and financial discussions to take place at a speed and 
with a conviviality that would not otherwise be possible.
These driving forces present two important areas of investigation for 
understanding the implications of celebrity for the evolution of Nature™ Inc. 
These are, first, the role of celebrity in facilitating the production and repro-
duction of an elite whose ideas are shaping the introduction of new envi-
ronmental discourses, and, second, the role of celebrity in the circulation 
of images and representations of nature on which so much environmental 
policy hinges. We will deal with each in turn below.
Evolving Elites and Circulating Celebrity Images
The construction of conservation and environmental elites has already been 
well studied. Perhaps the most specific contribution is George Holmes’s 
(2010) work on the creation of a “transnational conservation class.” Draw-
ing on Leslie Sklair’s (2001) ideas of a transnational capitalist class, Holmes 
postulates the existence of a similar transnational group of elite conserva-
tionists comprising scientists, bureaucrats, NGO workers, and government 
officials as well as environmental celebrities. In his own work he demon-
strates that these elites can sometimes function in contrary ways—they 
are nationally inspired at the same time as they are transnational in their 
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socializing, such that, in his case, elites from the Dominican Republic 
resisted the influence of US elites.
There are numerous other studies. Catherine Corson’s (2010) exam-
ination of the International Conservation Caucus Foundation provides a 
good indication of the way that elites function and the role of celebrity in 
providing a hinge and focus to plush galas that bring leading conservation 
NGOs into pleasant meetings with prominent politicians and business lead-
ers. One of the first such meetings honored Harrison Ford with an award 
for his support for conservation. Another example comes from Ken Mac-
Donald’s (2010a, 2010b) investigations (and see MacDonald and Corson 
2012) of the role of royalty and other celebrity elites in the construction of 
hegemonic conservation spectacles at international conservation meetings.
It is plain that here the role of celebrity is to provide a theatrical focal 
point (e.g., in the form of prize givings) to meetings that are mainly about 
facilitating contacts and agreements and a whole host of other interac-
tions taking place in the wings. They enable collective endorsements to 
be performed at large gatherings, as MacDonald has described, producing 
consent and support for the prophets and leaders of the new environmental 
policies. Celebrity, not surprisingly, is integral to the establishment and 
reinforcing of hegemony within environmental movements.
Researching such gatherings and networks is notoriously difficult—we 
simply cannot get access or close enough to the actual proceedings to learn 
what is going on. We have instead to rely on historical accounts, when 
archival records become available, or to study their effects from a distance. 
Occasionally, however, we can get glimpses behind the scenes at what 
people are saying from the odd report into these privileged gatherings.
One such is available from a gathering of the Brookings Blum Roundta-
ble in 2007, which brought together a number of famous faces and people 
close to famous faces in the development and environmental fields (Brain-
ard and LaFleur 2007). Attendees at the three-day event included former 
US vice president Al Gore, former Irish president Mary Robinson, former 
US secretary of state Madeleine Albright, cofounder of Product (RED) 
Bobby Shriver, and World Bank managing director Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. 
It was, in other words, a high-level gathering. Its purpose was to look at the 
new actors in development and the environment, including celebrities, 
philanthropists, and the private sector. The report of that gathering (Brain-
ard and LaFleur 2007) must be treated with some caution, as it is a pub-
lic-facing document that is unlikely to report the disagreements and debates 
that are bound to have animated the discussion. Nonetheless, precisely 
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what is interesting about it is what the participants and rapporteurs were 
prepared to agree about in public, especially as far as celebrity is concerned.
The overwhelming tone when celebrity is mentioned is of approval and 
commendation. Celebrities are “maximizing the power of their public 
appeal to champion global poverty awareness and activism” and “injecting 
a dose of credibility and charisma into the foreign assistance and develop-
ment debate” (Brainard and LaFleur 2007, 4). They “have focused public 
attention on humanitarian crises such as HIV/AIDS and the conflict in 
Darfur” (5) and helped to raise billions of dollars in development funds. 
Perhaps most of all, they are infusing some passion, joie de vivre, anger, 
and excitement into topics that can be dull to Western minds:
Whether rock stars, movie stars, moral leaders, or political icons, these 
“celanthropists” are infusing antipoverty campaigns with their own cha-
risma and brand allure. Some are adept at crystallizing complex issues 
in catchy slogans like “Drop the Debt” and “Make Poverty History.” 
Others have made energetic use of the popular media to attract new 
development audiences; witness MTV’s Diary of Angelina Jolie and 
Dr. Jeffrey Sachs in Africa. Seasoned performers on the global stage, 
these development champions are eloquent and impassioned in their 
appeals on behalf of the impoverished—invoking emotional language 
and images designed to anger, engage, and inspire action. (Brainard and 
LaFleur 2007, 16)
The report even finds a way of welcoming the fact that these new activ-
ists are inexperienced but still believe they can make a huge difference. 
This sort of thing is normally called arrogance, but here this trait is wel-
comed thus: “Many of the new development players are entering the field 
unburdened by the weight of conventional wisdom and are blessed with 
confidence in their own ability to achieve outsized results” (Brainard and 
LaFleur 2007, 35). These representations are interesting partly because 
of what is missing. For example, the role of celebrities in the Make Pov-
erty History campaign is simply and only painted in a positive light, even 
though it caused the most intense controversies at the time (Sireau 2008). 
The achievements of celebrity interventions in Darfur, again reported 
favorably, are also hotly disputed (Flint and De Waal 2008; Crilly 2010; 
Hamilton 2011). The report does mention problems of simplification of 
messages and refers to the uneasy relations that can exist between the two 
celebrity industries and NGOs, but these occupy just three paragraphs in 
a long document.
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The report is also interesting because one of the strongest characteristics 
of elite approaches to celebrity, at least as identified in this report, is their 
faith in the power of celebrity, particularly with respect to converting the 
public to their causes. This is stated in the baldest terms: “And it works. 
The public is answering their call in unprecedented numbers” (Brainard 
and LaFleur 2007, 16). Al Gore is quoted as saying that “rock stars proved 
instrumental in supercharging a new generation of climate crusaders 
during 2007’s Live Earth” (18). But what sort of public voice, produced by 
these celebrity interventions, is being welcomed by these elites? This is one 
of the most significant aspects of this report. For what this elite gathering 
celebrated as examples of the public voice are “the hundreds of thousands 
who attended the ten ‘Live 8’ concerts in the run-up to the Gleneagles 
summit, the more than 2.4 million signatures for the ONE Campaign, and 
the 63.5-million-strong audience for the 2007 U.S. television special Amer-
ican Idol: Idol Gives Back” (6). In other words, what this elite gathering 
celebrated were rather passive audiences expressing themselves through 
attending concerts, texting donations, switching on televisions, and signing 
on-line petitions. The marches of Make Poverty History, so controversially 
eclipsed by the Live 8 concerts, do not even get a mention. The very signs 
of democratic disillusion that so worry some commentators are welcomed 
here as evidence of success.
This document celebrates the power of celebrities to concentrate their 
voices into the hands of organizations that can then represent their interests 
at elite gatherings. While the elites at the Brookings Blum roundtable were 
probably among the most genial and egalitarian possible, their enthusiasm 
is for the elite-privileging politics of post-democracies. Indeed, it would be 
difficult to find a clearer example of Crouch’s (2004, 19–20) depiction of 
post-democratic politics and public roles: “The idea of post-democracy 
helps us describe situations when boredom, frustration and disillusion have 
settled in after a democratic moment; when powerful minority interests 
have become far more active than the mass of ordinary people in making 
the political system work for them; where political elites have learned to 
manage and manipulate popular demands; where people have to be per-
suaded to vote by top-down publicity campaigns.”
To understand the role of celebrity in circulation I draw on Büscher’s 
writings about the importance of circulation for our understanding of how 
value can be created out of conserved nature (see Büscher’s chapter in this 
volume). Büscher notes that capital can seek not to transform nature but 
to conserve it (e.g., in sequestered carbon or offset biodiversity) in order to 
create value from it. In such circumstances he argues that value is socially 
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produced through expert assessment and a host of practices that “make 
‘liquid nature’ believable, legitimate, and manageable,” to achieve which 
“capital has had to and continues to create particular governmentalities and 
associated ideological belief systems.” The crucial result of all this labor is 
that in “turning conserved nature into capital, conservation has become 
fictitious; it can still sell. All that it needs is a compelling brand: a mem-
orable logo, some catchy slogans, smooth marketing campaigns, visually 
captivating websites, celebrity spokespeople, and a take-home message that 
‘everybody wins.’”
Celebrity features prominently here, as Büscher notes in his chapter. 
But it is important to note how closely and well celebrity fits with require-
ments of this circulating nature. First, celebrity exists as circulation. That 
is its very essence. Celebrity is about being seen and noticed as often as 
possible and in as many different contexts as possible. Indeed, the rise in 
celebrity over the last twenty years partly reflects the changing conditions 
of circulating images within the media. As media outlets have been taken 
over by giant companies that have extended their control vertically and 
horizontally, so it becomes even more profitable for different companies 
owned by the same company to promote celebrities featured in each other’s 
news (Turner 2004). Their images circulate across different outputs. Thus 
we find Lily Allen (a singer) promoting rain forest conservation for the 
satellite television company BSkyeB in conjunction with the WWF. The 
company is seeking to act thus because such charitable activities are good 
for its brand: consumers like it. And the trip is covered by newspapers that 
are also owned (as is BSkyeB) by Rupert Murdoch, whose journalists were 
flown out, at Skye’s expense, to write the story.7
But celebrity also matters particularly with respect to the character of 
the changes to the economy and society that Nature™ Inc. envisages. For, 
in my assessment, the payments for ecosystem services, natural derivatives, 
and other new forms of financialization are more grandiosely imagined and 
vigorously projected than they are actually achieved.8 And in this realm 
of possibility and promise, dream and expectation, celebrities, who are 
people who exist as objects of desire and expectation, come to the fore. 
As Gabler (1998, 51) put it when analyzing the power of movies in early 
twentieth-century America: “The America of rapid industrialization, urban-
ization and immigration, was suffused with a new sense of possibility that 
made its citizens especially susceptible to the movies’ fantasies.” By anal-
ogy, as ecologists, conservationists, and entrepreneurs flock to payments for 
environmental services, biodiversity offsets, and other forms of incorporated 
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nature, the same attraction of possibilities is at work. Associations with 
celebrity are part of the way in which promise and expectation are built up.
Celebrity also functions to render intelligible economic policies and 
mechanisms that are complex and hard to understand. As Jim Igoe (2013b) 
has observed, “Statistics, derivatives, and the like are largely the purview 
of experts and thus inaccessible. . . . Spectacle, however, can retransform 
these intangible presentations into compellingly tangible ones designed to 
inspire the confidence and fire the imagination of policymakers, investors, 
and consumers.”
Celebrities, therefore, matter with respect to circulation because of the 
tone of the messages and images they circulate. If you want to imagine 
new commercial opportunities from new ecosystem services, then who 
better than Richard Branson to endorse them. He’s even finding ways of 
finding money from space travel (and it is precisely the point that these 
space adventures are still only proposals). For Nature™ Inc. to become a 
reality it will have to spark the interest and imagination of investors, and it 
helps to enroll celebrity on these projects. For the financial sector believes 
in celebrities; that sector is part of the elites who do so. Indeed, it has 
been documented that the very prospect of celebrity endorsement tends to 
meet with approval in the financial markets (Agrawal and Kamakura 1995). 
Again, note that these are merely announcements of future endorsements, 
not evaluations of what celebrities do to the product being shifted or to 
brand awareness. These crucial elites believe that celebrity works. The 
presence of celebrity at the dawn of Nature™ Inc. will help create this new 
era of commodified environments.
Conclusion
I hope it is clear from this chapter that celebrity is being increasingly closely 
integrated into the workings and practices of NGOs and is a vehicle by 
which they forge closer relations with the corporate sector. I hope it is clear 
too that in enquiring into the sort of work that celebrity achieves, we can 
learn more about the politics at work in inaugurating the new nature with 
respect to both the workings of elites and the mobilization of publics. The 
presence of celebrity in environmental issues is cause and consequence of 
post-democratic politics. Finally, I have stressed the role of celebrity in the 
value-creating circulation of images and possibilities upon which the new 
economic possibilities of nature depend.
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The dangers and deceit of celebrity spectacle should be plain. Igoe 
(2013b) expresses it most clearly: “This misrecognition of decontextualized 
circulating objects for ecological connection is perhaps the greatest chal-
lenge facing global environmentalism today, precisely because it hinders 
people from recognizing the types of relationships in which they are actually 
enmeshed.” To the extent that celebrity is implicated in such misconcep-
tions, misdirections, and misleadings, to that extent it is unwelcome. And, 
as I have previously documented (Brockington 2009), the sorts of nature, 
environments, and landscapes that attract celebrity can be distorted and 
misconceived. Celebrity, with its tendency to avoid divisive politics (Meyer 
and Gamson 1995), is a poor vehicle for communicating the tensions and 
divisions that must attend any environmental initiative. It will be a poor 
vehicle for communicating the problems of Nature™ Inc.
And yet I also think we need to be alert to the radical potential of celeb-
rity. This may seem absurd given the inequalities and industries that consti-
tute celebrity. But associations and complicity with capitalism implicate us 
all to differing degrees. Specifically, members of academic elites, including 
authors of this volume, are implicated by virtue of whom we educate, who 
funds our institutions, who profits from our publications, and how much 
we want to influence policy. We are often just as bound up in the creation 
and advancement of capitalism as celebrity elites. We just do so with less 
glamour and style to smaller audiences, at fewer parties, and for less money. 
And yet academic radicalism is often welcomed as a constructive contribu-
tion. I think we need a similarly generous understanding of the potential 
of celebrity politics.
We need to recognize, as Crouch does, that post-democratic politics 
are too entrenched to be easily fought. We will not be able to start with 
untainted institutional forms. So when Crouch (2004, 120) argues that 
“democratic politics therefore needs a vigorous, chaotic and noisy con-
text of movements and groups [which] are the seedbeds of democratic 
vitality,” these movements are likely to include celebrity advocates. When 
he recognizes too that new social identities will form and make demands 
upon democracies that cannot be (at least initially) easily accommodated 
by existing elites (116), celebrity is likely to feature in the construction of 
these identities.
I find unlikely support for my argument in Andy Merrifield’s book Mag-
ical Marxism (2011). Given that Merrifield is so inspired by a collective 
search for authenticity in reaction to the deceptions and false promises of 
capitalism, given that he draws so heavily on Guy Debord and his hostil-
ity to capitalist representations, and given that he deplores the invasion 
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of capitalism into leisure time (with celebrity as the vanguard), using his 
work to endorse the possibility of radical celebrity might seem strange. But 
Merrifield’s (2011, 18–19) repeated call is for Marxists to recognize the 
circumstances in which people live now, not to look for workers’ collectives 
and class action when the shop floor is no longer a site of activism or con-
sciousness or even collective experience. Mirroring Crouch, he observes 
that solidarity is to be found in all sorts of new collectivities (Merrifield 
lists many such on pages 43–44). He insists that what we need is a new and 
better fantasy (18) and inspiring dreams (42). Engrained in Merrifield’s 
work is a refreshing determination to find possibilities of the radical in 
unlikely places and alliances.
And although he does not specify it, these collectivities and the motiva-
tions of these new fantasies might include the famous. They are, after all, 
a rather broad category of people and should include at least some radicals. 
Moreover, it is possible to imagine his call to “disrupt and reinvent, to create 
desire and inspire hope” (Merrifield 2011, 18) in a way that could involve 
collusion with celebrity. Networks of activists (90) might include activist 
celebrities, if not celebrity activists. This subversive celebrity content will 
not come from the modalities of celebrity engagements that we know now, 
but it could emerge from other forms of engagement.
There are three general principles behind these points. First, consumer 
use of celebrity (which I have not explored here) is too diverse and unpre-
dictable to be determined by its producers. It can be used subversively.
Second, there is a great diversity of celebrity form. In the antics of the Yes 
Men, for example, fame is put to subversive ends. This is no commercial oper-
ation, but nonetheless it depends on well-known staged spectacles, filmed 
and circulated on the Internet, to poke holes in the glowing self-images of 
corporate endeavor. And if we admit the radical credentials of this group, 
then how far up the continuum of fame would we be willing to go?
Third, the aesthetic, Eagleton (1990, 3) insists, cannot be analyzed 
merely as an instrument of domination or rebellion but must be treated 
dialectically, for it is inescapably bound up in both: it is “an eminently 
contradictory phenomenon.” Creative genius and the commercial fabric 
around it can be, and often has been, put to the service of hegemonic 
regimes (it is partly what makes them hegemonic). But we have to at least 
be open to the possibility that where celebrities and their audiences are 
part of a hegemonic regime, this may be something both may wish to free 
themselves from.
In conclusion, there is good reason to be suspicious and wary of celeb-
rity politics in environmental affairs. It is part of the persuasive armory of 
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corporate power and the construction of remote elites who shape society to 
their own interests. And yet I will not be surprised if, amongst the vanguard 
of opposition that is forming in the wake of environmental commodities 
and landgrabbing, we should find some famous names using their renown 
effectively for just causes.
Notes
1. I refer readers who are new to the analysis of celebrity literature to these excellent 
accounts: Marshall (1997); Gamson (2000); Turner, Bonner, and Marshall (2000); 
Rojek (2001); Turner (2004); and Ferris (2007).
2. I follow in this chapter my practice of explaining why readers might be expected 
to have heard of any of the famous people mentioned, as we cannot assume that anyone 
is so famous that everyone has heard of them.
3. See http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/media/press-releases/stars-launch-save-arctic 
-campaign-20120621, accessed August 25, 2012.
4. This chapter draws upon research undertaken for an ESRC Fellowship (070–
27–0035) that I held between September 2010 and September 2012 and during the 
course of which I conducted over one hundred interviews with members of diverse 
NGOs, journalists, government officials, and employees in the media industry. These 
methods are described elsewhere (Brockington 2014). Suffice it to say here that quo-
tations and source numbers refer to these anonymized interviews. An earlier version 
of the arguments drawing on these interviews was written for and circulated to these 
interviewees. The feedback I received from them was strongly positive, indicating that 
they recognized the patterns I had observed in the interview data in their own lives and 
experience.
5. See http://www.theredpages.co.uk/, accessed August 25, 2012.
6. For a more detailed typology and examples of the work of the different celebrity 
environmentalists and environmental celebrities, see Brockington (2008, 2009).
7. Source 33 and http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/Green/2970915/
Lily-Allen-backs-bid-to-save-rainforest.html, accessed August 25, 2012.
8. As Thrift and others have insisted, mundane revenue streams have to underlie, 
at least in the first instance, the fantastic derivatives that were later conjured out of, 
for example, mortgages (Leyshon and Thrift 2007). I have argued earlier that these 
mundane revenue streams have yet to materialize with respect to natural capital 
(Brockington and Duffy 2010b). Using an impressive array of examples and a slightly 
broader definition of financialization, Sian Sullivan (2012b) has contested that point 
and demonstrated a number of ways in which revenue streams are forged. I do not think 
that this disagreement matters much for the argument I am making here. However 
thoroughly it has been realized or not, the point is that there is still great excitement 
about the potential of what can be achieved.
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chapter six
Capitalizing Conservation /  
Development
Dissimulation, Misrecognition, and the 
Erasure of Power
Peter R. Wilshusen
Capital is not a thing but a process in which money is perpetu-
ally sent in search of more money.
—david harvey, The Enigma of Capital
Capital is not a simple relation, but a process, in whose various 
movements it is always capital. . . . However, as representative 
of the general form of wealth—money—capital is the endless 
and limitless drive to go beyond its limiting barrier.
—karl marx, Grundrisse
Over the past twenty years, global conservation efforts have unfolded within 
the context of two macrotrends: attempts to frame and promote sustainable 
development and the rise of neoliberalism. More recent initiatives have 
explicitly joined these two domains of theory and action via global-scale 
programs aimed at constructing a “green economy.” Two high-profile inter-
national conferences staged during 2012—the United Nations Conference 
on Sustainable Development (UNCSD, or Rio+20) and the World Con-
servation Congress—illustrate how neoliberal capitalism has merged with 
conservation/development in practice. The Rio+20 meetings, for example, 
highlighted “green economy in the context of sustainable development 
and poverty eradication” as one of two overarching themes within a broad 
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statement issued by UN member states entitled “The Future We Want” 
(UNCSD 2012). Similarly, the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) identified “greening the world economy” as one of five key 
themes for its World Conservation Congress (IUCN 2012).
The extent to which the ideas and practices associated with neoliber-
alism have transformed conservation/development at all scales of activity 
has garnered considerable interest from critical scholars concerned with 
the tendency of capitalism to produce “accumulation by dispossession” 
(Harvey 2003, 2005).1 Some of the most overt expressions of neoliberal 
capitalist expansion center on rural spaces in which private-sector interests 
move to control natural resources such as land, water, forests, minerals, 
and oil in order to develop new markets (e.g., Borras et al. 2011; Bridge 
2008; Bakker 2007a; Sawyer 2004). Dispossession occurs, in part, when 
less powerful groups on the receiving end of capitalist expansion—such as 
small farmers and indigenous peoples—lose access to and control over the 
means of production.
Equally important, however, are the subtle and not-so-subtle ways in 
which neoliberalism has “colonized” conservation/development theory and 
practice over the past decade. The embrace of market-based approaches by 
a broad spectrum of conservation/development entities worldwide suggests 
that the assumptions and strategies associated with the green economy have 
coalesced into a largely unquestioned conventional wisdom. Thus, this 
chapter critically examines discursive manifestations of Nature™ Inc., point-
ing to the ways in which processes of neoliberalization within conservation/
development arenas contribute to novel forms of governmentality (Foucault 
2008; Fletcher 2010). My approach is to construct a conceptual interro-
gation of the term “capital” in order to explore how the logic of neoliber-
alism becomes enmeshed with and transforms the logic of conservation/
development.
When viewed in toto, neoliberal conservation/development constitutes 
a performative arena within which markets are but one element along-
side other social-structural factors that shape both targeted outcomes and 
power dynamics.2 Neoliberal conservation/development manifests itself 
across scales of analysis within global-level environmental governance 
institutions such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (MacDonald 
and Corson 2012; MacDonald 2010a; Duffy 2006; Goldman 2005) and 
applied market-based instruments such as payment for ecosystem services 
and carbon offsets (McAfee 1999, 2012a; McAfee and Shapiro 2010; Bum-
pus and Liverman 2008) and within the context of specific programs related 
to protected areas (Brockington, Duffy, and Igoe 2008), ecotourism (Duffy 
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2002), and community-based conservation/development (Fletcher 2012a; 
Li 2007; West 2006), among others.
Amid the growing literature that critiques neoliberal conservation/
development, little attention has been directed at the ways in which the 
logic of capitalism has inscribed itself upon shifting theories and practices 
over time. In what follows, I examine the ways in which the term “capital” 
has been discursively extended and transformed as a means of articulating 
concepts and organizing practices related to sustainable livelihoods and 
institutional design/environmental governance. I position these two frame-
works within the context of early discussions regarding sustainable develop-
ment during the 1990s to uncover a progression of ideas that unfolded in 
conjunction with the rise of neoliberalism, thus facilitating the emergence 
of concepts and practices associated with the green economy.
For more than two decades, a range of actors focused on sustainable 
development—and, more recently, the green economy—have adopted the 
language of capitalism to project a vision that sees a mutually reinforc-
ing relationship among economic growth, nature protection, and social 
equity objectives. The green economy seeks to value environmental goods 
and services in terms of natural capital, relying on a range of institutional 
“enabling conditions” to promote positive economic, ecological, and social 
outcomes. As with critiques of the initial framing of sustainable develop-
ment in the 1987 Bruntland Report, deep skepticism lingers regarding the 
extent to which conservation/development approaches wedded to the logic 
of capitalism are internally contradictory and thus self-defeating (Fletcher 
2012a; Buscher et al. 2012; Sullivan 2010a).
Beyond natural resources and services, however, the term “capital” 
became a ready metaphor to capture the range of “enabling conditions” 
that proponents of conservation/development might promote in order to 
achieve desired outcomes such as nature protection and poverty eradica-
tion. The so-called five capitals model (described below) offers a prime 
example of this tendency (see Porritt 2007). From a pragmatic perspective, 
the proposed integration of natural, social, human, manufactured, and 
financial forms of capital within conservation/development frameworks 
has garnered practitioners increased legitimacy and resources for activities 
aimed at stimulating local economies, empowering the rural poor, and 
protecting threatened ecosystems. From a critical perspective, however, 
reliance on constructs such as the five capitals raises questions about how 
frameworks centered on institutional design (environmental governance) 
and rural livelihoods (sustainable development) might hide key dimensions 
of the workings of capitalism and the skewed power relationships they often 
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produce. By gaining greater intellectual purchase in both academic and 
international development deliberations, have such efforts disguised the 
actual work that capital performs?
I argue that the discursive extension of the term “capital” beyond its orig-
inal meaning within economics tends to erase power in two ways. First, it 
hides the power dynamics associated with the exchange, flow, and accumu-
lation of power resources. Second, it masks an incremental process of eco-
nomic reductionism within conservation/development theory and practice. 
I construct my argument by revisiting the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1986), 
who offered one of the first presentations of different forms of capital. In 
building on Marx’s ([1867] 1976) critique, Bourdieu both set a precedent 
for the conceptual expansion of the term “capital” and offered a nuanced 
analysis suggesting how capital constitutes different forms of power. By recov-
ering Bourdieu’s perspective on capital, I show that contemporary discursive 
practices that see accumulations of multiple forms of capital as a pathway to 
empowerment often ignore the everyday power dynamics and relationships 
that produce and reproduce social inequality and conflict over time.
The implications of critically examining the work that the term “capital” 
performs within conservation/development frameworks are far-reaching, 
since the construct has been largely subsumed within a broader discursive 
formation understood as “the green economy.” Whereas early frameworks 
focused on livelihoods and institutional design deployed the word “cap-
ital” to connote “capacity” or empowerment, either within or indepen-
dent of market exchanges, proposals for a green economy directly align 
conservation/development theory and practice with the logic of capitalism, 
suggesting the predominance of a deeply seated neoliberal environmental-
ity (see Fletcher 2010). This combined paradigmatic shift and discursive 
slippage is important, because the conceptual extension of capital contin-
ues to connote natural, social, human, and cultural capacities even as the 
metanarrative of conservation/development theory and practice has shifted 
almost entirely to the logic of neoliberalism. Thus, despite a more explicit 
role for market-based approaches—and by extension the accumulation of 
economic capital—the continued use of the term “capital” to describe 
diverse human and natural capacities shields from view how economic 
capital accumulation unfolds.
The concept “capital”—as applied within sustainable livelihoods and 
institutional design frameworks—is understood mainly as any material or 
virtual asset or holding (a thing), as opposed to a continuing flow of goods 
and services tied to market exchanges (a process). By casting capital as 
largely stationary and independent from capitalist production, conservation/
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development frameworks often mask many of the political-economic prac-
tices they seek to temper through empowerment. In contemplating the 
role of different forms of capital in relation to social class and educational 
achievement, Bourdieu (1986) used the terms “dissimulation” and “mis-
recognition” to capture this type of conceptual detachment where social 
and cultural capital mask the power dynamics (flows, accumulations, class 
relations) inherent to economic capital.
In this chapter, I uncover a paradox in Bourdieu’s writing on “the forms 
of capital” as a means of further illuminating the contradictions inherent 
to conservation/development frameworks, including contemporary form-
ulations of the green economy. Bourdieu elaborated multiple forms of 
capital as a means of critiquing what he saw as the economization of social 
inquiry, in which all social exchanges are seen as mercantile exchanges. 
He sought to make visible a broader diversity of social interactions and 
persistent inequalities by simultaneously expanding and critiquing how 
the language of economics was deployed within the social sciences. The 
paradox lies in the fact that by developing concepts like social and cultural 
capital, Bourdieu contributed to the very intellectual developments he 
sought to undermine. As I describe below, proponents of conservation/
development frameworks uncritically adopted and adapted different forms 
of capital but for the most part did not account for the critique of capital 
that Bourdieu and others emphasized. The concepts persisted even as the 
political-economic context shifted but the critique was lost.
In order to recover the critique of capital relative to conservation/
development frameworks and the green economy, I first examine how dif-
ferent forms of capital emerged as the “building blocks” of conservation/
development during the 1990s and 2000s, drawing on two prominent frame-
works: sustainable livelihoods and institutional design. In this context, capi-
tal constitutes an empowering asset that facilitates community development 
and environmental governance, respectively. I contend that while the term 
“capital” provided a convenient and uncontroversial shorthand for empow-
erment, its usage ignored the internal contradictions of capitalism and thus 
elided the social and ecological ills the frameworks sought to redress.
The second part of the chapter returns to Bourdieu’s writing on the 
forms of capital in order to reevaluate his critique of economic reduction-
ism and to suggest how his commentary on the workings of capital might 
inform critiques of neoliberal conservation/development. A careful reading 
of “The Forms of Capital” in relation to Bourdieu’s wider work on practice 
theory reveals the twin processes of dissimulation and misrecognition, in 
which social actors intentionally and unintentionally disguise or euphemize 
132 • Peter R. Wilshusen
how everyday social interactions tend to reproduce persistent inequalities, 
particularly as they relate to the accumulation of economic capital.
The third section of the chapter explores how dissimulation and mis-
recognition of different forms of capital play out with respect to specific 
conservation/development interventions. Drawing on three examples from 
the literature, I highlight how the conflation of different forms of capital 
with empowerment in the context of neoliberal conservation/development 
programs hides the ways in which economic capital flows and accumulates. 
It is in this sense that dissimulation and misrecognition contribute to what 
I call the erasure of power.
The Building Blocks of Conservation/Development
In this section I unpack the concept of capital in relation to sustainable live-
lihoods and institutional design/environmental governance frameworks, 
each an important contributor to conservation/development thinking. I am 
mainly interested in formulations that present different forms of capital as 
building blocks or capacities that enable conservation/development. I com-
pare and contrast three discussions of frameworks focused on sustainable 
rural livelihoods (Scoones 1998; Bebbington 1999) and institutional design 
(Brondizio, Ostrom, and Young 2009) that rely on multiple forms of capital. 
Each approach has strongly influenced conservation/development prac-
tice, although the former (livelihoods) incorporates capital centrally, while 
the latter (institutional design) uses the concept tangentially as synergistic 
with institutional design. While Scoones (2009) indicates that sustainable 
livelihoods approaches have declined in importance within international 
aid efforts, the five capitals remain deeply embedded in the conservation/
development lexicon. Moreover, sustainable development frameworks that 
employ the five capitals model have extended beyond discussions related 
to international conservation/development, constituting the conceptual 
core of mainstream efforts to reform global capitalism by organizations like 
Forum for the Future (e.g., Porritt 2007).
In what follows, I critically examine how the three authors deploy the 
term “capital,” how they understand the interrelationships among different 
forms of capital, and how they situate livelihoods and institutional design 
within broader political-economic arenas. It is important to note that I 
do not critique the frameworks per se but rather the role and function 
of different forms of capital within those frameworks. In certain respects, 
the authors recognize and discuss key aspects of my core argument. The 
underlying question is straightforward: Despite its usefulness in signaling 
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the importance of ecological and social capacities, does the term “capital” 
hide more than it reveals?
Capital (Un)defined
Definition of the term “capital” is more elusive than it might seem. Formal 
definitions characterize capital as a “stock” or “reserve” of “accumulated 
goods” and distinguish it from income.3 Thus, in most scholarly as well as 
popular usage, capital connotes an object; it is understood as a thing that can 
be accumulated and exchanged more or less freely. However, since the early 
nineteenth century, when the word’s usage became linked to a particular 
economic system (ultimately providing the linguistic root of “capitalism”), 
a number of thinkers have exposed capital’s enigmatic or illusory quali-
ties.4 One of Marx’s ([1867] 1976) main contributions in this regard was to 
explicitly reconnect capital (as object) to the human labor that produced 
it, thus reflecting a particular mode of production (capitalism) and set of 
historically derived class relations. Ultimately, however, economists and 
noneconomists alike have stretched the original meaning of the term in 
an attempt to capture greater social and environmental complexity, but in 
doing so they have erased the relational and dynamic characteristics of capi-
tal that Marx emphasized. The recent trajectory of capital as an explanatory 
concept within conservation/development studies illustrates this tendency.
The World Bank played a central role in defining and assessing sustain-
able development in terms of different types of capital, attempting to place 
value not just on the exchange of money, goods, and services but also on 
nature, people, and social networks. For the World Bank (1997), concern 
over the “sustainability” of development emerged in response to critiques 
that conventional approaches focused solely on economic growth measured 
by the accumulation of material wealth like income or infrastructure. Initial 
adaptations accounted for the central role that training and education as 
well as environmental quality played in development by incorporating the 
terms “human” and “natural” capital.5 Subsequently, World Bank staff also 
acknowledged the importance of social organizations and networks by add-
ing another factor: “social” capital. In reports such as Expanding the Measure 
of Wealth, the World Bank (1997) proposed that sustainable development 
could be assessed across countries and regions based on relative endowments 
of these four types of capital: produced, human, natural, and social. In line 
with this approach, analysts understood capital to be an asset that could be 
accumulated, assigned a monetary value, and maintained or applied toward 
improving production and increasing wealth (see Bebbington 1999).
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Beyond viewing the World Bank’s efforts as a simple adaptation to cri-
tiques from civil society, it is important to briefly contextualize the organi-
zation’s promotion of sustainable development and adoption of the capitals 
framework in relation to the rise of neoliberal economic and political 
policies globally. Ben Fine (2001) situates the emergence of “sustainable 
development” and different forms of capital within the transition from the 
Washington Consensus (orthodox neoliberalism) to the post–Washington 
Consensus (reform neoliberalism). In the latter case, those responsible 
for framing documents such as the Bruntland Report (WCED 1987), the 
World Development Report 1990 (World Bank 1990), and Expanding the 
Measure of Wealth (World Bank 1997) presented sustainable development 
and, in some cases, multiple forms of capital to counter critiques regarding 
environmental and social impacts. The use of terms like “social capital” 
acknowledged the importance of social connectivity in empowering the 
subjects of development but also turned attention away from the structural 
inequities of neoliberal capitalism. Similarly, Goldman’s (2005, 33) study 
of the World Bank shows—among other things—how the organization 
came to dominate knowledge production in conservation/development 
arenas and thus contributed centrally to the formation of “regimes of green 
neoliberalism” (see also Harriss 2002; Bebbington et al. 2004).
Assets and Capabilities
The World Bank’s early attempts to create measures of natural, produced, 
human, and social capital to supplement income as a measure of pros-
perity focused attention on capital as a material asset.6 The sustainable 
rural livelihoods framework expands on this approach, suggesting that the 
presence or absence of “tangible and intangible assets” (forms of capital) 
enables people to pursue different livelihood strategies (Scoones 1998, 7; 
see figure 6.1).7 Different manifestations of capital constitute a resource 
base or endowment that drives productivity (use value). These assets may or 
may not carry market value, although they may facilitate market exchanges. 
I summarize six forms of capital and their applications in table 6.1.
In building on the work of Scoones (1998) and others, Bebbington (1999) 
reframes the idea of capital somewhat to encompass its role both as a resource 
that can enhance economic production and incomes and as capabilities 
that may be instrumentally beneficial, meaningful, and emancipatory. This 
construction emphasizes local agency and empowerment, where capabilities 































































Table 6.1. Forms of capital and conservation/development frameworks
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meaningful, and challenge the structures under which one makes a living” 
(Bebbington 1999, 2000). As I discuss further below, I question whether 
use of the term “capital” as a metaphorical shorthand for “empowerment” 
actually works against people’s ability to challenge structural inequalities.
Interestingly, Bebbington (1999) introduces an additional type of capi-
tal—cultural—that does not appear in mainstream discussions of sustain-
able rural livelihoods. The inclusion of cultural capital accounts for durable 
norms and practices that shape identities, social interactions, and attachment 
to place and might be important in explaining the motivations of indigenous 
federations or rural producer (campesino) cooperatives, among others. In 
noting that culture is not something that can be quantified, Bebbington 
argues that such qualities should be represented, since they often distinguish 
local from nonlocal understandings of poverty and development.
With regard to institutional design, Brondizio, Ostrom, and Young (2009) 
propose that different forms of capital enhance environmental governance 
across diverse organizational structures and scales, allowing actors to manage 
social-ecological systems more sustainably, effectively, and equitably. In this 
sense, individuals expend time and effort to build tools or acquire assets that 
can be applied toward increasing human welfare and ecological stability in 
the future. In drawing from the extensive literature on institutional design 
and common property (e.g., Ostrom 1990, 1994; Ostrom, Schroeder, and 
Wynne 1993; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994), Brondizio, Ostrom, 
and Young (2009) focus on how “human-made capital” (physical, human, 
social) enhances natural capital, as opposed to the sustainable livelihoods 
framework, which views natural capital in large part as a means to an end—
sustainable development. They emphasize the importance of social capital 
in particular as providing the social “glue” that enables connectivity and 
resilience of governance regimes across multiple scales of organization.
Synergies, Trade-Offs, and Connectivity
Each of the authors contemplates how different forms of capital might 
interact and examines the possible outcomes that these interactions might 
produce. Scoones’s (1998) presentation raises a series of questions regarding 
the sequencing of asset acquisition, the substitutability of types of capital, 
and the extent to which livelihoods strategies depend on multiple forms 
of capital working together (clustering). In extending this discussion, Beb-
bington (1999) recognizes the possibility of both synergies and trade-offs 
among different types of capital over space and time as people pursue 
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livelihoods. For example, a positive synergy might occur where a producer 
organization allows an individual to complete training that enhances her 
income. A trade-off might occur when a family decides to decrease fallow 
cycles when planting crops or repeatedly seeks financial support from social 
networks without reciprocating in kind.
Along these lines, Bebbington (1999) and Brondizio, Ostrom, and Young 
(2009) emphasize the importance of social capital in enabling collective 
action. Such presentations highlight the structural qualities of social capital, 
linking it to other forms of capital as a means of capacity building. Related 
work by Bebbington and Perreault (1999, 395), for example, discusses social 
capital “in the form of community, federated, and national indigenous 
peoples’ organizations and their institutional networks.” In the context of 
highland Ecuador, social capital enhances community access to other forms 
of capital, thus presenting people and groups with greater development 
options. Similarly, Brondizio, Ostrom, and Young (2009) differentiate social 
capital from other forms of capital because it is hard to create and main-
tain social capital through external interventions, and it is very difficult to 
measure social capital in a meaningful way. In spite of these challenges, 
however, the authors argue that social capital can serve as a unifying con-
cept that helps us understand institutional connectivity across multiscalar 
environmental governance regimes and interdependent ecosystems.
Despite these types of discussion that draw distinctions among the 
different types of capital, discursive extension of the term still creates an 
illusion of equivalency. This is particularly evident, for example, when 
practitioners reduce the more nuanced presentations of the sustainable 
livelihoods framework into guidance sheets, tool kits, and case studies (e.g., 
ELDIS 2011; IFAD 2011). Carney (2003, 27) observes that many applica-
tions “missed the point of SL [sustainable livelihoods] approaches” (poverty 
reduction through inclusive, people-centered development) by “going 
through the motions of using SL headings, reducing the holistic perspective 
to a set of rules that render the approach ineffective.” The tendency is to 
assume that all capital assets are roughly equivalent and that access to and 
control of these assets—even though mediated by “transforming structures 
and processes” (figure 6.1)—will produce virtuous cycles of productivity 
(sustainable development). These presentations fail to recognize that the 
presence of such assets may actually contribute to the opposite outcome.
External Factors
Both the sustainable livelihoods and environmental governance frameworks 
situate the forms of capital in relation to “institutions and organizations” 
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(Scoones 1998), “transforming structures and processes” (Farrington et al. 
1999; Carney 2003), and multiscalar social-ecological systems (Brondizio, 
Ostrom, and Young 2009). Initial formulations of the sustainable liveli-
hoods approach referred to the ways in which organizations and institutions 
external to sustainable development sites mediate people’s access to differ-
ent forms of capital. Revised versions of the framework sought to unpack 
the black box of “transforming structures and processes” by distinguishing 
the roles of the private sector, government, international actors, and “wider 
society” (Carney 2003). Similarly, Bebbington (1999) situates access to and 
control of capital within a web of exchange relationships that is shaped 
by economic, social, and political “contingencies.” In this sense, capital 
transactions unfold continuously across scales, while, at the same time, 
individuals’ and groups’ access to resources, other actors, and opportunities 
depends on an array of institutional constraints.
By contrast, in focusing on environmental governance, Brondizio, 
Ostrom, and Young (2009) place institutional design under the umbrella 
of social capital, viewing related challenges as a matter of developing insti-
tutional arrangements that effectively link different levels of organization. 
Their analysis of deforestation surrounding the Xingu Indigenous Park in 
northern Brazil suggests that external factors related to agropastoral devel-
opment activities undermined the Xingu people’s effective governance of 
the reserve. The authors present remarkable satellite imagery showing lim-
ited deforestation in the region surrounding the park in 1994 and extensive 
deforestation in the same area in 2005.
Most of the people involved with sustainable livelihoods and environ-
mental governance frameworks are keenly aware of the importance of 
political-economic factors in shaping outcomes. Again, particularly in the 
case of the sustainable livelihoods approach, simplification of the capitals 
model (“asset pentagon” in figure 6.1) typically emerges when develop-
ment organizations apply the framework in practice. Scoones (2009, 178) 
attributes oversimplification of the framework to the rapid rise of the sus-
tainable livelihoods construct in 1998 from a “diagrammatic checklist” to a 
fully funded set of programs within the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DfID’s Livelihoods Department).
Since the sustainable livelihoods framework relies heavily on five forms 
of capital constituting an asset pentagon, it is important to note Scoones’s 
(2009, 178) reflections on the model he helped to popularize, especially 
since they reinforce much of the analysis that I present in this chapter: “In 
some respects the focus on the ‘asset pentagon’ and the use of the ‘capitals’ 
metaphor was an unfortunate diversion. Other work on sustainable liveli-
hoods emphasized other features . . . [such as] . . . the idea of institutions 
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and organizations as mediating livelihood strategies and pathways. . . . They 
were subject to power and politics and were where the questions of rights, 
access and governance were centered.” Although presentations of sustain-
able livelihoods and institutional design frameworks account for issues of 
access, trade-offs, and political-economic constraints, they do not contend 
with the underlying assumptions that inform the overarching project of 
development (but see Bebbington 2000). Thus, even if practitioners took 
the time to attend to political-economic forces, use of the term “capital” 
still erases structural manifestations of power that come into view in the 
work of Marxian and postdevelopment scholars (e.g., Smith 2008; Kovel 
2002; Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994). In other words, discursive extension 
of “capital” uncritically embeds empowerment frameworks within broader 
discursive formations associated with progress and modernity.
Moreover, to the extent that capital in any form is tied to development 
activities, those who rely on the term still must confront Marx’s critique 
regarding the inherent contradictions of capitalism—particularly as they 
relate to primitive accumulation and environmental destruction (see Kovel 
2002; Harvey 2010). These inherent contradictions point to the “fatal flaw” 
of capital extended. French social theorist Pierre Bourdieu contributed to 
both the expansion of capital as a concept and its critique by observing that 
social actors tend to hide the workings of power—and the conflicts and 
inequalities that they create—via a dual process that he presented in terms 
of “dissimulation” and “misrecognition.”
Bourdieu’s Extension of Capital
In this section I revisit Pierre Bourdieu’s presentation of “the forms of capital” 
and contrast it with the formulations associated with sustainable livelihoods 
and environmental governance. Extension of the term “capital” represented 
a centrally important dimension of his theory of practice—a set of heuristics 
that he developed to analyze the production and reproduction of social 
inequality over time. I first summarize how Bourdieu defined three different 
forms of capital—economic, social, and cultural—and situated them within 
his theory of practice. I then discuss how he used the term “capital” as a 
surrogate for power. Finally, I examine how Bourdieu constructed the forms 
of capital as a critique of economic reductionism of social life. Each of these 
points offers insight into Bourdieu’s use of the terms “dissimulation” and 
“misrecognition” to signify the ways in which individuals and groups engage 
in “collective denial” of the workings of capital.
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Bourdieu (1986, 241) begins his exposition on “the forms of capital” 
with the following statement: “The social world is accumulated history, and 
if it is not to be reduced to a discontinuous series of instantaneous mechan-
ical equilibria between agents who are treated as interchangeable particles, 
one must reintroduce into it the notion of capital and with it, accumulation 
and all its effects.” Bourdieu’s critical stance in these opening lines posi-
tions his work in the same sphere as Marx’s writing on political economy. 
This is important because, in delineating multiple forms of capital, he 
sets out to show that economic capital can manifest itself in different ways 
but produce the same types of persistent inequalities associated with the 
workings of capitalism. In other words, Bourdieu maintained a conceptual 
link between the operation of economic capital within capitalist modes of 
production and the other forms he identified. The frameworks discussed in 
the previous section detach the accumulation of different types of capital 
from a particular mode of production.
Capital and the Workings of Power
Bourdieu’s understanding of capital builds upon Marx’s work by explicitly 
contemplating context, relationality, and power. It thus complements on 
one level but also deeply challenges more mainstream renderings linked 
to environmental governance and sustainable livelihoods. Bourdieu (1986, 
241) defined capital as “accumulated labor.” To the extent that actors 
appropriate capital, they capture “social energy” tied to productive effort 
over time and the social relationships that support it. He thus expanded 
upon Marx’s critique of capitalism by describing multiple forms of capital 
that he associated with practices not typically categorized as economic.8 
Table 6.2 summarizes Bourdieu’s definitions of the forms of capital and 
compares them to contemporary usages with sustainable livelihoods and 
environmental governance frameworks.
“The Forms of Capital” provides a discussion of social capital that high-
lights its dual character as both social structure and social process. Bourdieu 
(1986, 248–50) defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or 
potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network 
of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition. . . . [It] provides each of its members with the backing of the 
collectively owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in 
the various senses of the word.” Most references to Bourdieu in the social 
capital literature cite the first half of this definition and thus overlook the 
Table 6.2. Comparison of forms of capital in Bourdieu’s writing and conservation/
development frameworks
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discussion that follows, which emphasizes social process. He notes that 
“these relationships may exist only in the practical state, in material and/or 
symbolic exchanges which help to maintain them; . . . [t]hey are more or 
less really enacted and so maintained and reinforced, in exchanges.” Addi-
tionally, he emphasizes that “the reproduction of social capital presupposes 
an unceasing effort of sociability, a continuous series of exchanges in which 
recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed.”
As I discuss below, the key characteristic of social capital in Bourdieu’s 
rendering is not simply the presence or absence of a network or organization 
(collective capacity) but the ongoing enactment of exchanges among social 
actors who share a bond of trust (Wilshusen 2009). Different “species” of 
capital (Bourdieu’s term) are akin to what Max Weber ([1922] 1978) called 
“power resources.” Thus capital constitutes a dynamic flow rather than just 
a static stockpile (as the quotes from Marx and Harvey at the beginning of 
the chapter point out).
Despite adopting the language of economics in many instances (e.g., 
“collectively-owned capital,” “credentials,” and “credit”), Bourdieu did not 
frame exchanges as mere rational choices aimed at utility maximization. 
Rather, he understood human action to be embedded within culturally 
constructed “fields” or arenas of interaction. He used the term “habitus” 
to capture everyday practices tied to subjectivities (e.g., class) and life 
experiences. (For more on habitus, see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; 
Bourdieu 1990.) As a signifier of power, Bourdieu used the term “capital” 
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in its various forms to portray individuals and groups as occupying positions 
of relative domination or subordination within specific fields.
While Bourdieu’s presentation of social capital has received wide but 
superficial recognition, his writings on cultural capital have garnered much 
less attention. In addition to the power dynamics resulting from exchanges 
within networks, Bourdieu (1986, 243–48) maintained that another 
dimension of accumulation and social differentiation revolved around the 
relative distributions of cultural capital. He proposed that cultural capital 
could exist in three forms: an embodied state, an objectified state, and an 
institutionalized state. Embodied cultural capital refers to the incremental 
acquisition of capabilities and dispositions of mind and body. According to 
Bourdieu, the attainment of capacities (such as education) assumes long-
term self-investment, although the process may be more a result of everyday 
practices as opposed to “deliberate inculcation.” This type of cultural cap-
ital approximates what current frameworks call human capital; however, 
Bourdieu notes that attainment of embodied cultural capital depends on 
social-structural factors such as family and class (more on this below).
Objectified cultural capital comprises material and symbolic artifacts 
such as writings, paintings, machines, and instruments. In this regard, 
Bourdieu’s usage coincides to a certain extent with contemporary under-
standings of physical capital. At the same time, however, Bourdieu’s (1986, 
247) formulation emphasizes the relational character of capital in all of its 
forms, which highlights the power dynamics associated with what many 
think of as human and physical capital: “Cultural goods can be appropri-
ated both materially—which presupposes economic capital—and symbol-
ically—which presupposes cultural capital. It follows that the owner of the 
means of production must find a way of appropriating either the embodied 
capital which is the precondition of specific appropriation or the services 
of the holders of this capital.” Similarly, institutionalized cultural capital 
connotes formally conferred status such as titles that are tightly intertwined 
with embodied and objectified cultural capital. For example, an individual 
might acquire an education (embodied) that provides access to economic 
capital more readily via academic credentials (institutionalized) repre-
sented by a diploma (objectified). Taken together, Bourdieu’s description 
of three types of cultural capital is both more specific and far-reaching than 
Bebbington’s (1999) usage. Whereas Bebbington emphasizes how cultural 
practices that ascribe meaning to identities and place enable and empower 
collective action, Bourdieu focuses attention on the ways that specific man-
ifestations of culture contribute to distinction and differentiation.
Beyond relationality and flow, Bourdieu’s conceptualization of capital 
is deeply contextual. He used the term “field” in addition to “habitus” to 
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delineate arenas of struggle in which social actors seek to accrue economic, 
social, and cultural capital. He defined fields loosely to capture domains 
of social interaction such as the “artistic field” and the “academic field.”9 
He linked manifestations of capital—such as the example of educational 
credentials offered above—to a particular field. This is important because 
it suggests that, beyond the competitive struggles of social actors, the power 
derived from capital depends upon the discursive and institutional prac-
tices associated with fields (i.e., structural power).
Given the multiple dimensions of power encapsulated in Bourdieu’s use 
of the term “capital,” one might ask why he chose to adopt the term within 
his theory of practice. The answer centers on his concern regarding what 
he saw as a take-over of social inquiry by a narrowly defined, “classical” 
understanding of economics. As I discuss below, Bourdieu’s stance antici-
pated subsequent critiques regarding the neoliberalization of social theory 
(e.g., Fine 2001) and conservation/development frameworks.
Critique of Economic Reductionism
Bourdieu’s differentiation of multiple forms of capital in part constitutes a 
critique of dominant, economistic understandings of social life (exempli-
fied in the previous section by the World Bank framework). He sought to 
undermine the tendency of equating all social exchanges with mercantile 
exchanges by developing a counterterminology under the umbrella of a 
“general science of the economy of practices” (e.g., Bourdieu 1984). As I 
have noted, the examination of social processes that produce and reproduce 
structures of inequality was central to this project.
Bourdieu (1986, 242) viewed the economization of social inquiry as a 
reflection of hegemonic power structures: “It is remarkable that the prac-
tices and assets thus salvaged from the ‘icy water of egotistical calculation’ 
(and from science) are the virtual monopoly of the dominant class—as if 
economism had been able to reduce everything to economics only because 
the reduction on which that discipline is based protects from sacrilegious 
reduction everything which needs to be protected.” Some of Bourdieu’s 
rationale for employing the language of economics in his critique of eco-
nomic reductionism emerges in his discussion of cultural capital. He notes, 
for example, that the notion of cultural capital emerged in relation to com-
parative research on scholastic achievement of children from different social 
classes. Contrary to dominant explanations from the 1960s and 1970s, which 
emphasized natural aptitudes and human capital (following Becker 1964), 
Bourdieu pointed to social-structural factors such as family background, class 
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status, and institutional access as significant contributors to academic and 
employment success rates. He critiqued analyses that focused exclusively 
on monetary investments and profits and ignored other types of inputs and 
gains. He introduced the term “cultural capital” to both expand the scope 
of causal factors and enhance how scholars defined success.
In critiquing Becker (1964) and others, Bourdieu (1986, 244) concludes 
that “because they neglect to relate scholastic achievement strategies to the 
whole set of educational strategies and to the system of reproduction strat-
egies, they inevitably, by a necessary paradox, let slip the best hidden and 
socially most determinant educational investment, namely, the domestic 
transmission of cultural capital.” Thus, despite critiques that have found his 
writing to be overly deterministic and economistic, Bourdieu sought to contest 
purely behavioralist theories within the social sciences that tended to deposit 
power in the hands of autonomous individuals and groups while ignoring 
the broader social-structural constraints shaping choices. In this sense, he 
anticipated later critiques of the colonization of social theory by neoclassi-
cal economics (Fine 2001) as well as the neoliberalization of conservation/
development (summarized in Castree 2008a, 2008b; Wilshusen 2010). 
Fine’s (2001) interrogation of the rise of social capital, for example, argues 
that most applications of the term—such as those sponsored by the World 
Bank—emphasize a community’s or a region’s lack of collective capacity and 
thus target these places as being in need of interventions that would enhance 
their assets. Similar to Bourdieu’s analysis of scholastic achievement, Fine 
argues that such approaches ignore wider political and economic factors that 
structure access to resources and long-standing inequities.
Ultimately, Bourdieu’s use of the term “capital” pivots on the notion that 
social life is far more complex than narrow interpretations of Homo eco-
nomicus allow. In relation to extending the definition of capital, he saw that 
social actors tended to compete for resources that were rooted in economic 
capital but were not necessarily convertible into money (e.g., social and cul-
tural capital). He observed also that people tended to disguise or “euphemize” 
everyday power relationships. This raises the question: What types of social 
interactions and outcomes does the discursive extension of capital produce?
Dissimulation and Misrecognition
Taken as a whole, Bourdieu’s theory of practice represents a far-reaching 
alternative to economistic understandings of social life. By choosing the 
term “capital” to capture both power dynamics and historically rooted 
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social relationships, he deliberately used the language of economics to 
make visible what mainstream economics (defined in terms of capitalism) 
conceptually erased. Bourdieu (1986, 242) explains:
Economic theory has allowed to be foisted upon it a definition of the 
economy of practices which is the historical invention of capitalism; and 
by reducing the universe of exchanges to mercantile exchange, which is 
objectively and subjectively oriented toward the maximization of profit, 
i.e., (economically) self-interested, it has implicitly defined the other 
forms of exchange as noneconomic, and therefore disinterested. In par-
ticular, it defines as disinterested those forms of exchange which ensure 
the transubstantiation whereby the most material types of capital—those 
which are economic in the restricted sense—can present themselves in 
the immaterial form of cultural capital or social capital and vice versa.
In other writing, Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1990) ties this illusory trans-
mutation of economic capital into social or cultural capital as a discursive 
practice, where representations of social and cultural capital take on an 
inherent legitimacy or prestige and thus mask their roots in economic cap-
ital. Actors’ “misrecognition” or “collective denial” of the transubstantiation 
of different types of capital in their symbolic form constitutes a process 
that Bourdieu understood as the enactment of symbolic power. In this 
sense, actors participate in the unstated but mutually understood theatrics 
of denial, which in turn legitimize social practices and power relationships 
in a given field of play.
Bourdieu’s (1977, 195) analysis of gift exchanges, which draws from his 
ethnographic fieldwork among the Kabyle of Algeria during the late 1950s, 
provides some context for both the critique of economistic social science and 
the observation regarding transubstantiation of different forms of capital: 
“Wealth, the ultimate basis of power, can exert power, and exert it durably, 
only in the form of symbolic capital; in other words, economic capital can 
be accumulated only in the form of symbolic capital, the unrecognizable, 
and hence socially recognizable, form of the other kinds of capital.”10 While 
the theory of practice offers a deeply nuanced view of social process and 
power relationships, Bourdieu’s choice to counter narrow, economistic 
views of social life by using terminology derived from economics (fighting 
fire with fire) has contributed centrally to capital’s transformation into a 
paradox, a type of misrecognition in which complex interactions are misrep-
resented as assets of empowerment. Bourdieu (1986, 243) makes clear that 
he intends the term “capital” to be a heuristic device to allow those engaged 
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in critical social inquiry to see past the illusory yet hegemonic conflation of 
“mercantile exchanges” with the entirety of social exchanges: “A general 
science of the economy of practices, capable of reappropriating the totality 
of the practices which, although objectively economic, are not and cannot 
be socially recognized as economic, and which can be performed only at 
the cost of a whole labor of dissimulation or, more precisely, euphemization, 
must endeavor to grasp capital and profit in all their forms and to establish 
the laws whereby the different types of capital (or power, which amounts 
to the same thing) change into one another.”
The “dissimulation” and “euphemization” of cultural or social capital 
to cover for economic capital produce the “social alchemy” (collective 
denial or misrecognition) that forms the core of Bourdieu’s dramaturgical 
understanding of social life.11 The great irony is that, by constructing a 
heuristic—capital—to capture power dynamics and class relationships, 
Bourdieu set the stage for other scholars, representing schools of thought 
rooted in classical economics, to engage in exactly the acts of dissimulation 
that he sought to contest. As a result, many confer magical properties upon 
different forms of capital, using the term to represent power, ipso facto, 
rather than as a construct that captures flows of power resources and config-
urations of power relationships. The impact of discursively extending capi-
tal beyond its roots in monetary exchange is the erasure of power. In other 
words, the conceptual detachment of the different forms of capital from 
the workings of economic (or financial) capital depoliticizes conservation/
development interventions, whether framed in terms of sustainable liveli-
hoods, institutional design, the green economy, or something else.
The Social Alchemy of Capital
With Bourdieu’s critique of economic reductionism and insights on the 
workings of capital in view, the question then becomes: How do dis-
simulation, misrecognition, and the erasure of power occur in practice? 
Practice theory builds on the literature in critical development studies by 
highlighting the production and reproduction of power relationships over 
time. (In addition to Bourdieu’s work, see Ortner 2006; Sewell 2005; and 
Mosse 2010.) In critically examining the discursive extension of capital 
within conservation/development frameworks, I turn attention in this 
final section to the ways in which the erasure of power unfolds within 
the broader context of a neoliberal political economy. How does the logic 
of neoliberal capitalism manifest itself both symbolically and materially 
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in specific contexts? How do the subjects of conservation/development 
activities coproduce narratives of empowerment and nature protection 
alongside those positioned as change agents (e.g., the state, private-sector 
firms, NGOs, aid organizations)? How do dissimulation and misrecognition 
shape social relationships and impact conservation/development designs?
The neoliberalization of conservation/development over the past decade 
in particular has produced a significant realignment of ideas, actors, and 
institutional configurations as well as a concomitant set of responses by 
communities, NGOs, and state agencies to tie their activities to the logic of 
the market. Thus, on one level, “the market” and related flows of economic 
capital appear more overtly in programs like payment for ecosystem services 
(PES) and reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD+). On another level, however, the growing literature on neoliberal 
conservation/development uncovers how market-based approaches disguise 
their core assumptions and hide power dynamics in ways that work against 
stated goals such as poverty eradication and nature protection. In this sense, 
the literature mirrors Bourdieu’s critique of economic reductionism and 
his observations on the workings of capital. In responding to the questions 
posed above, I draw upon three recently published pieces to suggest how 
the erasure of power plays out in practice. As an initial comparison, table 6.2 
juxtaposes Bourdieu’s definitions of different forms of capital alongside the 
ways that capital appears in sustainable livelihoods and institutional design 
framework—most of which carries over to the green economy.
The Vagaries of Social Capital
My work (Wilshusen 2009) on the everyday politics of community forestry 
in Quintana Roo, Mexico, uses Bourdieu’s theory of practice explicitly and 
thus incorporates his perspectives on the forms of capital generally and 
social capital in particular. Social capital offers perhaps the most prom-
inent example of dissimulation and misrecognition within the context of 
conservation/development activities. The term attained near-universal 
recognition and usage during the 1990s and continues to be a key concept 
for conservation/development practitioners. In studying the responses of 
rural land-grant communities (ejidos) in southeastern Mexico to neoliberal 
policy reform measures during the late 1990s and early 2000s, I found 
that both state and nonstate actors relied on the idea of social capital to 
organize activities aimed at encouraging community members to expand 
and strengthen their market-based activities.
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One example of such an attempt at social capital “formation” in the 
context of a regional community forestry association illustrates how dissim-
ulation and misrecognition occur in practice. Between 1996 and 2001 a 
Mexican federal agency channeled approximately US$265,000 in grants to 
support a timber-marketing fund that would allow communities to aggre-
gate their wood products, enhance their collective bargaining power, and 
pursue higher selling prices in the marketplace. Representatives from each 
of the main actor types—federal agency, forestry association, communities, 
and state government—portrayed the timber-marketing fund as an exam-
ple of an intervention that empowered rural producers to strengthen their 
capacity as individual entrepreneurs and members of collective enterprises. 
By 2002 the fund had received national-level attention within policy circles 
and was included as a successful case study in an Interamerican Develop-
ment Bank (IADB) study on enterprise development.
As a participant-observer working with the community forestry associ-
ation mentioned above for most of 2000, I analyzed the fund’s accounts 
and found that the collective benefits recounted by promoters were far 
outweighed by a considerable number of unsettled transactions with a 
wide range of actors. Specifically, 92 percent of the $265,000 that the fund 
received during a five-year period circulated as informal loans to individu-
als, cash advances to communities, and open accounts with timber whole-
salers. The majority of the funds (63 percent) were never recovered, leaving 
the timber-marketing fund insolvent by late 2001 (Wilshusen 2009). Thus, 
even as the fund was crumbling under the weight of unpaid loans and 
other unresolved transactions, many of the principal actors involved were 
still presenting it as a success story to interested parties such as the IADB.
As I note elsewhere (Wilshusen 2009), social capital played an important 
role in how the fund operated day-to-day—but not in the way that the fund’s 
promoters reported to external audiences. The narrative offered to external 
audiences emphasized the fund’s role in empowering rural producers to 
more effectively interface with market actors, much in the way that social 
capital is typically discussed in conservation/development circles. Behind 
the scenes, however, the fund supported an active network of formal and 
informal loans and other transactions that produced significant inequalities 
in terms of economic capital accumulation. The fund generated the social 
alchemy or “collective denial” that Bourdieu described in that most observ-
ers saw it only as social capacity while ignoring the actual flow of resources 
(timber and money) and related power shifts.
Within the context of community forestry in southeastern Mexico, the 
logic of neoliberalism intersected in complex ways with long-established 
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practices built from the cloth of collectivism (see Wilshusen 2010). Social 
capital formation emerged in the late 1990s as a means of “capacity build-
ing” within and among rural communities that dovetailed with the neolib-
eral turn in Mexico’s agrarian sector. In addition to state and NGO actors 
that promoted social capital formation, many rural producers embraced 
the idea of becoming more successful entrepreneurs while simultaneously 
eschewing most aspects of collective forest management, which had been 
the dominant approach. The example of the timber-marketing fund sug-
gests how the concept of social capital assists with the neoliberal project 
of building entrepreneurial capacity at the same time that it disguises the 
workings of economic capital.
Conjuring Natural Capital
Within the scope of the green economy, natural capital takes center stage. 
The term “natural capital” redefines broader constructs of “nature,” “envi-
ronment,” and “biodiversity” in terms of its component goods, such as food, 
fuel, and minerals, and its ecological services, such as water regulation and 
carbon storage (see Porritt 2007; Natural Capital Project 2012). UNEP’s 
(2011) Towards a Green Economy report, for example, emphasizes that “a 
green economy recognizes the value of, and invests in, natural capital” as 
one of its main findings. The assumption that greater legibility or internal-
ization of environmental goods and services in pricing will lead to nature 
protection and, in some presentations, poverty reduction is widely accepted 
in conservation/development circles but largely untested. In particular, 
Bourdieu’s notion of “transubstantiation,” discussed above, allows us to 
ask how the transformation of nature into natural capital hides the flow 
and accumulation of economic capital but also reconfigures conservation/
development theory and practices into a predominantly neoliberal exer-
cise—what Fletcher (2010) calls neoliberal environmentality.
MacDonald and Corson’s (2012, 159) critical examination of The Eco-
nomics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) project explains the process 
of transubstantiation in terms of “virtualism,” concluding that measuring 
and valuing natural capital “makes nature legible by abstracting it from 
social and ecological contexts and making it subject to, and productive of, 
new market devices.” Using the 10th Conference of the Parties (COP10) to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) as a stage, the authors show 
how a range of key actors perform and socially construct green economy 
frameworks such as TEEB, simultaneously merging virtual and real nature 
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within the concept of natural capital and disguising its role as economic 
capital (dissimulation and misrecognition in Bourdieu’s terms).
MacDonald and Corson’s analysis points to the ways in which the real-
ization of an idealized model of a green economy based upon natural 
capital is predicated on new methods of privatizing access to and control 
of nature and the invention of new nature-based commodities and markets. 
TEEB represents a prominent example of a wider trend toward aligning 
conservation/development theory and practice with the logic of neoliberal-
ism. The project began in 2007 as a discrete study of the economics of bio-
diversity loss but rapidly evolved by 2010 into a broader policy instrument 
formally tied to the CBD’s governing secretariat. The core assumptions of 
neoliberal capitalism are expressed more explicitly in this case compared 
to the example of social capital formation discussed above. Projects like 
TEEB provide a tidy framework that allows policymakers, practitioners, and 
others to first measure and then assign monetary value to nature’s compo-
nents and processes. The problem of biodiversity loss from this perspective 
is understood as a matter of appropriately pricing nature (natural capital) 
within a given market.
While MacDonald and Corson’s global-scale analysis of natural capital 
and TEEB differs from my local-scale examination of social capital relative 
to community forestry in southeastern Mexico, both studies turn attention 
to the performative aspects of the social alchemy of capital and the shifting 
power dynamics that these performances produce. Similar to the public 
presentations of the timber-marketing fund that emphasized its role in 
empowering rural producers to engage in market transactions, proponents 
of TEEB actively sought to legitimate both the project and the process 
of monetarily valuing natural capital by suggesting how pricing enabled 
market-based approaches such as payment for ecosystem services. By quan-
tifying nature’s value, advocates strategically positioned conservation as a 
benefit rather than a cost vis-à-vis development. Moreover, TEEB’s main 
supporters argued that since nature is the “GDP of the poor,” its efforts to 
account for nature’s value in numerical terms would thus serve the interests 
of the poor (MacDonald and Corson 2012, 176). Hidden from view in this 
presentation are the myriad examples of accumulation by dispossession that 
emerge in the wake of privatization, commodification, and marketization.
Although Bourdieu did not contemplate natural capital in his writing, 
the process of transubstantiation or transmutation that he identified with 
respect to social and cultural forms of capital mirrors MacDonald and 
Corson’s understanding of natural capital as an expression of virtualism. 
By constructing an abstraction—natural capital—as a surrogate for both 
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nature and economic capital, proponents of the green economy have 
incrementally and almost completely realigned conservation/development 
theory and practice with the core dictates of neoliberal capitalism. As key 
examples of what Bourdieu called symbolic capital, terms like “the green 
economy” and “natural capital” take on inherent legitimacy via multi-
faceted collective performances such as the rollout of TEEB at COP10. 
Natural capital’s shape-shifting characteristics (active dissimulation in this 
case) leads to misrecognition of its roots in economic capital and the legit-
imation of a whole new sphere of ideas, actors, and institutions organized 
in terms of neoliberalism.
Conservation/Development qua Neoliberalism
The process of neoliberalization that MacDonald and Corson (2012) 
identify with respect to TEEB and the proceedings of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity mirrors Bourdieu’s critique of economic determin-
ism in social inquiry discussed above. Bourdieu’s concern that all social 
exchanges were understood as mercantile exchanges led him to elaborate 
a more general “economy of practices” that included multiple forms of 
capital. A similar concern emerges in critiques of neoliberal conservation/
development in which a widely shared conventional wisdom has emerged 
that embraces the market-based approaches of the green economy.
In this regard, Fletcher and Breitling’s (2012) review of two market-based 
approaches in Costa Rica’s Osa Peninsula—ecotourism and PES—argues 
that neoliberal strategies create an oppositional tension between conserva-
tion and development objectives rather than the mutually reinforcing rela-
tionship that advocates promote. In asking whether the “tools” of capitalism 
can conceivably resolve the environmental and social problems that their 
application tends to perpetuate, Fletcher and Breitling posit that neoliberal 
conservation/development techniques function as an “evasion of inequality.” 
While his analysis does not center directly on the discursive extension of 
capital, it does suggest how narrowly economistic attempts at integrating 
conservation and development produce collective denial of social inequality.
While nature protection efforts focused on the Osa Peninsula have 
succeeded in reducing forest cover loss and fragmentation measured 
since the late 1970s, it is unclear whether or not ecotourism and PES 
have contributed to this trend. For example, ecotourism in the Osa may 
contribute to increased local income, enhanced conservation conscious-
ness, and positive attitudes toward conservation activities. At the same time, 
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however, legal restrictions appear to influence declines in deforestation 
more directly, while the benefits of ecotourism enterprises and landowner-
ship have accrued to foreign entrepreneurs. Similarly, studies of the Osa’s 
PES projects, which make direct payments to landowners for protecting 
forests, suggest that reductions in deforestation have more to do with preex-
isting legal restrictions on forest clearing rather than economic incentives 
produced by payouts. Like ecotourism, PES appears to disproportionately 
benefit wealthier landowners. Moreover, PES activities in the Osa continue 
to depend heavily on injections of funds from the Costa Rican government, 
the World Bank, and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), raising ques-
tions as to whether they constitute a self-sustaining, market-based approach 
(Fletcher and Breitling 2012).
Ultimately, Fletcher and Breitling (2012) conclude that neoliberal 
conservation measures on Costa Rica’s Osa Peninsula evade the issue of 
inequality by ignoring the unbalanced accumulation of economic capital 
cited above and turning attention away from large-scale industrial activities 
that pose the greatest threat to the Osa’s forests. Thus the market-based 
designs represented by ecotourism and PES constitute a type of euphemism 
or dissimulation that promises increased incomes, entrepreneurial training, 
and stronger support networks (economic, human/cultural capital, and 
social capital, respectively) that will both enhance economic development 
and protect nature. As Fletcher and Breitling expose, however, this dis-
simulation turns out to be illusory on multiple levels: the programs do 
not produce conservation or development, they may not be market-based 
mechanisms (in the PES example), and they ignore the root causes of 
ecological and social degradation.
Whether it emerges more explicitly (e.g., the five capitals framework) 
or more implicitly (e.g., UNEP’s Towards a Green Economy), the discur-
sive extension of capital plays a central role in the neoliberalization of 
conservation/development, helping to produce a “commonsense” narrative 
about empowerment and nature protection that goes largely unchallenged. 
The language of capital subtly reinforces the assumptions of neoliberal 
capitalism without saying its name. As the examples in this section illus-
trate, while the logic of neoliberalism currently dominates conservation/
development thinking, it is not monolithic—it unfolds in complex, differ-
entiated ways across a range of fields or arenas ranging from global meetings 
such as the COP10 to the CBD to community-level interventions in places 
such as rural Mexico. The tendency of those involved with these nego-
tiations and interventions to first dissimulate and then misrecognize the 
workings of capital in its different forms hides the internal contradictions of 
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neoliberal capitalism and masks the dissent that often emerges in response to 
the material manifestations of these contradictions—environmental decline 
and social inequality. This is what I have called the erasure of power.
Conclusion
Bourdieu composed his chapter on the forms of capital prior to the neoliberal 
turn, but his critique of economic determinism and the dissimulation and 
misrecognition of capital in the context of everyday social interactions offers 
important insights with respect to neoliberal conservation/development. 
Indeed, in a series of essays published in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
Bourdieu (1998a, 2003) offered a scathing critique of neoliberalism and 
what he considered to be “the tyranny of the market.”
While the five capitals model may have already lost some of its cachet in 
discussions of sustainable livelihoods (Scoones 2009) and plays a tangential 
role in institutional design frameworks focused on common property and 
environmental governance, the construct remains strongly embedded both 
explicitly and implicitly within conservation/development discourse and 
practice. UNEP’s (2011) Towards a Green Economy targets adequate pric-
ing of natural capital but further emphasizes the fundamental importance 
of enabling conditions defined in terms of capacity building, education, 
training, strengthened governance, and sound regulatory frameworks, 
among other things. This approach builds directly on previous formulations 
of “natural capitalism” (e.g., Porritt 2007) that place the five capitals at the 
center of a framework for sustainable development.
In this light, advocates of the green economy or the five capitals model 
may view my critique as overwrought. From such a “green” perspective, 
one might argue that capitalism can manifest itself in a number of ways; 
it does not necessarily have to produce persistent inequality and environ-
mental destruction if those involved pursue “good” growth (e.g., health 
and happiness) as opposed to “bad.” Similarly, one could claim that use of 
the five capitals construct within sustainable livelihoods and institutional 
design frameworks has helped to improve upon traditional, top-down devel-
opment approaches and channeled scarce resources toward the ends of 
empowerment, nature protection, and good governance.
Yet, as the conceptual discussion and summary examples in this chapter 
show, discursive extension of the term “capital” produces an illusory pro-
jection of empowerment, social unity, and ecological resilience that ulti-
mately feeds a form of economic determinism—neoliberal conservation/
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development. By construing capital as a thing rather than a process, it 
erases the workings of power in practice, hiding the internal contradictions 
of neoliberal capitalism at the same time (see McAfee 2012a). From this 
point of view, while natural capitalism may be kinder and gentler than 
extractive and exploitative manifestations, it still leads to dissimulation and 
misrecognition of the true face of capital. In this sense, even though Bour-
dieu’s work helped set the stage for the very problem he sought to preempt, 
it also provides a lens that captures how capital flows and accumulates in 
the context of market and other types of exchanges. The paradox that I 
identify in Bourdieu’s writing on the forms of capital plays out similarly 
with respect to the green economy. The extent to which conservation/
development theory and practice have taken on the character of neoliberal 
capitalism has entailed a wholesale adoption of the logic and discourse 
of the market—the building blocks of Nature™ Inc. An untenable par-
adox emerges at the point when proponents of neoliberal conservation/
development gain the legitimation that grants access to centers of power 
but cannot achieve nature protection or poverty alleviation.
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1. I use the term “conservation/development” to capture a range of practices and 
approaches that explicitly link nature protection and sustainable development objectives 
and carry names such as integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs), 
community-based conservation (CBC), and community-based natural resources man-
agement (CBNRM). In many cases these activities employ market-oriented strategies 
associated with neoliberalism.
2. Fletcher (2012c, 297) describes five characteristics of neoliberal conservation/
development, including (1) devolution of governance responsibilities from state actors 
to nonstate actors such as NGOs, (2) creation of markets centered on natural resources, 
(3) privatization of natural resources, (4) commodification of natural resources, and 
(5) partnerships with private corporations for fund-raising purposes.
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3. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) offers the following entry on capital: 
“The accumulated wealth of an individual, company, or community, used as a fund 
for carrying on fresh production; wealth in any form used in producing more wealth.” 
The OED traces the word’s monetary usage to a 1611 entry in Randle Cotgrove’s 
A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues: “wealth, worth; a stocke, a man’s 
principall, or chiefe, substance.”
4. See Raymond Williams’s ([1976] 1983, 50–52) entry on “capitalism.”
5. Although the World Bank grouped the different types of capital under its sus-
tainable development framework, it did not invent the terms. Becker (1964) popular-
ized “human capital,” especially within economics. “Social capital” emerged in the 
sociological literature in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Coleman 1988; Bourdieu 1986) 
before achieving widespread visibility in the 1990s, especially following Putnam (1993). 
The term “natural capital” is most closely associated with the subfield of ecological 
economics (e.g., Jansson et al. 1994).
6. The designation “produced” capital used by the World Bank combines “finan-
cial” capital and “physical” capital (e.g., infrastructure)—a distinction that appears in 
subsequent presentations of the five capitals.
7. For historical context on the sustainable livelihoods approach, see Scoones 
(2009).
8. My summarization of Bourdieu’s conceptualization of capital is not intended to 
be comprehensive. Rather, I seek to capture certain distinctive qualities that emerge 
from his usage of the term, especially in his chapter “The Forms of Capital” (1986).
9. Further discussion of Bourdieu’s formulation of fields can be found in Bourdieu 
and Wacquant (1992).
10. Bourdieu’s use of the term “symbolic capital” refers to practices of representation 
that confer enduring and, in many cases, unquestioned legitimacy upon the other forms 
of capital. It bears a resemblance to Gramsci’s (1971) use of “common sense” in his writ-
ing on hegemony to the extent that the interests of capital become the interests of all.
11. The term “social alchemy” appears in Bourdieu (1977, 195). The influence of 
Marx’s formulation of “commodity fetishism” seems clear in Bourdieu’s construction 
inasmuch as Marx deliberately used the term “fetish” to signal the illusory or magi-
cal transformation achieved by commodities when they take on inherent value, thus 
masking the social relations and labor that produced them. It is interesting, therefore, 
to note Ben Fine’s (2001, 16; 2010) ongoing critique of social capital, which refers to 
the concept as a form of fetishism.
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chapter seven
Performative Equations and 
Neoliberal Commodification
The Case of Climate
Larry Lohmann
The Dilemmas of Theory
Between the insight that current economic and environmental crises are 
being exacerbated by the new forms of commodification characteristic of 
neoliberalism and the detailed specification of what those forms are lies 
the work of a hundred lifetimes. Commodification is a many-splendored 
process, and it has to be. All commodities-in-the-making are different, and 
so are the series of acts and actors, impulses and resistances that contribute 
to, or block, their making or unmaking. The proliferation of ambitious, 
variously contested commodities that has sprung up in the neoliberal 
era—from wetland offsets (Robertson 2000, 2004) and collateralized debt 
obligations to genome information products (Sunder Rajan 2006), public 
services (Huws 2011), and species (Pawliczek and Sullivan 2011)—only 
amplifies the diversity. As the work of scholars as varied as Elinor Ostrom 
(Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994), Viviana Zelizer (1995), Colin Wil-
liams (2005), Margaret Radin (1996), and Brett Frischmann and Mark 
Lemley (2006) confirms, the idea that there exists a single, uniform process 
of commodification operating everywhere on the as-yet uncommodified 
is as unfounded as the quasi-deistic notion, equally emblematic of the 
neoliberal era, that everything already is a commodity (O’Connor 1994a).
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The shorthand “the commodification of nature” is loaded with a par-
ticularly great breadth of meanings. If deployed without awareness of 
the teeming multitude of differing cases, each with its own complexities, 
the term runs the risk of confusing and clarifying in equal measure. Karl 
Polanyi (1944) and John Maynard Keynes (1936), following a path opened 
by Marx, highlighted some of the distinctive features and pitfalls of the 
commodification of land. In the neoliberal era, Marxist-inspired thinkers, 
actor-network theorists, and others have revealed some of the diversity of the 
“black boxes” that have to be opened to expose the predicaments specific to 
the commodification of many other aspects of “nature” (e.g., Kloppenburg 
1988; Bridge 2000; Holm 2001; Boyd 2001; Martinez-Alier 2003; Hender-
son 2003; Robertson 2004; Mansfield 2004; Bakker 2004; Robbins and 
Luginbuhl 2005; O’Neill 2006)—including those occasioned by various 
types of what Martin O’Connor (1994a) calls “nature’s resistance” or what 
Noel Castree (2003, 285) calls “contradictions between the materialities of 
nature and those of the commodification process.” Continually reminding 
such scholars of the particularities of individual struggles over commodi-
fication is a worldwide spectrum of confrontations at the grass roots over 
issues ranging from the enclosure of community forests to the expansion 
of credit involved in microfinance.
Nowhere is attentiveness to the diversity of commodification more cru-
cial than in the formulation of environmentalist strategy. “Our Earth is 
not for sale” may be a good rousing slogan for Friends of the Earth Inter-
national, “tu no puedes comprar el sol” a felicitous line in a popular anti-
capitalist anthem by the Puerto Rican group Calle 13, and “Nature™ Inc.” 
an excellent title for an international conference of critical academics on 
problems connected with current trends in the capitalization of nature. But 
without extensive explication, such throwaway phrases are too abstract to 
give much idea of where to locate the challenges and opportunities that are 
exercising so many movements and thinkers today or of where and how to 
make critical interventions. In reality, Nature (whatever one might mean by 
this questionable “key word”) has been Incorporated in one form or another 
for a good long time, and various bits of Earth have been on the block for 
many centuries. What, if anything, is really new, and if what is new is as 
frightening as often claimed, what is to be done about it?
Formal definitions of commodification are of limited help: their con-
cision tends to be in inverse proportion to their applicability. Take, for 
example, the definition offered by Karen Bakker, one of the subtlest schol-
ars of the commodification of water. She is at pains to dispel what she 
rightly regards as confusions among commodification, privatization, and 
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commercialization. Commodification, Bakker says, is the “creation of an 
economic good, through the application of mechanisms to appropriate and 
standardize a class of goods and services, enabling them to be sold at a price 
determined through market exchange” (2007b, 103, emphasis added). One 
of the virtues of this definition is that it pinpoints the enduring prominence, 
in commodification, of ownership, control, and measurement. Yet such 
definitions are considerably less illuminating today, in an era of financializa-
tion and a growing “green economy,” than they might have been a century 
or two ago. For one thing, commodification is not necessarily as closely 
associated with appropriation, in the usual senses of the word, as it used to 
be. To take one instance, the commodification of price changes (or, more 
precisely, of price change certainty and uncertainty) involved in today’s vast 
market in futures does not involve the appropriation of price certainty in 
any conventional sense. Nor is appropriation sensu stricto involved in the 
widespread practice of short selling, or “shorting.” Rather, securities are only 
borrowed, to be sold when the price is high and bought back when the price 
is low, even though not only the securities but also the underlying assets are 
also thus woven into expanded networks of exchange and thus, arguably, 
intensified commodification. As a whole, complex financial derivatives are 
types of commodities that are only tenuously related to seizure or assertion of 
property or access rights. The special powers they exert over land, water, and 
air are tangible and attributable in a sense to expanded commodification, 
but they are not achieved through standard processes of appropriation. The 
commodification of pollution presents another example. To avoid “takings” 
lawsuits from business that could result from governments’ tightening emis-
sions restrictions under cap-and-trade systems, tradable pollution permits 
are generally claimed in legislation not to be property rights of any kind—in 
spite of being universally treated as assets and commodities. Hence, when 
European corporations are granted monetizable rights to dump greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere or to use foreign vegetation or soil to soak up 
their carbon dioxide emissions, something is being appropriated, but that 
appropriation is hedged about and governed in novel ways.
Bakker’s criterion of standardization, similarly, falls short of capturing 
some of the most significant innovations in post-1970 commodification. 
Standardization is a process best applied to things that, to borrow the useful 
phrase of Donald MacKenzie (2009), have already been, at a basic level, 
“made the same.” For example, it was only because wheat was already a 
universally recognized classification that the Chicago Board of Trade in the 
nineteenth century was able to formulate practices for isolating categories 
such as “No. 2 spring wheat” as standardized commodities in an era in 
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which grain was being transformed from a product that stayed in sacks from 
farm gate to final buyer into a “golden stream” coursing through railroad 
cars and grain elevators (Cronon 1991, 97–147). No such preexisting clas-
sifications exist in the burgeoning post-1970 trend of ecosystems services 
commodification. The immediate challenge of commodification here is 
not in standardization but in making things the same in the first place. 
So-called carbon markets, for instance, despite having been in existence 
for two decades, have yet to identify an intelligible or universally agreed-
upon thing to trade in; the tradable unit is typically defined, as Jillian 
Button (2008, 581) observes, “not in terms of what the unit is, but what 
it entitles the holder to do.” Tradable carbon permits allow their buyers 
to emit greenhouse gases, but whether the permits are to be defined as 
access rights to global carbon-cycling capacity, whether this or that type of 
counterfactual reductions (emissions below “what would have happened 
otherwise”) of different greenhouse gases can be accepted as exchange-
able equivalents, whether units from countries with different emissions 
caps should be treated as the same, and so forth are matters of unceasing 
controversy, as will be described below. Indeed, as the markets expand, 
carbon commodities “created to fit the necessities of a market system” tend 
to become “increasingly vague” rather than globally standardized (Rosales 
2006, 1046; see also Munden Group 2011). As Jessica Dempsey (2011, 
199–203) points out, prerequisites for standardization are even harder to 
entrench in biodiversity markets, where the relative “clarity” of carbon 
commodities, ironically, is viewed with envy. Similarly, although wetlands 
bankers have been trading wetlands certificates since the 1980s, they not 
only have “not settled upon a system of measurement” but also have “not 
even agreed upon what the commodity is that they wish to measure” 
(Robertson 2004, 367). Standardization is also unattained (and probably 
unattainable) in contingent valuation, cost-benefit analysis, and the other 
types of “proxy commodification” (Castree 2003) that have enjoyed such a 
resurgence during the neoliberal era and that attempt to set up replicable 
and verifiable practices of market-like valuation ab ovo in circumstances 
in which none of the customary webs of market practices, with their con-
straining and enabling features, yet exist (Lohmann 2009). This is to say 
nothing of the growing range of commodification processes in which the 
very notions of commensuration and standardization are problematic, such 
as in markets for art or the more bespoke range of speculative financial 
products (Karpik 2010; Cooper 2010).
In an important survey article, Castree (2003) wisely sidesteps many of 
the difficulties of pat definitions of “commodification” by instead offering 
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a somewhat “thicker” account featuring various conditions seen by scholars 
of a Marxist bent as normally required for it. Castree’s work suggests the 
fruitfulness of approaching commodification not as a phenomenon to be 
corralled by a sharply rounded-off dictionary entry but as a subject of an 
open-ended, discursive, dialectical effort to grasp the nature of contempo-
rary crises. Castree (2003, 278) notes, for example, that the mere quality of 
being exchangeable has long been, for Marxists, “too thin a basis to spec-
ify what is entailed by capitalist commodification” as a process in which 
“qualitatively distinct things are rendered equivalent and salable through 
the medium of money,” with particular use values commensurated and 
acquiring the “general quality of exchange value.” Yet even this specifica-
tion is not nearly enough, for most Marxist scholars, to get a real handle on 
the subject. Further elements identified by Castree include privatization, 
which is as much about “control over commodities—prior to, during and 
after exchange—as it about ownership in the technical, legalistic sense” 
(279; cf. Bakker 2007a); alienability or “detachability” from sellers; indi-
viduation against a background of legal and material supporting contexts; 
functional abstraction, or the separating off of a measurable characteristic of 
a thing or process from the thing in its original context; spatial abstraction, 
or the treating of an individual thing in one place as the same as something 
(ostensibly different) elsewhere, as when wetlands in place A are mobilized 
to “replace” wetlands in place B (Robertson 2000); commensuration with 
other commodities in a way that allows a thing or process to function as one 
moment in the accumulation of capital; and displacement or fetishization, 
according to which commodities appear as things rather than socionatural 
relations. Elsewhere, Castree and others have expanded this treatment still 
further by linking new types of commodification of nature to neoliber-
alism or financialization (Smith 2008; O’Connor 1994a; Castree 2008a; 
Heynen et al. 2007; Moore 2010). Again, the point is not to arrive once 
and for all at a “master definition”—neoliberalization and financialization 
are themselves contested shorthands for complex processes about which 
controversy is rife—but to suggest practical tools for investigators whose 
instinct is that the study of commodification is especially important at the 
current moment. Initiatives such as Castree’s thus offer a useful way station 
or orienting device between, on the one hand, misleading abstractions 
and, on the other, lengthy “thick descriptions” (Geertz 1973) of particular 
instances of commodification whose relevance to other cases or to broader 
historical trends usually requires some effort to tease out.1
This chapter is intended as a limited further contribution to the effort to 
come to terms with neoliberalism’s new “nature commodities” by mediating 
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between, as it were, dictionary entries and encyclopedias, abstract defini-
tions and thick descriptions. While concerning itself with a single aspect of 
the commodification of a single “ecosystem service”—climate stability—it 
does so by proposing, and demonstrating the use of, a conceptual instru-
ment conceivably applicable to a variety of problematic post-1970 com-
modities. Focusing largely on the moments of “making things the same” 
that are crucial for so many such commodities, this instrument consists of 
summarizing complicated practices of commensuration in thematic perfor-
mative equations, around each of which specific accounts of actors, meth-
odologies, institutions, resistances, and outcomes can then be collected. 
Equations are used simply because they are a tidy way of expressing the 
relations of “sameness” that most commodities require for their operation. 
These equations are performative (Austin 1961; MacKenzie 2006) in the 
commodification context in the sense that, rather than being true or false 
descriptions of entrenched states of affairs, they constitute commitments 
to help bring about the equivalences they specify.
The Object of Climate Commodification
The question of why attempts have been made for the last two decades 
to make commodities out of climate, and how this was made possible by 
earlier twentieth-century developments, is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
although it has been discussed elsewhere (Lohmann 2006, 2011). The ques-
tion here is how one might fashion these commodities. The answer is not 
immediately obvious. Global warming results mainly from the transfer of 
carbon from a fossil pool locked underground to a separate pool circulating 
above the ground among the atmosphere, oceans, vegetation, soils, fresh-
water, and surface rocks. This transfer is irreversible over humanly relevant 
time scales. It follows that sustaining—or “producing”—the use value of 
a liveable climate requires keeping remaining fossil fuels in the ground.
To put it another way, given path dependence (Arthur 1999) and the 
way that fossil fuels have become “locked in” (Unruh 2000, 817) to indus-
trialized societies’ ways of life, climate reality calls for political mobiliza-
tion behind immediate long-term investment programs in new, nonfossil 
energy, transport, agricultural, and consumption regimes, particularly in 
the North. Climate reality also requires programs for shifting state subsidies 
from fossil fuels to existing initiatives defending or constructing low carbon 
means of livelihood. Above all, that reality demands widespread alliance 
building in support of the social movements that are already directly or 
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indirectly addressing the below- to above-ground transfer of carbon. These 
include movements working to “keep oil in the soil, coal in the hole, and 
tar sand in the land” in the Niger Delta, Alberta, Ecuador, South Africa, 
Appalachia, and elsewhere; stopping the development of dozens of coal-
fired power plants in the United States, Britain, India, Thailand, and other 
countries; fighting agrofuel projects whose effect would be to sustain a 
transportation infrastructure designed for oil; and working to ban banks 
from supporting fossil-intensive or fossil-extractive projects. Increasingly, 
such movements are aligning themselves with those in support of ecolog-
ical and peasant agriculture, more democratic public health and energy 
provision, cleaner air and water, and an end to militarism, environmental 
racism, and extractivism.
Prima facie, a climate change mitigation commodity would need to sup-
port movement building of this radical kind. Yet how might it be possible 
to buy and sell contributions toward the long-term political shift away from 
fossil fuels that such movements are working toward? In a tongue-in-cheek 
but nonetheless instructive proposal, legal scholar Douglas Kysar (2010) 
suggests that the “legal and political actions” that have “dramatic impact” 
on historical trends would have to be commodified. The resulting products 
could be sold by, for example, “indigenous groups that entirely block new 
exploration activities” or “forest dwelling communities that successfully 
fight to stop logging.” Investment banks seeking to craft new financial prod-
ucts would “devote themselves . . . to the identification and promotion of 
critical political interventions by disempowered voices for sustainability.” 
Accumulation would be a matter of investing in instruments that maxi-
mized structural societal change over the long term.
To make accounting, ownership, and capital accumulation possible, 
Kysar’s climate commodity would have to turn the qualitative relations that 
make up movement building and historical process into quantitative ones. 
But obstacles would arise immediately. For example, consumers would 
need to know, and producers to guarantee, what increment of historical 
change toward a halt to fossil fuel extraction each commodity sale rep-
resented. But who would quantify the extent to which each unit of the 
commodity contributed to undoing the social complexities of fossil fuel 
path dependence, and how? If different units contributed different incre-
ments of historical change depending on the particular pathway they were 
aggregated into, and the paths were incompatible, how would the units be 
commensurated, much less standardized? How would the historical effects 
of private ownership on the dialogue and movement building comprising 
the “labor” producing the climate commodity be calculated? If the expert 
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storytellers (Beckert 2011) whose services would be needed to help price 
the commodity attached a particular value to rolling back the dominance 
of a rampant financial sector, would Goldman Sachs sell the associated 
securities? The only way of removing such difficulties for accumulation 
would be to demote the market to being a provider of unspecified and 
unquantifiable “climate services”—in which case it would lose most of its 
usefulness for policymakers and its appeal to other potential customers.
An Alternative Model
The alternative to the immediate, dizzying multiplication of paradoxes of Kys-
ar’s whimsical proposal is to construct a commodity based on the enclosure 
and commodification of pollution sinks, whose extent the state defines in 
terms of limits on the quantity of molecules that can be emitted. This is what 
the United States’ sulphur dioxide trading system, instituted in the 1990s, did, 
and it is the model followed by the Kyoto Protocol’s carbon market, the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme, and all other actually existing climate markets.
The advantages are clear. Molecules can be counted (in many pollu-
tion markets, a metric ton is the unit of measurement). Molecules come 
“prestandardized” in the sense that they are the same the world over. Mol-
ecules—or molecular motions—can also be laid claim to, and so, at least 
in principle, can the sinks that absorb molecules—for example, oceans, 
trees, or lands that soak up carbon dioxide. Quantifiability and ownability 
make it possible to buy and sell rights to emit CO2—essentially, rights or 
access to the earth’s carbon-cycling capacity in the oceans, atmosphere, soil, 
vegetation, and rock. And with quantifiability, measurement, and property 
claims comes, too, the possibility of systematized market exchange and 
large-scale accumulation. Focusing commodity construction on molecular 
rather than social movements, in addition, has the advantage of tapping 
into an existing cultural and political momentum. Even before ecosystems 
markets became all the rage, the issue of “global climate change” had 
become identified with the largely molecular “concerns that have guided 
climate modelers in their daily practices” (Goeminne 2012, 3). Modelers’ 
efforts to build reliable climate knowledge from enormous amounts of 
disparate data had in turn been enabled partly by a more general postwar 
institutional movement centered on prediction and forecasting that has 
also profoundly shaped formal economics (Mirowski 2011). A molecular 
approach to climate change both reinforces and is reinforced by wide-
spread contemporary “processes of depoliticization” as well as fetishistic 
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and apocalyptic disavowals of the “multiple and complex relations through 
which environmental changes unfold” (Swyngedouw 2010, 214, 220).
As is the case with the mechanics of any commodification process, how-
ever, the flip side of the advantages of the choice of object is a complex set 
of costs and resistances (Marx [1867] 1976, 198). Both these advantages 
and the “overflows” (Callon 1998a) that are their inevitable counterpart can 
be mapped and analyzed according to the open-ended set of constructed 
equivalences or performative equations that, along with various technolo-
gies, persons, institutions, disciplines, and bits of nonhuman nature, make 
up one part of the infrastructures of markets (Callon 1998a; MacKenzie 
2006). The particular set of equivalences that symbolize and form part of 
the infrastructure for climate commodity formation are sketched out in the 
remainder of this chapter, forming an analytical backbone around which 
the logics and resistances associated with climate commodification can be 
taxonomized and discussed.
Instead of founding themselves on the premise that action on climate 
entails keeping fossil fuels in the ground, then, climate services markets 
are based on the equation:
a better climate = a reduction in CO2 emissions
An immediate effect of this institutionally and politically convenient choice 
of object is to entrench a process that continually reframes the climate 
problem in ways that disentangle it from climate history and the transfer 
of fossil fuels out of the ground and reembed it in neoclassical economics, 
chemistry, and a variety of other quantitative disciplines. Eliding the multi-
ple differences between reducing emissions and addressing the climate cri-
sis, the foundational equation above obscures, for example, the difference 
between stepwise molecule reductions over the short or medium term and 
actions that integrate into a program that would result in most remaining 
fossil fuels being left in the ground permanently.2 In addition, it ignores the 
nonlinearity and unverifiability of the relationship—a consequence of the 
physically “chaotic,” flip-flop nature of the atmospheric system—between 
any given increment of reduction, on the one hand, and any given incre-
ment of climate benefit, on the other. Also elided is the difference between 
molecules that can be classified as “survival” emissions and those that can 
be classified as “luxury” emissions (Agrawal and Narain 1991)—an elision 
that has climatic as well as class consequences, since “survival” emissions 
tend to have causes, dynamics, and historical accompaniments different 
from those of “luxury” emissions. In such effects lie the seeds of a whole 
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spectrum of resistances to climate commodification, ranging from the crit-
icisms of many climate scientists and environmentalists to the opposition 
of grassroots social movements in the global South.
Molecular Equations and Their Discontents
Once molecular flow management is made into the object of political 
action on climate, then the fact that CO2 molecules are identical through-
out the world implies that the following equation can also be made into a 
guiding principle of climate policy:
stopping transfer A of x molecules of CO2 into the atmosphere =  
stopping transfer B of x molecules of CO2 into the atmosphere
So, too, then, can its corollaries:
stopping the transfer of x molecules of CO2  
into the atmosphere in place A =  
stopping the transfer of x molecules of CO2  
into the atmosphere in place B
stopping the transfer of x molecules of CO2  
into the atmosphere through technology A =  
stopping the transfer of x molecules of CO2  
into the atmosphere through technology B
stopping the transfer into the atmosphere of  
x molecules of CO2 of underground fossil origin =  
stopping the transfer into the atmosphere of  
x molecules of CO2 of surface biotic origin
Such equations mark practices that allow firms, investors, and spec-
ulators to benefit from cost differentials between various investments in 
reduced molecule flows. If it is cheaper to invest in mandated reductions 
in place A than in place B or in reductions that use technology A rather 
than technology B, then the choice will be obvious for any business; it will 
be similarly obvious if it is cheaper to invest in forest conservation than 
in technologies that use less fossil fuel. Hence the celebrated cost-saving 
“flexibility” of climate markets in which one “reduction” can be traded for 
another in what proponents hope will be a maximally liquid trading system.
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The molecular focus of the four equations displayed above gives them 
the rhetorical or mythical (Zbaracki 2004) power of chemistry. Who 
could deny that molecules of CO2 are the same whatever their origins 
and locations? There is, however, once again a flip side: the appearance of 
indisputability is achieved only by reframing a question of climate history 
as one of chemistry. In reality, it can make a difference to the trajectory of 
global warming whether a given reduction in CO2 flows is attained in place 
A or place B, through technology A or technology B, or through industrial 
restructuring or forest conservation. Equating CO2 reductions that result 
from different technologies makes it not only possible but often necessary 
to make climatically wrong choices in the name of molecule prices—for 
example, to reduce molecule flows through routine, cheap efficiency 
improvements that entrench coal use and delay long-term nonfossil invest-
ment, or to build destructive hydroelectric dams that do nothing to displace 
coal and oil, rather than to select no-carbon technologies that form an inte-
gral part of a long-term program for phasing out fossil fuels (Driesen 2003; 
Taylor 2012). Equating reductions in place A with place B, meanwhile, 
obscures a number of geographically specific factors that make a difference 
to energy transitions, including the greater influence on technology devel-
opment that a reduction in emissions from a particular industrial process 
might have in a high income country, where it is more expensive, than 
in a low income country (Alfredsson 2009). It can also make a difference 
whether an identical reduction is achieved through technological inno-
vation or halting forest degradation. The traditional objection both inside 
and outside United Nations climate negotiations to policies that rely on 
trees for “reductions” is that they weaken incentives for structural change 
in industrialized societies. This quality is especially important given two 
further realities: first, that no increase in biotic carbon on the earth’s land 
surface would be capable of keeping out of the atmosphere and the oceans 
more than a fraction of the comparatively enormous stores of fossil carbon 
now being transferred to the surface from underground; and second, that 
the delays in the inevitable decarbonization of industrial societies enabled 
by exchanging biotic for fossil carbon make that decarbonization rapidly 
more expensive, and thus more daunting, over time. In short, as equations 
of chemistry, the four equations displayed above are true; as equations of 
climatology, they are false; but as equations that help structure market 
exchange, they are perhaps best regarded as neither true nor false but rather 
as normative expressions of, and commitments to, novel commensuration 
practices that are unavoidably conflict-ridden and uncompletable. Their 
truth-value in terms of chemistry is relevant to their performativity in the 
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market context only insofar as it provides them with some moral cachet in 
a context in which the climate issue has already been molecularized. Their 
truth-value (i.e., their falsity) in terms of climatology is relevant to their 
performativity only insofar as it tends to undermine their credibility among 
those who insist that climate markets should be about climate.
The four equations above give rise to other types of “blowback” as well. 
For example, making cost per molecule the criterion of choice between 
technology A and technology B helps pave the way for land-intensive (and 
thus socially discriminatory) programs that attempt, at least ostensibly, to 
“replace” fossil fuels. Among these are strife-ridden agrofuel schemes in 
countries such as Brazil, Honduras, and Indonesia, as well as wind power 
projects such as those in Mexico’s Tehuantepec isthmus, where indigenous 
communities have regretted cheaply signing over land to private wind farm 
developers from Spain and Mexico who profit not only from electricity 
sales but also from trading the resulting pollution rights in Europe or using 
them to sustain their own fossil-fueled installations. By abstracting from 
the tendency for pollution to be concentrated in what in the United States 
are called “poorer communities of color,” technology and place neutrality 
also help ground future capital accumulation in historical patterns of class 
and racial discrimination, ensuring staunch opposition to carbon markets 
from networks of underprivileged communities ranging from the Cali fornia 
Environmental Justice Movement (California Environmental Justice 
Movement 2010) to India’s National Forum of Forest Peoples and Forest 
Workers.3 Equating fossil and biotic carbon intensifies climate class struggle 
in the same way, since doing so provides additional economic and “scien-
tific” sanction for extensive landgrabs from the poor (Gregersen et al. 2010; 
Leach, Fairhead, and Fraser 2012), whose livelihoods are likely to come 
into competition with carbon-absorbing projects and who may also see their 
store of knowledge of low-carbon subsistence livelihoods depleted as a result 
(another effect that is inconvenient to include in carbon calculations). 
The “cost curves” that the equation makes possible also tend to abstract 
from the difference between forest clearing for commercial agriculture, 
on the one hand, and rotational forest farming that involves subsequent 
regrowth of forests and storage of carbon, on the other. This abstraction 
both works against long-term forest conservation and, again, facilitates the 
deskilling of forest dwellers. As Nathaniel Dyer and Simon Counsell (2010, 
69) comment, the “argument that we need a new economic model to 
account for [climate change] externalities and to put our economies on a 
sustainable path” has ironically led to cost curves that, with their “hidden 
costs and partial analysis,” are “similar to the narrow economic approach 
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that contributed to the problem that we are now attempting to solve.” Thus 
Aritana Yawalapiti, an indigenous leader in the upper Xingu River region of 
Brazil, reported in November 2010 that carbon forestry promoters visiting 
his territory had told his community that they would have to reduce forest 
burning if they were to be paid for producing carbon pollution licenses. 
But, Aritana objected, “We always burn at a place where we fish, hunt or 
open a small farmland area. . . . [W]e open a space to farm, we plant, we 
collect manioc, after some years everything recuperates again. . . . [T]he 
forest grows back, while we plant at another place.”4
In sum, the cost advantages of “geographical neutrality,” “technol-
ogy neutrality,” or “carbon source neutrality” map onto various aspects 
of “mission drift” in climate markets as an instrument of environmental 
policy, as well as a number of other severe market-undermining effects. 
Of course, contradictory effects following from the abstraction involved 
in commodification are nothing new: in the nineteenth-century Chicago 
grain markets, for example, commodity abstraction, while making futures 
possible, also engendered the possibility of, for example, market-crippling 
speculative corners or conflict over profits that elevator operators gained 
simply because they were located in a position that enabled them to mix 
grain from many different farmers in order to minimize the quality of each 
bulk consignment they sold within a standard grade (Cronon 1991, 134ff.). 
Questions regarding climate services markets’ contradictions, however, 
tend to be of far greater scope than those that challenged the new Chicago 
wheat market of the 1850s onward. For example, to what extent have the 
abstraction processes involved in the formation of climate commodities 
undermined their ostensible policy purpose altogether? Can the commod-
ities even be made coherent enough to survive? To what extent can their 
self-undermining dynamics be brought out of the “black box” in which they 
are currently concealed in United Nations and neoliberal environmen-
tal discourse and in the work of academics and other experts? The more 
carefully the performative equations structuring climate commodities are 
unpacked, the more salient such questions become.
Offset Equations and the Attack on Nonexpert Agency
One further step in this unpacking process involves examining the equa-
tions that structure the practices responsible for creating what are known as 
“offsets.” Under the Kyoto Protocol carbon market, as well as the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme and other climate market arrangements, 
polluters subject to government emissions caps, as well as funds, banks, 
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or other private or public enterprises, can finance carbon-saving projects 
outside the caps and use the resulting extra pollution rights—offsets—in 
lieu of emissions reduction obligations, or sell them to third parties, or 
speculate with them. Thus:
CO2 reduction under a cap = offset outside the cap
For example, European Union Allowances (EUAs), the emissions per-
mits traded under the EU cap, are exchangeable with Certified Emissions 
Reductions (CERs), which are Kyoto Protocol carbon offsets generated in 
southern countries outside the European cap:
EUA = CER
Offsets thus make possible additional abstractions from place and widen the 
scope of possible molecular cost savings from technology choice or forestry. 
That is, they take the “spatial fix” (Harvey 2006a) of cap and trade (which 
moves pollution around a “capped” landscape to wherever it is cheapest 
to abate) one step further, to territories not covered by caps, especially the 
global South, where carbon cleanup is cheaper (Bond 2010). This multiple 
boundary-crossing function is reflected in the distinctive equation in which 
offsets are embedded:
reduction under a cap = “avoided” emission outside the cap
This equivalence allows offset projects that emit greenhouse gases (and most 
do) to license the emissions of still more greenhouse gases elsewhere—as 
long as they emit less than “would have been released” in the absence of 
carbon finance. For instance, carbon traders or capped polluters in the UK 
can purchase carbon pollution rights from highly polluting sponge iron 
factories in India, provided the factory owners can convince UN regulators 
that technological improvements have resulted in less CO2 than would 
have been emitted otherwise and that this saving is measurable according 
to approved criteria.5 The cost savings are considerable. In September 2012 
the price differential between cheap CERs and more expensive EUAs on 
the Bluenext spot market in Paris was US$7.52—a gap that can also be 
profitably exploited by speculators.
In order to arrive at a single amount of “carbon saved” in India that can 
be priced and substituted for measured and verified industrial emissions 
reductions in the UK, however, a single counterfactual story line must be 
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posited as a baseline. Methodologically, then, the offset equation requires 
that counterfactual history be given the same epistemic status as actual 
history:
actual CO2 reduction = counterfactual CO2 reduction
“What would have happened” in the absence of carbon credit sales must 
be treated as determinate and quantifiable in the same way that CO2 reduc-
tions under a cap are determinate and quantifiable. These equations commit 
offset creators and traders to a deterministic modeling of human and nonhu-
man actors, since only on deterministic assumptions is it possible to isolate 
the single story line required for commodity pricing, based on the starting 
conditions of a counterfactual without-project scenario. This commitment 
to recasting political debate about alternative futures as disputes about the 
correctness of technical predictions has affinities with a more general post-
war technocratic dedication to ideals of forecasting and apolitical control, 
with rational actor theory in economics, and with a more recent trend in the 
financial markets toward “mechanized” storytelling about the future through 
mathematical models, whether those models are used as confidence-building 
devices (Beckert 2011), technologies of a new, credit ratings–dominated 
pattern of investment (Ouroussoff 2010), or actual engines of mass produc-
tion of certainty commodities (Tett 2009). Not surprisingly, it is subject to 
similar blowbacks. One is simply that the methodological ambition is too 
high. As George Soros (2008) and many others have emphasized for the 
financial markets, calculative technologies, when pushed beyond a certain 
point, undermine their own efficacy. Kevin Anderson (2012) of the Tyndall 
Centre for Climate Change research makes a similar point about carbon 
calculation: “The offsetters’ claim to account for carbon leakage over the 
relevant timeframe presumes powers of prediction that could have foreseen 
the internet and low-cost airlines following from Marconi’s 1901 telegraph 
and the Wright brothers’ 1903 maiden flight. Difficult though it is for con-
temporary society to accept, ascribing any meaningful level of certainty to 
such long-term multiplier effects is not possible and consequently offsetting 
is ill-fated from the start.” This indeterminacy underlies part of the prolonged 
methodological agony of conscientious offset accountancy experts such as 
Michael Gillenwater (2012), who asks, “What does it mean for an offset 
project to be real? What would an unreal offset project be? How could we 
tell if it was unreal, and is this something we should be concerned about?”
A second contradiction is that, necessary as a deterministic model is for 
offset calculation, it is also necessary that the technical experts and investors 
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responsible for offset projects be exempted from it: the offset commodity 
form requires that they be rewarded for making a choice in what otherwise 
is an unalterable course of history. Offsets, that is, must attribute agency 
to privileged actors while denying it to every other human or nonhuman 
agent. This is, of course, a move familiar from the annals of colonial and 
postcolonial history, as well as of neoclassical economic theory. But the 
denial of workers’ and farmers’ capability to create their own history is no 
more likely to escape resistance in the present case, where it is closely inte-
grated with commodity formation in climate markets, than it is elsewhere. 
Early on, for example, one group of Brazilian activists denounced the “sin-
ister strategy” of claiming that a pig iron industry was creating emissions 
reduction “equivalents” by burning plantation charcoal rather than coal:
What about the emissions that still happen in the pig iron industry, burn-
ing charcoal? What we really need are investments in clean energies 
that at the same time contribute to the cultural, social and economic 
well-being of local populations. . . . We can never accept the argument 
that one activity is less worse [sic] than another one to justify the serious 
negative impacts. . . . [W]e want to prevent these impacts and construct 
a society with an economic policy that includes every man and woman, 
preserving and recovering our environment. (FASE 2003)
CO2 Equivalence and the Pitfalls of “Efficiency”
Among its many other advantages, climate markets’ focus on molecules 
opens up the cost-saving possibility of using greenhouse gases other than 
carbon dioxide in the formation of climate commodities. Here market con-
struction has benefited from the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), which, prompted by the UN’s need for national 
greenhouse gas accounts as well as its own molecular preoccupations, has 
attempted to commensurate CO2 with a range of other greenhouse gases 
such as methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and various chlorofluoro-
carbons and fluorocarbons, including the industrial by-product HFC-23 
(IPCC 1996), according to their relative effects on global warming, or 
global warming potential (GWP). The result is the following equations:
CH4 = 21 × CO2
N2O = 310 × CO2
HFC-23 = 11,700 × CO2
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These equations can then be used to elaborate a climate commodity in 
terms of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) rather than just CO2. Having abstracted 
from the climate crisis to CO2 molecules, in other words, climate services 
markets now abstract from CO2 and other gases to posit portmanteau quasi- 
molecules of CO2e, which assume and expand the fetish status already 
accorded to CO2. In the performative equations previously analyzed in this 
chapter, accordingly, “CO2” can often be replaced with “CO2e” (depend-
ing on the particular market’s rules), amplifying each equation’s scope.
The consequence is to make the trade in climate services enormously 
more “efficient” and profitable, both for fossil fuel users and for dealers 
in pollution permits, due to the cost savings achieved by substituting new 
molecular “raw materials” for carbon dioxide. For instance, given that burn-
ing off just one ton of CH4 can generate salable rights to release twenty-one 
tons of CO2 in Europe, it is not surprising that—to take one example—more 
than two dozen giant hog farms operated by Granjas Carroll de México, 
a subsidiary of the US-based Smithfield Farms, have sought extra revenue 
by capturing the methane given off by the huge volumes of pig excrement 
they produce, burning it, and then selling the resulting carbon credits 
to Cargill International and EcoSecurities. Merely by destroying a few 
thousand tons of HFC-23, similarly, the Mexican chemical manufacturer 
Quimobásicos is set to sell over thirty million tons of carbon dioxide pollu-
tion rights to Goldman Sachs, EcoSecurities, and the Japanese electricity 
generator J-Power (UNEP, Risoe Centre 2010). Assuming that destruction 
of HFC-23 can be carried out for US$0.25 per ton of CO2e and that a ton 
of UN offset pollution rights can command US$3.11 on the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) spot market (at historically 
low September 2012 prices), both the company and the financial sector 
intermediaries it sells to can realize good profits. Industrial buyers of the 
permits can in turn save over US$140 per ton by using the rights in lieu of 
paying fines for not meeting their legal emissions requirements. Today, the 
cleanup of HFC-23 and N2O generates more profit for their manufactur-
ers than the primary products of the processes in question (Pearce 2010), 
creating perverse incentives to make global warming worse (Szabo 2010; 
Schneider 2011). Such industrial gas offsets—generated at a handful of 
industrial installations in China, India, Korea, Mexico, and a few other 
countries—still account for the bulk of Kyoto Protocol carbon credits. The 
CO2-equivalent construct also makes possible many other creative climate 
commodity-producing schemes. Coal mines in China, for example, can 
now produce and sell carbon credits by burning off some of the methane 
that seeps out of underground veins on the grounds that by converting 
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methane into carbon dioxide, the projects do less damage to the atmo-
sphere than would have been the case otherwise.
An additional advantage of the GWP construct is that it facilitates the 
running together, in a seemingly self-evident way, activities with different 
effects on climate history. Thus ex–World Bank executive Robert Goodland 
(Goodland and Anhang 2010, 11), noting that “domesticated animals cause 
32 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, more than the combined 
impact of industry and energy,” can effortlessly draw the politically conve-
nient conclusion that “replacing livestock products with better alternatives 
would . . . have far more rapid effects on greenhouse gas emissions . . . than 
actions to replace fossil fuels with renewable energy.”
One of the contradictions of the pursuit of efficiency through CO2 equiv-
alents, as with that of the fossil-biotic carbon equivalance, is, accordingly, 
an inbuilt bias against the rural poor that has already generated criticism 
from activist networks such as La Via Campesina and the World Rainforest 
Movement. But the problems and resistances go a great deal deeper. For 
example, devising the performative equations about different greenhouse 
gases displayed above requires a great deal of fudging, leading to continuing 
technical disputes. Each greenhouse gas behaves qualitatively differently 
in the atmosphere and over different time spans, and the control of each 
has a different effect on fossil fuel use. The IPCC itself winds up revising 
its calculations of the CO2-calibrated GWP of various gases every few 
years and insists on giving gases different GWPs over twenty-year, one-
hundred-year, and five-hundred-year time horizons. But even such token 
caveats cannot be accommodated by a market that requires a single, stable 
number in order to make exchange possible. The UN carbon market, for 
example, disregards the IPCC’s recent revisions in GWP figures, discards 
twenty-year and five-hundred-year figures, and ignores the often enormous 
“error bands” specified by the IPCC (in the case of HFC-23, plus or minus 
five thousand CO2 equivalents). Again, translation and simplification turn 
out to have heavy blowbacks.
Ownership and “Deresponsibilization”
If there is to be a market in CO2 emissions reductions, someone must 
“produce” them, and someone must buy them. To put it another way, 
if there is to be a market in greenhouse gas pollution dumps, someone 
must make them scarce, someone must “own” them, and someone must 
“rent” them. Setting up this apparatus can only be the job of governments, 
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which must impose both the need for reductions (by making pollution 
dumps scarce) and the means of “producing” or owning them. Govern-
ments achieve the former by imposing “caps” or limits on emissions on 
companies or economic sectors. To accomplish the latter (i.e., create a 
reduction commodity), governments need an equation:
regulated reduction of CO2 emissions to level c within time period p = 
tradable right to emit CO2 up to level c by the end of period p
Carbon dioxide reductions (and, by inference, climate action) can accord-
ingly be achieved by the production of tradable pollution rights whose 
scarcity or otherwise is determined by government fiat. Progressive carbon 
dioxide reductions can in turn be achieved by relying on an additional 
equation:
reducing CO2 emissions progressively through regulation =  
issuing fewer tradable rights to emit CO2 in  
period p + 1 than were issued in period p
The producers or owners of these rights are, in the first instance, gov-
ernments themselves. European Union Allowances, for example, are 
“produced” in preset amounts by the pens or keystrokes of politicians and 
bureaucrats under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. They 
are then sold or, more usually, given away free to large private-sector pol-
luters. Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), one of the climate commodities of 
the Kyoto Protocol carbon market, are meanwhile “produced” by confer-
ences of the parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
before being distributed, again free of charge, to the national governments 
of industrialized countries.
In helping to “perform” climate commodities, the above two equations 
at the same time engender additional severe and contradictory overflow 
effects. First, equating reductions with salable property rights once again 
distances the new markets from their assigned function in climate policy. As 
fossil fuel use becomes more deeply entrenched through a “polluter earns” 
system, the preoccupation with price discovery draws emphasis away from 
the long-term structural change demanded by global warming. All things 
being equal, corporations will choose cheaper alternatives, but if long-term 
structural alternatives have not been made available, not even the highest 
prices can compel anyone to choose them; on the contrary, they are likely 
to incite revolts against the trading system’s design. Nor have low prices 
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ever historically been drivers of the kind of structural change that global 
warming demands. The EU ETS has not incentivized investment away 
from fossil fuels even in the one sector, electricity generation, that has 
been consistently short of emissions rights (see, e.g., Deutsche Bank 2009).
Second, the performative equations above embed, in the institutions 
surrounding climate markets, a far-reaching capillary system of practices 
that, at all levels, deresponsibilizes industrial societies with regard to global 
warming. For example, instead of being fined for exceeding Kyoto Proto-
col emissions targets (which, as Herbert Docena [2011, 42] points out, 
implies the commission of an offense), industrialized country signatories 
are encouraged to buy extra pollution permits from abroad to compensate 
for their failure (an action that connotes the acquisition of an entitlement). 
At the same time, in Nigeria, the Philippines, South Africa, Guyana, and 
many other southern countries, governments are incentivized by carbon 
markets not to promulgate or enforce environmental laws (which attribute 
responsibility for harm to defendants) but instead to allow their societies 
to remain dirty in order to be able to sell pollution rights from subsequent 
cleanup programs. Increasing institutionalization of opportunity-cost esti-
mates in the design of biotic offset schemes, similarly, favors the relatively 
wealthy—those with the means to destroy forests wholesale—over poorer 
communities that follow a more environmentally benign approach, thereby 
further reducing the space for practices that work to recognize and gauge 
responsibility for destruction or preservation (McAfee 2012a; Lang 2011). 
Tens of thousands of experts, traders, bankers, lawyers, accountants, con-
sultants, and bureaucrats working in a US$100 billion–plus global market 
setting fuel emission proxy factors, commenting on carbon project design 
documents, formulating schedules and criteria for payments for forest con-
servation certificates, making submissions to UN carbon market regulators, 
hedging investments, buying land, tallying molecules, balancing accounts, 
establishing ownership, and discovering prices continually produce and 
reproduce deresponsibilization in each of the offices and arenas they 
work in. Rich nations are thereby “transformed” from climate offenders or 
debtors into climate leaders or benefactors. Colonialist ideologies tempo-
rarily challenged by the early 1990s global debate over climate change have 
been rehegemonized not so much through propaganda, moral reasoning, 
bad science, or outright threats and bribes as through the repetition and 
accretion of thousands of quotidian technical practices surrounding com-
modity construction and operation. Accompanied as it is by the erosion of 
juridical approaches to the environment and the reduction of fines to fees, 
this colonialist resurgence has, unsurprisingly, provoked strong opposition 
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to the new climate commodities from social movements and activists in 
both northern and southern nations (Osuoka 2009; Docena 2010).
Conclusion: Regulation and Internalization
The strenuous commodifying processes of simplification, abstraction, quan-
tification, propertization, and so forth reflected in performative equations 
constitute the deep structure of the attempted “internalization of envi-
ronmental and social externalities” that is one face of the market environ-
mentalism characteristic of the neoliberal era. These processes continually 
reinterpret and transform the challenges they confront; their goals are never 
exogenous but are incessantly reshaped by the very process of addressing 
them. This chapter has argued that, with respect to the climate crisis in par-
ticular, internalizing externalities through commodity formation, however 
profitable the result, constantly gives rise to fresh externalities that are so 
overwhelming that, from an environmental point of view, they invalidate 
the project.
From this perspective, the commonly heard appeal to “regulation” as 
a solution for such failures needs disambiguation. Does regulation mean 
revising, elaborating, and extending the contradictory performative equa-
tions that provide infrastructure for the new commodities in question, as 
is implied by most critical writings on climate markets (e.g., Newell and 
Paterson 2010; Perdan and Azapagic 2011; Bumpus 2011)? Or does it, 
rather, mean progressively “deactivating” some or all of the equations? The 
burden of this chapter has been that, in the case of climate services markets, 
progressive deactivation will be the environmentally wiser approach in view 
of the incessantly ramifying counterproductivities that any variants of the 
relevant performative equations are bound to engender.
For example, no additional equivalences, surveillance procedures, or 
technical criteria for determining when a carbon offset project goes beyond 
“business as usual” could ever be capable of relieving the contradictions 
built into the equation:
actual CO2e reduction = counterfactual CO2e reduction
On the contrary: given the equation’s commitment to the impossibilities 
of verifiable counterfactual history, they merely give these contradictions 
“more room to move,” to quote a resonant phrase of Marx ([1867] 1976, 
198). The effect has been to reinforce the supply-side dominance in the 
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offset markets of large polluting corporations that operate in the global 
South—Sasol, Mondi, Rhodia, Tata, Birla, Jindal, and the like (UNEP, 
Risoe Centre 2010)—which are better able than others to devote resources 
to navigating the growing regulatory and planning mazes that the contra-
dictions feed in the service of gleaning new revenues for activities that 
reinforce fossil fuel use. That, in turn, signifies another step backward in 
the struggle over climate change.
One virtue of breaking down the omnibus category of commodification 
into bite-sized chunks using the tool of performative equations is that to 
do so gives concrete content to the observation that commodification and 
decommodification have many forms and degrees, as well as a spectrum 
of different types of internal structures. To do so also provides a criterion 
for distinguishing instances of regulation—of whatever motivation or prov-
enance—that contribute toward a goal of decommodification from those 
that do not. Such a criterion can be useful for climate activists in deciding 
which tactics to adopt, since even governments that have subordinated 
their climate policies to a commodity framework are sometimes induced 
to undertake actions with modest decommodification effects that, if sup-
ported, may lead to larger and more constructive changes. For example, 
the EU decided in 2011 to stop applying the equation
HFC-23 = 11,700 × CO2
by banning HFC-23 credits from sale as of 2013. The reasons for this move 
were complex, involving not only scandals over the issuance of a flood of 
blatantly bogus pollution rights from industrial gas projects (EIA 2010) but 
also fears that European industries in the sector in question may relocate 
to the global South to take advantage of offset revenues, a desire to reduce 
transaction costs in the manufacture of carbon offsets by sourcing them 
from entire sectors rather than individual projects, and worries that an over-
supply of carbon credits will undermine market operations. Nevertheless, 
the curb does demonstrate the possibility of rolling back commodification 
rather than extending it, as do environmentalist campaigns to abolish offsets 
and hence deactivate equations such as:
EUA = CER
Breaking down specific neoliberal nature-commodification processes 
using open-ended sets of performative equations, then, is one way of teasing 
out a core of both analytic and practical strategic sense in reactive slogans 
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such as “our Earth is not for sale” as well as in overly abstract academic 
definitions of commodification. In clarifying contemporary struggles over 
market environmentalism, it may help identify and expand spaces for 
potential alliances among various movements questioning commodifi-
cation—whether of climate, water, electricity, health services, ideas, bio-
diversity, or genes—and supporting land and labor rights, alternative energy 
and transport, food sovereignty, and public control of the financial sector.
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1. One of the best models of such “thick descriptions” remains Cronon’s treat-
ment of wheat and lumber in the nineteenth-century US Midwest, but there are of 
course dozens of other valuable studies, including Thompson (1990), Thomas (1991), 
Mirowski (2011), Sivaramakrishnan (1999), and so on.
2. The difference between the two is illustrated by the fact that the industrial slow-
down resulting from the financial crisis of 2007–8 resulted in more CO2 emission 
reductions than all the world’s climate markets put together had achieved (Chaffin 
2010), yet has not changed structural dependence on fossil fuels.




4. R. Sommer, 2010, video interview with Pirakuma Yawalapiti, Xingu spokesper-
son, about carbon trading, Xingu River, Brazil, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_
JSM6gaM9CA and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JMs3szvzfeA&feature=related.
5. Similarly, forest carbon projects can generate carbon credits even if they allow 
an increase in deforestation, as long as the increase is “less than would have happened 
otherwise” (see, e.g., American Carbon Registry 2011).
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Nature on the Move I
The Value and Circulation of Liquid Nature 
and the Emergence of Fictitious Conservation
Bram Büscher
This chapter is part of a broader project to understand the place of conser-
vation in the critical analysis of the relations between nature and contempo-
rary capitalism. While there are vast literatures on how “nature” and “cap-
italism” interrelate, these are overwhelmingly geared toward the manner 
in which the latter uses, transforms, and/or impacts upon sociobiophysical 
natures. A solid theoretical framework for thinking about the place of the 
conservation of nature within contemporary capitalism is still embryonic. 
This is odd, considering that the fate of modern conservation has been 
interwoven with capitalist trajectories since its inception in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries (Grove 1995). In fact, the preservation of the 
world’s “last wild places” appears as a classic Polanyian double-movement, 
a direct response to the alienation of humans from nature and the massive 
transformation of nature under capitalist expansion (Cronon 1996). At the 
same time, by separating rural people from their land, conservation aided 
in the formation of the labor force that industrial capitalism needed (Perel-
man 2007) while proving a valuable tool in colonial administrative control 
(MacKenzie 1997). More recently, an intensive and pervasive proliferation 
of protected areas has accompanied the rise of neoliberal capitalism since 
the late 1970s (Brockington, Duffy, and Igoe 2008), while the 1990s and 
2000s have given rise to popular paradigms such as “payment for ecosystem 
services” and novel approaches such as biodiversity derivatives, wetland 
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credits, species banking, and more (Robertson 2004; Cooper 2010; Sul-
livan 2012b). All these are based on the assumption that capitalism and 
conservation are—can be made—compatible (see Brockington and Duffy 
2010b), which leads to a pertinent question: How can we understand the 
conservation of nature as a capitalist project?
This question is the topic of a nascent but swiftly growing literature. Igoe, 
Neves, and Brockington (2010), for example, focus on how a Gramscian 
hegemonic “historic bloc” intersects with an economy focused on Debor-
dian “spectacle” to produce the idea that capitalism and conservation can 
indeed be compatible (see also Fletcher 2010 for a poststructuralist perspec-
tive). While these authors convincingly show how in this way the prediction 
by green Marxists that the “second contradiction of capitalism” would lead 
people to demand ecosocialism (O’Connor 1998) has been neutralized—or 
delayed—they leave implicit the question how the conservation of nature 
actually functions as capital in the twenty-first-century global economy. Over 
the last two decades, this question has become a prominent one, particularly 
after the recent (or ongoing) financial crisis. Not only has the idea that busi-
ness should “green” itself received a massive boost, the financial crisis also 
led to calls for a “global Green New Deal” and a “green economy” that focus 
on shifting the global political economy from extractive to nonextractive or 
nontransformative use and its concomitant valuation of nature and natural 
resources (Büscher and Arsel 2012).1 We thus witness the capitalist system 
increasingly accepting the effects of the “second contradiction” yet trying to 
deal with it by making it part and parcel of the system, by giving “value” to 
the conservation of nature. It does this in the only way it knows how to give 
things value: by taking them up as commodities in capital circulation, by 
finding new ways to guarantee “nature on the move.”
Obviously, this makes sense from the perspective of capital. After all, cap-
ital, according to Marx ([1867] 1976, 256), is “money in process,” “value in 
process.” If anything, the last years have again made abundantly clear that 
when capital stops moving, the system in which it thrives is in deep crisis. 
Hence, all over the world, governments were fixated on getting money mov-
ing again and so turn it back into capital. Similarly, in our times of multiple 
environmental crises, we see many actors working hard to turn the conser-
vation of nature into capital so that it can take its “rightful” place in global 
markets and no longer be dispensed with as mere “externality.” This leads 
to a further dilemma: how does “conserved nature”—what I will call “liquid 
nature”—circulate as capital, as “value in process,” and what does this mean 
for the value of nature?2 This is a significant question with potentially quite 
radical implications for (neo- or post-) Marxist theory and for conservation.
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Let me briefly outline why before moving on to discuss the question in 
more depth. Most fundamentally, the commodities “produced” by capitalist 
conservation (aim to) turn “production” on its head and hence ingrain ideas 
about (the production of) value. The accepted, Marxist way of thinking 
about the relation between capitalist production and nature goes some-
thing like this: “Human beings exploit nature in all sorts of ways. It hardly 
seems possible to imagine otherwise. The transformation of nature, though 
it takes place under all manner of conditions and through all manner of 
socially embedded practices, is an absolute requirement for the production 
of anything” (Henderson 2003, 77). Of course, this is generally correct, with 
one major possible exception, namely, when capital seeks to produce the 
nontransformation of nature, most especially through its conservation. Now, 
it has to immediately be added that the conservation of nature does not mean 
the nontransformation of nature. The opposite is true: nature is actively 
produced and transformed through its conservation (Brockington and Duffy 
2010b; Dressler 2011). Yet, the manner of production and transformation 
is rather different from what is generally understood as the “transformation 
of nature under capitalism.” It is a transformation that aims to leave nature 
(materially) unexploited and unused and is as such seen as diametrically 
opposed to and—importantly—fit to offset “traditional” production processes 
that do (materially) exploit and use nature. Phrased differently, the value in 
this product, at least theoretically, is found exactly in the fact that nature is 
(believed to be) not (materially) used, transformed, or exploited.
In contemporary conservation, this idea has become known under the 
banner of “natural capital,” which provides “environmental services” to 
humans. Nature-to-be-conserved functions in this rhetoric as a peculiar 
kind of fixed capital whose value circulates through the capital embod-
ied in and implied by its environmental services. I refer to this as liquid 
nature—nature made fit to circulate in capitalist commodity markets—the 
potential for which, I argue, has been made possible within a change in the 
nature of circulation in contemporary capitalism. Yet, these services, like 
the land and nature they are derived from, are a form of fictitious capital: 
“capital without any material basis in commodities or productive activity” 
(Harvey 2006a, 95). In Marxist terms, this would also mean that they cannot 
hold any value, as they have not been (directly) produced through human 
labor. Given this, the question “how does conserved nature circulate as 
capital, as value in process” has potentially fundamental implications for 
ingrained ways of thinking about value, nature, and the relations between 
production and circulation in capitalism. Indeed, a central argument of 
this chapter is that the analysis of conserved nature as capital necessitates 
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a shift in emphasis from production to circulation. It is (the nature of) con-
temporary capitalist circulation that enables the circulation of liquid nature 
as a form of fictitious capital, the ultimate result and consequence of which 
is “fictitious conservation.” This, however, is not to discount production. To 
the contrary: production, as we will see, remains crucial, but quite different 
from “standard” Marxist theories of production.
In what is to follow, this argument is approached from two angles. First, I 
will outline the nature of circulation in capitalism and how this has changed 
over the last three to four decades. Next, I will discuss how this transforma-
tion relates to attempts to enable the circulation of nature, leading to the 
argument that to make markets for conserved nature fully liquid—or to 
create fully liquid nature—capital has had to “elevate” nature from fixed to 
fictitious capital. The difference is that in the latter case, the link between 
actual natures and their conservation through digitalized financial mech-
anisms is severed, so creating “fictitious conservation.” The penultimate 
section discusses the notion of fictitious conservation in more depth and 
explores its consequences for Marxist theories on production, circulation, 
and value. The chapter ends with some brief concluding thoughts.
Before moving on, it is important to emphasize that all of this is not a 
matter of mere abstract political economy: to make liquid nature believ-
able, legitimate, and manageable, capital has had to and continues to cre-
ate particular governmentalities and associated ideological belief systems. 
These matters, however, are outside the purview of this chapter and will be 
taken up by Jim Igoe in his companion piece. Moreover, it also does not 
mean that no alternative ontologies and epistemologies exist when it comes 
to “nature on the move” and that these could potentially provide ways out 
of the current capitalist deadlock. These will be discussed by Sian Sullivan 
in her companion piece. The sole objective of this chapter is a stepwise 
theoretical exploration of how conserved or liquid nature becomes capital 
that circulates with great speed in our contemporary global economy. It is 
an exercise in logical reasoning, not an empirical investigation, although 
the potential empirical and practical implications might be considerable.
The Nature of Circulation in Capitalism and  
“Fictitious Capital”
The ensuing discussion on the nature of circulation in contemporary capi-
talism will start by going into some “fundamentals” of capitalist circulation 
based on Marx’s Capital ([1867] 1976) and Harvey’s The Limits to Capital 
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(2006a). I will then move beyond this “deep structure” of capitalism to 
incorporate how circulation has changed alongside recent changes in 
global capitalism. Hence, I explicitly start with Marx, not end with his work, 
as is sometimes the case in Marxist-inspired work. I will argue that several 
aspects of Marx’s work will need to be reconsidered and/or expanded in 
order to fully understand contemporary capitalist circulation that has made 
liquid nature possible.
The basis of capitalist circulation for Marx ([1867] 1976, 227–28) starts 
when commodities are “sold not in order to buy commodities, but in 
order to replace their commodity-form [C] by the money-form [M]” and 
when “the change of form becomes an end in itself.” This leads to the 
famous conversion from C–M–C to M–C–M, whereby a capitalist “throws 
money into circulation, in order to withdraw it again by the sale of the same 
commodity” (249). Money thus becomes “money in process” or “value 
in process” and therefore capital. This has due implications: “The circu-
lation of money as capital is an end in itself, for the valorization of value 
takes place only within this constantly renewed movement” (253). When 
capitalist circulation becomes an end in itself, and under the pressures of 
competition, the “immanent laws of capitalist production” start confront-
ing “the individual capitalist as a coercive force external to him” (381). A 
tremendous amount of faith is thus placed in the (seemingly) “exogenous” 
process of circulation to keep accumulation on track. As even mainstream 
economists recognize, however, this is obviously incorrect. In the endless 
complexities of the differentiated circulation and realization times of capi-
tal, production, commodities, and values, it is clear that circulation in the 
aggregate is never an even, consistent, or automatic process (Marx [1870] 
1978). If circulation of capital converged exclusively around commodities, 
capitalism would quickly become immensely unstable. This imminent 
instability is, for Harvey (2006a, 254), why credit is vitally important to 
the system.
While full discussion of credit is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
some remarks are important for clarifying its focus on circulation. Har-
vey (2006a, 285) talks about the “immense potential power that resides 
within the credit system”: “Credit can be used to accelerate production 
and consumption simultaneously. Flows of fixed and circulating capital 
can also be co-ordinated over time via seemingly simple adjustments within 
the credit system.” Credit, however, leads to what Marx called “fictitious 
capital,” which Harvey (2006a, 95) describes as “money that is thrown 
into circulation as capital without any material basis in commodities or 
productive activity.” In turn, he argues that “the potentiality for ‘fictitious 
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capital’ lies within the money form itself and is particularly associated with 
the emergence of credit money” (267). He explains as follows:
Consider . . . a producer who received credit against the collateral of an 
unsold commodity. The money equivalent of the commodity is acquired 
before an actual sale. This money can then be used to purchase fresh 
means of production and labour power. The lender, however, holds a 
piece of paper, the value of which is backed by an unsold commodity. This 
piece of paper may be characterized as fictitious value. Commercial credit 
of any sort creates these fictitious values. If the pieces of paper (primarily 
bills of exchange) begin to circulate as credit money, then it is fictitious 
value that is circulating. A gap is thereby opened up between credit mon-
eys . . . and “real” moneys tied directly to a money commodity. . . . If this 
credit money is loaned out as capital, then it becomes fictitious capital.
While arguing that credit can function to stabilize circulation, Harvey 
(2006a, 288) adds that this does not mean that credit solves capitalism’s 
inherent contradictions. Indeed, it embodies the contradictions it aims to 
solve, but on new levels and with new complexities:
What started out by appearing as a sane device for expressing the col-
lective interests of the capitalist class, as a means for overcoming the 
“immanent fetters and barriers to production” and so raising the “mate-
rial foundations” of capitalism to new levels of perfection, “becomes 
the main level for over-production and over-speculation.” The “insane 
forms” of fictitious capital come to the fore and allow the “height of dis-
tortion” to take place within the credit system. What began by appearing 
as a neat solution to capitalism’s contradictions becomes, instead, the 
locus of a problem to be overcome.
Once a process of relying on debt to guarantee and intensify accumu-
lation has been set in motion, there is no way back: accumulation has to 
continuously increase in order for “fictitious capital” to retain its “value.” 
The use of credit thus adds a major impetus to ensure that capital is truly 
“money in process” or “value in process” and thus that the velocity of 
circulation must continuously increase. Circulation, Marx ([1858] 1973, 
255) remarked in the Grundrisse, “has to be mediated not only in each 
of its moments, but as a whole of mediation, as a total process itself.” 
What this points toward is that a certain velocity of circulation helps sus-
tain a particular amount of “fictitious capital” and how with its further 
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institutionalization capitalism becomes progressively dependent on the 
circulation and proliferation of this type of capital.
Much has changed since Marx’s day and even since Harvey first pub-
lished The Limits to Capital in 1982. It is thus necessary to account for 
subsequent dramatic changes in the global political economy and their 
effects on capitalist circulation. This is crucial, since while Marx’s and 
Harvey’s analyses point us in the right direction, one thing both these 
scholars did not foresee is the way in which global capitalism would (try 
to) adjust in relation to the environmental degradation it engenders. This 
was obviously not a major issue in Marx’s time, but even Harvey does not 
devote much attention to this in his work and so completely misses the 
important connections between changes in contemporary capitalism and 
the energy expended to finding ways to green capitalism through conser-
vation (Büscher et al. 2012).
The background to these changes is found in a central imperative of 
capitalism, namely, “to reduce the time and cost of circulation so that 
capital can be returned more quickly to the sphere of production and 
accumulation can proceed more rapidly” (Smith 2008, 126). On a global 
scale, Castells (2000, 136–37) argues, this has truly become possible with 
the advent of new information and communication technologies, includ-
ing “advanced computer systems” that allow “new, powerful mathematical 
models to manage complex financial products, and to perform transactions 
at high speed.” In this process, “the whole ordering of meaningful events 
loses its internal, chronological rhythm, and becomes arranged in time 
sequences depending upon the social context of their utilization” (492).
So far, so good, but an apparently irreducible obstacle to this dream 
of unfettered hypercirculation remains. For as Smith (2008, 126) further 
argues, “the circulation of value requires also a physical circulation of 
material objects in which value is embodied or represented” (see also 
Henderson 2003, 43). Understanding how capitalism may be transcending 
(or perhaps circumventing) this apparently irreducible obstacle requires 
further theorization of value and circulation. Let us start with LiPuma and 
Lee (2004, 19), who make the same point about the central imperative of 
capitalism as Smith but draw more radical implications about circulation: 
“The basic or founding argument is that the internal dynamic of capitalism 
compels it to perpetually and compulsively drive toward higher and more 
globally encompassing levels of production. This directional dynamic has 
engendered such progressively ascending levels of complexity that connec-
tivity itself has become the significant sociostructuring value, leading to the 
emergence of circulation as a relatively autonomous realm, now endowed 
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with its own social institutions, interpretative culture, and socially mediat-
ing forms.” While the level of “autonomy” can be debated, the fact is that 
connectivity has become a “significant sociostructuring value,” to the extent 
that Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) have elevated this value to the center 
of their analysis of the “new spirit of capitalism.” LiPuma and Lee (2004, 
97), however, draw their conclusions about circulation from their analysis 
of financial derivatives, which for most of their history “were production- 
focused and functionally geared to hedging.” This changed in the 1970s 
with several far-reaching “institutional changes and the liberalization of 
national capital controls” (98). As a result, “the essential movement of the 
market was away from hedging on production to wagering on circulation” 
(99). Next, LiPuma and Lee describe how this process started leading a 
life of its own to the extent that it has created a system “in which means 
dominate ends”: “The goal of financial circulation increasingly shapes the 
means of its realization” (154).
Again, some elements of LiPuma and Lee’s (2004, 179–80) overall anal-
ysis can be debated, most especially the power they attribute to financial 
capital in the West and their “move away from production,” as it is clear 
that financial capital has recently reemphasized material production, par-
ticularly land and agricultural commodities in the global South, resulting 
in massive landgrabs (Borras et al. 2011). That said, it is undeniable that 
the direction of change in global capitalism has been toward unleashing 
financial markets and hence massively increasing the intensity and velocity 
of capital circulation (Moore 2010; Marazzi 2011). What, then, does this 
mean for the concept of value?
LiPuma and Lee (2004, 83), again, take a radical step, arguing that 
“standard macroeconomic theories of international trade and exchange 
rates, or Marxist approaches that originate from a labor theory of value, 
appear to have little to say about circulation.” Technically, this is not cor-
rect: many do have many things to say about circulation, but they interpret 
this rather differently. The central question here, at least from a Marxist 
perspective, is where and how value is produced. In this chapter, I follow 
Phil Graham (2007, 174), who argues that while Marx’s theory of value 
still forms the “deep structure” of capital, contemporary notions of value 
(e.g., those embodied by financial derivatives) are no longer the ones that 
Marx first articulated:
Today it is not the muscle-power of people that provides the most highly 
valued labor forms. Far more intimate aspects of human activity have 
become technologized and exposed to the logic of commodification. 
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Correspondingly abstract forms of value have developed. Value produc-
tion, in turn, has become more obviously “situated” in the valorized 
dialects of “sacred” and powerful institutions, such as legislatures, univer-
sities, and transnational corporations. In official political economy, value 
has moved from an objective category that pertains to such substances 
as precious metals and land, to become located today predominantly in 
“expert” ways of meaning and, more importantly, in their institutional 
contexts of production.
This has major consequences for the nature of circulation in capitalism. 
It means that capital increasingly circulates as “expert ways of meaning” and 
“institutional contexts of production,” for example, through reports, policy 
briefs, think tanks, brands, marketing, and so on (Goldman and Papson 
2006), but also through financial derivatives, futures, and other financial 
constructs (Lee and LiPuma 2002). In other words, what circulate mostly 
these days are forms of fictitious capital—capital that does not directly have 
“any material basis in commodities or productive activity” (Harvey 2006a, 
95). In addition to credit, this capital takes the form of a whole host of 
financial and nonfinancial derivative “products” that, among others, focus 
on institutional or organizational efficiency; management of meaning; tech-
nological, informational, and communicative “innovation”; or simply spec-
ulation. These “products” all crucially depend on a concept of value that is 
ephemeral and transient. Indeed, Graham (2007, 4) argues that “what we 
call ‘values’ are more or less ephemeral products of evaluation,” which, “like 
all aspects of meaning, . . . are socially produced and mediated.”
This, it must be emphasized, is not to say that production-based labor 
is not important. It does mean that its role in the production of value has 
changed, most notably through a shift in emphasis toward circulation, in 
that circulation increasingly determines production rather than the other 
way around (see also Marazzi 2011, 48–49). LiPuma and Lee (2005, 424, 
emphasis added) articulate these changes as follows: “We appear to be 
. . . heading into an era where speculative capital, a socio-historically spe-
cific concept of risk and derivatives products have become the centre of 
the financial clockwork that turns the hands of contemporary capitalism. 
There is thus reason to believe that circulation-based risk represents a new 
self-structuring dynamic that is superimposed upon and structurally super-
sedes an earlier form grounded in production-based labour.” Circulation 
superseding and determining production, however, is not new, as pointed 
out for California agriculture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries by Henderson (2003). What has changed over the last decades, 
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or so I argue, is that the valorization of production is increasingly alienated 
from the act of production.
This, of course, has consequences for production in general and for the 
“production of conservation” under capitalism specifically. Production in 
general, in this process, is relegated to producing “underlying assets” for 
the (financialized) derivative structure that is the prime focus for value 
creation in contemporary capitalism.3 In turn, it is in this context that we 
see global capitalism increasingly directing its attention to dealing with 
its negative environmental consequences in a way that mediates its worst 
excesses while opening up new frontiers for capital accumulation (Arsel 
and Büscher 2012). To enable this process, several fundamental changes 
in the way capitalism operates and generates value are necessary, first, and 
most especially, to value the nonuse or nonextraction of nature (and hence 
paying for labor that conserves rather than appropriates or destroys nature) 
while simultaneously trying to reduce the “physical circulation of material 
objects” that Smith (2008, 126) argues is necessary for the circulation of 
value and, second, to replace these with creating the possibilities for the 
circulation of liquid nature as capital. It is to these changes and their chal-
lenges and critiques that we now turn.
The Circulation of Liquid Nature as Capital
Anno 2014, it is abundantly obvious that our planet’s natural environments 
are being transformed and commodified with unprecedented intensity and 
speed. As policymakers, NGOs, businesses, and politicians work to alleviate 
the growing concerns about capitalism’s negative ecological record, they 
often do so under the banner of “natural capital” (see Costanza et al. 1997). 
This (usually) involves bringing nature deeper into contemporary capital-
ism through mainstream neoclassical economic tactics (Burkett 2005, 113). 
Nature as “capital,” in this discourse, appears to function according to clas-
sical forms of fixed capital, which “circulate as value while remaining mate-
rially locked within the confines of the production process” (Harvey 2006a, 
209). This is achieved in large part through the products nature creates, 
namely, a whole host of different “environmental services” (Sullivan 2009).
What different variations of the idea of environmental services have in 
common is their rather simplistic presentation of how embedded value is 
“transported” from the producing entity “nature” to the consuming entity 
“humanity.” These variations, according to proponents, could be different 
categories of services, including supporting, provisioning, regulating, and 
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cultural ecosystem services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005, 
vi).4 The exact nature of these different types of services, however, is not 
relevant; what matters for the analysis is that a complex array of services 
is tied to a range of “constituents of well-being” (vi) through a valuation 
model that relies on monetary payments in order to assign quantitatively 
comparable values to qualitatively incommensurable conditions and rela-
tionships (Kosoy and Corbera 2010). Arguably the most important policy 
result of this thinking is the currently trendy payments for environmental 
services (PES) paradigm.
Of course, the standardization of value measures is an extremely com-
plicated process, requiring a great deal of speculation by those doing the 
“measuring” and “valuing.” In this section I will not focus on precisely how 
this is done. Rather, based on the two functions of money, namely, “as a 
measure of value and as a medium of circulation” (Harvey 2006a, 292–93), 
my primary concern is, first, to briefly outline the implications and prob-
lematic aspects of the monetization of nature and, second, to discuss how 
nevertheless this monetized nature is supposed to become circulating and 
valuable global conservation capital.
Importantly, if nature is expressed in money, we need to first clarify our 
conceptualizing of “nature,” particularly if some kind of material, biophys-
ical nature is to be conserved through some kind of commodified, abstract 
value circulation. Biodiversity conservation is explicitly not interested in 
what Castree (2003, 286) calls “internal nature,” nature that has been 
brought almost entirely under human technological control, like genet-
ically modified seeds. It is explicitly interested in nature that “still retains 
the independent capacity to act,” or what Castree calls “external nature.” 
Although most external nature is “inherently social” (Smith 2007, 77), 
fundamentally shaped by human thought and action, it remains far more 
unruly and encompassing than internal nature. It is precisely this kind of 
unruly and encompassing nature that biodiversity conservation sets into 
motion so that it may circulate as a form of fictitious capital.
To theorize this circulating nature, it is necessary to account for both the 
biophysical and social aspects of nature and to engage with them as inter-
connected and mutually constituting realms (Castree 2000; Carolan 2005; 
Büscher et al. 2012). After all, as argued by Smith (2007, 33), “capital is no 
longer content simply to plunder an available nature but rather increasingly 
moves to produce an inherently social nature as the basis of new sectors 
of production and accumulation.” However, as Carolan (2005, 400, 409) 
cautions from a critical realist position, it is also necessary to maintain 
some distinction between these categories such that they do not wind up 
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simply merging into one another. He thus distinguishes three categories: 
Nature, nature, and “nature.”5 The first is “the Nature of physicality, cau-
sality, and permanence-with flux,” the second is nature as sociobiophysical 
phenomenon, and the third is “nature” as discursive construction. While 
all three are important, in this chapter I am centrally concerned with the 
latter two categories, their intersections and mutual constitutions, in the 
circulation of conserved nature as capital. Conservation is always to a large 
extent a struggle between different “natures” in terms of “discourse, power/
knowledge, cultural violence, and discursive subjugation” (401). As these 
discursive regimes influence human action, they play an active hand in 
shaping biophysical nature (Carrier and West 2009). At the same time, bio-
physical nature shapes, limits, and defines discursive regimes of “nature,” 
such that the two are in constant dialogue, as shown by Igoe’s and Sullivan’s 
companion pieces.
This brief discussion has obvious implications for the circulation of 
conserved nature as fictitious capital. If it is to circulate in the capitalist 
economy, conserved nature must be monetized. If it is monetized, it will 
be expressed and understood in quantitative terms, which erases the “onto-
logical depth” and qualitative complexity of relationships between Nature, 
nature, and “nature.” Specifically, as Burkett (2005, 122–24) elaborates, it 
is possible to identify five important problems with the monetization of 
nature: (1) “unlike money, ‘nature cannot be disaggregated into discrete 
and homogenous value units’”; (2) a reliance on money leads to “inade-
quate accounting for the irreversible character of many natural processes” 
(e.g., there is no reason to assume that the monetary value of an ecosystem 
will go up before its depletion/extinction is irreversible); (3) monetization 
involves an absolute “tension between money’s quantitative limitlessness 
and the limits to natural wealth of any given material qualities”; (4) “the 
price of a resource stock is not determined solely by its absolute size” but 
by many other aspects of how markets work, meaning that “price may not 
rise as depletion occurs”; and (5) “higher resource prices may actually 
accelerate a resource’s depletion by spurring technological advances that 
reduce extraction costs and/or lower the amount of the resource needed 
per unit of final goods, thereby encouraging its further use to increase 
total output.” Burkett (115, emphasis added) concludes that even “many 
ecological economists have resisted it [natural capital] on the grounds that 
it is irreparably anti-ecological” and “lends a spurious legitimacy to the 
commercialisation of nature and its reduction to a productive input.”
These points highlight the problematic and contradictory effects of 
transforming nature into a quantitative, monetary input—a point I will 
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come back to below. At the same time, these criticisms have not prevented 
many conservation, business, and government actors from trying to mon-
etize nature. In fact, it has spurred them on even more (Bracking 2012; 
MacDonald and Corson 2012). In this endeavor, they have been enabled, 
I argue, by the contextual transformations in global capitalism laid out 
in the previous section, most notably, the proliferation of complex forms 
of fictitious capital, changes in the production of value, and how these 
have influenced interrelated processes of production, consumption, and 
circulation. In other words, while the idea of monetizing ecosystem ser-
vices as the product of “fixed” natural capital is a problematic and, critics 
would argue, futile and false solution, it is only the starting point for those 
who aim to bring conserved nature into contemporary capital circulation. 
They need to go further still and find ways to link capitalist conservation 
to a political economy where value has become ephemeral and located 
“in ‘expert’ ways of meaning and, more importantly, in their institutional 
contexts of production” (Graham 2007, 174).
And this is exactly what has been happening, as shown by recent scholar-
ship on conservation and capitalism. Thus, Garland (2008, 67) has posited 
a “conservationist mode of production” that “lays claims to natural (and 
thus fixed) capital” and adds value to it “through various mediations and 
ultimately transform it to a capital of a more convertible and globally ram-
ifying kind.” Brockington (2008) chronicles the “power of ungrounded 
environmentalisms” by emphasizing how conservation celebrities enable 
(mostly Western) audiences to reestablish their bonds with the wild through 
commodified representations of nature. Igoe (2010) records how conserva-
tion produces and turns upon Debordian “spectacle” in the “global econ-
omy of appearances,” particularly how spectacular media representations 
of nature are dominating the way environmental nongovernmental orga-
nizations communicate and “sell” their conservation messages. Dressler 
(2011), based on research in Palawan Island, the Philippines, notes how 
capitalist conservation shifted from first to third nature, a nature that lives 
up to how tourists would like nature on Palawan to be. Lastly, I have earlier 
shown how conservation initiatives around the 2010 soccer World Cup in 
South Africa produced and incorporated what I call “derivative nature,” 
the systemic preference on the side of capital for idealized representa-
tions of nature and “poor locals” in order to attract tourists and investment 
(Büscher 2010b). What these disparate examples have in common is that 
they show how contemporary conservation fundamentally adheres to and 
relies on “ephemeral values” to enable the circulation of conserved nature 
in contemporary capitalism.
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Having stated this, it is crucial that we do not take this argument too far: 
just as a rapidly circulating and speculative financial realm ultimately still 
depends on a more “mundane” production, distribution, and consumption 
of asset streams (Leyshon and Thrift 2007, 98), so is contemporary conser-
vation still deeply intertwined with the material realities of sociobiophysical 
nature. This, for instance, is clear from work by Katja Neves (2010, 721), 
who shows that the commodity fetishization of whale watching is not as 
diametrically opposed to exploitative whale hunting as it imagines itself to 
be. In fact, she argues that the “transition from one to the other is more 
closely related to transformations in the global capitalist economy than to 
enlightened progress in human-cetacean relations.” The new production 
of conserving whales through ecotourism, then, precariously links making 
audiences literally buy into commodified and romanticized whale encoun-
ters and shielding them from the negative material sides of the same, for 
example, the disturbance of whale ecology and carbon-packed air travel. 
This poses a more general problem, namely, that the circulation of con-
served nature as capital has to be achieved through creating “derivative” 
ephemeral value while at the same time remaining inextricably linked to 
material (sociobiophysical) nature.
In other words, for conserved nature to truly function as capital, it has to 
go beyond environmental services. After all, the generally accepted defini-
tion of PES talks about a “well-defined environmental service” that is sold 
by a particular provider to a buyer “if and only if the ES provider secures 
environmental service provision (conditionality)” (Wunder 2005, 3). The 
“problem” here is that this does not necessarily involve competitive markets 
and indeed often comes down to mere “compensation schemes.” True 
capitalist marketization of conserved nature would need to go far beyond 
this in order to link material nature with ephemeral values. In business 
terms, most environmental services markets lack sufficient “liquidity.” 
Liquidity is business lingo for a market with an ever-ready supply of sellers 
and buyers where assets can easily be bought or sold with little effect on 
price levels. It means that commodities need to be fully “alienable” and/or 
fully transferable at minimum transaction cost. This presents fundamental 
problems for markets of “environmental services,” as their liquidity is usu-
ally circumscribed in space and time (see also Fletcher and Breitling 2012). 
Thus when the rather naive idea of PES has scarcely become popular in 
mainstream conservation, it is already being overshadowed by a host of 
much farther-reaching proposals to turn conserved nature into circulating 
capital. We are currently witnessing the creativity at work of those who push 
the frontiers of capitalist commodification ever further, as conservation 
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derivatives, “sustainability enhanced investments,” wetland and mitigation 
banking, biodiversity offsets, and other schemes are rapidly making head-
way in conservation and extraconservation arenas.
While an extensive discussion of these separate schemes is neither pos-
sible nor necessary here (see Sullivan 2012b), what they have in common 
is that risks related to, impacts on, and incentives toward biodiversity (con-
servation) are financialized and subjected to market exchange. Mandel, 
Donlan, and Armstrong (2010, 45–46), for example, promote “conservation 
derivatives” as hybrids of “two types of financial instruments” “in which an 
insurance derivative is issued with modifications to allow responsible action 
to decrease the likelihood of the insured event.” Wetland and mitigation 
banking and biodiversity offset schemes, in contrast, are geared toward off-
setting the impact of development projects by (at least) restoring or reviving 
the same amount of biodiversity that was destroyed by the project (see, 
e.g., http://bbop.forest-trends.org/ and Robertson 2000 for a critique). Taken 
together, the goal of all these mechanisms is to make markets for conserved 
nature more fully liquid, which indeed is how it is referred to in practice.6 
Let us now look at the implications of this development on Marxist theory 
and conservation in more detail.
The Emergence of Fictitious Conservation
The ultimate objective of getting market liquidity right is of course the 
lubrication of producing greater surplus value or profits.7 The immediate 
objective of liquidity is to facilitate faster and/or smoother turnover of cap-
ital and thus to increase the velocity and/or stability of capital circulation. 
The Platonic ideal of liquid nature is one in which monetized forms would 
be completely free from the material contexts and relationships that pro-
duced them. In reality, of course, “financial superstructures” are always 
entangled in material realities (Leyshon and Thrift 2007, 98). Neoliberal 
conservation’s entanglements with material realities are the topic of another 
emerging body of literature and need not detain us (but see West 2006; 
Neves 2010; Büscher 2010b). What is important to note here is that these 
entanglements occur in “a world that can no longer be directly grasped” 
(Debord 1967, 11), in which production and consumption have become 
so separated that “their relationship becomes all but unfathomable, save in 
fantasy” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2002, 784).
Accordingly, the connections and disconnections between consumers 
of liquid nature and the conditions and relationships that produced it have 
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become so complicated that they are, for most intents and purposes, severed. 
It is not just that individual producers, consumers, and natures are no longer 
directly in touch, though this is often certainly the case. The point is that 
the various products derived from many distinct natures have to become 
standardized and utterly abstracted in order to be exchangeable. This is 
not just a strategic process, as Smith (2007, 29) has it; it is a necessary one. 
This is achieved in large part through securitization: the standardization and 
rational ization of “nontransparent and localized commodities . . . so that dif-
ferent buyers and sellers in different places around the globe can understand 
their features and qualities and exchange them easily” (Gotham 2009, 357).
Hildyard (2008, 4–5) takes the idea of securitization one step further, 
arguing that it is “a process whereby assets that generate regular streams of 
income . . . are sold to a newly created company (a Special Purpose Vehicle 
[SPV] . . . ). The SPV then issues derivatives . . . that give investors the 
right to the income stream from the assets.” As these highly complicated 
processes are stacked on top of one another, one can immediately see how 
they completely erase any local, qualitative, and spiritual properties and 
contexts around an “environmental service” through their subjection to 
utterly abstract numbers on marketized value indices. This has resulted in 
the profoundly “new face of nature,” depicted in figure 8.1.
Proponents of the marketization of conserved nature usually argue that 
securitization helps stabilize and balance markets and prices. Yet, examples 
from other markets that depend on the “liquidization” of fixed capital com-
modities reveal this is not the case. Taking the housing market, which had 
such a major role in the financial crisis, as an example, Gotham (2009, 357, 
368) contends that “the housing finance sector is permeated by significant 
contradictions and irrationalities that reflect the disruptive and unstable 
financial process of transforming illiquid commodities into liquid resources” 
and that this “conceptualization of securitization as a process of creating 
liquidity out of spatial fixity dovetails with theoretizations that emphasize 
the conflictual, contested and deeply contradictory nature of uneven geo-
graphical development.” This is a stark warning for ecosystem markets. 
Fundamentally, it points to the ways in which securitization artifices have 
systematically transformed homes and neighborhoods into fictitious capital 
that can circulate in the global economy without concern for, or even 
knowledge of, the material and social conditions that produced them. I am 
arguing, by extension, that similar securitization artifices are systematically 
and fundamentally separating liquid forms of conserved nature from the 
material and social conditions that produced them. The upshot is the full-
fledged conversion of conserved nature into capital, thereby enabling its 
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Figure 8.1. The “new face of nature,” or a typical index for pricing (here carbon). 
Source: http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com, accessed September 22, 2010.
ultimate purpose: becoming a new vehicle for money in process, or value 
in process. Conservation, in other words, has become fictitious capital, 
which leads to what I call “fictitious conservation,” conservation without 
any direct basis in material, sociobiophysical nature.
Fictitious conservation has not displaced or subsumed more traditional 
forms. Rather, it accompanies them, intertwines with them, and infuses 
them with its logic in ways remarkably analogous to interactions between 
“nature” and nature as outlined above. Traditional forms of conservation 
may continue to protect animals, landscapes, and ecosystemic processes. 
Increasingly, however, the valorization of these activities is alienated from 
them and subject to broader processes of the circulation of liquid nature. At 
the same time, the logic of fictitious conservation is increasingly geared 
toward the production of liquid nature tout court. In losing much of its 
basis in sociobiophysical nature in favor of liquidity, the idea of “fictitious 
conservation” can almost be taken literally; after all, how can conservation 
alleviate the “second contradiction” of capitalist expansion if it is capitalist 
expansion that is the ultimate objective to begin with?
The implications of all this are legion. For one, it adds an additional 
layer of complexity to Smith’s (2007, 33) cogent discussions of “nature as 
accumulation strategy,” in which he argues that the “horizontal integration 
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of nature into capital” (the exploitation of material nature) is now being 
complemented by the “vertical integration of nature into capital” through 
the “production of nature ‘all the way down’” and “its simultaneous finan-
cialisation ‘all the way up.’” A focus on the circulation of liquid nature 
further complicates this picture. Liquid nature, I have argued, depends on 
a conceptualization of ephemeral value that blurs Smith’s horizontal and 
vertical axes of nature as capital beyond recognition. It moves through these 
intermittently and simultaneously as a frenzied circulation of a seemingly 
integrated “nature” and nature.
The analysis also complicates Smith’s (1996; 2007, 25) discussions of the 
“production of nature” as well as Garland’s (2008) concept of the “conser-
vationist mode of production.” While I agree with Smith’s epistemology 
behind the idea of the production of nature as taking both material and 
discourse seriously, I believe that conserved nature as capital in the context 
of contemporary capitalism emphasizes that “formerly distinct spheres of 
analysis”—production, distribution, consumption, and circulation—are 
converging more than this thesis can give credit for (Graham 2007, 7). 
Being overly “productivist” can blind analyses for “other processes that 
simultaneously socialize nature” (Castree 2000, 285) while it also obscures 
the ephemeral and hybrid character of value in contemporary hypercapital-
ism.8 Likewise, the concept of a “conservation mode of production” cannot 
do justice to the ways in which nature and conservation are increasingly 
becoming “valuable” in the global economy, namely, as fictitious capital, 
which depends on the ever-increasing velocity of circulation.9 Nature is not 
only produced. It is constantly on the move, along with fictitious versions 
of the very forces that produced it, through simultaneous and intertwined 
processes of circulation, consumption, distribution, and production.
Yet, while having said this, the analysis at the same time leads us to 
the argument that the emphasis in the creation of value has shifted from 
production to circulation. The Marxian theory of value would stress that 
value is ultimately produced through the surplus extracted from labor in 
production, which in turn happens through the appropriation of nature. 
This becomes problematic, of course, when environmental services circu-
late as fictitious capital without having been produced by human labor. In 
fact, the idea of capitalist conservation says that humans should be paid to 
forgo the creative appropriation of nature. As such, capitalist conservation 
is at the same time an acknowledgment of production and its role in the 
transformation of nature, as well as its (hoped-for) negation. These two 
opposites, in turn, are brought together in the idea that natural capital 
commodities (seem to) skip the phase of material production to focus on 
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the production of circulation. Central in all of this is the elimination of 
the (traditional) role of labor and hence the questioning of what Hannah 
Arendt ([1958] 1998, 85) referred to as “the glorification of labor as the 
source of all values.” In other words, the point of capitalist conservation 
becomes giving (ephemeral) value to the elimination of labor’s appropria-
tion or transformation of nature.
Interestingly, Arendt in the 1950s had already criticized Marx in a similar 
way. In The Human Condition she argues that Marx’s conceptualization of 
labor as being directly embedded in the life process through the metabolism 
of nature leads to a “fundamental and flagrant contradiction” in his value 
theory (1998, 103–4). She argues, on the one hand, that “when Marx insists 
that the labor ‘process comes to its end in the product,’ he forgets his own 
definition of this process as the ‘metabolism between man and nature’ into 
which the product is immediately ‘incorporated,’ consumed, and annihi-
lated by the body’s life process.” On the other hand, she insists that “while 
it was an ‘external necessity imposed by nature’ and the most human and 
productive of man’s activities, the revolution, according to Marx, has not 
the task of emancipating the laboring classes but of emancipating man from 
labor; only when labor is abolished can the ‘realm of freedom’ supplant the 
‘realm of necessity.’” Interestingly, the capitalist system is now trying some-
thing similar: to emancipate capital circulation from labor and its role in the 
transformation of nature as a way of “offsetting” other labor processes that do 
(need to) continue to transform nature. This, of course, is inherently con-
tradictory, showing again how fictitious capitalist conservation is becoming.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to see this contradiction for what it is, which 
leads me to a second reason why it is important to emphasize circulation. 
This is because of Marx’s ([1867] 1976, 253, 381, and see above) argument 
that circulation develops into a “coercive external force” that becomes “an 
end in itself.” Of course, production, distribution, and consumption can 
also become “ends in themselves,” yet it is only their converging total-
ity aimed at accumulation through circulation that becomes a “coercive 
external force.” Hence, while circulation itself is indeed (continuously) 
produced, distributed, and consumed, as a totality it seems to have become 
an external force that affects us all—albeit in highly differentiated ways.
This, in turn, is further intensified in the context of hypercapitalist cir-
culation, a maelstrom that moves at incredible speed and velocity, continu-
ously taking on (and shedding) bodies, information, technologies, natures, 
relations, spaces, and time as it proceeds. Hypercapitalism, as Graham 
(2007, 1) stresses, is “hyper” indeed, creating the possibility that its circula-
tion has significant potential to be used and abused as a seemingly external 
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force that magically creates value for those who can step in and out of this 
circulation when they want to (see also Marazzi 2011). While we see the 
evidence of this all around us, particularly in the financial sector, we again 
immediately have to stress the limits of circulation as an “external force,” 
since the growth of the circulatory circuit of production, distribution, and 
consumption of capital and values can absorb only so many “free riders.” 
In other words, somewhere, someone still has to produce, distribute, or 
consume something, or, paraphrasing Leyshon and Thrift (2007), specu-
lative structures can only be built on more mundane structures, and these 
are interwoven in complex ways.10 Similarly, fictitious conservation has its 
limits and is thus never truly free from more traditional forms, even though 
these limits are always continuously pushed under capitalism.
Concluding Thoughts
Conservation, it seems, is increasingly becoming its own negation. Where 
once it might have been a Polanyian countermovement against the eco-
logical contradictions of capitalism, this is no longer the case (Igoe, Neves, 
and Brockington 2010). Capitalist conservation has become an important 
instrument for the production of surplus value on its own and a way to “off-
set” and so seemingly legitimate more conventional methods of producing 
capital. This has meant that conserved nature itself needed to become 
capital, to become “value,” and to be able to circulate within the ephemeral 
hyperspheres of contemporary capitalism. Marx ([1867] 1976, 638), while 
recognizing that the soil was one of the “original sources of all wealth,” 
believed that capitalist commodities could only ever have value if they 
incorporated the interaction between labor and material nature (see also 
Arendt [1958] 1998). These days, we see something different. Humanity 
has become so fearful of its own capability of destroying all this wealth 
that it is increasingly “willing to pay” for its value to be recognized on 
the explicit condition that it does not incorporate the interaction between 
labor and material nature.11 Characteristically, it does so by further bringing 
inherent contradictions in capitalism to new heights and levels, in this case 
to what I have called “fictitious conservation.”
Fictitious conservation precariously tries to link the conservation of 
material nature via its “environmental services” to contemporary hyper-
capitalism and its emphasis on the circulation of ephemeral values. Occa-
sionally it might succeed in doing so and indeed “save” some material 
nature from the onslaught of more “traditional” capitalist expansion. This, 
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however, cannot be concretely verified if, for all intents and purposes, the 
link between consumers of liquid nature and the conditions and relation-
ships that produced it has been severed. But this is hardly the point. The 
central paradox of fictitious conservation is not that it has little chance of 
not “working” but rather that it ultimately is not really about conservation 
at all. It is first and foremost about capital: generating value that is of use 
in and to contemporary capitalism. This is, I argue, what the severing of 
the link between material natures and ephemeral values signifies. Iron-
ically, conservation’s latest financialized products, such as conservation 
derivatives, “sustainability enhanced investments,” mitigation banking, 
biodiversity offsets, and others, are still “marketed” under the heading of 
“environmental services” to try and emphasize direct links with material, 
biophysical natures. But it is the attempt at delinking that made these 
schemes attractive to capitalists, and this should therefore be the starting 
point of their characterization.
If this sounds “cynical,” I would argue that it is—unfortunately—only 
the start. Truly cynical is that it no longer matters that in the complexity of 
turning conserved nature into capital, conservation has become fictitious; 
it can still sell. All that it needs is a compelling brand: a memorable logo, 
some catchy slogans, smooth marketing campaigns, visually captivating 
websites, celebrity spokespeople, and a take-home message that “everybody 
wins.” It can make people “feel good” in the face of serious problems that 
seem to be going out of the rational, technical control capitalism thrives 
on. No wonder, then, that Sian Sullivan (2009, and see her chapter in 
this volume) talks about a profound manifestation of “cultural poverty” 
through the seeming incapacity to think of nature as anything in any other 
but capitalist terms.
Yet none of this is unforetold. Fictitious conservation is but one man-
ifestation of the intensification of capitalism rather than its extensifica-
tion (Smith 2007), and in line with Carolan’s critical realist distinction 
between Nature, nature and “nature,” the point for capitalist expansion is 
to penetrate deeper into rather than merely wider across reality. Hence, the 
uptake of conservation into the capitalist system signals that the hegemony 
of neoliberal capitalism is strong indeed, despite or perhaps even because 
of the recent crisis (Igoe, Neves, and Brockington 2010; Büscher and Arsel 
2012). Indeed, the incorporation and celebration of its own contradictions 
may well be the basis of our current hegemony’s perhaps unprecedented 
strength. To believe that nature can be conserved by increasing the 
intensity, reach, and depth of capital circulation is arguably one of the 
biggest contradictions of our times. The only way, then, to confront the 
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contemporary contradictions around conservation is by working from and 
acknowledging both the “deep structures” and the contemporary dynamics 
of capitalism lest we continue to have conservation politics and policies 
based on symptoms rather than real causes.
Notes
1. See http://www.unep.org/pdf/A_Global_Green_New_Deal_Policy_Brief.pdf, 
p. 4, accessed September 15, 2010.
2. Neil Smith (2007) has written an extremely interesting and relevant essay entitled 
“Nature as Accumulation Strategy” that touches on many of the issues discussed in this 
chapter. In my view, however, Smith does not give “conservation” a central enough 
place (indeed, he hardly even uses the concept at all) and so misses some crucial links 
in explaining “conserved nature as capital” and what this implies for the value of nature 
in contemporary capitalism. These will be discussed later in the chapter.
3. Note that this is not the same as Marx’s base-superstructure theory in relation to 
capitalism.
4. The category of “cultural ecosystem services” is interesting in relation to Sullivan’s 
(2009) point that the whole exercise of subjecting nature to capitalist market dynamics 
is a profound manifestation of “cultural poverty,” as it almost seems to acknowledge 
this very point by ensuring that “culture” is given its appropriate place in an otherwise 
culturally lifeless framework.
5. Importantly, Carolan (2005, 401) adds that “all three natures—‘nature,’ nature, 
and Nature—represent bounded hybrids. In each, sociobiophysical interactions occur, 
but to various degrees, thereby underlying the need to conceptually stratify reality so 
as to better understand how those strata interact and the bounded hybrids that result.”
6. For “entrepreneurs” making the market liquid, see http://www.ecosystemmarket 
place.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=7682&section=news_articles& 
eod=1, accessed September 21, 2010. Important to add is that the degree to which this 
“rendering liquid” varies in practice is great.
7. Note that it is generally accepted that “more” liquidity is not always the best for 
market stability and thus for profits, hence the phrase “getting market liquidity right.”
8. Although obviously not for all—many people in the world are still clearly caught 
in capitalist relations that are not all that hybrid, as conceptualized here.
9. Moreover, the term is actually confusing, as it seems that the “conservation mode 
of production” is somehow different from the “capitalist mode of production,” while 
Garland (and others; e.g., see Brockington and Scholfield 2010) indeed argue that 
conservation is a capitalist mode of production and not a self-standing mode.
10. The simplistic way in which Mandel, Donlan, and Armstrong (2010, 49) argue 
that “short-term volatility in the price of the derivative does not affect the underlying 
asset” is therefore wholly unfounded and a disturbing act of wishful thinking.
11. Finding out people’s “willingness to pay” for conservation is one of the favorite 




Nature on the Move II
Contemplation Becomes Speculation
Jim Igoe
In the first intallation to this triptych, Bram Büscher posits the emergence 
of a “liquid nature”—a kind of “fictitious capital” no longer grounded in 
any specific material context or relationships.
Abstraction and financialization “are extending new possibilities for 
nature’s speculative release into the realm of circulating money” (Sullivan 
2013b, 208). Liquid nature, Büscher (this volume) further argues, requires 
“‘fictitious conservation,’ conservation without any direct basis in material, 
sociobiophysical nature.” Through fictitious conservation, the valorization 
of actual conservation activities is alienated from those activities them-
selves. Fictitious conservation circulates with liquid nature, which it also 
authenticates and valorizes. Both nature and the conservation of nature 
have been rendered into circulating commodity forms.
While these developments may initially appear as sudden and counter-
intuitive, emergent forms of nature for speculation are actually rooted 
in older and more widely recognized forms of nature for contemplation. 
Lukács (1971) has ascribed the pervasiveness of contemplation in mod-
ern society to Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism, arguing that it is 
symptomatic of a generalized separation accompanying the alienation of 
labor’s use value into exchange value by industrial capitalism. Over time, 
he asserts, people have increasingly become passive contemplators of the 
apparently autonomous movement of commodities as a “kind of second 
nature” (128).1 The industrial transformation of commodity into a kind 
of nature was accompanied by a corollary transformation of nature into 
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a kind of commodity, a spatially framed and putatively timeless view that 
people would pay to contemplate at a comfortable distance (Cronon 1996; 
Neumann 1998). This was consistently achieved by the forced removal of 
people who lived and labored in landscapes and the subsequent erasure of 
those removals (Igoe 2004).
Thus, as Sian Sullivan (this volume) elaborates in the third installation 
of this triptych, making nature move first required making it sit still as an 
increasingly deadened object of contemplation.2 The second section of 
this essay will accordingly examine how the putative stillness of nature for 
contemplation has been entrained to the movement of nature for specu-
lation. My analysis is informed by Guy Debord’s ([1967] 1995) concept 
of “spectacle,” a uniquely specialized and powerful form of “capital accu-
mulated to the point that it becomes image” (thesis 34) and that mystifies 
and mediates the relationships of its own production (thesis 4). Debord 
further argued that spectacle’s power to transform fragments of reality into 
a visually pervasive totality produced “a separate pseudo world” (thesis 2) 
offered in exchange for the totality of actual activities and relationships, a 
world of “money for contemplation only” (thesis 49).
Abstraction of nature into spectacle, as we shall see, has turned it into 
money for contemplation and speculation. Via multi-billion-dollar film and 
advertising industries, nature has moved onto screens that are seemingly 
everywhere (Mitman 1999; Brockington 2009). Such images also lend 
themselves to the simulation of nature in themed environments through 
which multiple and far-flung natures can be contemplated in one comfort-
able and conveniently located setting (Wilson 1993; Igoe 2004). Moving 
images of nature move consumers to buy products, take vacations, and 
give money to worthy conservation causes (Igoe 2010). Finally, spectacle 
provides visual testimony for a movable nature that can be “disassembled, 
recombined, and subjected to the disciplinary design of expert manage-
ment” (Luke 1999, 142). This is the basis for what I call “ecofunctional 
nature,” which appears as though it can be calibrated to optimize ecosytem 
health and economic growth. Ecofunctional nature, I will argue, is indis-
pensable to the current global policy consensus that the financialization of 
nature is the key to its salvation—a pseudoqualitative accompaniment to 
complexly quantified forms of financialized liquid nature.
In addition to its abstraction of nature into circulating images and its 
visual embellishment of the practices and rationale of nature’s financializa-
tion (cf. Debord [1967] 1995, thesis 15), spectacle offers a powerful tech-
nique for fostering and managing subjectivities appropriate to commodity 
nature (cf. MacDonald 2010a). The ability to create the appearance of 
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certain realities, even when those realities have not been—in fact cannot 
be—achieved, is in itself a powerful effect, particularly when the reality in 
question is presented as “nature,” “the inherent force that directs the world, 
human beings, or both” and “the material world itself” (Williams [1976] 
1983, 219). Spectacle should therefore be considered as part of the wider 
mosaic that Michel Foucault (1982, 2007, 2008) called techniques and 
technologies of government (Debord [1988] 1998, 2; Crory 2002, 456).
In section 3 of this essay I will address the ways spectacle is produced and 
deployed in the intentionally modified and interconnected contexts that I 
call micropolitical milieus of commodity nature. These milieus are sites for 
the production and consumption of liquid nature and fictitious conserva-
tion, as well as of diversity of decentered and seemingly unrelated struggles 
over what nature is and what it will be. One of my main motivations for 
sketching these milieus is the possibility of short-circuiting spectacle and its 
attendant mystifications through the intensification of “channels, concepts, 
and processes that can link up and thereby intensify transversal struggles 
into larger collective, but discontinuous movements” (Nealon 2008, 106).
The Nature of Spectacle and the Spectacle of Nature
Historical treatments of nature, on the one hand, and spectacle, on the 
other, to the best of my knowledge have yet to be synthesized. The gene-
alogical synthesis presented here focuses specifically on Western and pre-
dominantly North American contexts. I begin somewhat arbitrarily, with 
eighteenth-century land enclosures that accompanied Europe’s industrial 
revolution and segregated countrysides into landscapes of production (for 
the production of wealth) and landscapes of consumption (for leisure and 
contemplation only) (for details, see Green 1990; Neumann 1998; Igoe 
2004). The creation of nineteenth-century American parks as the ultimate 
landscapes of consumption revitalized this segregation to generate a widely 
recognized and eminently transportable abstract category of nature as big 
outdoors (Cronon 1996).
While such abstraction is an important element of circulating com-
modity forms, the category of nature itself was consistently presented as 
immutable, immovable, and thus forever outside of capitalist value pro-
duction (Brockington, Duffy, and Igoe 2008). Landscapes of production, 
by contrast, were celebrated, elaborated, and simulated by elaborate 
commodity displays, mass-produced and embedded in new landscapes of 
consumption, from county fairs to world exhibitions. These displays not 
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only effaced the labor that produced them but also appeared capable of 
transcending their own materiality (Connerton 2009), qualities that were 
important antecedents to what Debord would later call spectacle. Nature 
and spectacle thus appear less as separate parallel threads than as strands 
of a double helix becoming more tightly interwoven over time.
The Nature of Spectacle
As noted by Crory (2002, 457–58), Debord dated spectacle’s origin to the 
year 1927 and “the technological perfection of the television. Right at the 
age when an awareness rose of the age of mechanical reproduction, a new 
model of circulation and transmission appeared. . . . [S]pectacle was to 
become inseparable from this new kind of image and its speed, ubiquity, 
and simultaneity.” This year also introduced the first sync sound films, 
which demanded more concentrated attention from viewers than previous 
moving pictures. Debord’s concern with sync sound suggests that he saw 
spectacular power as “inseparable from a larger organization of perceptual 
consumption” (Crory 2002, 458)—as near as possible to a total sensory 
experience.
Shortly thereafter, the Third Reich and Stalinism demonstrated the 
power of these technologies for producing encompassing state-sponsored 
propaganda, which Debord ([1988] 1998, 8) called “concentrated spec-
tacle.” American corporations and marketing firms deployed the same 
technology to produce “diffuse spectacle,” an apparently decentered pro-
fusion of commodities on display (8). While doubtlessly catalyzed by these 
technologies, diffuse spectacle is rooted in mid-nineteenth-century world 
exhibitions that inspired German economists to posit an “exhibition value 
to indicate the productive capacity of representation itself. . . . [T]hings 
gain value simply by their mode of appearance, quite apart from their use 
value” (Brain 1993, 13–14).
Exhibition value proved and capitalized upon Marx’s ([1867] 1976, 163) 
point that a commodity is “a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical 
subtleties and theological niceties.” By exaggerating and manipulating the 
metaphysics of commodities, their use value was effaced in what Benja-
min (1979, 152) described as “a phantasmagoria that people enter to be 
amused.” These were intentionally designed to overwhelm and disorient: 
giant glass buildings presented “an unending perspective that fades into the 
horizon,” exhibit machines were also exhibiting machines, and panoramas 
moved past stationary spectactors to simulate a hybrid collage of travel 
experiences (Brain 1993, 39, 48, 65). Such simulacra, Jameson (1991, 18) 
Nature on the Move II • 209
held, “come to life in a society where exchange value has been generalized 
to the point at which the memory of use value is effaced.” By the turn of 
the twentieth century, exhibition simulacra were bursting their boundaries 
and spilling into their surrounding environs. Visitors to the 1900 Universal 
Exhibition found it difficult to distinguish the exhibition space from the 
rest of Paris (Brain 1993, 10). This, argues Connerton (2009, 60), was the 
beginning of diffuse spectacle, “an all embracing medium where people 
continuously interact with commodities.”
Today this medium is indeed a kind of “second Nature,” readily and 
ubiquitously visible in the environments with which consumers most com-
monly interact: cities, restaurants, freeways and rest stops, shopping malls, 
airports, train stations (and of course trains and planes themselves), not to 
mention theme parks and all manner of entertainment venues and tourist 
attractions.3 It is also working its way into places like schools, hospitals, and 
office buildings. All these environments incorporate a diversity of video 
screens, from towering Jumbotrons to tiny televisions in taxicabs and air-
plane seats. They also provide settings for the production of commodified 
images, resulting in a recursive relationship between “reality and image” 
(e.g., a Jumbotron in Times Square promoted the Broadway production of 
Madagascar by endlessly repeating a sequence from the film in which the 
animals escape from the Central Park Zoo and wind up in Times Square). 
This is the basis of what Debord ([1988] 1998, 9) called “integrated specta-
cle—spectacle that has integrated itself into reality to the same extent that 
it was describing it, and that it was reconstructing it as it was describing it.”
Since Debord’s death in 1994, the boundary between actual and virtual 
reality has been further blurred by Wi-Fi and a diversity of portable com-
munication devices. In my classroom a phalanx of glowing Macintosh logos 
mediates the space between me and the students, who are in actual and 
virtual reality at the same time. They listen to my live lecture and take notes 
while texting each other, shopping online, and updating their Facebook 
profiles. To spice things up, I show a YouTube video of Slavoj Žižek lectur-
ing from First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, saving myself the labor of prepara-
tion and them the labor of reading. Žižek defines “cultural capitalism” as a 
reality in which “the very act of consumption entails redemption for being 
a consumer.”4 I rush to relate this point to the “prosumption” (simultaneous 
consumption and production) of nature (Büscher and Igoe 2013). I display 
a website where users can track radio-collared polar bears to see how drink-
ing Coca-Cola helps protect Arctic habitats. Another invites consumers 
to adopt acres of virtual rain forest personalized with their names and a 
graphic of their favorite endangered species, but a synchronized closing 
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of laptops indicates time is up. Next time, I promise, we will explore the 
transformations of nature that have rendered such presentations plausible.
The Spectacle of Nature
nature for contemplation . . . . In contrast to nineteenth-century 
exhibitions, which enshrined intensifying industrial production, nineteenth- 
century national parks enshrined a special kind of “natural legacy.” While 
these exhibitions offered escape from industrial life into phantasmagorias 
where “commodities are now all there is to see” (Debord [1967] 1995, 
thesis 45), parks offered escape from industrial life into putatively pristine 
realms, one of the main attractions of which was that commodities seemed 
to be absent (cf. Cronon 1996). In spite of these differences, exhibitions 
and parks operated by similar logics of abstraction and contemplation at 
play in the production of contemporary spectacle through which nature is 
now explicitly presented as the ultimate commodity.
Like exhibitions, parks effaced the conditions of their own production. 
Their displays of timeless wilderness for leisurely contemplation depended 
upon the systematic clearance of their human inhabitants.5 For the illusion 
of timelessness to be effective, however, “this process of erasure had to 
erase itself” (Igoe 2004, 85). Nature was thereby presented as reality with-
out social or historical connections, an arrangement ironically requiring 
significant administrative and technical intervention. The contemplation 
of nature in these terms, as Cronon (1996) aptly notes, was only possible 
by virtue of the modern conditions to which it was supposedly the anti-
dote. For elites who championed American parks, however, this nature 
was nothing less than “the basis of universal truth available through direct 
experience and study. To study a particular instance offers a window onto 
the universal” (Tsing 2005, 97).
These conditions present four important antecedents to spectacle: (1) 
forgetting, (2) abstraction, (3) reifications, and (4) protoexchangeability. 
Forgetting is essential to Lukács’s (1971) theoretical elaboration of com-
modity fetishism: “The precise process that produces commodities gets 
forgotten . . . [and] . . . manufactured artifacts . . . fall prey to cultural 
amnesia” (Connerton 2009, 43).6 Forgetting is a precondition of reification, 
whereby artifacts appear to take on a life independent of their manufacture, 
“much like the laws of nature” (43). It also figures centrally in abstrac-
tion, whereby artifacts apparently transcend their own material limitations 
(Büscher this volume). The notion that individual parks materially embody 
an ideal universal nature is a kind of abstraction, since this universal nature 
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presumably transcends the material boundaries of any park in particular. 
The ability of one object (a park) to stand for a class of objects (imagined 
universal nature) is furthermore an essential element of Marx’s ([1870] 
1978) theory of how commodities gain exchangeability and the basis of 
spectacle as “money for contemplation.”
Because parks were meant to be stable and enduring, however, the 
nature they displayed required further mediation to transgress its material 
boundaries. This came with the aforementioned advent of sync sound 
and television, paving the way for the nature film industry. By the 1950s 
technicolor nature films were a popular staple for Western theatergoers 
(Mitman 1999), while freeways in the United States were transforming 
parks from a rarefied elite playground into popular vacation destinations for 
millions of newly affluent automobile owners.7 Nature became part of the 
wider current of consumptive experiences that exploded on the scene in 
the years following World War II (for details, see Wilson 1993), presenting 
unprecedented possibility for its refinement into reified commodity forms 
that are also generators of additional value.
The career of Frankfurt Zoological Society director Bernhard Grzimek 
poignantly illustrates these refinements. At the end of World War II, 
Grzimek set up shop in what would become Tanzania’s Serengeti National 
Park. With revenue from his award-winning film, No Room for Wild Ani-
mals, he conducted an aerial survey of the now world-famous wildebeest 
migrations. The survey was the centerpiece of Serengeti Shall Not Die!, 
an international best seller that won the Oscar for best documentary in 
1957 (Bonner 1993). By the 1960s Grzimek presented a popular Ger-
man television show called A Place for Animals, which he used to market 
nonexistent tours to East Africa. He speculated that this would generate 
sufficient demand to bring the safaris into existence, and he was correct 
(Lekan 2011, 225). Tourism is now Tanzania’s second largest source of 
foreign currency (Igoe and Croucher 2007), while the royalties from 
Serengeti Shall Not Die! have built a world-class headquarters for the 
Frankfurt Zoological Society inside Serengeti, where it remains to this day 
(Bonner 1993).
Grizmek’s story reveals nascent formulations of a now fully blown “con-
servationist mode of production” in which, “through various mediations . . . 
natural capital is converted into capital of a more circulating and globally 
ramifying kind” (Garland 2008, 62). This is achieved in large part through 
the abstraction of nature into image. In addition to their multi-billion-dollar 
value in the nature film industry, these images inform completely fabri-
cated pseudonature in 3D blockbusters like Avatar and The Lorax. Images 
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of conserved nature, and promises of conserving nature, are used to market 
everything from fast food to dish soap, SUVs to computer printers. They 
spread through the theming of space in airports, resorts, shopping malls, 
zoos, botanic gardens, and of course theme parks (Igoe 2010). Finally, as 
we have just seen, conservation NGOs use them to distinguish their brand 
in a crowded and highly competitive funding environment (Sachedina 
2008). When images of nature are deposited in “image banks” (Goldman 
and Papson 2011, 137) from which they can be withdrawn and reanimated 
for any of the purposes above, there can be no further doubt that nature is 
“money for contemplation.”
becomes nature for speculation . . . . But how might nature that 
is money for contemplation become nature that is money for speculation? 
Both require abstraction and reification, but in the case of the latter, these 
are more meticulous and precise. As recent work by Sullivan (2013a, 82) 
illustrates, the abstraction of nature into tradable units of financial value 
is closely associated with “[V]ariously marketized forms of environmental 
offsetting,” which will reputedly resolve “contradictions between economic 
development and nature health.” Monetized ecosystem services theoreti-
cally correspond to land-based localities, nature banks, “where they can 
be situated and accounted for” (Sullivan 2013a, 83). These notional con-
nections inform “key design features” for turning nature into money for 
speculation (Sullivan 2013a, 83; see also Büscher, this volume; Fairhead, 
Leach, and Scoones 2012b).
Two of these are of particular relevance to the present discussion. The 
first is the need for an “ecosystem metrics to permit exchangeability,” a 
“symbolic numerical signifier that can serve as an abstraction of ecosystem 
aspects in different places and in different times, such that these abstrac-
tions become commensurable with and substitutable for one another” 
(Sullivan 2013a, 84–85). The second is the principle of “additionality,” 
which assumes that nature conservation would not have occurred without 
offset payments (86). While the illogic of these assumptions may seem 
self-evident, it merits brief mention here: making nature quantitatively fun-
gible conceptually obliterates the unique qualities of specific ecosystems 
and the cultures of people who dwell within them, while the principle of 
additionality depends on counterfactual scenarios.
It is precisely in areas like this that nature for contemplation is most 
important to nature for speculation. The former does not become the latter 
by turning into it; instead, it is like a becoming outfit that enhances some-
one’s attractiveness to the point of becoming indistinguishable from them 
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(as when we tell a friend, “That outfit is you!”). Nature for contemplation 
suits nature for speculation, covering over its blemishes and lumpy bits 
while enhancing its finer qualities. Nature for contemplation is “the indis-
pensable decoration” of nature for speculation and “the general gloss on the 
rationale of the system” that produces it (Debord [1967] 1995, thesis 15).8
Productions of nature for contemplation have consistently and elaborately 
effaced its use values and its wider ecological and social connections (Cronon 
1996). Contemplative activities are accordingly portrayed as nonconsumptive 
and transcendent of more mundane concerns, such as environmental effects 
of the contemplator’s everyday activities (Cronon 1996) or even of traveling 
to the nature that will be contemplated (Carrier and Macleod 2005). The 
production of nature films and related conservation celebrity contributed to 
a popular perception that such natures would disappear if not for the efforts 
of heroic conservationists (Bonner 1993; Brockington 2009; Lekan 2011). 
Finally, mass-produced images and simulations of nature replaced uniquely 
contextualized qualities with iconic signifiers that could be transported to 
other locations and rearranged as desired (Wilson 1993). In this light, nature 
for contemplation appears tailor-made for scenarios of exchangeability and 
additionality, and it also becomes the idea that local people will prosper 
more from nature’s exchange values than from its use values.
Considering these compatibilities, it is not surprising that nature for con-
templation is a consistent backdrop to the reified practices that Büscher (this 
volume) calls “fictitious conservation” as well as standing for its putative 
ends. Fictitious conservation, Büscher correctly notes, is indispensable to 
the valorization of nature as money for speculation, which he calls “liquid 
nature.” It is visually articulated—and made to circulate—by spectacular 
presentations of conservationists in action, often also incorporating narra-
tive testimonies from conservationists themselves or celebrities speaking on 
their behalf (cf. Brockington 2009; Igoe 2010).
Nature for contemplation also figures in the calculative and technical 
reworkings of nature into money for speculation. The web page of TEEB 
(The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity) tells us, “You cannot man-
age what you do not measure.”9 Of course, most people find it difficult to 
relate to abstract calculations and financial mechanisms, and nature for 
contemplation therefore remains essentially important. The TEEB page 
accordingly features a montage of endangered species, stock market trading 
screens, pristine landscapes, bar charts, and local people. A video promot-
ing ARIES (Artificial Intelligence for Ecosystem Services) intersperses 
images of wildlife and satellite maps with illustrated explanations of how 
the technology operates to calculate values of environmental assets.10
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Visual mashups of nature for contemplation, fictitious conservation, sat-
ellite maps, graphs, and charts are transforming nature for contemplation 
through explicit, though selective, presentations of what has long been 
present but previously hidden from view, “the application of techniques, 
procedures, and practices” by which nature is brought forth as “an object 
of knowledge and target for regulation” (Bäckstrand 2004, 703; cf. Foucault 
2007, 79). Through the rapid proliferation of these kinds of mashups, even 
in popular presentations, nature for contemplation appears increasingly 
ecofunctional, still beautiful and entertaining but no longer pristine and 
best left to its own devices. Ecofunctional nature, as I call it, appears amena-
ble to technological reorderings that will optimize economy and ecology, or 
at least accommodate putatively inevitable growth with minimal disruption 
to ecosystems and human well-being.
Popular presentations of ecofunction appear to operationalize cultural 
capitalism’s promise of consumption redeeming consumption (see note 3). 
Donations and purchases appear to initiate events resulting in the protec-
tion of animals and ecosystems (Brockington, Duffy, and Igoe 2008, chap. 
9; Igoe 2010). Texting “tree” to a designated number helps to make a shim-
mering virtual forest grow on Jumbotrons in Times Square, metaphorically 
standing for actual forests being planted in Kenya and Mexico.11 Those who 
want more details of how such arrangements work can track virtual polar 
bears, follow the blogs of African conservationists, or watch videos outlining 
the logic of interventions they are helping to support (Brockington, Duffy, 
and Igoe 2008, chap. 9; Igoe 2010).12
Ecofunction also informs more general commentary on the environment 
in popular media. A recent special edition of Time Magazine (March 12, 
2012), for instance, showcases a top 10 list of “ideas that are changing 
your life”—number 9: “Nature Is Over.” The corresponding article (Walsh 
2012) explains that we are living in what atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen 
calls the “Anthropocene,” a geological epoch in which human activity has 
become an irreducible element of the biological, chemical, and geological 
processes of our planet: “It is no longer us against nature,” Crutzen opines, 
“instead it is we who decide what nature is and what it will be” (Walsh 2012, 
84). This, the article continues, will revolve around technological inter-
ventions and their acceptable trade-offs. With genetically modified seeds 
we will grow more food on less land, freeing up space for wildlife. We will 
also “learn to live” with nuclear power’s “risk of accident.” Finally, we may 
have to “fiddle with the climate” using “planetary scale technology” (85).
While such scenarios are scary, they are made to seem less so by more 
whimsical interactions with ecofunction and language that lionizes the 
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power of expert knowledge while softening the potential dangers of the 
transformations experts will oversee. While optimal ecofunction is almost 
certainly unachievable, in spectacle it can be conjured as a fait accompli. 
Spectacle’s ability to project unity and consensus where none actually exist 
(Debord [1988] 1998, 2) makes it a powerful “technology of government” 
(cf. MacDonald 2010a). It provides visual articulations of nature as an 
ecofunctional object of intervention while concealing and marginalizing 
alternatives and opposition to its seemingly monolithic vision. We now turn 
from the relationship of spectacle to what I call the micropolitical milieus 
of commodity nature.
The Micropolitical Milieus of Commodity Nature
Spectacular celebrations of fictitious conservation and financialized nature 
conceal a much more contested politics of what nature is and what it will 
be. Missing are Western conservationists who believe in their bones that 
capitalism and profit motive spell nature’s demise and not its salvation (see 
esp. Ehrenfeld 2009). We will also never see the occassional tourists who 
look beyond the spectacle they have been shown to gain a more nuanced 
understanding of nature conservation in specific locales. Some tourists 
even go to the trouble to educate others by disseminating what they have 
learned.13 Also absent are the resistances and critiques of the diverse rural 
people whose lives, livelihoods, and ontologies of more-than-human reality 
have been discounted and displaced by conservation (see Dowie 2009; 
regarding ontologies, see Sullivan 2009).
In stark contrast to earlier green Marxist predictions that a looming envi-
ronmental crisis would catalyze mass social movements, demanding eco-
logically sane alternatives to capitalism (esp. O’Connor 1988), the struggles 
of these actors are decentered and seemingly disconnected. My theoretical 
framing of these struggles draws from the productive intersection of Marx-
ian concerns with the subsumption of culture by capital and Foucaultian 
scholarship on techniques of government. The conditions described in the 
previous sections reveal what Nealon (2008, 84) describes as the recircu-
lation of value not only at all points on the socius but also at diverse points 
of interaction between humans and more-than-human nature around the 
world. Furthermore, as Read (2003, 126) has argued, the spread of com-
modity relationships from concentrated sites of production has required a 
concomitant spread of techniques and technologies designed to produce 
appropriate subjectivities. Nature on the move, which is produced and 
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supported by these dispersions, presents a difficult moving target for activists 
and social movements, shifting and changing at different scales and locales.
This situation reflects two broader historical transformations that I have 
already touched upon. The first began when the nineteenth-century crisis 
of capitalist overproduction prompted the creation of a marketing industry 
to channel human desire into an apparently unlimited demand for con-
sumer goods and services (see Debord [1988] 1998, thesis 45). The second 
began with the late twentieth-century proliferations of fictitious capital 
“without any material basis in commodities or productive activity” (Har-
vey 2006a, 95), of which reified nature for speculation is the most recent 
expression. Taken together, as they frequently are, these processes have 
spawned a gigantic intellectual labor force tasked with creating, celebrat-
ing, authenticating, and valorizing the latest consumer commodities and 
financial products. And of course there is the labor of consumption, which 
includes interpreting—and ideally taking appropriate action upon—a 
continuous bombardment of commodity signs: brands, slogans, and asso-
ciations between desired experiences/qualities and designated products/
services (Goldman 1994).
All of this “immaterial labor,” according to Read (2003, 129–30), 
both targets and shapes social communication and social space. It travels 
through “epistemic, aesthetic, and affective models that structure social 
communication.” These, according to Virno (1996, 23), include “infor-
mation systems, epistemological paradigms, and images of the world” 
and are communicated through manuals and reports, videos, seminars, 
and workshops. They are thus stored in archives but also in the “minds 
of workers, as little productive machines (virtual fixed capital), without 
necessarily originating from them” (Read 1993, 131). These valuable little 
machines are activiated and reproduced in realms outside the direct control 
of capital: in the subjectivity of producer/consumers and the diversity of 
social spaces they inhabit.
In Foucault beyond Foucault (2008), Nealon describes how mutations 
in modes of production from factory to cultural life correspond to similar 
mutations in modes of power. My understanding of these mutations is 
informed by Foucault’s (1982, 220) basic definition of government as the 
“conduct of conduct,” achieved by “structuring the possible field of action 
of others. . . . [I]t induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult.” 
Government is inseparable from regimes of truth (Dreyfus and Rabinow 
1983), producing objects of knowledge and intervention (e.g., conservation 
as a regime of truth that produces nature). Government is concerned with 
shaping people’s subjective perceptions of what is possible, plausible, and 
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desirable and thus of their own efficacy in any situation—for the purpose 
of “developing, canalizing, and harnessing social and individual capacities 
on a . . . cost effective mass scale” (Nealon 2008, 27).
Over time, Nealon (2008, 31) argues, techniques and technologies of 
government have become more efficient as they have been made lighter 
and more virtual. Discipline, for instance, works in a retail fashion on 
individual bodies in specific institutional contexts through a “series of 
discontinuous institutional training exercises” (41). Subsequent modes of 
biopower do not replace discipline but infiltrate it and amplify its effect by 
working throughout populations and infusing “each individual at a nearly 
ubiquitous number of actual and virtual sites.” Biopower works less on 
actual bodies and more on potential actions, thereby “gaining an intensified 
hold on what [bodies] are, will be, may be” (31). Along these lines, Foucault 
(2008, 271) posited that neoliberalism is a new “art of government . . . 
which will systematically act on an environment and modify its variables.” 
The point is to channel the acts of individuals, presumably acting in their 
own best interests, toward a spectrum of preferred outcomes and effects 
(Fletcher 2010).
What forms might “enviromental governmentality” take with respect 
to the politics with which we are currently concerned? The politics of 
commodity nature, I believe, occur for the most part in modified environ-
ments that greatly resemble Foucault’s (2007, 20–21) discussion of milieu, 
which is a “multi-valent and transformable framework” fabricated from 
“pre-existing material givens” that are designed to “maximize the positive 
elements . . . [while] minimizing what is risky and inconvenient” (these 
elements, of course, are defined for the most part by planners, politicians, 
and other powerful actors). “It is what is needed to account for the action 
of one body on another at a distance.” “What one tries to reach through 
this milieu is precisely the conjunction of a series of events produced by 
[people] and quasi natural events which occur around them.” While his 
discussion is derived from town planning in eighteenth-century Europe, 
the dynamics he describes are visible, intensified, and refined in the micro-
political milieus of commodified nature.
The first of these is a consumer milieu consisting of the kinds of spectacle- 
dominated environments described in the previous section of this essay. In 
this milieu the action of one body (a consumer) can appear to initiate a chain 
of events positively affecting another body at a distance (e.g., a polar bear or 
a tree). Its recent explosion of Web 2.0 applications marries self-expression 
(sharing your favorite causes) to wholesale monitoring and delineation of 
consumer types (people who care about the same causes as you also love 
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Endangered Species Chocolate!).14 While micropolitics of commodity 
nature occupy a tiny segment of this milieu, its presentations of conserva-
tion and nature are dominated by celebrity, consumerism, and depoliticized 
presentations of fictitious conservation (Igoe 2010). While it is possible to 
find virtual communities and media that are critical of commodity nature, 
they are few, and their connections to efficacious action are undeveloped.15 
This remains for the most part a spectator milieu.
Next we have a transnational institutional milieu that corresponds to 
what MacDonald (2010a) calls “the new fields of conservation.” This is the 
policy environment in which the creation and valorization of new forms 
of nature for speculation take place. It is also a realm in which immaterial 
labor takes the form of “little productive machines,” like TEEB and ARIES, 
as described above, and many other formulas, models, and matrices dis-
seminated through interactive displays, expert presentations, promotional 
literature, videos, seminars, workshops, and the like. Earlier in the millen-
nium this milieu was more prone to conflict and contestation. The 2003 
World Parks Congress in Durban, for instance, was disrupted by protests 
from indigenous peoples (Brosius 2004; Brockington and Igoe 2006). Sim-
ilar disruptions have been reduced at subsequent events through a variety 
of management techniques designed to minimize interactions between 
attendees likely to have strong disagreements (MacDonald 2010a). They 
also entail orchestrated performances of community consensus, miniature 
concentrated spectacles hailing appropriate subjectivities in their intended 
audiences (MacDonald 2010a). This milieu, itself accessible to only a lim-
ited range of actors, is segregated into exclusive events within events that 
are accessible to only the most powerful and privileged actors of all.
Finally, we have the landscapes and seascapes that are sites to conser-
vation interventions and the source of nature spectacle circulating for 
contemplation and speculation in the milieus outlined above (see Igoe 
2010). The modification of these milieus increasingly turns on complex 
and multifaceted arrangements among NGOs, states, corporations, and 
local people operating through “the restructuring of rules and author-
ity over the access, use, and management of resources, in related labor 
relations, and in human-ecological relationships” (Fairhead, Leach, and 
Scoones 2012b, 239). While these arrangements include voluntary relo-
cation guidelines, they also often involve arrangements in which choices 
for relocation and/or livelihood transformations appear preferable to con-
tending with the risks that the inverventions themselves present for existing 
settlements and livelihoods (see Schmidt-Soltau and Brockington 2007). 
Resistances to such transformations are complexly intertwined with “local 
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cultural politics, identities and material struggles” and frequently informed 
by complex assessments of the situations in question. However, established 
presentations of local people as “green primitives” make it only too easy 
to reimagine these resistances as uninformed, “primitivist and hopelessly 
romantic” (Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones 2012b, 253).
Concluding Remarks
The micropolitical milieus that I have sketched here are currently the sub-
ject of intense scholarly analysis, and important inroads are being made into 
understanding their internal dynamics, their interconnections, and their 
disconnections. I hope that in some small way the conceptual schema I have 
offered in this chapter will prove useful to ongoing and future endeavors. 
If, however, “the point is to change it,” there remain a few things to say. 
It almost goes without saying that the stakes are very high by just about 
any standard. As Sullivan argues in the third installation to this triptych, 
productions of nature for speculation are profoundly anti ecological. Indeed, 
she puts it more strongly than this: they are made possible by the systematic 
deadening of animate ecologies and noncapitalist human ontologies. Nor is 
it likely that turning nature into a giant bundle of capital assets will automat-
ically result in the global spread of holistic stewardship practices. To quote 
Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones (2012b, 244): “Logic might suggest that this 
would inevitably value ecosystems over and above the sum of [their] parts. 
And yet that is what employees often think of viable businesses they work 
for when they are sold—before they are asset-stripped. The perversities of 
the financialized world are legion, and once there are markets for nature’s 
assets, so nature’s assets can be stripped.”
Debord ([1971] 2008, 81) perhaps put it most succinctly with his 
assertion that capitalism was creating “a sick planet” rendered palatable 
and seemingly inevitable by media spectacle as “the environment and 
backdrop of its own pathological growth and reproduction.” As evidence 
for this undesirable outcome mounts, I increasingly hear conservationists 
lament that they did not know what they were helping to make when they 
embarked on the financialization of nature—a sentiment that resonates 
with Foucault’s observation that “people know what they do; they often 
know why they do what they do; what they don’t know is what they do does” 
(in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 187).
Of course, it is doubly difficult to know what we do does from inside a 
spectacle-saturated milieu. As Agamben (1993, 80) notes in his comments 
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on Debord’s legacy, spectacle is “the alienation of language itself, of the 
very linguistic and communicative nature of humans.” As such, Read (2003, 
151) elaborates, “it is the simultaneous site of mystification and struggle.” 
Spectacle, as a technique and symptom of power, works to appropriate 
the diversity and commonality of human communication and experience, 
presenting it as an apparently unassailable singularity. Spectacle’s meta-
message, Debord ([1967] 1995, thesis 12) believed, is “everything that 
appears is good; everything that is good will appear.”
As both Debord and Foucault urged, each in his own way, we denizens 
of postindustrial consumer society have a lot of work to do on our sub-
jective experiences of, and by extension engagements with, “the intense 
singularity that is the present” (to borrow a phrase from Nealon 2008, 106). 
More expansively, struggles in the micropolitics of commodity nature are 
animated by and productive of transformative knowledges and practices 
that need to be taken more seriously. To quote Foucault once more: “It is 
possible that [in] the struggles now underway, the local, the regional, [and 
we can add the transnational], discontinuous theories being elaborated 
in the course of these struggles, and which are absolutely of a piece with 
them, are just beginning to discover the ways in which power is exercised” 
(in Deleuze 2001, 212).
As West (2006, 66) aptly notes, for instance, we have not begun to 
understand the creative and diverse ways that people around the world 
engage in and critique capitalism and, by extension, capitalist natures. 
These in turn point to possibilities beyond oppositional critique, taken up 
by Sullivan in the following chapter, enlivening “both nonhuman natures 
and understandings of what it means to be human in intimate, moving and 
maintaining improvisations with other-than-human worlds.”
Notes
1. This usage is distinct from current usages referencing anthropogenic environ-
ments (Hughes 2005, 157–58), though all share Hegelian roots (see Schmidt 1971, 
42–43; Smith 2008, 19; and Jappe 1999, 20–31).
2. The logic of deadened nature for contemplation is lucidly set out by Timothy 
Luke in his discussion of the Nature Conservancy as the Nature Cemetery. “Nature 
is dead,” Luke (1999, 68) argues. “Material signs of its now dead substance need to be 
conserved as pristine preserved parts, like pressed leaves in a book, dried animal pelts 
in a drawer, or a loved one’s mortal remains in a tomb.”
3. For a detailed account of these transformations in North America, see Wilson 
(1993).
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4. To view this video, visit http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpAMbpQ8J7g, acces-
sed July 27, 2009. For the more adventurous there is of course the book by the same 
title (Žižek 2009).
5. For some time this aspect of parks was so underresearched that Jacoby (2001) 
described it as “the hidden history of American conservation” (also see Brockington and 
Igoe 2006). Since then the topic has gained more attention through a flurry of research, 
investigative journalism, and documentary films. For an overview of this extensive work 
I recommend Dowie (2009).
6. These ideas were a major inspiration for Society of the Spectacle (see note 1).
7. The enjoyment of pristine wilderness by millions of people was of course a par-
adoxical arrangement, as evidenced by “bear jams,” which happen when the supply of 
bears cannot meet the demand of photographers, resulting in hundreds of tourists con-
centrating around sparsely distributed animals. Parks in Tanzania experience the similar 
phenomenon of “lion jams,” and I imagine parks in India probably have “tiger jams.”
8. An alternative translation is “insdispensable embelishment” [sic], http://www 
.bopsecrets.org/SI/debord/, accessed July 26, 2012.
9. TEEB is a global initiative and an evolving array of calculative technologies 
dedicated to saving nature through its systematic valuation. See http://www.teebweb 
.org/HomeofTEEB/tabid/924/Default.aspx, accessed July 26, 2012.
10. ARIES is a web-based technology offered to users worldwide to assist in rapid 
ecosystem service assessment and valuation. See http://www.ariesonline.org/about/intro 
.html, accessed July 26, 2012.
11. See http://3blmedia.com/theCSRfeed/Earth-Day-2011-Celebrations-Times 
-Square-ReGreen-World, accessed July 27, 2012.
12. See especially http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_fwEwBdAM6U&feature= 
endscreen, https://www.arctichome.com/web/index.html, and http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=ACHqdkfmP4Q, all accessed July 27, 2012.
13. See especially “View from the Termite Mound” by Susanna Nordlund, http://
termitemoundview.blogspot.com/, accessed July 27, 2012.
14. The Facebook page of Endangered Species Chocolate currently features a 
photograph of four lion cubs. Clicking on this takes you to a comment from a “friend,” 
who states, “I officially want to adopt the four babies pictured here ♥ ♥ ♥ ♥ I know 
it’s not reasonable, but they’re just so stinkin cute!!!!!” The company responds, “We 
know the feeling! You can symbolically adopt them through African Wildlife Founda-
tion.” See http://www.facebook.com/EndangeredSpeciesChocolate and https://www 
.chocolatebar.com/categories.php?category=Gift-Collections percent2FAWF-Adoption 
-Collections, both accessed July 27, 2012.
15. For an example of a critical virtual community, see the Facebook page of Just 
Conservation, http://www.facebook.com/JustConservation, accessed July 15, 2012. 
For critical media, see Silence of the Pandas: What the WWF Isn’t Saying, http://www 
.youtube.com/watch?v=YSztqfLT3F0; Conservation’s Dirty Secrets, http://www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=pTVELt-pdGc; A Place without People, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=QrEmUjNhwyo; and the BBC’s Unnatural Histories, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
programmes/b011wd41, all accessed July 14, 2012.
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chapter ten
Nature on the Move III
(Re)countenancing an Animate Nature
Sian Sullivan
From the invisible atom to the celestial body lost in space, everything is 
movement. . . . It is the most apparent characteristic of life.
—étienne-jules marey, 1830–1904,  
cited in E. Oberzaucher and K. Grammer,  
“Everything Is Movement,” emphasis added
In the Oedipal relation the mother is also the earth, and incest is an 
infinite renaissance.
—g. deleuze and f. guattari, Anti-Oedipus
They lived firmly and wholly in the real world. Spiritual yearning and 
the sense of sacredness they knew, but they did not know anything holier 
than the world, and they did not seek a power greater than nature.
—ursula k. le guin, The Telling
To refract . . . To change direction as a result of entering a different 
medium. . . . To cause . . . to change direction as a result of entering a 
different medium.
—from wiktionary, the free dictionary
Coding Nature?
In the beginning, the primal Mother Tiamat was creator of the universe, 
heaven and earth, water, air, and plants. This female serpent emerged 
from the sea to teach humankind the arts of living well. Over time, a com-
plexified pantheon of gods and goddesses began to bear a curious resem-
blance to the egoic and heroic struggles of an emerging metropolitan elite. 
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But their transcendent and celebrated glamour was not without challenge. 
Threat came from their own laborers and from envious neighbors and 
other barbarians, not to mention the capricious dance of the elements, 
which brought drought, flood, and all manner of earthly chaos to chal-
lenge their elite order and control. It was clear to the ruling class that 
Tiamat needed disciplining. And so a young god killed Apsu, her favored 
consort, and then crowned himself king. With his wife, Damkina, he had 
a son named Marduk. This son was a murderer who was driven to crush 
all chthonic, chaotic threat to the growing Babylonian hierarchical order. 
He killed the genetrix Tiamat and from her split and dead body remade 
heaven and earth. From the blood of her murdered consort Kingu Marduk 
made humans to be slaves to the ruling-class gods, assistants in the latter’s 
pursuit of war, leisure, and pleasure. This complete revolution turned the 
generative cosmos into dead matter to be fashioned for use through the 
artisanal expertise and force of the ruling class. Standing astride the dead 
body of the genetrix, the gods assumed transcendence over and possession 
of their new objects of the cosmos. The rest, as they say, is history.1
Bram Büscher and James Igoe, in the first two chapters of this “triptych,” diag-
nose the contemporary moment as saturated with a dizzying range of com-
modified, financialized, and spectacularized “other-than-human natures.”2 
Many of these are new commodities designed to service a green-economy 
suturing of economic growth and environmental sustainability (see UNEP 
2011). This in part relies on market logic to solve the environmental harm 
caused through the failure of capitalist markets to adequately account for the 
costs of environmental degradation.3 Carbon credits, environmental options 
and futures, biodiversity derivatives, mitigation insurance, species credits, 
biodiversity offsets, and so on are among the plethora of actual and proposed 
entities populating the resultant new ecology of monetized and marketized 
nature (Sullivan 2012b, 2013b). They are made through particular abstrac-
tions, significations, and conceptual transformations of nonhuman nature 
to create a circulating commensurability of environmental health and harm 
that can be managed through the remote control of the market. And they 
become visible through lively marketized exchanges in which the “value” of 
nature, as the dollar signs and zeros and ones of digitized “natural capital,” 
becomes materialized (as described and discussed in Robertson 2006, 2012; 
Sullivan 2010b, 2012b, 2013a; Szersynski 2010; Pawliczek and Sullivan 
2011; Bracking 2012; Lohmann 2012; also see Plant 1998).
At the same time, these universalizing abstractions seem to amplify and 
even require a deadening of nature’s immanent and vivacious movement. 
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As Igoe (this volume) writes, “Making nature move first required making it 
sit still as an increasingly deadened object of contemplation.”4 The liquid, 
capitalized nature of which Büscher (this volume) speaks thus is simultane-
ously an abstracted, contemplated, and stilled nature legible to the extent 
that it can be packaged into units that can be calculated and traded, for 
“it is only when ‘nature’ is dead that a full-scale Nature™ Inc. becomes a 
possibility” (Arsel and Büscher 2012, 62). The commodity fetishism that 
animates capitalist circulation thus not only strips away the “incorporated 
creative life [of workers] toward equivalence within an exchange,” such that 
labor value is deflected toward “the account of capital” (Nancy 2001, 3).5 In 
the biopolitical subsumption of life itself, the “zombie-soul” (Holert 2012, 
4) “animating” the commodity form also makes productively exchangeable 
but deadened objects of life’s immanent vitality and diversity. The current 
reframing of a working nature as provider of discrete services (see Daily 
and Ellison 2002, 5) and as a bank of units of natural capital might thus be 
seen as an extension of “thanato-politics” and “necro-capitalism” (Banerjee 
2008) in the environmental sphere, even while claiming exactly the oppo-
site.6 Through these new myths of nature (Sullivan 2013c), “the soul of 
capital” is able to extend its vampiric subjugation of life in the juggernaut 
momentum of “value” production, economic growth, and corporate power 
(Crouch 2011).
Current socioecological accounting practices conceived as emphasiz-
ing the monetized “value” of nonhuman nature (Costanza et al. 1997; 
Sukhdev 2010), such as in ecosystem service science, carbon metrics, 
biodiversity offset metrics, “the TEEB approach,” REDD+ calculations 
and corporate ecosystem valuation (see, e.g., BBOP 2009, 2012; TEEB 
2010; WBCSD 2011; DEFRA 2012), thus are conceptualizing and con-
structing other-than-human natures such that they can be further entwined 
and entrained with transcendent monetary categories and measures (see 
Mac Kenzie and Millo 2003).7 These accounting practices attach monetary 
value to selected indices of nonhuman nature, and, notwithstanding the 
work of those in the CBD process to mobilize finance through enhancing 
regulatory mechanisms and fiscal reform, they are permitting the emer-
gence of new market exchanges in these measures.8 These practices per-
haps do relatively little to respond to and transform the underlying value 
practices tending toward problematic nature exploitation and commodity 
fetishism (see Kosoy and Corbera 2010). Instead, they rely on economic 
incentives that appeal to individual self-interest so as to alter behavior. As 
such, these monetizations continue the zeitgeist of (neo)liberal individ-
ualism and competitive entrepreneurialism with which exploitative and 
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dissociative socioenvironmental relations currently are linked. (For key 
proposals by significant corporate and financial “visionaries,” see Kiernan 
2009; Sandor 2012; Sukhdev 2012.) As MacDonald and Corson (2012, 
159) claim, the “endeavour to put an economic value on ecosystems makes 
nature legible by abstracting it from social and ecological contexts and mak-
ing it subject to, and productive of, new market devices.” In a Foucaultian 
sense, new nature valuation technologies act to intensify capital’s power 
effects (Nealon 2008; see also Sullivan 2013b), whereby all is subsumed to 
the “truth regime” and associated accumulations of “the market” (Foucault 
2008). The subsequent release of new nature values into the totalizing and 
biopolitical control of the smooth flows of capital associated with globalized 
markets thus intensifies capital’s power effects while also sustaining the sub-
suming dynamic of capital present since at least the European Enclosure 
Acts (Federici 2004).
In the process, new constitutions of material nature are brought forth, 
together with new means of its practical appropriation. The discursive and 
calculative technologies (see Callon and Muneisa 2005) that create and 
prime entities for marketized exchanges—from genetic plant resources 
under the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity to insurance 
derivatives on the Chicago Board Options Exchange—thus structure and 
shape the materiality of the things that thereby become traded, with effects 
on the ecosocial contexts from which they derive (MacKenzie and Millo 
2003; Brand and Görg 2008). At the same time, contemporary techno-
configurations of circulating commodified nature are amplifying an ecol-
ogy that resides in a radically disembedding and disembodying ontology. 
Through this, the fates of diverse rain forest assemblages are influenced 
and managed through the remote control of electronic exchanges;9 online 
cybersafaris of African savannas seemingly generate authoritative knowl-
edge of “the real thing”;10 and radical geographies of nonlocality become 
the basis of nature conservation through the marketized exchange of varied 
“conservation credits” between landowners and localities.11
These approaches to environmental management for conservation con-
stitute both recent innovations and intensified conceptual decouplings of 
culture from nature familiar in Europe since at least the Enlightenment, 
an era that itself is rooted in Renaissance interpretations of classical Greek 
philosophy (Merchant [1980] 1989). They are part and parcel of a broader 
series of epistemic shifts that can be traced to successive transformational 
moments in different cultural milieus, such as that summarized in the 
Babylonian story with which this chapter opens (also see Merchant [1980] 
1989; Roszak [1992] 2001). In the Western context, these approaches 
226 • Sian Sullivan
extend and entrench an older Occidental biblical creation hierarchy 
asserting “man’s” dominion over other creatures (Cohen 1986, 15) and 
the dominion of a singular God over all. As returned to in the postscript to 
this chapter, the associated transcendence or “set-apartness” of experience of 
the sacred is a related and relevant construct flowing from this monotheism. 
It corresponds with both a removal of “the sacred” from the immanent vital 
materialities of “nature” and an associated separation of leader-priests from 
followers through variously rigidified hierarchies that serve(d) political, 
economic, and technological inequities (Young 2011).
The phenomena described above invoke a significant paradox: that 
of the intensified lively circulation of new commodified digital units of 
nonhuman nature intended to signify the incorporation of environmental 
harms into productions of economic value (what Büscher in this volume 
calls “liquid nature”) and that of the simultaneous dependence of these 
lively representations and circulations on an amplified treatment of non-
human nature as distant, stilled, bounded, and mute object (see Ingold 
2006). A key effect of this, as Latour (2004) gestures toward in his Politics 
of Nature, is that human nature has been rendered increasingly deaf to a 
stilled and desacralized nonhuman nature that is its mirror (Weber [1904] 
2001; Curry 2008). Environmental philosopher Andrew Dobson (2010) 
elaborates the implications of this, noting an associated entrenching of 
an Aristotelian position that “Man” alone is a political animal, with non-
human nature rendered mute in political terms. Anselm Franke (2012b, 
12–13, emphasis added) thus invokes Indonesian narratives that tell of “the 
falling silent of the world under the burden of ‘primitive accumulation,’ of 
capitalist exploitation, and of colonial administration.” And so behind the 
contemporary proliferations and circulations of the fetishized abstractions 
of nonhuman nature described above is a deepened muting and deadening 
of the enunciative possibilities of nonhuman natures, accompanied by an 
intensified “tuning out,” as irrelevant and obstructive, of the communiqués 
of other(ed) culturenature ontologies.
This predicament, and its tendency toward inequity and a possibly global 
ecocidal moment, generates significant questions. What relationships and 
ontologies are strengthened through these contemporary constructions 
and circulations? What is demoted and negated? And what “gaps” remain 
for (re)embodying socioecological arrangements that are both differently 
democratic and nourishing of life’s alive diversity?
Deleuze and Guattari ([1972] 2004, 177–78), on whose work I draw 
throughout this chapter, refer to nature’s immanence as “the germen,” the 
original full and flowing body of the intense germinal and generative earth. 
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They argue that inhibition of the incest-like desire for possession of this full 
and flowing force has always required systemic cultural codifications. Thus, 
“in indigenous and other . . . rural communities of the world, one almost 
always finds institutions with rules that serve to limit short-term self-interest 
and promote long-term group interest” (Berkes 2008, 238). Indeed, for most 
of human history and cultural circumstances, the separating culture/nature 
assumptions described above seem to have been understood and refused as 
negative in their effects. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, the abstracting 
and fictionalizing impetus that enables state capitalism’s de- and recoding 
of the ecosocius has tended to be thoroughly resisted, prevented, and con-
tained (cf. Clastres [1974] 1989; and see the discussion in Melitopoulos and 
Lazzarato 2012b). They write, for example, that “the primitive machine 
is not ignorant of exchange, commerce, and industry; it exorcises them, 
localizes them, cordons them off, encastes them . . . so that the flows of 
exchange and the flows of production do not manage to break the codes in 
favor of their abstract or fictional quantities” (Deleuze and Guattari [1972] 
2004, 168; see also Polanyi 1944). Anthropologist Laura Rival (1996, 146) 
echoes this in writing of Huaoroni, Zaparo, Shuar, and Tukanoan nations 
of the Upper Marañón River of Peru that “they have constituted nomadic 
and autarkic enclaves fiercely refusing contact, trade, and exchange with 
powerful neighbours.” As such, the separation of market exchanges from 
ecosocial relations (as in the ideal of free-market economics) has been vari-
ously inhibited in part because this separation is known to break embodied 
ties of living community, ties that otherwise might be understood as binding 
all emplaced entities in moral and maintaining economies of connection, 
cooperation, and sharing (Bird-David 1992; Lewis 2008/9; Graeber 2011).12
In the modern era of industrialism, capitalism, and the controlling free-
dom of the market, human endeavor has seemingly become untethered 
from these codes. The effect has been a chimerical disembedding of human 
from nonhuman natures (Polanyi 1944; Latour 1993) and an unleashing 
of accumulated stocks into flows that escape prior societal codifications 
(Buchanan and Thoburn 2008, 25). In this reading, it is an intensified 
breaking of inhibiting codes that makes possible current value-accumulating 
circulations of newly commodified stocks and flows of abstracted nature 
and whose recoding as “natural capital” and “ecosystem services” assists this 
instrumentalization perfectly.
I seek, then, to destabilize and refract these deadening and disembodying 
assumptions by calling on ethnographic and historical records that clarify 
different possibilities for conceptualizing and enacting human-with-nature 
existence. I focus on varied animist ontologies from different geographical 
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and temporal contexts (see also Ingold 2006). Modernity’s “nature as mute 
and stilled object” is an empowered but particular cultural fetish (or “fac-
tish”; cf. Latour 2010b), permitting instrumentalizing abstractions that 
are proving problematic in their socioecological effects (see Latour 2004; 
Hornborg 2006). Nature’s conceptual pacification has been made possible 
precisely through denial and purification of the animist ontologies that 
both constitute modernity’s necessary Other and pose(d) danger to the 
transcendent coherence of modern (b)orders (Franke 2012b; cf. Douglas 
1966). As the Nobel Laureate and molecular biologist Jacques Monod 
wrote in the 1970s, science necessarily “subverts everyone of the mythical 
ontogenies upon which the animist tradition . . . has based morality” so as 
to establish “the objectivity principle” as the value that defines “objective 
knowledge itself” (1972, 160–64, quoted in Midgley [2004] 2011, 4). My 
intention instead is to refocus attention on the ecoethical effects that may 
be associated with bringing nature “back to life” via a reactivation of animist 
relational ontoepistemologies concerned with maintaining good relations 
between all entities/actants in each moment rather than conserving via 
capitalizing specific objectified and thus transcendent natures (cf. Harvey 
2005; Ingold 2006; Bird-David and Naveh 2008; Sullivan 2010a; Curry 
2011; Stengers 2012).
I hope to speak to Bruno Latour’s (2010a) call, in his recent “Compo-
sitionist Manifesto,” for movements beyond critique and toward curiosity 
and support for subversive everyday (re)compositions of human-with-nature 
ecologies. Latour encourages us to broach and brave, as well as to remem-
ber, a very different collection of concepts, concerns, and practices. In 
this vein, relevant work regarding diverse and (re)embodying insertions 
of nature and materiality in society is being productively conducted in a 
range of social science and humanities genres, including critical geography, 
science and technology studies, religious studies, feminism, environmental 
philosophy, political theory, and art (see, e.g., Castree and Braun 2001; 
Harvey 2005; Plumwood 2006; Curry 2008, 2011; Haraway 2008; Bennett 
2010; Coole and Frost 2010; Lorimer 2010, 2012; Panelli 2010; Yusoff 2012; 
and the contributions in the volume of e-flux edited by Franke [2012a]). 
But the possibilities are greater still for “enlivening” nonhuman realms 
and the ecosocius in ways that refract the deadening abstractions of Nature 
required for its financialized circulations. Anthropology and cross-cultural 
ethnographic work can offer much here by way of bringing into the frame 
markedly differently embodied culturenature ontologies and associated 
effects (see Descola and Pálsson 1996a; Ingold 2000, 2006, 2011; Posey 
2002; Hornborg 2006; Neves 2006, 2009b; Berkes 2008; Moeller 2010).
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I explore a few contributions here, all of which have a key common-
ality. This is of an amodern assumption of the alive sentience of “other- 
than-human natures” as animate and relational subjects rather than inani-
mate and atomised objects. An effect is to enliven both nonhuman natures 
and understandings of what it means to be human in intimate, moving and 
maintaining improvisations with other-than-human worlds. “Animism” is 
the term used to describe this orientation. This is a descriptor that enfolds 
Edward Tylor’s ([1871] 1913; see also Gilmore 1919) “mistaken primitives,” 
positioned prior to the attainment of Enlightenment rationality in his theory 
of religion, with postmodern “ecopagans” of the industrial West, for whom 
animism is a contemporary ecoethical “concern with knowing how to behave 
appropriately towards persons, not all of whom are human” (Harvey 2005, xi; 
see also Plows 1998; Letcher 2003; Harris 2008). As such, animism is both 
“a knowledge construct of the West” (Garuba 2012, 7) and a universalis-
ing term acknowledging a “primacy of relationality” (cf. Bird-David 1999; 
Ingold 2006) and a set of affirmative practices that “resist objectification” by 
privileging an expansionary intersubjectivity (Franke 2012b, 4, 7). Animist 
ontoepistemologies in varied circumstances seem to have tended toward 
ordinary praxes of living with ecoethical effects that enhance(d) ecocultural 
diversity and poetic meaning. As such, they are worthy of (re)countenancing.
Counter-Culturenature Ontologies
Countenance n. 5 bearing or expression that offers approval or sanc-
tion : moral support. v. to extend approval or toleration to : sanction.
—merriam-webster online dictionary
An established ethnographic literature destabilizes some of the seemingly 
intractable dichotomies and categories infusing the growth- and commodity- 
oriented political economies of modernity and postmodernity. In this, 
the culture/nature dualism and accompanying assumptions of either 
environmental determinism (over cultural activity) or a passive Nature as 
background to cultural dominion make way for “ethnoepistemologies” that 
challenge these modern ways of organizing what it is possible to know 
(Descola and Pálsson 1996a; Hornborg 2006). Key here are a plethora of 
possibilities in which humans are envisaged as sharing ontological social 
space with the beings that “Western human ontology” (see Glynos 2012) 
frames as “nonhuman.” This seems entwined with a sense that what exists 
is brought into being through ongoing participation in relationship by all 
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entities (Ingold 2006). Agency, while differentiated, thus is present every-
where, such that all activity is simultaneously imbued with a moral, if 
frequently ambiguous, dimension (Ingold 2000). Arguably, such different 
culturenature ontologies have actualized lively embodied ecologies that 
favor the maintenance of biological and other diversities. As such, they 
warrant engagement and “re-animation” (Ingold 2006, 19) even in contexts 
more attuned to modern technological and economic discourses regarding 
policy solutions in biodiversity conservation (and perhaps especially in such 
contexts).13 In what follows I draw on a selection of ethnographic studies 
to foreground elements of the animist socioecologies associated with sev-
eral contemporary and historical circumstances. These emphasize what 
seems to be an uncynical ontology that knows all dimensions of existence 
to embody and enact agency in interrelationship, as well as to be animated 
and alive with sacred and connective meaning. I return to the latter theme 
in the postscript that completes this chapter.
My first exploration is a 1992 article by anthropologist Nurit Bird-David, 
whose ethnographic work on “animism” has been critical for establishing 
key parameters in this subfield. In this early article she develops Marshall 
Sahlins’s (1974) conception of “the original affluent society” through consid-
ering so-called hunter-gatherer conceptions of the provisioning roles of other- 
than-human natures in such economies. Her ethnographies are of the 
Nayaka of South India (also see Bird-David and Naveh 2008), Batek of 
Malaysia, and Mbuti of Zaire. Their orientations to “nonhuman natures” 
are understood in terms of assuming “the environment” to give to humans 
in a profound “economy of sharing” that mediates human-with-human and 
nature-with-human provisioning. “Nonhuman” natures are “humanized” 
such that they are known as kin and as ancestral embodiments, as commu-
nicative agencies, and as friends. Landscape entities as well as nonhuman 
animal species are attributed with life and consciousness. An order of good-
ness, while at times ambivalent, in general is assumed. Such knowledges 
find expression in value practices oriented toward sung, spoken, and danced 
communication and multiway gift giving with nonhuman natures that are 
equivalently expressive. All of these situate human persons as agents con-
tinually doing their part to maintain a moral and dynamically generative 
socioecological order of trust that implicitly is assumed to be both abundant 
and good. This assumption of abundance and the associated “full-subject” 
(Glynos 2012, 2379) mitigates against a need for excessive consumption 
or hoarding of possessions.
Specific cultural innovations assist with the maintenance of this sense 
and assumption of abundance. Work by anthropologist Jerome Lewis (2008, 
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2008/9) with Mbendjele Yaka of Congo thus emphasizes the importance of 
appropriate sharing through the guiding concept of ekila. As Lewis (2008/9, 
13) states, “For Yaka, people should be successful in their activities because 
nature is abundant. If they are not, it is because they, or somebody else, has 
ruined their ekila by sharing inappropriately.” Significantly, “ekila regulates 
Yaka environmental relations by defining what constitutes proper sharing” 
(13). Ekila is ruined by an action such as not sharing hunted meat, being 
excessively successful and thus engendering envy, inappropriately sharing 
sexuality, or sharing laughter in such a way that the forest will not rejoice. 
By regulating potency through appropriate sharing, dynamic abundance 
is maintained for all. As Lewis writes, such culturenature ontologies and 
associated value practices have established a relationship with “resources” 
that has meant that Yaka people have “experienced the forest as a place 
of abundance for the entirety of their cultural memory” (13). This, again, 
is in rather stark contrast with modern discourses of resource scarcity and 
the associated competitive urgency to capture “values” in both extractive 
industry and conservation activity.14
Working in a different context again, anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros 
de Castro (2004) speaks of the similar multinatural “perspectivism” of cos-
mologies associated with peoples of the Amazon, a concept that currently 
is much celebrated by Bruno Latour (2004, 2010a). Viveiros de Castro 
posits perspectivism as the understanding that all beings share culture, 
kinship, and reciprocal relationships, their perspectives differing due to 
being seated in different bodily affects (or “natures”). Key aspects of this 
proposition are as follows: of an original culture that is disaggregated into 
different embodied perspectives; of all animals and plants being conceived 
as subjects/persons sharing a spirited hypostasis cloaked in different embod-
ied perspectives; and of all embodiments as sentient, alive, and able to act 
with intentionality. Ecological relations thus are social relations, with all 
persons able to share and exchange knowledge. Communication and even 
transformation between such different embodied perspectives is an intrinsic 
possibility. These perspectives are understood in contradistinction to the 
naturalism of modernity, which proposes a shared universal Nature from 
which human culture and Reason rise and become progressively separate 
(see the critique in Gray 2002). Indeed, science becomes scientific when 
the world is decluttered of intentionality (Viveiros de Castro interviewed 
in Melitopoulos and Lazzarato 2012a, 4), such that the life sciences, on 
which modern conservation policy depends, propose a radically emptied 
encounter with nonhuman life. The “Amerindian” conception instead is 
that, “having been people [in the mythological past] animals and other 
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species continue to be people behind their everyday appearance,” endowed 
with the soul or spirit that personifies them (Viveiros de Castro 2004, 467). 
As such, “nonhumans,” including ancestors and spirits, are attributed with 
“the capacities of conscious intentionality and social agency” (467). They 
are understood as subjects with empathically knowable and communicable 
subject positions that complexify possibilities for social and moral action.
Cognate culturenature orientations have been confirmed for me through 
ethnographic fieldwork since 1992 with people associated with the names 
Damara / ≠Nū Khoen and dwelling in northwest Namibia (also see Biesele 
1993; Lewis-Williams and Pearce 2004; Low 2008).15 I have written on this in 
the journal New Formations (Sullivan 2010a), and I reproduce some of that 
material here. This is a context where a rain shaman dances into trance and 
in this state of consciousness is able to climb a rope of light into a different 
but no less real world inhabited by the spirited beings that shape and form 
the life force(s) of daily embodied existence. Here he negotiates with the 
rain goddess |Nanus, seducing her to permit him to retrieve life-giving rain, 
which is then brought back with apparently real and celebrated effect (||Khu-
mub et al. 2007). In this context, people can shapeshift into lions and other 
animals and be witnessed doing so, iterating the “reality of becoming-animal, 
even though one does not in reality become animal” (Deleuze and Guat-
tari [1980] 1987, 273). Giant snakes, sometimes with antelope horns on 
their heads and quartz or lights in their foreheads, are known to roam the 
landscape, filling it with intense generative potency (Hoff 1997; Schmidt 
1998; Low and Sullivan forthcoming). Here the most all-knowing deity 
is an insect—the praying mantis—who capriciously shapeshifts into and 
shares kin relations with many other animals, thus iterating the dynamic 
ambiguity of life itself as a force to be moved with in ways that maintain, 
rather than still, this movement (personal field notes; Biesele 1993). And 
here illness is carried and caused by wind, smell, and energetic arrows, with 
healing accomplished by the manipulation and alignment of energetic 
forms called |gais so that they stand up straight in the body (Low 2008). 
Culturenature assemblages of potency thus enfold human and nonhuman 
domains into endlessly dynamic connectivities, establishing mysteriously 
mutable relationships between what Occidental ontologies know as different 
orders of being (Biesele 1993; Power and Watts 1997; Low 2008). All of these 
phenomena, spoken of in contemporary times, sit within and affirm an old 
and broad KhoeSa-n conceptual world that speaks suggestively through the 
layers of rock art imagery, which is enormously prolific in southern Africa.
My final example embraces a quite different cultural context and is 
detailed in a 1986 article by Esther Cohen called “Law, Folklore and Animal 
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Lore,” from which I will quote extensively.16 Cohen describes the practice 
of “the criminal prosecution and execution of animals” in both secular 
and ecclesiastical courts of Western Europe in the later Middle Ages and 
the early modern period. She draws on legal anthropology and associated 
cross-cultural methodologies to assist with understanding the mutual social 
obligations that normatively bind animals and humans in these trials. Ani-
mal trials are first mentioned during the thirteenth century in northern and 
eastern France, from where they spread to the Low Countries, Germany, 
and Italy. They are documented in court records from the thirteenth to the 
eighteenth century, “reaching their peak of frequency and geographical 
scope during the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” (Cohen 
1986, 17). In them, sentences “were passed and executed in properly con-
stituted courts of law by fully qualified magistrates, according to generally 
accepted laws,” at the same time as being “an integral part of customary 
law” and owing “their continued existence partially to popular traditions 
and influences” (10). They generally followed two distinct procedures, 
secular and ecclesiastical. Secular procedures, for example, were “used to 
penalize domestic beasts that had mortally injured a human being,” while 
ecclesiastical procedures were “employed to rid the population of natural 
pests that could not individually be punished” (10). Frequently, sentences 
were passed only after “ponderous debates and trials years long” (16). Here 
I provide some detail from a description of one of these proceedings, a 
trial of domestic animals in a secular court. My intention is to illustrate 
the seriousness with which nonhuman animals in these relatively recent 
European cases were attributed with subjectivity, intentionality, and per-
sonhood, leading to the animals’ treatment as legal persons in the processes 
surrounding their trial and sentencing. These trials “differed as little as 
possible from human trials,” usually involving appointment of an advocate 
for the defense of the accused nonhuman animal(s) (13).
Drawing on references from archival research, Cohen (1986, 10–11) 
writes:
In December 1457 the sow of Jehan Bailly of Savigny and her six piglets 
were caught in the act of killing the five-year-old Jehan Martin. All seven 
pigs were imprisoned for murder and brought to trial a month later before 
the seigneurial justice of Savigny. Besides the judge, the protocol recorded 
the presence at the trial of one lawyer (function unspecified), two prose-
cutors (one of them a lawyer and a councillor of the duke of Burgundy), 
eight witnesses by name, “and several other witnesses summoned and 
requested for this cause.” Though the owner was formally the defendant, 
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it is clear from the proceedings that he stood accused only of negligence 
and was in no danger of any personal punishment. Moreover he was 
allowed to argue in court “concerning the punishment and just execution 
that should be inflicted upon the said sow,” if he could give any reason 
why the sow should be spared. The owner having waived this right, the 
prosecutor requested a death sentence. The judge, having heard all the 
relevant testimony and consulted with wise men knowledgeable in local 
law, ruled, according to the custom of Burgundy, that the sow should be 
forfeit to the justice of Savigny for the purpose of hanging by her hind 
legs on a suitable tree. The piglets created a more difficult problem as 
there was no proof that they had actually bitten the child, though they 
were found bloodstained. They were therefore remanded to the custody 
of their owner, who was required to vouch for their future behaviour and 
produce them for trial, should new evidence come to light. When the 
latter refused to give such a guarantee, the piglets were declared forfeit 
to the local lord’s justice, though they suffered no further punishment. 
The court brought from Chalon-sur-Saône a professional hangman who 
carried out the execution according to the judge’s specific instructions.
Cohen (1986, 11) explains that “the case of the sow of Savigny is typical 
in many respects of most secular animal trials. In the first place, it was held 
in Burgundy, one of the earliest areas to record such cases.” In addition, “the 
defendant’s porcine nature also recurred in a great many trials. Pigs, who 
seem to have accounted for the deaths of many unattended infants, were the 
most common culprits, but such trials also occurred throughout this time 
for homicidal pigs, oxen, cows, horses and dogs” (11). What is particularly 
relevant here is that “the trial is typical in its painstaking insistence upon 
the observance of legal custom and proper judicial procedure. This was 
neither a vindictive lynching nor the extermination of a dangerous beast. 
Other records mention, in addition to pre-trial imprisonment, the granting 
of remissions to wrongly accused beasts, the burning in effigy of a ‘contu-
macious’ [i.e., willfully disobedient] animal, and the public display of an 
executed cow’s head” (11). Further, “where the hangman’s bills are extant, 
they closely resemble those presented for the execution of humans” (12).
In her analysis, Cohen (1986, 15) notes that “the very existence of ani-
mal trials in Europe poses severe problems for the historian of Western 
culture” because “the practice runs counter to all commonly accepted con-
ceptions of justice, humanity and the animal kingdom; and yet it survived 
and flourished for centuries.” She writes that it is apparent that there are 
no clear distinctions between these domains in “the minds of medieval 
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legists” (19). This is an ontological disposition that overlapped significantly 
with an emerging and elite modern rationalism regarding “the immutable 
categories of nature” and associated universal hierarchies (23–24), as well 
as with the radically different Cartesian notion that “animals are automata 
possessing neither sense nor feelings” (16).17 For the medieval and early 
modern mind, the difference between “man and beast” instead “was func-
tional, not causal: pigs or locusts who harmed man must alike stand trial in 
the interest of universal justice” (19). In parallel with the ethnographies of 
non-Western cultures discussed above, European animal trials thus seem 
to have “expressed a perception of law that held sway over the entire uni-
verse” for people who “viewed justice as a universal attribute, applicable 
to all nature” and in which “animals were neither insensate nor lacking in 
intent” (35–36).
In summary, these examples gesture toward an amodern “ontoepistemol-
ogy” generating experiences of and dealings with “nonhuman natures” that 
depart radically from those empowered in the modern era.18 They do more 
than simply suggest that nonhuman natures and objects are animate(d) 
actants producing effects and affects. Key additional themes emerge to stabi-
lize the grid of this amodern episteme. “Nonhuman” entities are understood 
to embody variously different perspectives in a shared moral community of 
“persons,” all of whom possess and enact intentionality that is communica-
ble and knowable. The “social character” of relations between humans and 
nonhumans tends toward multiway economies of gifts, exchanges, sharings, 
and transformations between all persons (see Sullivan 2009; Haber 2012) 
and to mitigate against a commodity economy based on the creation and 
production of disembedded, pacified things (Viveiros de Castro 2004, 481–
82). In addition, an array of “counterexistential” but actually commonplace 
experiences and ontological configurations permits transversal movements 
into other experiential domains populated by beings known and related with 
through millennia of dynamic biocultural concerns and desires.
Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987, 309) write that what is valued 
in this “amodernity” is the ability and skill to improvise well with “what 
already is musical in nature.”19 Ontologically, this seems quite distinct from 
a modern imaginary that fixes nature and nature knowledge through sur-
veys, measurements, maps, numerical models, and metrics (as discussed 
in Robertson 2012; Hannis and Sullivan 2012) and whose expert readers 
and constructors can be ordained to know their silenced constituents in 
advance (Castree 2006, 161). Improvising-with instead confers what Guat-
tari ([1989] 2000, 21) refers to as the “significance of human interventions” 
in a context of an always and potently communicative nonhuman world 
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that also is sentient and mind-full and asserts responsive agency. As Deleuze 
and Guattari ([1980] 1987, 258) state, “the plane of composition, the plane 
of Nature, is precisely for participations of this kind.”
Becoming-Animist?
People call the soil mineral matter, but some one hundred 
million bacteria, yeasts, molds, diatoms, and other microbes live 
in just one gram of ordinary topsoil. Far from being dead and 
inanimate, the soil is teeming with life. These microorganisms 
do not exist without reason. Each lives for a purpose, struggling, 
cooperating, and carrying on the cycles of nature.
—masanobu fukuoka, quoted in S. H. Buhner,  
The Lost Language of Plants
The disenchantment of the world is the extirpation of animism.
—t. adorno and m. horkheimer,  
Dialectic of Enlightenment
Today, it seems interesting to me to go back to what I would call 
an animist conception of subjectivity.
—félix guattari, quoted in A. Melitopoulos  
and M. Lazzarato, “Assemblages: Félix  
Guattari and Machinic Animism”
The understandings suggested in the previous section propose cogent 
“counterlogics” and praxes regarding nature/culture relationships that 
open the black box of mute nature proposed by modernity’s great divide 
(see Latour 2004), the circulating abstractions of which infuse the 
current conceptual and policy paradox of “green growth.” Such count-
er-culturenature ontologies may indeed be among the social forces that 
can be mobilized and affirmed today in (re)configuring, (re)composing, 
(re)embodying culturenature relationships that are enlivened in support 
of the flourishing of life’s diversity (Sullivan 2010b), thus curtailing the 
modernist project of severed relationships (Hornborg 2006). Animist moral 
economies propose conceptual and ecoethical space for the dynamic sus-
tenance of relationships between diverse entities, with all acting to play a 
part in this maintaining “sustainability” (Descola and Pálsson 1996a, 14; 
Harvey 2005; Bird-David and Naveh 2008; Schwartzman 2010, 322). It is 
this “power effect” that makes animist culturenature ontologies worthy of 
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engagement, given the Anthropocenic juncture at which collectively we 
find ourselves.
But it can be difficult to speak of such animist counterlogics and ontol-
ogies within academia and other modern institutional contexts. This is 
due both to the necessary systemic “epistemological purification” of such 
amodern knowledges for the consolidation of modern categories (Descola 
and Pálsson 1996a, 8) and to the mirror of falling prey to “‘archaic illusion,’ 
where moderns . . . nourish their fantasies about the primitive other, mys-
terious communications, mimetic contagions, spirits, enchanted nature, 
and so forth” (Franke 2012b, 21, after Taussig 1987). Anthropologists are 
specifically hampered by a charge that in speaking of animist culturenature 
counterlogics we might iterate a romantic and nostalgic construction of 
indigenous peoples as living in some sort of unreachable and ahistorical 
harmony with a spirited nature. Kuper (1993), for example, argues that 
such a romanticism, and a delineating of “indigenous peoples” and affec-
tive relationships with “the environment” more generally, effects a prob-
lematic “return of the native” in anthropology. He suggests that this echoes 
earlier colonial characterizations that served to denote and demote the 
“other” and that made possible the displacements and violences enabling 
the reconstitution of people and nature as labor and property.
There is a danger here, however, of throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater (Sullivan 2006a), by implying that it is only legitimate to under-
stand relationships between culture and nature from the perspective of the 
ontological bifurcation between them—via which “nature” can be peered 
at from the culture side of the fence, and any refraction of this divide, in 
terms of where subjectivity, agency, and intentionality might be located, 
becomes subject to dismissal. It also imputes a valorization of essentialized 
identities, as opposed to a curiosity regarding different culturenature praxes 
and their productive effects. In other words, it is not that the animist cul-
turenature conceptions, experiences, and value practices explored above 
are interesting because they might be those learned from indigenous peo-
ples (the European example from Cohen [1986] in any case destabilizes 
this pattern here). It is because the conceptions and praxes themselves 
might have effects that are relevant for coming to terms with being human 
in the Anthropocene, as well as for making choices regarding subjectivity 
that might be better calibrated with life’s diversity.20
Indeed, the current global socioecological cul-de-sac in which collec-
tively we find ourselves suggests that continued dismissal of such different 
culturenature ontologies is a luxury we can ill afford. As ecologist Richard 
Norgaard (2010) describes, in shoe-horning our understandings of nature 
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such that the only valid terms and concepts are contemplated, objectified, 
and monetary ones (whether metaphorical or as newly devised and trad-
able commodities), a foundational contraction of possibilities is occurring. 
Options for different socioecological praxes are being foreclosed, even as 
a new frontier for capital investment in nature conservation is composing 
new “socionature” and “world-ecology” possibilities.21
This, then, is a proposal for a positive and refracting dialectics (Rud-
dick 2008; Latour 2010a; Gibson-Graham 2011) that is inspired by ani-
mist ontoepistemologies so as “to undo the very ‘alienation’ that capitalist 
modernity induces” (Franke 2012b, 21). It is a proposal for engagements 
that mobilize knowledge of the cultural and historical particularities that 
have silenced “nonhuman nature” and diverse biocultural knowledges 
so as to resuscitate and affirm immanent “counterlogics” and praxes that 
might bring socionature arrangements “back to life.” Bennett (2010, 14) 
affirms that “the starting point of ethics is . . . the recognition of human 
participation in a shared, vital materiality” (see also Goldstein 2012). The 
culturenature ontologies of other(ed) cultural perspectives offer much for 
the guiding of such recognition. At the same time, their (re)countenancing 
requires both considerable decolonization of the orders of knowledge sus-
taining modernity and a turning to face the systemic violences with which 
these orders have been established and maintained. Nonetheless, and to 
invoke a hopeful Foucault ([1976] 1998), since the strategic relationships, 
practices, and discourses that become empowered also always contain their 
own “gaps”—their own possibilities for breakdown, subversion, and recon-
stitution—a corresponding potential exists for interventions that exploit 
these contradictions and ambivalences.
In moving from critique toward insertions that may refract and recon-
stitute, however, “we” also need to have something different to say. In 
the spirit of “ambitious naiveté” (Bennett 2010, 19), I hope here to have 
brought in some suggestions for ways in which culturenature relationships 
might be thought and practiced differently and thereby to have provided 
elements of something different to say and do.
Postscript: Ethical Gestures toward a  
Transcendental Immanence
The transcendental field is defined by a plane of immanence, 
and the plane of immanence by a life. . . . Transcendence is 
always a product of immanence.
—g. deleuze, Pure Immanence
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The world is holy! The soul is holy! The skin is holy!
The nose is holy! The tongue and cock and hand
and asshole holy!
Everything is holy! everybody’s holy! everywhere is
holy! . . .
Holy the supernatural extra brilliant intelligent
kindness of the soul!
—allen ginsberg, “Footnote to Howl”
Nature never became a toy to a wise spirit.
—ralph waldo emerson, Nature
Even the difference between transcendence and immanence 
seemed to be beyond them.
—bruno latour, On the Modern  
Cult of the Factish Gods
On closing this essay, I realized I had made an omission. I had overlooked 
making any gesture toward considering and locating “the sacred” and its 
significance in the animist culturenature ontologies engaged with above. 
This is curious, since my sense is that animist tendencies, with a healthy 
force of humor (Willerslev 2012), centralize the sacred in conceptions and 
constitutions of culturenature, with potent ecoethical effects. The sacred is 
everywhere present: as the soul connecting relational entities of different 
form (Buhner 2002; Harvey 2005); as a sanctioning of the gaps in knowing 
generated by the experience of mystery that thereby emerges (Wheeler 2010, 
44); and as the lived relationships via which each being in “the cosmic com-
munity of beings . . . is bred, grows, reproduces and dies” (Haber 2012, 5).22
Reflecting on why this omission occurred brings to mind a series of 
constraining and silencing trajectories. Of a millennia-old capture of the 
sacred by priestly castes tasked with mediating between a sanctified heav-
enly realm inhabited by a distant, individualized, and judging God and 
a populace of lesser mortals denied legitimate experience of “the divine” 
(Young 2011). Of the similarly transcendent expert knowledge and religious 
fervors (Wheeler 2010, 37) of priestly castes of scientists, entrepreneurs, 
and politicians whose choices are elevated in Man’s continuing dominion 
over Nature. And of a simultaneous historical and contemporary denial of 
sacred presence in the ordinary natures of everyday life, combined with the 
occlusion of commonsense knowledges and practices of those experienc-
ing as well as instrumentalizing this immanent presence (Federici 2004). 
Through this nexus of circumstances the sacred becomes set apart from the 
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earthly and fleshly germinative plane of immanence, such that participa-
tion in, and engagement with, earth and body are devalued. The sacred as 
transcendent experience has tended to be seen in contradistinction to the 
immanent sphere. A transcendent God is both beyond the limitations of 
the material universe and beyond knowing by nonspecialist humans, not 
to mention being intrinsically unavailable to creatures deemed made less 
closely in the image of Him.
But of course, this is not the only way in which the sacred might be 
conceived, as expressed by poets, mystics, shamans, and critics of all times 
and cultures. In his 1836 essay Nature, the North American poet and 
essayist Ralph Waldo Emerson destabilizes this sense of a transcendent 
sacred realm that is unknowable or unreachable without the mediation 
of empowered experts through an exposition that paradoxically became 
known as “Transcendentalism.” In this, “nature” is deemed poetically 
knowable by the most innocent of minds through the attunement of the 
senses between inner and outer worlds. He speaks of “an occult relation 
between man [sic] and the vegetable” in which “I am not alone and unac-
knowledged. They nod to me, and I to them” (Emerson [1836] 1985, 6). 
Emerson’s “Transcendentalism” affirms a pantheistic sacred immanence 
infused with an “ethical character” that “so penetrates the bone and marrow 
of nature, as to seem the end for which it was made” (28). The sacred, as 
transcendent and intuitive experience (Wheeler 2010, 37) and as entranced 
state of consciousness (cf. Sullivan 2006b; Fletcher 2007, and references 
therein), thus is immanent in a nature, the generation of which humans 
and other persons are part (Ingold 2006). Transcendent sacred experience 
is an ordinary possibility for the human by virtue of being a facet of nature’s 
immanence that can also know and open to the other aspects of nature’s 
diverse embodiment (Bateson and Bateson 2004, discussed in Wheeler 
2010). As Hepburn (1984, 184, quoted in Curry 2008, 64, emphasis added) 
states and as echoed later in the quote by Deleuze that opens this section, 
“there is no wholly-other paradise from which we are excluded: the only 
transcendence that can be real to us is an ‘immanent’ one.”
A sense of this commonality perhaps is present in the ethnographic 
examples above. Viveiros de Castro (2004, 464) describes an ontological 
“state of being where self and other interpenetrate, submerged in the same 
immanent, presubjective, preobjective milieu.” The hypostasis of embod-
ied difference thus is an all-pervasive, connecting, and communicative 
vitality—an ontological primacy of animacy, as Ingold (2006, 10) puts it. 
Arguably, the instrumentalizations of life and landscapes associated with 
monotheistic doctrine, Enlightenment thought, and the rise of modern 
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capitalism are effected in conjunction with the enforced denial and sys-
temic disruption of this embodied immanence (Weber [1904] 2001; Mer-
chant [1980] 1989; Federici 2004). This is a constraining gendered dynamic 
too, in that the subject position of Western transcendental/Enlightenment 
philosophy—the “Father-logos” that “claims to be the overall engenderer 
compared to mother-nature,” sets up “a transcendence corresponding to a 
monosexual code” (Irigaray 1997, 314). This “Law-making-God-the-Father” 
equates “to an absolute transcendence only insofar as it is appropriated to 
male identity,” in the meantime ensuring that “everything that is of the 
feminine gender is . . . less valued in this logic because it lacks any possi-
ble dimension of transcendence” (314). When this includes a feminized 
earth, the feminized values of the body and of the (indigenous) natural 
become discarded and violated (as documented in brutal detail in Mer-
chant [1980] 1989; Taussig 1987; and Federici 2004). This generates “the 
ecofeminist insight that there is a relationship between the subordination 
of women and the exploitation of nature” that is extended to indigenes, 
configured conceptually as similarly close to nature (Mellor 2000, 107). 
It is associated with a patriarchal circumstance in which “dominant men” 
are “above nature (transcendent),” while “women are seen as steeped in 
the natural world of the body (immanent)” (111; see also Sullivan 2011c). 
Mary Mellor (2000, 117) thus urges a conceptualization of “human envel-
opment in ‘nature’ as a material relation, an immanent materialism, that is 
the historical unfolding of the material reality of human embodiment and 
embeddedness within its ecological and biological context.”
But perhaps it is the experience of this material immanence as also a tran-
scendent experience of the animate embodied sacred that enhances ecoeth-
ical behaviors? This, then, is an affirmation of the ethical praxes that might 
be engendered by the notion of a “transcendental immanence,” arising both 
from the “transcendent experience” of the inviolable sacred as immanent or 
in-dwelling in all entities and relationships; and from the a priori possibility 
that such experience is part of the immanent “toolkit” of the embodied 
“human condition” (see Spinoza [1677] 1996). It is based on the proposition 
that when sensual and communicative vitality is known as shared by and 
pervading all entities, it arguably (and hopefully) becomes harder to make 
choices that violate socioecological integrity. As Bennett (2010, 14) iterates, 
“the ethical task at hand here is to cultivate the ability to discern nonhuman 
vitality, to become perceptually open to it.” In this vein, then, and in solidar-
ity with a growing number of authors (see Merchant [1980] 1989; Abram 
1996; Roszak [1992] 2001; Buhner 2002; Harvey 2005; Ingold 2006; Curry 
2011), a revitalized experience of living in embodied relationship with a 
242 • Sian Sullivan
communicative and animate nature is a necessity if current alienations and 
violences are to transmute into democratic and vivacious socioecological 
sustainabilities. With Allen Ginsberg in the provocative quote above, it is 
a reminder that everywhere, everything, and every body is holy and can be 
reimagined, experienced, and treated ethically as such.
Notes
When this chapter was first presented at the conference “Nature™ Inc.: Questioning the 
Market Panacea in Environmental Policy and Conservation,” it was accompanied by a 
short film, which can now be viewed online (http://siansullivan.net/talks-events/). This 
chapter is dedicated to the memory of Kadisen ||Khumub, rain-shaman of the Etosha 
Hai||om and road laborer for Etosha National Park, Namibia. In Vibrant Matter Jane 
Bennett (2010, 21) writes that “an actant never really acts alone”—that “agency always 
depends on the collaboration, cooperation, or interactive interference of many bodies 
and forces.” In the years that this piece has been gestating, I have been sustained by 
many such inspirations and frictions. My appreciation goes in particular to my partner, 
environmental philosopher Mike Hannis, and to friends, colleagues, and human and 
“other-than-human” collaborators in the Viva, Nature™ Inc., Movement Medicine, 
and Kings Hill communities. All errors remain mine alone.
1. This is my adaptation of the Sumerian creation myth of around 2000 BCE, later 
retold as the Babylonian story Enuma Elish. Summarized in Willis and Curry (2004) 
and Young (2011).
2. I use the terms “other-than-human nature(s)” and occasionally “nonhuman 
nature” and “more-than-human nature” when referring to organisms, entities, and 
contexts other than the modern commonsense understanding of the biological spe-
cies Homo sapiens. As highlighted in this chapter, however, these terms are already 
culturally embedded and constructed. For cultural contexts where the “nonhuman” is 
“personified” and there is a tendency toward the assumption of one humanity and many 
different embodied perspectives, these terms are problematic and even nonsensical. In 
the ontological domain of shamanic “perspectivism,” for example, there are no “non-
humans” (Viveiros de Castro 2004).
3. As framed, for example, by the EU- and UN-supported TEEB (The Economics 
of Ecosystems and Biodiversity) program, on which see Sukhdev (2010), and by the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP 2011). For critical engagement, see 
Büscher et al. (2012).
4. Note that this is a move that echoes the rise of the signifier of equilibrium in 
colonial ecology and the imperial tendency to view ecosystems of the “periphery” in 
terms of a definable and desirable climatic climax, with anything different to this classed 
as degradation through irrational (indigenous) use practices (see, e.g., Anker 2001; 
Sullivan and Rohde 2002).
5. Commodity fetishism emerges in Marx’s writings to clarify “the relationship 
between exchange value and use value as it is embodied in the commodity” (Holert 
Nature on the Move III • 243
2012, 4), whereby the value of an object is seen as residing in the thing itself in a manner 
that obscures and thus alienates the labor (and nonhuman life) from which it is made 
(Graeber 2011, 65). The systemic screening-out of materiality and labor relations from 
commodity production and consumption under capitalist commercialization creates a 
logic that endows commodities with something akin to a soul, wherein they appear to 
assume human powers and properties and thus act to satisfy wants. Marx (1975, 189, 
quoted in Nancy 2001, 4) derived his theory of commodity fetishism from interpre-
tations of the fetishistic abstractions of objects amongst noncapitalist societies at the 
colonial frontier, stating that “fantasy arising from desire deceives the fetish-worshipper 
into believing that an ‘inanimate object’ will give up its natural character in order to 
comply with his desires.” He extended this to the abstracted commodities and curren-
cies produced under capitalist relations of production, including money—hence “the 
magic of money” (quoted in Nancy 2001, 5). A corresponding attribution of agency to 
capital, capitalism, and markets has led Michael Taussig (1987) to speak of a “capitalist 
animism” (see discussion in Holert 2012; also Jones 2013). A “postcapitalist animism” 
(Holert 2012) instead might note that a modern removal of subjectivity and intention-
ality from nonhuman entities was itself an historically embedded discursive move that 
facilitated the creation of a scientifically knowable, exploitable, and tradable world of 
objects. Marx’s ([1853] 1962) understanding of “primitive” fetishistic practices and 
“the brutalising worship of nature” derives from this context. While foregrounding the 
“truths” that are screened out by the activities of commodities and capitalisms, it is 
worth noting, then, that the concept of “commodity fetishism” is steeped in particular 
understandings of the “fetish” as a component of “primitive” and animist thought and 
is associated with a broader modern dismissal of amodern animist ontologies as “sav-
age” and irrational. This chapter seeks in part to reclaim amodern animist ontologies 
from such dismissals, noting that in any case the apparently exterior “matters of fact” 
and commodity objects of the modern are themselves fetishized “factishes,” as Latour 
(2010b) puts it—brought into being through human work but charged with acting 
from a distance as exteriorized facts animated technically and socially with authorita-
tive, objective power. We may never have been modern, because we are all fetishists, 
endowing the materialities we create and with which we are embedded the powers to 
shape our actions, choices, and affects.
6. See the Bank of Natural Capital website established by TEEB at http://bankof 
naturalcapital.com/.
7. REDD+ refers to the United Nations program for Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation in Developing Countries (http://www.un-redd.org).
8. I have observed the immense work to raise sources of finance for biodiversity 
conservation by policymakers associated with the UN Convention on Biodiversity 
(CBD) through being an invited participant in meetings held by the UN Secretariat of 
CBD and partners on “Scaling Up Biodiversity Finance” (in Quito, Ecuador, March 
2012, http://www.cbd.int/financial/quitoseminar/) and “Ecology and Economy for a 
Sustainable Society” (in Trondheim, Norway, May 2013, http://www.dirnat.no/tk13/).
9. As, for example, in the binding of distant localities to financialized trade in carbon 
and associated option and futures exchanges, as well as in weather derivatives and 
various environmental futures and derivatives (see the emissions trading page of the 
Intercontinental Exchange [ICE], https://www.theice.com/emissions.jhtml, and dis-
cussion in Böhm and Dabhi 2009; Cooper 2010; Randalls 2010; and Lohmann 2012).
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10. See, for example, WildEarth™ at http://www.wildearth.tv/, accessed October 23, 
2011.
11. For examples of such environmental conservation markets, see Carroll, Fox, 
and Bayon (2008) and Briggs, Hill, and Gillespie (2009); for discussion, see Robertson 
(2004, 2006); Morris (2006); Robertson and Hayden (2008); Pawliczek and Sullivan 
(2011).
12. In invoking “place” and “emplacement” here, I follow Ingold’s (2005, 507) con-
ception that “places are not static nodes but are constituted in movement,” in comings 
and goings and through embodied actions and perceptions, all of which necessitate 
movement in conjunction with an always moving milieu of nonhuman presences (see 
also Abram 1996, 65). This is not to say, of course, that times of disagreement, blood-
shed, and warfare do not occur in these circumstances (see Rival 1996).
13. On bringing diverse biocultural and spiritual values into modern conservation 
praxis, see the special issue of the Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture 
titled “Indigenous Nature Reverence and Nature Conservation,” introduced and edited 
by Snodgrass and Tiedje (2008), and the Biocultural Community Protocol Toolkit at 
http://www.community-protocols.org/toolkit, accessed April 24, 2012.
14. This competitive urgency to capture “values” in both extractive industry and 
conservation activity is also increasingly compounded by a global movement in which 
the offsetting of impacts from the former may enhance the scarcity and financializable 
“value” of the latter (e.g., see Seagle 2012; Sullivan 2013a).
15. The symbols used here reflect the standard orthography for KhoeSa-n languages 
used to denote click consonants.
16. Thank you to Martin Pedersen for drawing my attention to this paper.
17. In Discourse 5 of René Descartes’s Discourse on Method ([1637] 1968, 75–76), 
he writes of animals that “they do not have a mind, and . . . it is nature which acts in 
them according to the disposition of their organs, as one sees that a clock, which is made 
up of only wheels and springs, can count the hours and measure time more exactly than 
we can with all our art.” Other authors argue against the thesis that Descartes considered 
animals to be incapable of feeling while affirming his insistence on animals as automata, 
possessing neither thought nor self-consciousness (Harrison 1992, 219–20). It is telling 
that the emerging Cartesian vivisectionists “felt compelled to sever the vocal chords of 
the dogs whose living anatomy they explored,” thus performing “their modernist task” 
only after having literally silenced their subjects in the endeavor of transforming them 
into objects of study (Hornborg 2006, 24).
18. By amodern “ontoepistemology” I mean reasoned knowledge flowing from par-
ticular cultural and historically situated assumptions regarding the nature of reality and 
the methods through which, given these assumptions, it is possible to know this. I derive 
the term “ontoepistemology” from Jones (1999). On the connected understanding of 
episteme as the cultural and historical fabric that shapes and determines what it is possi-
ble to know, see Foucault ([1966] 1970). Foucault uses the term “episteme” to describe 
the assumed or a priori knowledge of reality—the knowledge that is taken as given—that 
infuses and permits sense making to occur in all discursive interactions flowing from 
and reinforcing a historical period or epoch. This is similar to an understanding of 
“culture” as the shared norms and values that infuse and produce community in all 
spheres of praxis and language. An episteme thus guides and influences the social 
production of discourses—or empowered knowledge frames—that at the same time 
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iteratively reproduce what epistemologically is, and becomes, shared as self-evident 
about the nature of reality.
19. For more on improvisation as a dynamically sustaining praxis, see Gilbert (2004) 
and the edited volume by Ingold and Hallam (2007).
20. Compare Guattari’s ([1989] 2000, 19–20) differentiated and multiplicitous “eco-
sophy” as “an ethico-political articulation” between the three ecological registers of 
“the environment, social relations and human subjectivity” that reimbeds relationships 
between interior (subjective) and exterior (social and environmental) potencies.
21. The term “socionature” is borrowed from Swyngedouw (1999), and “world- 
ecology” is from Moore (2010). It seems hard to find a term in English that unclum-
sily expresses connectivity between human and “other-than-human” worlds. It seems 
important to do so, however, so as to keep affirming connections and correspondences 
between these worlds. After all, no individuals of any species, including our own, are 
actually able to exist in a state of disentanglement from other species (see Ingold 2010).
22. The current government of Bolivia has integrated a conception of sacred 
within its legal framework for buen vivir (living well), as in chapter 2, article 4(2) of the 
“Framework Law of Mother Earth and Integral Development for Living Well,” which 
states that “the environmental functions and natural processes of the components and 




The Limits of Nature™ Inc.  
and the Search for Vital 
Alternatives
Wolfram Dressler, Bram Büscher, and Robert Fletcher
This book began with the suggestion that “nature trademarked incorpo-
rated” stands as an apt metaphor for conservation in our times. The premise 
argued that in the neoliberal age, new frontiers of environmental conser-
vation have become inextricably bound, defined, invested, and reinvented 
in terms of the interrelated dynamics of commodification, competition, 
financialization, and market disciplining that were less dominant in earlier 
management regimes. As a concept and reality, Nature™ Inc. has set out 
to define and condition not only the design and substance of conservation 
planning and practice but also the fundamental values, beliefs, and assump-
tions that underlie a range of conservation frameworks and practices across 
different scales and, in the process, has “refurbished” the sociocultural 
dynamics, livelihoods, and landscapes that support the prevailing economic 
system (and the ecologies underpinning this system).
As each chapter reveals, the enactment of the concept has shown how 
social and cultural relations embedded in land and lifeways become hol-
lowed out and refurbished within and through market mechanisms aiming 
“to transcend the conservation of particular in situ natural resources to 
allow for the abstraction and circulation of ‘natural capital’ through the 
global economy,” as described in the introduction. The outcomes of this 
process have had profound discursive and material reach and impact, 
strongly influencing perceptions and representations of human relations 
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with nonhuman natures. As noted in the introduction, with so much at 
stake, it remains critical to continue to investigate how neoliberal conser-
vation actively reshapes human-nature relations in the context of several 
centuries of capitalist development.
While acknowledging the need to keep problematizing the neoliberal 
order in the face of its increased promotion in global environmental gov-
ernance arenas, however, we agree with a growing chorus of thinkers, prac-
titioners, and activists that it is necessary to also promote serious discussion 
of alternative forms of (re)production and ways of being that go beyond 
Nature™ Inc. in all its proliferating forms. This entails, first, moving the 
debate on the politics and political economy of conservation forward by 
outlining and encouraging new theoretical perspectives on the process; 
and second, reflecting on and informing empirical practice directed toward 
non- and/or postcapitalist spaces and possibilities (Gibson-Graham 2006; 
Gibson-Graham, Cameron, and Healy 2013). The two aims are of course 
bound together and cannot be treated adequately in a short concluding 
chapter. This is not our aim. Rather, we build on the book’s content by 
outlining what we believe are key themes, issues, directions, and initiatives 
involved in starting to move discussions and practices beyond neoliberalism 
in pursuit of what we and the editors of the series this book is part of call 
“Vital Alternatives.”
We begin by recapping some of the key issues raised in the preceding 
chapters, contending that what our critiques and analyses add up to, essen-
tially, is the recognition that there are indeed clear limits to the capacity of 
a neoliberal approach to effectively commodify biodiversity conservation. 
This grounds our call for consideration of Vital Alternatives, where we 
outline a variety of emerging perspectives and possibilities that may help us 
to transcend Nature™ Inc. in pursuit of a world beyond the impoverished 
(and impoverishing) promises of neoliberal capitalism. We conclude by 
outlining a brief manifesto for the new book series of which this volume is 
the first installment. In this sense, both the present volume and the over-
arching series function as a broader call for new discussions and practices 
involving conservation and human-nature relations as we move deeper into 
the twenty-first century.
The Limits of Nature™ Inc.
As the chapters in this volume reveal, neoliberal conservation is highly 
problematic for a number of reasons that for the sake of brevity can be 
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summarized under material and discursive dimensions. Materially, a neolib-
eral approach to environmental governance commonly contributes to eco-
nomic and other inequalities due to its propensity to redistribute “upward” 
rather than “downward” (Dressler 2009; McAfee 2012a, 2012b). At the same 
time, neoliberalism’s reliance on economic growth means that it necessi-
tates environmentally destructive dynamics and activities, thus often forcing 
into opposition the very conservation and development concerns it ostensi-
bly seeks to reconcile (Fletcher 2012c). In addition, provision of economic 
incentives to encourage conservation can backfire when those incentives 
are meager or unevenly distributed. Hence, West (2006, 185) highlights a 
situation in which disagreement concerning ownership of a particular tree 
housing a harpy eagle valued by foreign conservationists led to one disputant 
chopping down the tree, cautioning that a market approach “may well lead 
to environmental destruction instead of environmental conservation.” At 
the same time, the failure to develop tourist markets for women’s crafts was 
“making them hostile to the practice of ‘conservation’” (207).
Moreover, an incentive-based approach has difficulty countering large-
scale activities such as mining and logging since such activities are already 
highly profitable and their opportunity costs often preclusive, given the 
limited resources market-based conservation mechanisms are able to mar-
shal (Fletcher 2012c). Relatedly, in other instances, resource extraction 
and market-based conservation (e.g., ecotourism) are increasingly drawn 
together as associated interventions, where the latter are supposed to (but 
in practice often do not) offset negative externalities and so reinforce the 
growth potential of the former (Büscher and Davidov 2013). Finally, it is 
questionable to what extent common faith in the potential of undiscovered 
commodities for which sustainable local markets can be developed (e.g., 
via bioprospecting; see Neimark 2012) is in fact realistic.
In terms of discursive dimensions, neoliberal conservation’s reduction of 
a highly complex “nature” to single-dimensional “natural capital” evinces a 
striking “cultural poverty” (Sullivan 2009), foreclosing the far different means 
of valuing “natural resources” found beyond the realm of monetary exchange 
value (Singh 2013; Sullivan, this volume). Likewise, neoliberal conserva-
tion’s characteristic promotion of successful “win-win-win” outcomes in 
the interest of satisfying donor and business partner expectations frequently 
conceals the contradictions and discrepancies operating beneath this rhetoric 
(Büscher et al. 2012; Fletcher, this volume; Lohmann, this volume). Further, 
virtual “nature” encounters and creative consumption encouraged by celeb-
rities and business-centered conservation (e.g., buying a Happy Meal to help 
endangered species) functions as a form of commodity fetishism obscuring 
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the often-dubious results of such strategies in practice (West 2006, 2010; Igoe 
2010, 2013a; Igoe, Neves, and Brockington 2010; Brockington, this volume).
Obviously, these two dimensions of neoliberal conservation’s problematic 
nature are only schematically presented and cannot be treated adequately 
in several short paragraphs. To do them justice would entail repeating the 
theoretical connections, ethnographic relations, and analytical linkages 
(re)established and presented by the contributors of this volume in response 
to the common neoliberal practice to “actively obscure” the social, cultural, 
and political connections that give societal and ecological diversity its sub-
stance, depth, and vibrancy—the basis from which alternatives may emerge 
as solutions (Duggan 2012). Indeed, the chapters were written against and 
in the face of neoliberal “master terms and categories” that “do not simply 
describe the ‘real’ world but rather provide only one way of understanding 
and organizing collective life . . . hiding stark inequalities of wealth and 
power and of class, race, gender and sexuality” (5).
As the consolidation of neoliberal conservation, Nature™ Inc. yields the 
same logic to organize and structure ideals, beliefs, and actions of transna-
tional capitalist elites, practitioners, and resource users to retain more with 
less, but usually at the expense of the majority who are excluded from these 
relations (Sklair 2001). The main message here is that the homogenizing 
tendencies of Nature™ Inc. emerge from the simultaneous disciplining of 
beliefs and ideals and the intensification of actions and output, effectively 
narrowing fields of vision and production in line with restrictive means and 
ends. This stems from the broader governance structures and technologies 
of control—payments for ecosystem services, carbon monitoring, etc.—
that intersect and strengthen preexisting capitalist relations of production, 
exchange, and consolidation of resource commodities, whether tangible 
or intangible (e.g., carbon trading intersecting with “boom crop” produc-
tion). Indeed, the diverse theoretical and empirical case evidence that the 
chapters of this book bring to bear on the above exemplifies the ubiquitous 
discursive and material impact of neoliberalism in even the remotest of 
frontiers—that is, the ways in which both neoliberal economics and gover-
nance work within and through society to discipline and streamline thought 
and action among citizens (see, among others, the chapters by Matose, 
Wilshusen, Dressler, MacDonald and Corson, and Sullivan).
The extent and scope of such issues suggests that there are clear and 
immanent limits to the efficacy of Nature™ Inc. to achieve conservation 
on a significant scale. This is a conclusion to which several recent analyses 
are beginning to point (Arsel and Büscher 2012; Wilshusen, this volume; 
Fletcher, this volume; McAfee 2012a, 2012b). It is in line with Peck’s 
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(2010, xiii) overarching assessment that neoliberal policies in general tend 
to evince limited efficacy in practice, functioning instead as “repeated, 
prosaic, and often botched efforts to fix markets, to build quasi-markets, 
and to repair market failure.”
If this assessment is correct—and we believe it is—then it becomes all 
the more urgent to challenge the continued hegemony of Nature™ Inc. 
and open space for the vision and practice of more equitable and effica-
cious approaches to managing human-nonhuman relations. This is central 
to the search for Vital Alternatives, intended to be understood in two inter-
related senses: (1) to designate the urgent necessity of developing viable 
alternatives to the current neoliberal order, particularly in the face of the 
growing environmental/economic crisis (Büscher and Arsel 2012; Fletcher 
and others, this volume); and (2) to emphasize that these alternatives must 
be founded on a more expansive understanding of the value and politics 
of life, both human and nonhuman, than capitalist economic rationality 
affords (Gibson-Graham 2006; Igoe, this volume; Sullivan, this volume).
Insofar as the contributors to this volume critically engage neoliberal 
conservation and other market-based governance processes, some offer tan-
gible examples of practices falling to some degree outside these bounds. Yet 
few of us provide truly new or Vital Alternatives to Nature™ Inc.’s tendency 
to control, hollow out, and impoverish socioecological systems. As such, 
we further our discussion, analysis, and conclusion toward tangible steps 
in this direction, paralleling Hall, Massey, and Rustin’s (2013, 18) Kilburn 
Manifesto After Neoliberalism, in which they argue that “the neoliberal 
order itself needs to be called into question, and radical alternatives to its 
foundational assumptions put forward for discussion. Our analysis suggests 
that this is a moment for changing the terms of debate, reformulating posi-
tions, taking the longer view, making a leap.”
What, then, are some of the parameters for this leap with respect to neo-
liberal conservation? We outline below a variety of emerging approaches 
to addressing this question, along with others that we feel hold potential 
for future elaboration.
Vital Alternatives
Discussions about alternatives to capitalism are, of course, long-standing, 
including those that focus specifically on the environment. As we cannot 
do justice to these discussions here, we aim to simply give some exam-
ples of work we believe may specifically help to go “beyond neoliberal 
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conservation.” To explore “vital alternatives,” after all, is to keep discussions, 
visions, and vistas of other, noncapitalist ways of being, seeing, and con-
serving alive and “vivacious” while at the same time showing their crucial 
importance. In doing so it matters less—for the moment—whether we 
fully agree with each of the alternatives we discuss, though it obviously 
remains vital to also continue scrutinizing and critically debating any pro-
posed alternative. By simply giving an overview and acknowledging the 
importance of some discussions, we want to show that these are indeed 
vital, as in “lively,” and that they deserve to be built upon—critically and 
constructively—in future work in this series and beyond.
A good starting point for discussions of “postcapitalism” is the work by 
Gibson-Graham (2006), including recent writing by Gibson-Graham, 
Cameron, and Healy (2013), in which they argue that we must “take back 
the economy.” The authors suggest that this involves sustained “revisionist 
thinking” and action that can create alternative spaces within which to 
first buffer and then reverse the destructive nature of neoliberal practices. 
While these and other authors acknowledge that the neoliberal economy 
is one made up of decisions and choices that become normative com-
mon sense, they note that, despite this, it continues to be based on fallible 
human discourse and action that can be challenged and transformed. In 
other words, there is nothing inevitable about the long-term presence and 
impact of neoliberalism (see also Hall, Massey, and Rustin 2013). New 
and important perspectives are thus emerging not only to critically engage 
neoliberalism in advocacy writing but also to inform action in terms of 
ethical practice, the equitable distribution of surplus, and respectful and 
conscientious relations and consumption, as well as invest in protecting 
and/or revitalizing the commons (Gibson-Graham 2006; Gibson-Graham, 
Cameron, and Healy 2013; Wolff 2012).
Other work takes a more geographical turn in tackling capitalism’s struc-
tural features and ingrained modes of power and being. David Harvey’s 
Spaces of Hope (2000) is a good example, while Neil Smith’s (2008) work 
has led to a flurry of analyses trying to understand how we could “produce” 
nature and space differently. Yet others explore how we can subvert and 
change “high-technology capitalism” to make space for “communications 
commons” focused on the “public financing of a multiplicity of decentral-
ized but collectively or cooperatively operated media outlets, licensed on 
the basis of commitment to encouraging participatory involvement in all 
levels of their activity” (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 204, and see esp. chap. 7).
When these (and other) alternatives to capitalism are extended to alter-
natives to neoliberal conservation, one can take further inspiration from 
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the many debates that explicitly link capitalism and ecology. These, too, 
are very diverse and range from radical Marxist socialism (Williams 2010; 
Magdoff and Bellamy Foster 2011), strategies for economic “degrowth” 
(Kallis 2011), anarchist geographies (Springer et al. 2012), and less radical 
“steady state economics” (Dietz and O’Neill 2013; Czech 2013) to “biore-
gional” economies (Scott Cato 2012). Moreover, there are calls for “living 
with” biodiversity (Turnhout et al. 2013) and emphases on affective hope 
and ways of relating with nonhumans that are different from the destructive 
capitalist ratio (Sullivan, this volume; Singh 2013). Allied with this are 
growing calls for legitimation of nondualist ontologies that, for example, 
adopt the perspective of “dwelling” (Ingold 2000) or embodiment (Valera 
1992), or the increased attention devoted to Amazonian cosmovisions, 
among many others (Descola 2005; Viveiros de Castro 1998, 2004). These 
approaches work best in particular contexts, reflecting the unique natures 
and diversity in which they are immersed, but when appropriately linked, 
in concept and action, they offer tangible and inspiring alternatives to 
Nature™ Inc. We do not consider these clear or straightforward alternatives, 
for blueprints for action do not exist and indeed go against the needed diver-
sity of democratic and socially just conservation spaces that we envision.
Toward a Research and Practice Agenda around  
Vital Alternatives
Overall, critical inquiry in the social sciences—spanning disciplines from 
anthropology to pedagogy—has perhaps a greater responsibility than ever 
before to move critique into vision and action by allying itself with move-
ments, collectives, and interventions both “on the ground” and “in the 
mind”—the means by which diversity might (re)sustain and reinvigorate 
itself (against homogenizing tendencies) and so create spaces for Vital 
Alternatives. Movements throughout the “global South,” particularly in 
South and Central America, have fused critical intellectual thought and 
writing with creative resistance in order to forge relatively autonomous 
spaces for thinking and acting out against the “burden of neoliberalism” 
(see, e.g., Arsel 2012; Arsel and Angel 2012; Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012). 
As Osterweil (2004, 8) describes, “asserting and creating . . . other ways of 
being in the world, these movements rob capital [or the state] of its monop-
oly and singular definition of time, space and value” and simultaneously 
help to “furnish new tools to address the complex set of problematic power 
relations” that confront and define the everyday realities and thus social 
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and ecological existence of both conservationists and the rural poor. At 
their best, these movements reveal and produce “landscape[s] of radical 
heterogeneity populated by an array of capitalist and non-capitalist enter-
prises; market, non-market, and ‘altermarket’ transactions; paid, unpaid, 
and alternatively compensated labor; and various forms of finance and 
property—a diverse economy in place” (Gibson-Graham 2011, 2).
The new book series of which this volume is the initial installment seeks 
to contribute to this broader project, taking as its central theme critical 
green engagements, with specific attention to and articulation of Vital 
Alternatives to the growing green economy paradigm. The editors and 
authors contributing to this volume have sought to critically engage the 
theory, concept, and practice of neoliberal conservation not simply for the 
purpose of problematizing Nature™ Inc. but to illuminate spaces within 
which new debates and actions can proceed to help move conservation 
back to investing in the fundamentals of a robust, equitable society—one 
that lives with and respects social groupings and ecosystems in all their 
depth, diversity, and difference (Dressler et al. 2010).
In conclusion, we hope that this brief outline will help to direct future 
inquiry into Nature™ Inc. and its alternatives toward engagement with the 
following questions, among others: What initiatives, existing in the inter-
stices of the current neoliberal order, effectively challenge or subvert this 
order? How might such initiatives be scaled up in the future? How can they 
provide productive models for innovative efforts elsewhere? How might 
new possibilities beyond current practice be conceptualized? What novel 
theoretical frameworks, or rearticulations of older ones, might offer inspi-
ration for such efforts? How might theory and practice be combined into a 
productive new praxis? How, finally, might all of this be brought together 
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